tai lieu tham khao tam ly hoc khac biet

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the important role of individual
difference factors in the experience of emotion. We begin by describing several
commonalties across two major approaches to the study of emotion, namely, the
neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives. Both approaches provide some degree of
support for the role of individual differences and cognitive factors in the experience of
emotion. This paper builds on these commonalities by reviewing personality and
psychopathology findings that indicate the contribution of both positive and negative
personality characteristics (e.g., extraversion, optimism vs. neuroticism, trait anxiety) to
the types of cognitive appraisals and emotional responses exhibited by different
individuals. A self-schema model of emotion is presented as a means of integrating more
fully this individual differences perspective with a theory of emotion. In this model, selfschema content provides the basis for individual differences in underlying core themes
and self-evaluative beliefs. The model describes how self-schema content distinctions
across individuals may have a differential impact on the initial processing of an event,
evaluation of this event with respect to the self, and emotional and behavioral output.
Several examples are then presented to illustrate the increased predictability afforded by
this individual differences-based self-schema model of emotion. The application of this
model to treatment and prevention issues in clinical and health psychology is also briefly
considered. Finally, the model is integrated with other theoretical perspectives on
emotion by describing a number of additional research and theoretical implications.
Emphasis is placed on the need for further clarification of both cognitive and emotional
components of an individual differences perspective on the study of emotions. © 1997
Elsevier Science Ltd THE PAST decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the study
of emotions. A wide variety of theoretical perspectives have been advanced, ranging
from neuropsychological approaches to cognitive-based theories of emotion (Izard,
1993; Parkinson, 1997). At the neuropsychological level, researchers have typically
attempted to identify various brain systems that may mediate the experience of
emotions. As one illustration, it has been proposed by several investigators that the two
hemispheres of the Authorship is equal. Correspondence should be addressed to Kathy
A. Winter, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario,
Canada N6A 5C2. 791 792 K. A. Winter and ;\: A. Kuiper brain are differentially related to
emotion. Activation of the left frontal region is thought to be associated with positive

affect or approach-related emotions, whereas activation of the right frontal region of the
brain is associated with negative affect or withdrawal related emotions (Davidson, 1993;
Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992). Congruent with this proposal, it has been found that righthemisphere arousal and vigilance mechanisms are particularly sensitive to increased
levels of negative affect (such as depression), resulting in impaired functioning (Liotti &
Tucker, 1992). In a somewhat different vein, other neuropsychological investigators have
focused on mapping out the biologically based motivational systems that may underlie
different behaviors and emotions. A prime illustration is provided by Gray's (1990)
neuropsychological model for the control of emotional behavior. In his model, Gray has
identified three fundamental neurologically based emotion systems, namely, the
behavioral approach system (BAS), the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), and the
fight/flight system (F/FL S). The behavioral approach system regulates the individual's
behavior in the presence of signals of reward, producing positive emotions and filrther
approach behaviors. The behavioral inhibition system regulates behaviors in the
presence of signals of punishment, leading to increases in anxiety, negative arousal, and
the further inhibition of behavioral responses. Finally, engagement of the fight/flight
system may lead to escape behaviors and/or defensive aggression, coupled with the
emotions of terror and rage. Along with a neux'opsychological perspective, another
approach to the study of emotions that has become increasingly prominent over the
past decade involves a cognitive orientation. This approach is based on the premise that
emotional experience is contingent upon a person's evaluation and interpretation of the
situation for his or her well-being (Frijda, 1993; Izard, 1993; Lazarus, 1993; Ortony, Clore,
& Collins, 1988; Parkinson, 1997; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1993). This personal
evaluation, known as cognitive appraisal, is conceptualized slightly differently by various
cognitive emotion theorists. Some of these theorists describe the emotional experience
without attempting to detail the particular appraisals involved (Arnold, 1960; Epstein,
1983; Leventhal, 1984). Other theorists contend, however, that each emotion is
characterized by a specific and unique set of cognitive appraisals (Frijda, 1987; Lazarus,
1991a, 1993; Ortony et al., 1988; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Commonalties

Across Different Theoretical Perspectives on Emotion Despite the apparent diversity
across various theoretical perspectives on emotion, several commonalties exist. To
begin, both the neuropsychological and cognitive approaches generally distinguish


between emotional and cognitive components when describing their theoretical models
(Izard, 1993; Parkinson, 1997). Considering the emotional components first, one
relatively common theme across both perspectives is that a basic set of emotions can be
identified and classified. For example, the four basic emotions proposed by Gray (1990)
are hypothesized to correspond to each of his three neurologically based motivational
systems. That is, the behavioral approach system is hypothesized to correspond to
reward, the behavioral inhibition system is hypothesized to correspond to anxiety, and
the fight/flight system is hypothesized to correspond to rage and terror (Ortony &
Turner, 1990). Other emotion researchers have advanced somewhat different sets,
depending upon their theoretical perspectives. Plutchik (1980) has proposed that eight
primary emotions exist. These are fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation,
.joy, and acceptance. Oatley and Individual Differences and Emotion 793 Johnson-Laird
(1987), in comparison, have proposed that the number of basic emotions totals five, and
includes sadness, disgust, anger, anxiety, and happiness. Although the exact number and
identity of basic emotions may vary from one theoretical perspective to the next, a high
degree of convergence is still evident in terms of positing a fundamental distinction
between positive and negative emotions. Past models in both domains have typically
focused on negative emotions in greater detail. This imbalance has been recognized in
more recent theoretical approaches, which have also provided a more fine-grained
analysis of positive emotions. As one illustration, a recent cognitive theory of emotion by
Lazarus (1993) describes six positively valenced emotions (happiness, pride, relief, love,
hope, and compassion), in addition to nine negatively valenced emotions (anger, anxiety,
fright, guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, and disgust). Both the neuropsychologicai
and cognitive perspectives on the study of emotion have also acknowledged, to varying
degrees, the important role that cognitions may play in the experience of emotion (Izard,

1993). In Gray's (1990) neuropsychological system, for example, information processing
or computational functions of the brain are suggested to underlie all psychological
processes, including emotion. Within current cognitive theories of emotion, cognitions
are posited to play a central role (Lazarus, 1993; Parkinson, 1997). As suggested earlier,
these theories are governed by the proposition that the onset of emotional responses or
affective states is dictated by the manner in which an individual ascribes meaning to the
environment. That is, emotions are elicited and differentiated via the perception of the


situation or event as appraised by the individual (Scherer, 1993). There is considerable
debate among current cognitive theorists, however, regarding the number and type of
cognitive appraisals that are thought to differentiate the emotions (Parkinson, 1997).
Lazarus (1993) has advanced a cognitive-motivationalrelational theory of emotion in
which both positive and negative emotions are thought to be shaped by two cognitive
mediators -- primary and secondary appraisals. According to Lazarus, primary appraisal is
defined as an evaluation of the personal relevance of an encounter for one's well-being,
and consists of three well-defined cognitive dimensions: goal relevance, goal
congruence, and type of ego involvement (Lazarus, 1991b, 1991c, 1993). Secondary
appraisal, on the other hand, is defined as the evaluation of the person's options and
resources for coping with the situation and future prospects, and includes three specific
and detailed components: blame/credit, coping potential, and future expectancy. In
comparison to the set of appraisals specified by Lazarus, Roseman (1979) suggested that
emotion is dependent upon a different set of cognitive attributes, including motivational
state, situational state (presence/absence of reward/punishment), probability (certainty
of outcome), legitimacy, and agency (responsibility). Adding to this list, Smith and
Ellsworth (1987) have found evidence for three further appraisal dimensions, namely,
attentional activity, anticipated effort, and perceived obstacles. Finally, Frijda and his
colleagues (Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) conducted a meta-analysis
of several proposed cognitive appraisals and concluded that support existed for the
presence of five dimensions: valence, certainty, agency, interestingness, and globality.

While much of current cognitive emotion theory focuses on appraisals as the primary
means of eliciting emotions, attributions and construals have also been identified as
antecedents to emotions (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Even more recently, however,
cognitive theories of emotion have begun to incorporate discussions of 794 K. A. Winter
and N. A. Kuiper relational meaning, dynamic systems, and cognitive schemata (e.g.,
Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1993; Lewis, 1996). Thus, in addition to specifying the type of
cognitive content that may be important in emotions (e.g., cognitive appraisals and
attributions), more recent cognitive models of emotion have increasingly focused on the
cognitive processes that may pertain to the dynamic, unfolding nature of emotions. As
one example, Lazarus (1993) has proposed that each emotion can be defined by a
particular pattern of thought, known as a core relational theme. These core themes are


higher order cognitive constructs that are derived from particular combinations of
primary and secondary appraisal components. Fifteen core relational themes have been
advanced by Lazarus (1993), with each representing a specific relationship between the
person and environment. With respect to anger, for example, the underlying core theme
relates to a demeaning offense against the individual and her possessions. In contrast,
the emotion of happiness relates to a core theme of making reasonable progress toward
a goal. Sadness relates to the experience of an irrevocable loss, whereas pride is
associated with a core theme of enhancing one's ego-identity by taking credit for an
achievement or valued object. A second example of a recent cognitive process
orientation toward the study of emotion is provided by Lewis (1996). Building upon a
dynamic systems approach, his model of emotion recognizes the importance of the
ongoing interplay between cognitions and emotions. In accord with current cognitive
theories of emotion, Lewis (1996) incorporates the notion of a reciprocal relation
between cognitive appraisals and emotions. His model further proposes, however, that
the feedback between cognition and emotion is the basis for self-organizing appraisals
that are recurrent for an individual. These appraisals assemble over time, and constitute
global interpretations of situations that correspond with particular emotions. Thus, for

each individual, self-organizing appraisals help guide the direction and magnitude of an
emotional response by shifting that person's attention to certain features of an event or
situation, and also highlighting particular memories, associations, and scripts. These
cognitive processes elicit emotions. In turn, these emotional changes provide further
feedback that helps guide that individual's subsequent cognitive processing of other
salient features of the situation and/or directs attention to other relevant memories,
associations, and scripts. Overall, Lewis' (1996) model clearly acknowledges the complex
and ongoing interplay between appraisals, emotions, and cognitive processes, such as
selective attention and memory. A final common theme evident across both the
neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives on emotion relates to the role of
individual differences. At a neuropsychological level, investigators have described various
individual differences in neurological systems underlying the experience of emotion.
Davidson (1992), for example, has reported that individual differences in measures of
brain activation asymmetry are associated with substantial variations in dispositional
mood, affective reactivity, and temperament. In a similar fashion, Gray (1990) has


acknowledged the existence of prominent individual difference factors relating to the
degree of sensitivity associated with each of his neurologically based emotion systems.
As corroborated by a number of other investigators (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Larsen &
Ketelaar, 1991; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), individuals
high on the general personality dimension of extraversion exhibit heightened sensitivity
to signals of reward (BAS), producing increased levels of positive affect. In contrast,
individuals high on the general personality dimension of neuroticism display heightened
sensitivity to punishment (BIS), with subsequently enhanced levels of negative affect.
When Individual Differences and Emotion 7~5 taken together, this pattern suggests that
individual difference factors mapping onto underlying biologically based systems may
play a prominent role in the differential experience of situations and emotions. Current
cognitive theories of emotion have also begun to consider the potential role of
individual differences in the experience of emotion. Roseman (1991) has hinted at the

need for future research to investigate individual differences in cognitive appraisals, and
their potential relation to emotional predispositions. In turn, Lazarus' (1991c, 1993)
model has introduced several person-mediated variables that readily lend themselves to
further consideration from an individual difference perspective. In discussing cognitive
appraisals, for example, Lazarus has proposed that, beyond sharing certain common
beliefs and goals, each person also has their own specific set of well-established and
stable goal hierarchies, beliefs, and cognitive styles that influence how situations are
appraised. Thus, due to unique learning and developmental experiences, individuals may
vary significantly in the types of cognitive appraisals that are made for similar situations.
Paralleling his views relating to cognitive appraisals, Lazarus (1991c) has suggested that
great variations in emotions are noted among individuals as well. Although he proposes
that general laws can be formulated about the emotion process, and that people share
emotional experiences, he believes that "an emotion happens to an individual with a
distinctive history who wants, thinks, and confronts specific environments, evaluates
their significance, and acts as adaptively as possible" (Lazarus, 1991c, p. 7). Moreover,
according to Lazarus, when faced with a recurrent person-environment relationship,
stable emotional patterns will result in the individual. Summary. In addition to
distinguishing between cognitive and emotional components, both the
neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives have commented on the number of basic


emotions, with a fundamental distinction being drawn between positive and negative
emotions. Furthermore, although current cognitive theories of emotion are primarily
dedicated to uncovering the role of cognitions within the experience of emotion,
neuropsychological perspectives have also acknowledged the contribution of cognitive
elements as well. For cognitive-based theories of emotion, this emphasis has recently
resulted in more refined theoretical models that incorporate both cognitive content and
processes. In addition to articulating various types of cognitive content (e.g., appraisals,
core themes, and attributions), cognitive-based emotion researchers have also begun to
specify more fully the cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention and information

processing effects) that may relate to emotion. A final commonality, and one that forms
the principal concern of the present article, pertains to the role of individual differences
in emotion. Across both perspectives there is now reasonable support for the proposal
that various individual difference factors may bear importantly on the experience of
emotion. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION In this article, we propose
that a detailed consideration of individual difference factors is integral to a more
complete theory of emotion. This proposal is quite congruent with a substantial body of
literature that supports an integrative hierarchical model of personality and emotionality
advanced by Watson and Clark (1984, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). This hierarchical model
consists of both a general and specific level. The general level refers to broad distinctions
across personality attributes, namely extra- 796 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper version
versus neuroticism, that also map onto broad distinctions across emotions, namely,
positive versus negative affect. Within each general level of this model there is also a
lower order specific level. As one example, the general level of neuroticism and negative
affect can be further subdivided into different content domains at the specific level, such
as depression or anxiety (Watson et al., 1994). The hierarchical model was briefly
alluded to in our previous discussion of individual difference factors relating to Gray's
(1990) emotion systems. In particular, the general dimension of extraversion is
characterized by a temperamental sensitivity to pleasurable stimuli (BAS); and is
associated with the more frequent and intense expression of positive affect, including
the specific content emotions of joyfulness, enthusiasm, boldness, pride, and selfconfidence. Neuroticism, on the other hand, is thought to be characterized by a
temperamental sensitivity to painful or negative stimuli (BIS). Individuals scoring high on


this general negative dimension of personality more frequently and intensely experience
negative affect, including such specific content emotions as fear. anxiety, sadness, guilt,
hostility, and self-dissatisfaction. Considerable research findings now converge on the
proposal that individuals scoring high on neuroticism generally perceive their world in a
negative manner, viewing their life experiences as threatening, problematic, and
distressing. In contrast, individuals with high levels of extraversion generally approach

their environment in a positive and energetic manner, displaying a strong willingness and
enthusiasm to seek out and actively engage in various life events (Watson & Clark, 1984,
1992a, 1992b, 1994). The Watson and Clark hierarchical model is relevant to our
individual differences approach to emotions in several ways. First, the numerous findings
associated with this model provide strong empirical support for the proposal that
individual differences in personality are of fundamental importance to the differential
experience of emotions. Second, the most general level of this hierarchical model (i.e.,
positive vs. negative valence) provides a useful framework for organizing our
presentation of additional findings that pertain directly to the cognitive and emotional
components of theories of emotion. Third, and as discussed in subsequent sections of
the paper, the specific content level of the hierarchical model (e.g., depression vs.
anxiety; pride vs. enthusiasm) is of particular importance to the development and
presentation of our individual differences-based self-schema model of emotion. Finally,
the last section of the paper indicates how both the specific and general levels of this
hierarchical model might be integrated with other theoretical and research perspectives
to further advance our understanding of individual difference factors pertaining to
emotions. Individual Differences in Personality and Psychopathology Congruent with the
general level of the Watson and Clark hierarchical framework described above, this
section of the paper reviews research findings from both the personality and
psychopathology domains that are of direct relevance to an individual difference
perspective on theories of emotion. In particular, the impact of both positive and
negative personality characteristics on cognition and emotion, the two central aspects of
theories of emotion, is described. When considering cognition, this review focuses on a
construct of primary interest to emotion theorists, namely, cognitive appraisals of
events. Following this, the review of emotion describes additional personality and
psychopathology findings that highlight the important role of individual difference


factors in emotional responses to events. Individual Differences and Emotion 797
Cognition. A review of the literature indicates that individual differences in personality

mediate cognitive appraisals of both positive and negative life event.s. To begin with
negative personality characteristics, Gallagher (1990) found that individuals high in
neuroticism were more likely to appraise academic events as more threatening and less
challenging than those low in neuroticism. In a similar fashion,Jerusalem (1990)
discovered that individuals high in trait anxiety appraised a series of difficult
performance tasks as threatening and involving loss, whereas low trait anxiety
individuals buffered the experience of stress by appraising these situations as less
threatening. In addition to the specific cognitive appraisals of loss, threat, and challenge
described above, negative personality characteristics have also been found to be related
to higher general stress appraisals for life events. Olinger, Kuiper, and Shaw (1987), for
example, found that individuals who endorsed a large number of rigid and dysfunctional
self-evaluative standards were found to think about stressful events more often, and rate
them as more displeasing, than individuals who displayed few dysfunctional selfevaluative standards. This pattern of findings was evident even when these individuals
were currently nondepressed, suggesting a persistent depressive personality style
related to negative cognitive attitudes or beliefs about self-evaluation. Similarly, Westra
and Kuiper (1992) found that Type A dispositions were significantly related to increased
perceived stress, with higher Type A individuals appraising an arithmetic task as more
stressful than those lower in Type A attributes. These heightened stress appraisals,
however, were only found to be correlated with increased Type A characteristics when
the arithmetic task was presented in a manner that maximized self-worth evaluations.
While negative personality characteristics tend to be associated with increased
appraisals of threat and loss, positive personality attributes have been shown to be
related to more positive appraisals of challenge. In terms of extraversion, for example,
Gallagher (1990) found that extraverted individuals were more likely to appraise
academic stressors as challenging than were individuals low in extraversion. A similar
appraisal pattern has been demonstrated for sense of humor, with Kuiper, Martin, and
Olinger (1993) reporting that individuals with a higher sense of humor viewed stressful
events as more challenging than individuals with a lower sense of humor. Other research
has shown that positive personality characteristics are also associated with reduced

negative appraisals of threat and loss regarding stressful life events. In a sample of
German migrants, for example,Jerusalem (1993) found that those individuals high in
optimism and self-efficacy were less likely to appraise their current adaptational
demands as threatening, and were less likely to consider that they had suffered a loss,
when compared with those who were low in optimism. Furthermore, the relationship
between an individual's level of optimism and both challenge and threat appraisals has
been examined in a sample of 73 dental patients presenting for wisdom-tooth extraction
under general anesthesia (Siim, 1994). In this study, higher levels of optimism were
positively related to appraisals of challenge and negatively related to appraisals of
threat. That is, those people who had a positive outlook on life felt more confident and
less afraid when it came to surgery than those people who have a negative outlook on
life. As well, optimists were more likely to appraise pain following surgery as more
challenging, less threatening, and more controllable than pessimists. A similar appraisal
pattern has been demonstrated for individual differences in sense of humor. In
particular, when faced with performing a novel task in a laboratory setting, Kuiper,
McKenzie, and Belanger (1995) found that individuals with 798 K. A. Winter and N. A.
K'uiper an increased level of humor provided higher challenge and lower threat
appraisals, compared with individuals displaying a lower sense of humor. Emotion. A
review of the literature also indicates that individual differences in personality mediate
affective responses to life events. There is some agreement in the literature that a
depressive personality style is associated with a variety of negative emotional features,
including increased levels of dysphoric affect, sadness, anxiety, and guilt (Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Kuiper, Olinger, & Martin, 1990; Segal & Swallow, 1993). As one
example, Krantz and Hammen (1979) found that when faced with ambiguous
information, depressed individuals favored emotionally negative interpretations. As a
second illustration, Olinger et al. (1987) found that individuals with a large number of
dysfunctional self-evaluative standards rated negative life events as having a greater
emotional impact, ruminated more often about these events, and displayed higher
perceived stress levels than individuals who were less cognitively vulnerable to

depression. Consistent with a depressive personality style, these effects were also
evident even when these individuals were nondepressed. Congruent with the above
findings, individuals high in Type A characteristics also perceive their lives as involving


more stress, and consequently experience greater emotional distress than those
individuals displaying few Type A characteristics (Kuiper & Martin, 1989). In two separate
studies, Westra and Kuiper (1992) found a positive relation between Type A
characteristics and negative emotion. That is, high Type A individuals were found to have
increased depressive affect, and reported more anger and negative affect, than
individuals who did not display Type A features. While negative personality
characteristics tend to be related to emotional distress, positive personality
characteristics have been shown to be consistently related to positive emotion. For
example, Carver and Gaines (1987) explored the effects of trait optimism in a group of
women during their transition from pregnancy to motherhood. In this study, an
individual's level of optimism (measured in the third trimester of pregnancy) was found
to be inversely related to depressed mood, 3 weeks postpartum. Similarly, Scheier and
Carver (1991) found that higher levels of trait optimism were negatively related to the
expression of depressive affect in adaptation to college life. The association between
trait optimism and affect is further illustrated in a study of individuals recovering from
coronary artery bypass surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). Specifically, optimistic individuals
were found to report lower levels of hostility and depressive affect prior to surgery,
hnmediately postsurgery, more optimistic individuals were also found to report greater
happiness, relief, and satisfaction than individuals low in optimism. Individual differences
in sense of humor have also been found to moderate emotion in a positive fashion. In
addition to work that has shown that a greater sense of humor is inversely related to
negative affect in response to negative life events (Lefcourt & Martin, 1986), other
research has also found higher levels of humor to be related to more positive emotions
surrounding positive life events (Martin, Kuiper, Olinger, & Dance, 1993). An increased
sense of humor is also significantly related to greater positive emotion in novel

situations. In particular, following the completion of a novel drawing task, Kuiper et al.
(1995) found that individuals with a greater sense of humor also displayed significantly
higher levels of positive affect. Individual Differences and Emotion 799 Summary. Our
review of the personality and psychopathology literature points to the important role
that individual differences play in cognition and emotion; the two fundamental
components of theories of emotion. With regard to the cognitive component, individuals
who display negative or psychopathological personality attributes, such as neuroticism


or trait anxiety, often provide cognitive appraisals that construe their environments as
more stressful and threatening. In contrast, individuals displaying such positive
personality characteristics as extraversion or optimism typically appraise their
environments in a more favorable and challenging manner. In terms of the emotional
component, individuals who have more negative personality characteristics, such as
depressive or Type A dispositions, report heightened levels of emotional distress and
negative emotions when faced with either stressful or nonstressful life events, when
compared with individuals displaying more positive personality characteristics, such as
optimism or sense of humor. COGNITION AND EMOTION IN THE SELF-SCHEMA Attention
will now focus on a higher order construct, the self-schema, as a means of integrating
cognition and emotion within the individual. The self-schema construct was selected as
it has a considerable theoretical and research base that encompasses both cognitive
content and process from an individual difference perspective (Banaji & Prentice, 1994;
Kuiper et al., 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Segal & Swallow, 1993). In this approach, the
self-schema consists of the organized cognitive representations of one's own unique
traits, attributes, abilities, opinions, and attitudes. This constellation of self-referent
information in the self-schema serves to guide the processing of personally relevant
information. Each individual has a self-schema that is unique or person-specific, and is
responsible for influencing perception, attention, appraisal, and memory processes. By
filtering aspects of the external world, and thereby influencing what is attended to, selfschemata shape knowledge and behavior (Pace, 1988). This blending of content and
process allows for a conceptual model that readily captures features of the ongoing

interactions an individual has with the environment. As such, a self-schema model is
particularly sensitive to the dynamic unfolding nature of emotions, as it includes the
application of motives and cognitive content to ongoing information processing and
feedback. Overall, our general aim in presenting this integrative self-schema model is to
illustrate how an individual difference perspective can be fully incorporated within a
theory of emotion. Prior to presenting this model we first review findings from both the
personality and psychopathology domains that demonstrate that individual differences
in self: schemata exist, and that these differences have important implications for both
the cognitive and emotional components of theories of emotion. Congruent with the
Watson and Clark (1992, 1994) hierarchical framework described earlier, this review


begins by incorporating the general level distinction between positive and negative
personality characteristics. As the review progresses, however, it becomes increasingly
clear that the more specific content level of the hierarchical framework is of particular
importance to our proposed self-schema model. Within the general negative personality
domain, for example, self-schema findings will be reviewed that indicate that specific
content differences between depression and anxiety provide fundamental distinctions in
patterns of self-representation, and the experience of emotions. Finally, this review
further demonstrates the important role of cognitive processes in the experience of
emotion. This processing element begins to emerge in the consider- 800 K. A. Winter
and ~\ A. Kuiper ation of cognition and self-schemata, and then assumes more central
importance when commenting on the relationship between emotions and individual
differences in self-schemata. Self-schemata and cognition. Considering first negative
personality characteristics, a number of studies suggest that a unique self-schema with a
specific cognitive profile exists for a depressive personality style. Overall, the relevant
cognitions are organized around broad themes of personal worthlessness and
inadequacy (Clark & Beck, 1989; Kuiper et al., 1990; Segal & Swallow, 1993; Westra &
Kuiper, 1996), and translate into a negative content schema with negatively biased
information processing. Clinically depressed individuals, for example, show greater selfreferent endorsement and recall for negative content personal adjectives, such as

inadequate, unlucky, weak, helpless, and inferior (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Mineka &
Sutton, 1992). In contrast, selfschemata for normal and nondepressed psychiatric
controls shows a positive content orientation, with much greater endorsement and
recall of positive personality characteristics, such as achieving, capable, inquiring,
helpful, and sociable. Finally, additional research has shown that individual differences in
self-schemata exist for individuals who are mildly depressed, Kuiper and Derry (1982),
for example, found that mild depressives endorsed and subsequently recalled equal
amounts of self-referent positive and negative personality, characteristics, whereas
nondepressed individuals primarily endorsed and recalled positive content material only.
Further research has demonstrated that a specific set of dysfunctional self-evaluative
beliefs may also play an important role in a depressive personality self-schema (Kuiper et
al., 1990; Olinger et al., 1987). Using the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), a self-report
inventory designed to measure the dysfimctional sell-worth beliefs thought to


predispose individuals to depression, Cane, Olinge~, Gotlib, and Kuiper (1986) found
evidence for two distinct cognitive dimensions. These were, respectively, performance
evaluation (e.g., "If I do not do as well as other people, it means I am an inferior human
being"), and approval of others (e.g., "What other people think of me is very
important."). Empirically, the increased endorsement of these rigid self-evaluative
standards has robust effects. In addition to the Olinger et al. (1987) findings reported
earlier in this paper, Kuiper and Dance (1994) tound that dysfunctional self-evaluative
standards were significant predictors of increased depression levels and diminished selfesteem across time. This effect remained significant even "after taking into account
initial levels of depression and self-esteem at time 1. As such, this research highlights the
utility of dysfunctional selfevaluative standards in terms of predicting subsequent levels
of aftect and self-esteem. Individual differences in cognitive self-representation can also
be described for anxious individuals. Although a variety' of cognitive structures account
tor anxiety disorders, self-schema content is tL~cused on feelings of vulnerability and
fragility (Segal & Swallow, 1993), as well as themes of personal danger, threat, and
uncertainty (Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; Westra & Kuiper, 1996). In a sample of 470

patients, Clark et al. (1990), for example, found evidence to support Beck's cognitive
theory of psychopathology. That is, factor analytic findings revealed a two-factor
solution, in which anxiety and depression formed separate dimensions. While those who
were clinically depressed were characterized by hopelessness, low self-worth and
negative thoughts involving loss and past failure, clinically anxious individuals reported
significantly more thoughts of anticipated harm and danger. Despite the fact that fewer
empirical studies have examined the sell-schema of anxious individuals, the existing
research has generally been supportive. In particular, anxious individuals have been
Individual Differences and Emotion 801 found to rate more negative traits as selfdescriptive and display superior attention to and recall for fear relevant stimuli, as
compared to those individuals who are nonanxious (Breck & Smith, 1983; Mineka &
Sutton, 1992). Individual differences in self-schemata have also been investigated for
Type A persons. Price (1982) postulated that three specific fears or irrational beliefs are
characteristic of Type A individuals, namely, that self-worth is largely a function of
personal achievements, that no universal moral principles exist, and that resources are
in scarce supply. This Type A schema, which centers around achievement, competition,


and negativity toward others, has generally received empirical support. Westra and
Kuiper (1992), for instance, reported that individuals high in Type A have dysfunctional
cognitions concerning performance evaluation. These individuals are also characterized
by numerous aberrant cognitions, including a need to seek revenge, a belief that
resources are in scarce supply and that one will not acquire one's share of desirable
commodities, and the conviction that self-worth is contingent upon personal
accomplishments. In a study that simultaneously examined dysfunctional self-schema
content across four different maladjustment domains, Westra and Kuiper (1996) found
further support for the proposed individual difference profiles for content-specificity.
These researchers demonstrated that for depression, Type A characteristics, anxiety, and
bulimia, the expected self-schema content emerged, and was specific for each domain of
maladjustment. Anxiety, for example, was marked by a specific focus on interpersonal
evaluative fears, whereas higher levels of depression were specifically associated with

dysfunctional self-evaluative cognitions pertaining to failure and loss. In addition, it was
found that these individual differences in dysfunctional self-schema content were highly
predictive of future levels of maladjustment in each domain, even after controlling for
both initial maladjustment level and the endorsement of more general types of
dysfunctional cognitions. Given the relatively recent focus on investigating self-schemata
for positive personality dimensions, there is still somewhat limited empirical evidence in
this area. Hillson (1997), however, has found promising initial results pertaining to two
distinct dimensions within positive personality. In her work, she factor analyzed the Ryff
(1989) scale, a broad-based measure of several positive personality characteristics.
Across several samples these analyses consistently revealed two underlying dimensions
of positive personality, namely, Positive Individualism (PI) and Positive Relations with
Others (PR). Positive Individualism consists of items relating to feelings of acceptance of
oneself, feelings of independent or autonomous functioning, having purpose or sense of
meaning in one's life, and a sense of success or mastery over one's environment.
Positive Relations with Others refers to the giving and receiving inherent in healthy adult
relationships, including one's interpretation of the appropriate use and availability of
social support. In addition to ascertaining that PI and PR are distinct from each other,
Hillson (1997) also found that PI and PR are distinct from other positive personality
dimensions, such as extraversion, optimism, and sense of humor. Of particular relevance


in the present context, Hillson (1997) has demonstrated that these two dimensions of
positive personality show expected self-schema content effects, both in terms of selfdescriptive adjectives and belief statements. Her research demonstrated that unique
sets of self-descriptive adjectives and belief statements (modeled after the Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale, but positive in nature) were each able to discriminate between the two
positive personality dimensions of PI and PR. Examples of self-descriptive adjectives for
PI include aspiring and individualistic; 802 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper whereas selfdescriptive adjectives for PR include warm, companionable, and unselfish. Similarly, an
example of a belief statement for PI includes: "You should be confident in your own
opinions and evaluate yourself by your own standards." In contrast, a belief statement
reflecting the PR dimension includes: "It is important to have a sense of belonging with

those around you." Self-schemata and emotion. Over the past few years, the view that
cognitive schematic processes are closely related to the experience of emotion has been
steadily gaining ground (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Researchers are in general
agreement with the notion that individual differences in attitudes, beliefs, and general
cognitive selfrepresentations are associated with individual differences in emotions.
According to Segal and Swallow (1993), for instance, certain schemata are hypothesized
to have concomitant emotional features. Using depression as an example, these
researchers suggested that the core schema of inadequacy and worthlessness that is
characteristic of depressives activates cognitive appraisals of uncontrollability, which
subsequently triggers feelings of sadness. Other studies have also highlighted the
influence of individual differences in cognitive schemata on emotional experiences. In a
sample of university students, Larsen, Diener, and Cropanzano (1987) found that
cognitive processes consistent with a schematic approach are positively related to more
intense affective responses when certain individuals are exposed to either positive or
negative emotional stimuli. These researchers found that individuals scoring high on the
individual difference variable of affective reactivity engaged in more negative selfreferencing and focusing on the specific emotion-provoking aspects of events than
individuals scoring low on affective reactivity. High scorers on this personality dimension
also tended to overgeneralize the emotional implications of a single negative event,
when compared to low scorers. In addition to research that has demonstrated a link
between cognitive schematic processes and the magnitude of emotional experience,


there is some empirical support for a significant relation between individual differences
in cognitive style and the expression of different types of negative emotions. As one
illustration, Berenbaum, Fujita, and Pfennig (1995) found that general cognitive styles
relating to attributional preferences are differentially associated with negative emotions.
Those individuals displaying an increased general tendency to make internal and
unstable causal attributions, for example, also displayed higher levels of fear. In contrast,
individuals with an increased general tendency to make global and stable attributions for
various events displayed higher levels of sadness and anger. Turning to the

psychopathology literature, Mathews and MacLeod (1994) have carefully detailed
empirical research affirming the link between schematic processes and emotion for
depressed and anxious individuals. Specifically, these investigators reviewed literature
attesting to cognitive biases in information processing, selective interpretation, and
selective memory. With respect to cognitive processing, research shows that anxiety and
depression are associated with an encoding bias favoring emotionally negative
information. For example, both anxious and depressed individuals were found to display
disproportionately long color-naming latencies for threatrelated stimulus words
(indicating greater distraction by the semantic meaning of these words); as well as
exhibiting speeded detection of a probe occurring in the spatial location of negative
words. Anxious and depressives also exhibited a selective bias favoring emotionally
negative interpretations. As one illustration, in a homophone spelling test, high anxious
individuals provided more negative word spellings Individual Differences and Emotion
803 for ambiguous homophones than did low anxious individuals (e.g., pain for pane).
Moreover, anxious individuals displayed a greater priming effect for target words that
had a single spelling, but two meanings differing in emotional valence (e.g., stroke).
Finally, depressed individuals were found to have short recall latency for negative
memories and exhibited superior recall for emotionally negative stimulus words.
Summary. Research was presented suggesting that a coherent set of self-descriptive
adjectives and belief statements exists for both positive and negative personality; and
that further specific distinctions can then be made within each of these general
categories. Examination of the cognitive profiles for several patterns of maladjustment
(e.g., depression, anxiety, and Type A) revealed that pathological personality is
differentially related to negative content schemata, and that excessively rigid and


inappropriate evaluative standards are used to guide the lives of those who have
negative personalities. In contrast, preliminary research by Hillson (1997) suggests that
there are at least two useful dimensions within positive personality; and that these two
dimensions are differentially related to self-descriptive adjectives and positive belief

statements that guide self-evaluations and behavior. The preceding review also revealed
that certain cognitive schemata are related to affect intensity, and that cognitive styles
are differentially associated with negative emotions. Finally, it was demonstrated that
cognitive schemata of anxious and depressed individuals are differentially related to the
encoding of emotionally negative information, the favoring of emotionally negative
interpretations, and superior recall of emotionally negative memories. A SELF-SCHEMA
MODEL OF EMOTION This section of the paper presents a self-schema model of emotion
that places individual differences in the forefront. As shown in Figure 1, this will be done
by suggesting that the two major aspects of the self-schema consist of content and
function. The content aspect of the self-schema provides a means for detailing the
precise role of specific individual differences in self-relevant content in theories of
emotion. The three functional aspects of the self-schema, namely, initial processing,
evaluation, and output, provide a means for blending the content and process
components of the self, as the individual deals with environmental events. Components
of a Self-Schema Model of Emotion Self-schema content. As reviewed earlier, the
content aspect of the self-schema includes traits, attributes, abilities, opinions, and
attitudes that are unique to each individual. In addition, self-schema content reflects an
individual's self-descriptive adjectives, self-evaluative belief statements, and attributions.
Although not addressed in the self-schema literature, it is our contention that Lazarus'
notion of core relational themes, as outlined earlier in the paper, is also an important
element of self-schema content. In order for this element to be incorporated within selfschema content, however, some modification is required. Specifically, Lazarus (1993) has
proposed that a universe of 15 core relational themes is available for each and every
person to draw from. In contrast, our model proposes that the general availability and
applicability of core relational themes across all individuals may not be the case. Instead,
our examination of the self-schema literature suggests that only certain subsets of core
relational themes are inherent in each individual. Within our model, these themes then
804 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper Self-Schema Content Self-Schema Functioning i Self-


Schema trmts, attributes, abilities. opinions, attitudes self-descriptive adjectives selfevaluative beliefs attributions core relational themes 4 ................. perception 'niti -positive self-relevant Ev u ti°n evaluative H - emotions Outpu' selective attention

judgements behaviors (coping) encoding negative self-relevant evaluative cognitive
appraisal judgements core relational themes Life Events (stressful and non-stressful)
FIGURE 1. A self-schema model of emotion depicting how individual differences in
schema content influence initial processing, evaluation, and output of stressful and
nonstressful llfe events. uniquely guide that person's appraisal of and emotional
reactions to his or her own life events. As one illustration of guiding themes, a person
with Type A characteristics may generally experience core themes centering around
feeling cheated or being given a raw deal, when faced with life situations. In contrast, a
person with depressive personality characteristics may generally experience themes
centering around feeling inadequate regarding progress toward desired goals.
Furthermore, our review of the self-schema literature suggests that for certain
individuals, other sets of core themes above and beyond those described by Lazarus in
his model of emotion, may be particularly relevant and salient. Recall that Hillson (1997)
has identified a set of self-referent belief statements reflecting the content of at least
two distinct dimensions of positive personality (i.e., positive individualism, positive
relatedness) that are not redundant with those proposed by Lazarus. Self-schema
content components can impact on self-schema functioning in a variety of ways,
including initial processing, evaluation, and the generation of output, when individuals
are faced with either stressful or nonstressful life events. During the initial processing
stage, self-schema content guides what information is attended to by actively filtering
out environmental stimuli deemed to be extraneous or irrelevant to the self. A number
of cognitive strategies employing self-schema content guide initial processing, and serve
to maintain positive affect or favorable self-evaluations within the individual. Examples
of these cognitive strategies include social reasoning, social comparison, and selfpresentation (Banaji & Prentice, 1994). Via these strategies, generally favorable
information is accommodated within the self, and slight adjustments to the sell-schema
are subsequently made. However, when one's self-concept is negative, personal
constructs are rigid, and new positively-valenced information is generally not
accommodated within the self-schema. Accordingly, cognitive distortions result.

Selective abstraction, for example, is a form of cognitive distortion in Individual D!
[ferences and Emotion 805 which attention is directed toward personal information that
has bearing upon issues of inadequacy and worthlessness, thereby ignoring positive
information that is incompatible with this depressive self-schema (Beck et al., 1979).
Negative views of the self can also be maintained by social comparison strategies. As one
illustration, Swallow and Kuiper (1993) found that depressed individuals failed to exhibit
self-protective downward comparison strategies following poor performance on a task,
when compared with nondepressed individuals. Also as shown in Figure 1, self-schema
content is further implicated in how events are evaluated and subsequently
experienced. An example of self-schema content that is integral to the evaluation phase
of schema-functioning pertains to self-evaluative belief statements. As described earlier
in this paper, these unique sets of cognitive representations influence how individuals
personally evaluate situations that are encountered in their daily lives. Depending upon
the exact nature of the self-referent belief statements endorsed by the individual, these
self-relevant evaluative judgments may be either positive or negative in tone. The final
stage that self-schema content is implicated in is output (see Figure 1). This stage
consists of the expression of emotion and a wide range of behaxfors, including coping
techniques. 1 Of particular relevance in the present context is that cognitive strategies
within the self (which themselves are intertwined with content factors), have been
found to influence the types of emotions that are experienced. Recall, for example, that
biases in cognitive processing, selective interpretation, and selective memory for
depressives were found to be associated with negative emotion (Mathews & MacLeod,
1994). Initial processing. As can be seen in Figure 1, initial processing consists of
perception, selective attention, and encoding. Given that this phase is cognitive in nature
and occurs early on in the experience of emotion, we propose that cognitive appraisals
can also be considered to exemplify operations occurring within the initial processing
phase of self-schema functioning. According to most cognitive theories of emotion, the
first step in the experience of emotion is cognitive appraisal. At this stage, judgments are
made regarding the personal meaning or future significance of a particular situation.
That is, attributes of the person or self-schema content (e.g., commitments, beliefs, etc.)

combine with situation factors (e.g., familiarity, predictability, imminence, etc.) to
produce cognitive appraisals (Lazarus, 1993). Although this approach recognizes the


importance of both person and situation factors, we suggest that theories of emotion
would benefit: from an even more explicit focus on personal attributes relating to
individual differences. In particular, our model would suggest that in order to accurately
represent the appraisal process, various individual differences in self-schema content
must be accounted for. Since distinct learning and developmental experiences, as well as
unique ~Although our self-schema model of emotion does not directly address the isstie
of coping at this point in time, it is proposed that knowledge of self-schema content and
fimctioning will provide valuable information regarding individual differences in both the
choice and effectiveness of coping strategies. These distinctions are elaborated oil in a
stress and coping model of child maltreatment developed by Hillson and Kuiper (1994).
Their model indicates how individual differences in both the cognitive appraisals and
core themes exhibited by different caregivers can result in different coping strategies
that range from highly effective to highly maladaptive. 806 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper
person factors, contribute to cognitive appraisal, our model would propose that
individual difference factors play a central role. Our proposal is reinforced by the findings
presented earlier. In particular, there is ample evidence to suggest that within the
domains of both personality and psychopathology, individuals have characteristic and
unique ways of construing events in their lives. Our review of the literature regarding
cognitive appraisals and neuroticism, trait anxiety, depressive personality style, and Type
A dispositions suggests that these particular personality characteristics are associated
with more negative appraisals of life events (i.e., threat, loss). In contrast, this review
also indicated that positive personality attributes, such as extraversion, optimism, and
sense of humor, relate to much more favorable appraisals of life events (i.e., challenge).
Evaluation. The evaluation phase of self-schema functioning consists of both positive
and negative self-relevant evaluative beliefs. The self-schema research examined earlier
in the paper indicates that unique cognitive concepts and beliefs are associated with

both psychopathology and positive personality, respectively. Our review of the literature
regarding negative personality (e.g., depressive personality, Type A characteristics)
suggests that each form of pathological personality is differentially related to negativecontent schemata, with each type of schema also incorporating rigid and unique
dysfunctional beliefs that guide self-evaluations and behaviors. A depressive personality
style, for example, is associated with a negative content schema that also includes


dysfimctional self-evaluative standards centering around performance evaluation and
approval by others. Anxiety', on the other hand, is associated with a fear-related content
schema and self:relevant beliefs centering on feelings of vulnerability, fragility, personal
danger, threat, and uncertainty. Finally, our review also revealed some evidence to
suggest at least two useful dimensions within positive personality, with each of these
dimensions then being differentially related to a unique set of positive self-descriptive
adjectives and self-evaluative belief statements. The evaluation phase is hypothesized to
influence the generation of output, namely, the emotional reactions and/or behavioral
manifestations that result when an individual encounters an event. Since Lazarus' (1993)
core relational themes are thought to underlie the evaluation and experience of
emotion, we have incorporated this construct within the evaluative component of our
model. In general, we would propose that the unique cognitive concepts and beliefs
associated with individual differences in both personality and psychopathology have
differential implications for core relational themes. That is, our self-schema model would
suggest that the relevance of core relational themes varies markedly as a function of
identifiable individual difference factors. For example, it is predicted that individuals
with a depressive personality, style would most likely experience core themes centering
around loss, and feeling that they have not lived up to personal expectations. In contrast,
our model would predict that trait anxious individuals would most likely experience an
entirely different set of core themes, namely, those centering around feeling uncertain,
threatened, and overwhelmed by some immediate danger. In terms of positive
personality factors, our approach would predict that people high on positive relatedness
would tend to more often experience and employ core relational themes centering

around empathizing with the needs of others and wanting to help, whereas people high
on positive individualism would more often tend to experience and use core relational
themes centering around feeling self-satisfied and content. Overall, then, the critical
distinction here is that specific and unique sets of core relational themes Individual
Differences and Emotion 807 can be identified, a pr/0r/, for a wide variety of different
personality characteristics. This focus on the important role of individual differences is in
marked contrast to existing cognitive theories of emotion, which generally assume the
universality of these themes across all individuals, regardless of personality
characteristics. Output. As shown in Figure 1, the final phase of self-schema functioning


consists of emotional reactions and behaviors. Although emotion has previously been
identified as an important derivative of the output phase that is closely tied to selfschema content, current theories of emotion have tended to underemphasize this point.
In Lazarus' approach, for example, a set of 15 discrete emotions, grouped into positive,
negative, and borderline categories, has been identified. Each emotion is derived from a
different pattern of appraisal components, and is thought to represent the various ways
that a person can be harmed or benefited in an encounter. While Lazarus recognizes that
variations in emotions between individuals occur, he does not explicitly address this
notion in his model. As argued here, however, adequate explanation of the experience
of emotion requires consideration of an individual differences perspective. Based on
individual difference factors, people are predisposed toward particular mood states and
thus have certain characteristic domains of emotional expression. When faced with the
same situation, different people will either experience similar emotions in varying
degrees, or perhaps even report a different constellation of emotions entirely. Drawing
attention once again to the literature that was reviewed earlier, it was found that
different individuals display different characteristic forms of emotional expression. Our
review of neuroticism, depressive personality style, and Type A personality
characteristics indicates that people with these negative dispositions tend to report
increased negative affect. In contrast, findings for extraversion, trait optimism, and sense
of humor suggest that individuals with these more favorable dispositions tend to report

generally positive affect relating to life events. Thus, using Lazarus' list of 15 basic
emotions as an illustration, we would propose that while the whole spectrum of
emotions may be experienced, certain subsets of these emotions are more often
experienced by a given individual, and that the composition of each subset varies as a
function of individual difference factors. Individuals with a depressive personality, for
example, are predicted to more often experience guilt, shame, and sadness, whereas
individuals high in Type A characteristics are predicted to more often experience anger
and anxiety. In contrast, individuals who are optimistic are predicted to more often
experience hope and happiness. These proposed emotional distinctions map directly
onto the self-schema content differences in our model. Summary. The model presented
here proposes that the two main aspects of the self-schema involve content and
function. In this approach, each of the three sell: schema functions (initial processing,


evaluation, output), represents a blending of unique self-schema content for a given
individual with their processing of environmental events. The model underscores the
primary importance of individual differences in self-schemata impacting on cognitive
appraisals, core relational themes, and the expression of emotions. In addition to the
specified relations among self-schema content and functioning, it is proposed that
earlier schema functions can also impact on later functions, and vice-versa. That is, initial
processing, evaluation, and output can operate interdepen- 808 K. A. Winter and N. A.
Kuiper dently or even covary. To clarify, initial processing may influence evaluation,
which may subsequently influence emotional reactions and/or behavioral
manifestations. Furthermore, self-schema output may influence both initial processing
and evaluation functions, or further evaluations may revise both the processing and
output functions. It is also possible that self-schema functioning, via a feedback loop,
may lead to subsequent changes to self-schema content. Although this model
emphasizes the person, it should be noted that situation factors are not ignored. Implicit
in self-schema theory is a consideration of situation factors, with aspects of the selfschema being activated each time a situation is encountered. Thus, similar to the notion
of relational meaning incorporated within Lazarus' (1993) theory of emotion, the

present model is based on the premise that separate person and environmental
variables are merged into a higher order construct, the self-schema. Employing the Selfschema Model to Increase Predictive Accuracy for Emotions Having described our selfschema model, the next stage is to indicate how this model might serve to increase
predictive accuracy regarding the experience of emotions. This will be done by using a
brief scenario to illustrate how the self-schema model makes differential predictions for
two specific individual difference factors (i.e., depressive personality style vs. trait
optimism), at each of the three major stages of dealing with life experiences (i.e., initial
processing, evaluation, and output). The self-schema model of emotion proposes that
individuals with a depressive personality display specific and unique negative selfschema content, which, in turn, impacts on their self-schema functioning across a wide
range of life experiences. As indicated earlier, these individuals show negative selfreferent content profiles (e.g., hopeless, loss, failure), inappropriate beliefs and attitudes
(e.g., unrealistic selfevaluative standards), and dysfunctional cognitive biases (e.g.,
selective attention and inappropriate social comparisons) that guide their life


experiences. The specific ramifications of this depressive personality self-schema can be
highlighted by considering the following scenario, adapted from Smith and Lazarus
(1993), in which person A, a close friend of person B, betrays the trust of B by revealing
to a third party that B has cheated on his lover. In terms of initial processing of this
situation, our model would predict that, if person B has a depressive personality selfschema, he would be more likely to report negative cognitive appraisals that center
around construals of threat, loss, and increased personal responsibility. At the evaluation
stage, the self-schema model would propose that person B would be more likely to
employ core relational themes that are again negatively valenced. Given their depressive
personality self-schema, these themes may include the perception that they are
hopeless with regard to their ability to handle or improve this situation, and that they
are personally to blame tor everything that has happened. Finally, in terms of emotion,
our model would predict that, consistent with a depressive personality self-schema,
person B would be more likely to exhibit negative feelings, such as sadness and/or guilt,
at the output stage. For this same scenario, the self-schema model of emotion would
make quite different predictions for individuals displaying positive personality
characteristics, such as trait optimism. Our earlier review indicated that individuals with
higher levels of optimism have generally positive self-schema content, consisting of

favorable attitudes and beliefs (e.g., a generalized expectancy for good rather than bad
outcomes), Individual Differences and Emotion 809 as well as adaptive cognitive
strategies (e.g., social reasoning that emphasizes positive personal attributes).
Compared to a depressive personality, then, the unique selfschema content associated
with an optimistic individual would have quite different effects on each phase of selfschema functioning. That is, when the self-schema content of an optimist is mapped
onto schema-related functioning for person B in the above scenario, different initial
processing, evaluations, and outcomes would be expected. In terms of initial processing,
our model would predict that an optimistic individual B would be likely to appraise this
situation as generally nonthreatening and, perhaps, even somewhat challenging. In
terms of evaluation, the generalized expectancy for good rather than bad outcomes may
translate into a core relational theme pertaining to increased hope (i.e., fearing the
worst, but wanting better). Finally, in terms of outcome, the model would predict that
optimism would be associated with more favorable emotions, such as hope and/or