Authors libby rittenberg 869

maximize their own satisfaction, not the public interest. This insight
suggests that regulatory agencies seek to expand their bureaucratic
structure in order to serve the interests of the bureaucrats. As the people
in control of providing government protection from the rigors of the
market, bureaucrats respond favorably to lobbyists and special interests.
Public choice theory views the regulatory process as one in which various
groups jockey to pursue their respective interests. Firms might exploit
regulation to limit competition. Consumers might seek lower prices or
changes in products. Regulators themselves might pursue their own
interests in expanding their prestige or incomes. The abstract goal of
economic efficiency is unlikely to serve the interest of any one group;
public choice theory does not predict that efficiency will be a goal of the
regulatory process. Regulation might improve on inefficient outcomes, but
it might not.

Consumer Protection
Every day we come into contact with regulations designed to protect
consumers from unsafe products, unscrupulous sellers, or our own
carelessness. Seat belts are mandated in cars and airplanes; drivers must
provide proof of liability insurance; deceptive advertising is illegal; firms
cannot run “going out of business” sales forever; electrical and plumbing
systems in new construction must be inspected and approved; packaged
and prepared foods must carry certain information on their labels;
cigarette packages must warn users of the dangers involved in smoking;
gasoline stations must prevent gas spillage; used-car odometers must be
certified as accurate. The list of regulations is seemingly endless.

Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen
Saylor URL: />
Saylor.org

869