The rise of modern philosophy a new history of western philosophy volume 3 (new history of western philosophy) ( PDFDrive ) (1) 168

KNOWLEDGE

and the wallpaper are external to me, the after-image and the subvocal
humming are interior events. But Hume accepts the empiricist thesis that
all we ever know are our own perceptions. My hearing the bird sing is not a
transaction between myself and the bird, but my encounter with a vivid
bird-like sound. For Hume, everyone’s life is just one introspection after
another.
It has to be by introspection, then, that we tell the diVerence between
our memories and our imaginings. The diVerence between the two, one
might think, could best be made out in terms of belief. If I take myself to
be remembering that p, then I believe that p; but I can imagine p’s being the
case without any such belief. As Hume himself says, we conceive many
things that we do not believe. But his classiWcation of mental states makes it
diYcult for him to Wnd a suitable place for belief.
The diVerence between merely having the thought that p and actually
believing that p cannot be a diVerence of content. As Hume puts it, belief
cannot consist in the addition of an extra idea to the idea or ideas which
constitute what is believed. One argument for this is that we are free to add
any ideas we like, but we cannot choose to believe whatever we please.
A more convincing reason would be that if belief consisted in an extra idea,
someone who believes that Caesar died in his bed and someone who does
not believe that Caesar died in his bed would not be in conXict with each
other because they would not be considering the same proposition (T, 95).
In the Enquiry, Hume says that belief is a conception ‘attended with a
feeling or sentiment, diVerent from the loose reveries of the fancy’.
But such a feeling would surely be an impression; and in an appendix to
the Treatise, Hume argues forcefully that this would be directly contrary
to experience—belief consists only of ideas. But he still insists that ‘An idea
assented to feels diVerent from a Wctitious idea,’ and he oVers various names
to describe the feeling: ‘force, vivacity, solidity, Wrmness, steadiness’. He

ends by confessing that ‘’tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or
manner of conception’ (T, 629). But he urges us to accept his account on
the implausible ground that history books (which we believe to be factual)
are much more vivid to read than novels (which we are well aware are
Wction) (T, 97).
Some of the diYculties in Hume’s account of vivacity as a mark of belief
are internal to his system. We observe his embarrassment at discovering a
perception that is neither quite an idea nor quite an impression. We may
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