The rise of modern philosophy a new history of western philosophy volume 3 (new history of western philosophy) ( PDFDrive ) (1) 217

METAPHYSICS

an idea, not a thought about a tree. In thinking it, I am not thinking that
the tree is a pretty hazy one. Ideas, if you must speak of ideas in this
way, are the things we think with; they are not, in general, the things that
we think about.
The opening passage quoted from the Principles already assumes the
idealism that is supposed to be the conclusion of a long argument. Idealism
is implicit in the initial confusion between mental acts and their objects. It
cannot be said that Berkeley was unaware that this criticism could be
levelled. Hylas, near the end of the Wrst Dialogue, makes a distinction
between object and sensation. He says:
The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is
something perceived; and this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow
on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in
the tulip. (BPW, 158)

Philonous’ rejection of this takes a very oblique route. He picks on the
word ‘act’ and proceeds to argue that a sensation—e.g. smelling the
tulip—is something passive, not active.
Dubious though that claim is, there is no need for Hylas to controvert it
in order to defend his distinction. All he has to do is to substitute the
expression ‘event in the mind’ for ‘act of the mind’. But Philonous sails on
to his conclusion by substituting the ambiguous word ‘perception’ for the
ambiguous word ‘idea’, and taking it casually for granted that the object of
a perception is a part of the perception (BPW, 159).
If there is nothing that we can know except ideas, and if ideas can exist
only in a mind, then it is not diYcult for Berkeley to reach his conclusion
that everything that we can know to exist is in the mind of God:
When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind
in particular but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my

mind; since I Wnd them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore
some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my
perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my
supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with regard to all other Wnite
created spirits, it necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which
knows and comprehends all things.5
5 Berkeley’s proof of the existence of God is considered in detail in Ch. 10.

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