The rise of modern philosophy a new history of western philosophy volume 3 (new history of western philosophy) ( PDFDrive ) (1) 301

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

As long as men retain this right, no man has security of living out his
natural life. Rational self-interest, therefore, urges a man to give up some
of the unfettered liberty conferred by this right in return for equal
concessions by others. Thus there is a law of nature:
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and
defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other
men against himself. (L. 87)

This and other laws of nature lead men to transfer all their rights, except
that of basic self-defence, to a central power which is able to enforce the
laws of nature by punitive sanctions.
Among the other laws of nature (Hobbes lists nineteen in all), the most
important is the third ‘that men keep their covenants made’. A covenant, for
Hobbes, is a particular form of contract. A contract is a transfer of right to
another in consideration of a reciprocal beneWt. A covenant is a contract in
which—unlike immediate buying and selling—there is an element of trust.
At least one party to a covenant leaves the other party to perform his part of
the bargain at a later time. Without the third law of nature, Hobbes says,
‘covenants are in vain and but empty words; and the right of all men to all
things remaining, we are still in the condition of war’. It is this law that is the
foundation of the notions of justice and injustice; for injustice is precisely the
failure to perform a covenant; and whatever is not unjust is just (L, 95–6).
But covenants do not bind where there is a fear of non-performance on
either part, as there is bound to be in the state of nature. ‘Therefore before
the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive
power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by
the terror of some punishment, greater than the beneWt they expect by the
breach of their covenant.’ Before the establishment of a commonwealth

there is no such power: ‘Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and
of no strength to secure a man at all’ (L, 95–6, 111).
The only way to set up a common power is for men to ‘confer all their
power and strength to one man, or one assembly of men, that may reduce
all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will’. Each man must say to
every other man ‘I give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or
to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to
him and authorise all his actions in like manner.’ The central authority
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