Groundless paths the prajnaparamita sutras, the o ( (148)

Notes 749
in cluding its seeds, on its ow n path. The hinayána knowledge o f entities is bound by such cling­
ing because it lacks such realization and thus is not able to relinquish said clinging, including
its seeds, on its ow n path. The clinging to characteristics that is to be relinquished here is the
m ental state o f grasping at conditioned phenom ena as being not dependent on anything else,
but being autonom ous. This clinging is tw ofold —its instances that are included in the afflictive
obscurations consist o f the innate and imputational clinging to a personal identity. Its instances
that are included in the cognitive obscurations consist o f the coarse stains o f clinging to objects,
which arise from the clinging to a phenom enal identity. These stains can be divided in terms o f
(1) the clinging itself and (2) its objects. (1) Clinging is tw ofold—the clinging to characteristics
that consists o f (a) clinging to substance and (b) clinging to imputations, (a) The clinging to
substance corresponds to the clinging to identity that conceives o f the three spheres with regard
to all phenom ena (subjects and objects). It is equivalent to the clinging to a p h enom enal identity
and is twofold, (aa) The innate clinging to a phenomenal identity corresponds to mental states
o f naturally clinging to subjects and objects as being really existent, without relying on any
scriptures, reasonings, and so on. (ab) The imputational clinging to a phenomenal identity cor­
responds to mental states o f clinging to subjects and objects by way o f exam ining and analyzing
them on the basis o f seem ingly valid scriptures and reasonings, (b) The clinging to imputations
corresponds to the conceptions that are cognitive obscurations and cling to subjects and objects
as being mere imputations. It is tw ofold—coarse and very subtle, (ba) The first one consists
o f the clinging to characteristics and the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and
referents, w h ich exist up through the seventh bhúmi. (bb) The second one consists o f the very
subtle clinging to objects as being mere im putations, which exists up through the subsequent
attainment o f the tenth bhumi. (2) In terms o f its objects, clinging to characteristics is three­
fold—clinging to (a) the ground, (b) the path, and (c) the fruition, (a) is the twofold clinging to
characteristics with regard to the nature o f phen om en a and the bearers o f this nature at the time
o f the ground, which is taught by AA III.3ab:
The antagonistic factors are discrim inating notions about engaging
In the skandhas (such as form) being em ptiness . . .
(b) The clinging to characteristics with regard to the path is taught by AA III.3d:
And the factors o f enlightenm ent (such as generosity).

(c) The clinging to characteristics with regard to the fruition is taught by AA III.4d:
Thus, attachment to the victors and so on is subtle.
Therefore, through the AA explicitly teaching here the clinging to characteristics that binds, the
hinayána knowledge o f entities that is bound by it is taught by implication. As for the m anner in
w h ich the rem edial knowledge o f entities relinquishes these forms o f clinging to characteristics
as its factors to be relinquished, it is not that the remedial k n ow ledge o f entities and the entirety
o f the clinging to characteristics are explained by way o f matching them as the rem edy and its
factors to be relinquished because mental states o f clinging to characteristics are not necessarily
associated directly with the remedies that overcom e them. Therefore, the w isdom o f noble bod­
hisattvas o f directly realizing the lack o f characteristics directly relinquishes the obscurations in
the m ind streams o f these bodhisattvas. For through directly canceling out the seeds o f clinging
to characteristics in said m ind streams, it indirectly overcom es the m anifest forms o f this cling­
ing. MPZL (pp. 9 3 -9 4 ) divides the factors to be relinquished here into the clinging to entities
as (real) phenomena, which consist o f the two realities, and the clinging to entities as a person
who engages in the practices o f the path. Implicitly, in the latter clinging, the discriminating
n otions o f clinging to the practices as the remedies for the clinging to a person w ho practices
them are included as factors to be relinquished too. Though there appear to be different sys­
tems o f saying that this clinging to a person exists only in šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas, what


750 Groundless Paths
appears as the intention o f the AA and its com mentaries is as follows. Said clinging does exist in
the m ind streams o f ¿ravakas and pratyekabuddhas in general, but it is also associated with the
mind streams o f bodhisattvas in the manner o f a factor to be relinquished and, up through the
seventh bhumi, som etim es they even have manifest forms o f clinging to characteristics. After
the seventh bhumi, the relinquishm ent o f the clinging to a person is com pleted, w hile the relin­
quishm ent o f the clinging to phenom ena is com pleted at the end o f the continuum .
499 The Sanskrit prayogamarga and the Tibetan sb yo r lam can mean “path o f training,” “path
o f preparation,” or “path o f connecting.”
500

This and the following quotes are found on pp. 3 0 2 -5 in CZ.

501

P. 425.

502

These tw o term s are explicitly used by LSSP (fol. 394a.2).

503

LSSP (fol. 3 9 4a.6-394 b .l) adds the following: “Conceived form —the other-dependent

[nature]—is the basis for analyzing said being com plete or incomplete. Therefore, it is not that
it is not taught here because it is (a) the basis for the superim positions that are the imaginary
nature and (b) what bears the nature o f the perfect [nature]. This principle is to be applied to
[everything] up through the knowledge o f all aspects. In brief, if one does not cling to form and
so on as being the three natures, one engages in the m other.” PGSD (pp. 19 2-9 3) defines the
imaginary nature as “the phenom ena that are the mere seem ing appearances which do not per­
form a function.” It is twofold—the imaginary w ithout any characteristics (such as the horns o f
a rabbit) and the nominal imaginary (everything that is permanent and is not ultimate reality).
The definition o f the other-dependent nature is “dependently originating phenom ena, w hich
arise from their specific causes and conditions.” It is tw ofold —the pure other-dependent cor­
responds to the subsequent attainments in the m ind streams o f noble ones and the impure one,
to samsara. The definition o f the perfect nature is “the true reality that is the primary object o f
the valid cognition o f a reasoning consciousness.” It is tw ofold—the unmistaken perfect nature
corresponds to the meditative equipoises in the m ind streams o f noble ones and the unchanging
one, to the nature o f phenomena. In brief, the three natures are contained in the two realities

because the perfect nature is presented as ultimate reality and the other-dependent and imaginary
natures, as seeming reality in terms o f being and not being able, respectively, to perform a fun c­
tion. The three natures are presented as being definitely three in terms o f their objects because
they are respectively presented in term s o f the objects o f the m inds o f ordinary beings, the sub­
sequent attainments o f noble ones, and the meditative equipoises o f the latter. Their order is as
given in Mahdydnasutralamkara XVIII.80ab (“For the sake o f fully know ing, relinquishing, and
directly perceiving . . . ”). The three natures bear their names because they respectively are mere
conceptual superim positions, are dependent on other causes and conditions, and are perfect as
the basic nature o f objects. Their scriptural source in the prajnaparamita sutras is the Maitreya
Chapter in the sutra in twenty-five thousand lines, which speaks o f imaginary form, conceived
form, and the form o f the nature o f phenomena. MCG (fol. 77a.5-77b.2) explains that imagi­
nary form means that form and so on are incom plete as the foundation o f qualities, which refers
to the perception o f form by ordinary beings. That is, no matter how much they focus on forms
as being forms by w ay o f clinging to these forms w hile they are appearing in a dualistic manner,
the qualities o f the path are not produced. The form o f the nature o f phenom ena is the perfect
nature empty o f a real other-dependent nature, which refers to the subsequent attainments of
noble ones. If they focus on this form that is specified by lacking a nature o f its own, they see it
as illusionlike and therefore the qualities o f the path are produced in a complete manner. SCG
(fol. 69b.2-5) quotes the Aloka (p. 47): “Imaginary form consists o f the im putations in the m an ­
ner o f apprehender and apprehended. Since con ceived form is false im agination, it is this very
cognition that appears like [apprehender and apprehended]. As for the form o f the nature o f
phenomena, in true reality form itself is perfect as the nature o f em ptiness. Feelings and so on


Notes 751
are to be described in the sam e way.” Thus, the first one is labeled as the em ptiness o f charac­
teristics and the last one possesses the collection o f qualities and represents the true nature o f
phenom ena. Therefore, they are incom plete and com plete, respectively. MPZL (p. 98) says that,
though there appear m any ways o f explaining the m eaning o f “incom plete and com plete” (such
as referring to im aginary form and perfect form, or the forms o f children and old people), the

prajnaparamita sutra in twenty-five thousand lines generally speaks o f the above-m entioned
three kinds o f form. As for their meanings, the intention o f the AA is that im aginary form refers
to form being perm anent and so on as im puted by the tirthikas, which are not the distinctive
features o f form. Conceived form and the form o f the nature o f phenom ena are discussed in
the AA by way o f the trainings that stop engaging in clinging to the com m o n and u n com m o n
characteristics, respectively, o f form and so on.
504
N ote that “smaller and larger Brhattikan refers to the number o f prajnaparamita sutras on
w hich D3807 and D3808 respectively com m ent, but not to the size o f these texts (in fact, D3807
is twice as lo n g as D3808).
505

D3795, fol. 266a. 1-2.

506
PGSD (pp. 191-92) defines the explicitly taught trainings in the knowledge o f entities
as “the practices o f familiarizing with either o f the tw o types o f identitylessness.” The defini­
tion o f the mahayana trainings in the k n ow ledge o f entities is “the yogas o f bodhisattvas that
are cultivated by way o f respectively stopping the clinging to real existence with regard to ten
objects, such as form .” The first four am ong these ten trainings are called “the natural trainings”
because they exist in an on go in g manner from the path o f accum ulation up through the end o f
the continuum . The rem aining six are “the temporary trainings” because they are o n ly cultivated
if their respectively corresponding flaws arise, but need not be cultivated if these flaws do not
arise. The definition o f the implicitly taught hlnayana trainings in the knowledge o f entities is
“the hlnayana practices o f familiarizing with entities as being without a personal identity.” They
consist o f the four hlnayana paths o f learning.
507

CZ, p. 305.

508

D3807, vol. pa, fol. 55b.2-4.

509

D 3808, fol. 202b.2.

510

D 3791, fol. 172a.3-4.

511
LSSP/PSD have rgyu mtshan (“cau se”), but the Aloka has mtshan m a (“characteristics”),
both being translations o f Skt. n im itta, which has both these meanings. However, th e context in
all com m entaries clearly suggests that the latter is meant here.
512
PGSD (fol. 192) defines the equality o f the trainings in the k n ow led ge o f entities as “the
yoga o f bodhisattvas o f familiarizing with the trainings (the subject) and the objects o f these
trainings as being equality in that they lack real existence.” This equality is fourfold in terms o f
training in stop p in g clin gin g to real existence w ith regard to the nature o f form and so on, its
distinctive features, the elaborations o f its divisions, and the trainings themselves as the cogn iz­
ing subjects.
513

CZ, p. 457.

514

D3787, fol. 118b.4-6.

515
PGSD (p. 194) says that, in the context o f the knowledge o f entities, there is a reason
for explicitly teaching the mahayana path o f seeing o f directly and new ly realizing personal
identitylessness because bodhisattvas must directly realize personal identitylessness in order to
take care o f those to be guided who have the ¿ravaka disposition. There is also a reason for
not explicitly teaching the mahayana path of familiarization of familiarizing with the personal


752 Groundless Paths
identitylessness that was realized already because noble bodhisattvas do not strive for the frui­
tions o f the hinayána, such as the relinquishment o f the clinging to a personal identity. SZB (pp.
31 8-1 9) says that the reason for not teaching the maháyána path o f familiarization here is not
because bodhisattvas do not familiarize with the already seen types o f realization o f árávakas
and pratyekabuddhas. Rather, they do not familiarize with the limited types o f realization o f
árávakas and pratyekabuddhas in the first place, but only with the u n com m on types o f realiza­
tion o f the maháyána k now ledge o f entities, which is free from the thirty-tw o superim positions
and is understood implicitly by virtue o f the know ledge o f the path. In general, the realization
o f all entities lacking a personal identity is only divided into three (the types o f realization o f
noble árávakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas) by virtue o f the m anner o f realizing the
k nowledge o f entities being com plete or incomplete, but not by virtue o f the k now ledge o f the
path being com plete or incom plete because the know ledge o f the path does not exist at all in
árávakas and pratyekabuddhas.
516

This and the following two quotes are found o n pp. 3 0 9 -10 i n CZ.

517
Except for a few words here and there, the following three paragraphs, which summarize
and further explain the m eaning o f the above three quotes, are not found in LSSP. However,

each o f these paragraphs in PSD is in quotation marks, so that they cannot be considered as
Patrul Rinpoches own explanations either.
518

CZ, pp. 312-17.

519
PGSD (pp. 200-203) says that bodhisattvas need to know all p h en om en a through study­
ing and reflecting because they must practice them in the manner o f their lacking real existence.
Thus, the definition o f the aspects o f the com plete training in all aspects is “the phenom ena with
which bodhisattvas familiarize as lacking real existence.” These aspects consist o f (1) the refer­
ent aspects and (2) the cognitive aspects. (1) The definition o f referent aspects is “the aspects to
be familiarized with that are the objects to be realized by the cognitive aspects.” Their instances
consist o f all phenom ena and they are divided into the referent aspects o f the three knowledges.
(2) The definition o f cognitive aspects is “the aspects to be familiarized with that are the aware­
nesses which apprehend their specific referent aspects.” Their instances consist o f all cognitions
and they are divided into (a) the cognitive aspects that are antagonistic factors and (b) those
that are remedies, (a) The definition o f the first is “the cognitive aspects that are to be absolutely
rejected by persons who strive for liberation.” Their instances correspond to the clinging to
a personal identity and the clinging to a phenom enal identity, (b) The definition o f remedial
cognitive aspects is “the cognitive aspects that are to be relied on in the m ind streams o f persons
who strive for liberation.” Their instances consist o f all paths to liberation and they are divided
into the aspects o f the three knowledges. As for the manner o f familiarizing with these aspects,
to ascertain that all phenom ena lack real existence and then to properly familiarize with this
actuality represent the progressive stages o f familiarization in terms o f m entally engaging in the
topic o f the essence (emptiness). To practice the clear realizations (the subjects) and emptiness
(the object) by w ay o f their being a unity represents the progressive stages o f familiarization in
terms o f m entally engaging in the topic o f the clear realizations. These two are not mutually
exclusive because a single mental state is able to simultaneously practice both the subject (a clear
realization) and the object (emptiness). The manner o f familiarizing with the aspects is fourfold.

The familiarization by way o f the aspect o f the nature, just as it is, refers to familiarizing by way
o f generating the phenom ena to be familiarized with from the perspective o f the mental states
that familiarize with them (for example, the cultivation o f the four foundations o f m indfulness
on the path o f accumulation). The familiarization by way o f the aspect o f approximate concor­
dance refers to familiarizing with the focal objects and aspects that are approximately concordant
with the actual ones to be familiarized with (for example, m entally engaging in the focal objects
and aspects o f the path o f preparation on the path o f accumulation). The familiarization by


Notes 753
way o f th e aspect o f approximately engaging in characteristics refers to approximately engag­
ing in the characteristics o f higher factors to be attained (for example, m entally engaging in the
general and specific characteristics o f the paths o f noble ones on the path o f accumulation).
The familiarization by w ay o f the aspect o f aspiration refers to mentally engaging through the
m otivation o f w ishing to attain a special fruition (for exam ple, familiarizing with the knowledge
o f all aspects on the path o f accumulation). It may be said that it is not justified to familiarize
with the knowledge o f all aspects on the path o f accum ulation because said knowledge does not
exist on that path. However, there is no flaw because though there is no familiarization with this
knowledge in terms o f its nature, just as it is, on said path, this path does possess the familiariza­
tions with the k n ow led ge o f all aspects by w ay o f the aspects o f approximate concordance and
aspiration. As for the aspects that are explicitly taught in the brief introductions and the detailed
explanations in both the sutras and the AA, they are necessarily cognitive aspects. For AA IV. 1
speaks o f “aspects” as the specific instances o f w isd om and Haribhadra’s Aloka (D3791, fol.
176a.3-4) and Vivrti (D3793, fol. 104b.3-4) define them as the rem edies for antagonistic factors.
Thus, also the detailed explanations must explicate just this. In brief, the aspects that are taught
here are tw ofold— the three knowledges (the subjects) and the four realities (the objects). The
first represent the cognitive aspects that are the primary ones to be taught explicitly, while the
second represent the referent aspects that are taught in an implicit manner. Thus, the mahayana
path o f seeing represents a remedial cognitive aspect because it is the wisdom that, by way o f
directly realizing the basic nature o f the four realities, functions as the rem ed y for the antago­

nistic factors to be relinquished. MCG (fols. 81b.3-82a.2 and 8 9 b .5 -9 0 a .l) says that “aspects”
refers to cultivating, in the m anner o f prajna and m eans being in union, the 173 w isd om s that
are the rem edies for m istaken superim positions onto the phenom ena o f entities, the path, and
all aspects. However, there is no need for any disputes about cognitive aspects and referent
aspects because both are just divisions in terms o f isolates. In general, “referent aspects” are
the aspects o f the objects and “cognitive aspects,” the modes o f apprehension o f their subjects.
Therefore, ultimately, they exist in an inseparable manner. H owever, in terms o f classifying all
aspects in terms o f the three k now ledges from the perspective o f subject and object, the aspects
o f the know led ge o f entities and the knowledge o f the path are taught from the point o f view o f
being referent aspects and the aspects o f the k n ow ledge o f all aspects, from the point o f view o f
being cognitive aspects. T hough these 173 aspects o f the three knowledges are all n othing but
prajnaparamita, which overcom es the antagonistic factor o f clinging to characteristics and is
free from the triad o f arising, abiding, and ceasing, in terms o f the m anner o f cultivating them
they are for the sake o f realizing the threefold nonarising (o f the three knowledges) and also
apply to all four trainings. Therefore, they are cultivated successively in one swoop. The reason
for this is that they do not consist o f just a part o f the vast num ber o f all aspects o f the path, but
represent their entirety without any incom pleteness. For though they are all o f one taste in being
em ptiness, the vast m eans o f the path need to be com plete too (such as the need for generating
bodhicitta). To cultivate the com plete training in all aspects on the path o f accum ulation repre­
sents the rem edy that invalidates the factors to be relinquished through seeing; the culm inating
training o f the path o f preparation, a part o f the remedy that relinquishes said factors; and the
serial training, their distancing remedy. SZB (pp. 3 3 1 -3 2 ) says that the explicit statements in
the sutras m ostly teach the referent aspects in an explicit m anner and the cognitive aspects as
the hidden m eaning. The explicit statements in the AA, w hen dividing the aspects in terms o f
the three knowledges (as in IV. 1), teach the cognitive aspects explicitly and the referent aspects
merely implicitly.
520
PGSD (pp. 201 and 2 0 3 -4 ) defines the aspects o f the knowledge o f entities as “the
w isd om s o f directly realizing the basic nature o f the four realities as being personal identity­
lessness.” As for the three paths described above, the definition o f the uncontam inated path

that serves as the rem edy for the afflictive obscurations is “the type o f hlnayana realization that