Intermarket Technical Analysis - Trading Strategies docx

INTERMARKET Technical ANAlysyS
TRADING STRATEGIES
FOR THE GLOBAL
STOCK, BOND, COMMODITY,
AND CURRENCY MARKETS
"It's a tribute to Murphy that he's covered ground here that will become
standard within a decade. This is great work."
—John Sweeney
Technical Analysis of Stocks and
Commodities Magazine
Events of the past decade have made it clear that markets don't move in
isolation. Tremors in Tokyo are felt in London and New York; the futures
pits in Chicago move prices on the stock exchanges worldwide. As a
result, technical analysis is quickly evolving to take these intermarket
relationships into consideration. Written by John Murphy, one of the
world's lead ing technical analysts, this groundbreaking book explains"
these relationships in terms that any trader and investor—regardless of
his or her technical background—can understand and profit from.
• Reveals key relationships you should understand—including the rela-
tionship between commodity prices and bonds, stocks and bonds,
commodities and the U.S. dollar, the dollar versus interest rates and
stocks, and more
• Explains the impact of intermarket relationships on U.S. and foreign
stock markets, commodities, interest rates, and currencies
• Includes numerous charts and graphs that reveal the interrelationship
between stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies
Intermarket Technical Analysis explores the art and science of technical
analysis at its state-of-the-art level. It's for all traders and investors who
recognize the globalization of today's financial markets and are eager to
capitalize on it.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Professional, Reference and Trade Group
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY. 10158-0012
New York • Chichester • Brisbane • Toronto • Singapore
INTERMARKET
TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS
TRADING STRATEGIES
FOR THE GLOBAL
STOCK, BOND, COMMODITY
AND CURRENCY MARKETS
John J. Murphy
Wiley Finance Editions
JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
New York • Chichester • Brisbane • Toronto • Singapore
In recognition of the importance of preserving what has
been written, it is a policy of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. to
have books of enduring value printed on acid-free paper,
and we exert our best efforts to that end.
Copyright ©1991 by John J. Murphy
Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
All rights reserved. Published simultaneously in Canada.
Reproduction or translation of any part of this work
beyond that permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the
1976 United States Copyright Act without the permission
of the copyright owner is unlawful. Requests for
permission or further information should be addressed to
the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
This publication is designed to provide accurate and
authoritative information in regard to the subject
matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that

the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting,
or other professional service. If legal advice or other
expert assistance is required, the services of a competent
professional person should be sought. From a Declaration
of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the
American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Murphy, John J.
Intermarket technical analysis: trading strategies
for the global stock, bond, commodity, and currency markets /
John J. Murphy.
p. cm. — (Wiley finance editions)
Includes index.
ISBN 0-471-52433-6 (cloth)
1. Investment analysis. 2. Portfolio management. I. Title.
II. Series.
HG4529.M86 1991
332.6-dc20 90-48567
Printed in the United States of America
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
Contents
Preface v
1 A New Dimension in Technical Analysis 1
2 The 1987 Crash Revisited—an Intermarket Perspective 12
3 Commodity Prices and Bonds 20
4 Bonds Versus Stocks 40
5 Commodities and the U.S. Dollar 56
6 The Dollar Versus Interest Rates and Stocks 74
7 Commodity Indexes 95
8 International Markets 122

9 Stock Market Groups 149
10 The Dow Utilities as a Leading Indicator of Stocks 173
11 Relative-Strength Analysis of Commodities 186
12 Commodities and Asset Allocation 206
13 Intermarket Analysis and the Business Cycle 225
14 The Myth of Program Trading 240
15 A New Direction 253
Appendix 259
Glossary 273
Index 277
III
Preface
Like that of most technical analysts, my analytical work for many years relied on
traditional chart analysis supported by a host of internal technical indicators. About
five years ago, however, my technical work took a different direction. As consulting
editor for the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB), I spent a considerable amount of
time analyzing the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index, which measures
the trend of commodity prices. I had always used the CRB Index in my analysis of
commodity markets in much the same way that equity analysts used the Dow Jones
Industrial Average in their analysis of common stocks. However, I began to notice
some interesting correlations with markets outside the commodity field, most notably
the bond market, that piqued my interest.
The simple observation that commodity prices and bond yields trend in the
same direction provided the initial insight that there was a lot more information to
be got from our price charts, and that insight opened the door to my intermarket
journey. As consultant to the New York Futures Exchange during the launching of
a futures contract on the CRB Futures Price Index, my work began to focus on the
relationship between commodities and stocks, since that exchange also trades a stock
index futures contract. I had access to correlation studies being done between the
various financial sectors: commodities, Treasury bonds, and stocks. The results of

that research confirmed what I was seeing on my charts—namely, that commodities,
bonds, and stocks are closely linked, and that a thorough analysis of one should
include consideration of the other two. At a later date, I incorporated the dollar into
my work because of its direct impact on the commodity markets and its indirect
impact on bonds and stocks.
The turning point for me came in 1987. The dramatic market events of that year
turned what was an interesting theory into cold reality. A collapse in the bond market
during the spring, coinciding with an explosion in the commodity sector, set the stage
V
To Patty, my friend
and
to Clare and Brian
vi PREFACE
for the stock market crash in the fall of that year. The interplay between the dollar, the
commodity markets, bonds, and stocks during 1987 convinced me that intermarket
analysis represented a critically important dimension to technical work that could
no longer be ignored.
• Another by-product of 1987 was my growing awareness of the importance of
international markets as global stock markets rose and fell together that year. I noticed
that activity in the global bond and stock markets often gave advance warnings of
what our markets were up to. Another illustration of global forces at work was given
at the start of 1990, when the collapse in the American bond market during the first
quarter was foreshadowed by declines in the German, British, and Japanese markets.
The collapse in the Japanese stock market during the first quarter of 1990 also gave
advance warning of the coming drop in other global equity markets, including our
own, later that summer.
This book is the result of my continuing research into the world of intermarket
analysis. I hope the charts that are included will clearly demonstrate the interrela-
tionships that exist among the various market sectors, and why it's so important to be
aware of those relationships. I believe the greatest contribution made by intermarket

analysis is that it improves the technical analyst's peripheral trading vision. Trying to
trade the markets without intermarket awareness is like trying to drive a car without
looking out the side and rear windows—in other words, it's very dangerous.
The application of intermarket analysis extends into all markets everywhere on
the globe. By turning the focus of the technical analyst outward instead of inward,
intermarket analysis provides a more rational understanding of technical forces at
work in the marketplace. It provides a more unified view of global market behavior.
Intermarket analysis uses activity in surrounding markets in much the same way
that most of us have employed traditional technical indicators, that is, for directional
clues. Intermarket analysis doesn't replace other technical work, but simply adds
another dimension to it. It also has some bearing on interest rate direction, inflation,
Federal Reserve policy, economic analysis, and the business cycle.
The work presented in this book is a beginning rather than an end. There's still
a lot that remains to be done before we can fully understand how markets relate
to one another. The intermarket principles described herein, while evident in most
situations, are meant to be used as guidelines in market analysis, not as rigid or
mechanical rules. Although the scope of intermarket analysis is broad, forcing us to
stretch our imaginations and expand our vision, the potential benefit is well worth
the extra effort. I'm excited about the prospects for intermarket analysis, and I hope
you'll agree after reading the following pages.
John J. Murphy
February 1991
1
A New Dimension
in Technical Analysis
One of the most striking lessons of the 1980s is that all markets are interrelated—
financial and nonfinancial, domestic and international. The U.S. stock market doesn't
trade in a vacuum; it is heavily influenced by the bond market. Bond prices are very
much affected by the direction of commodity markets, which in turn depend on the
trend of the U.S. dollar. Overseas markets are also impacted by and in turn have

an impact on the U.S. markets. Events of the past decade have made it clear that
markets don't move in isolation. As a result, the concept of technical analysis is
now evolving to take these intermarket relationships into consideration. Intermarket
technical analysis refers to the application of technical analysis to these intermarket
linkages.
The idea behind intermarket analysis seems so obvious that it's a mystery why we
haven't paid more attention to it sooner. It's not unusual these days to open a financial
newspaper to the stock market page only to read about bond prices and the dollar. The
bond page often talks about such things as the price of gold and oil, or sometimes
even the amount of rain in Iowa and its impact on soybean prices. Reference is
frequently made to the Japanese and British markets. The financial markets haven't
really changed, but our perception of them has.
Think back to 1987 when the stock market took its terrible plunge. Remember
how all the other world equity markets plunged as well. Remember how those same
world markets, led by the Japanese stock market, then led the United States out of
those 1987 doldrums to record highs in 1989 (see Figure 1.1).
Turn on your favorite business show any morning and you'll get a recap of the
overnight developments that took place overseas in the U.S. dollar, gold and oil,
treasury bond prices, and the foreign stock markets. The world continued trading
while we slept and, in many cases, already determined how our markets were going
to open that morning.
1
A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
FIGURE 1.1
A COMPARISON Of THE WORLD'S THREE LARGEST EQUITY MARKETS: THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, AND BRITAIN. GLOBAL MARKETS COLLAPSED TOGETHER IN 1987. THE SUBSEQUENT
GLOBAL STOCK MARKET RECOVERY THAT LASTED THROUGH THE END OF 1989 WAS LED BY
THE JAPANESE MARKET.
World Equity Trends
Reproduced with permisson by Knight Bidder's Tradecenter. Tradecenter is a registered trademark of Knight Ridder's Financial Information.

ALL MARKETS ARE RELATED
What this means for us as traders and investors is that it is no longer possible to
study any financial market in isolation, whether it's the U.S. stock market or gold
futures. Stock traders have to watch the bond market. Bond traders have to watch
the commodity markets. And everyone has to watch the U.S. dollar. Then there's the
Japanese stock market to consider. So who needs intermarket analysis? I guess just
about everyone; since all sectors are influenced in some way, it stands to reason that
anyone interested in any of the financial markets should benefit in some way from
knowledge of how intermarket relationships work.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Technical analysis has always had an inward focus. Emphasis was placed on a par-
ticular market to which a host of internal technical indicators were applied. There
THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK 3
was a time when stock traders didn't watch bond prices too closely, when bond
traders didn't pay too much attention to commodities. Study of the dollar was left to
interbank traders and multinational corporations. Overseas markets were something
we knew existed, but didn't care too much about.
It was enough for the technical analyst to study only the market in question. To
consider outside influences seemed like heresy. To look at what the other markets
were doing smacked of fundamental or economic analysis. All of that is now
changing. Intermarket analysis is a step in another direction. It uses information in
related markets in much the same way that traditional technical indicators have been
employed. Stock technicians talk about the divergence between bonds and stocks in
much the same way that they used to talk about divergence between stocks and the
advance/decline line.
Markets provide us with an enormous amount of information. Bonds tell us
which way interest rates are heading, a trend that influences stock prices. Commodity
prices tell us which way inflation is headed, which influences bond prices and
interest rates. The U.S. dollar largely determines the inflationary environment and
influences which way commodities trend. Overseas equity markets often provide

valuable clues to the type of environment the U.S. market is a part of. The job of
the technical trader is to sniff out clues wherever they may lie. If they lie in another
market, so be it. As long as price movements can be studied on price charts, and as
long as it can be demonstrated that they have an impact on one another, why not
take whatever useful information the markets are offering us? Technical analysis is
the study of market action. No one ever said that we had to limit that study to only
the market or markets we're trading.
Intermarket analysis represents an evolutionary step in technical analysis.
Intermarket work builds on existing technical theory and adds another step to
the analytical process. Later in this chapter, I'll discuss why technical analysis
is uniquely suited to this type of investigative work and why technical analysis
represents the preferred vehicle for intermarket analysis.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK
The goal of this book is to demonstrate how these intermarket relationships work in a
way that can be easily recognized by technicians and nontechnicians alike. You won't
have to be a technical expert to understand the argument, although some knowledge
of technical analysis wouldn't hurt. For those who are new to technical work, some of
the principles and tools employed throughout the book are explained in the Glossary.
However, the primary focus here is to study interrelationships between markets, not
to break any new ground in the use of traditional technical indicators.
We'll be looking at the four market sectors—currencies, commodities, bonds,
and stocks—as well as the overseas markets. This is a book about the study of market
action. Therefore, it will be a very visual book. The charts should largely speak for
themselves. Once the basic relationships are described, charts will be employed to
show how they have worked in real life.
Although economic forces, which are impossible to avoid, are at work here, the
discussions of those economic forces will be kept to a minimum. It's not possible to
do intermarket work without gaining a better understanding of the fundamental forces
behind those moves. However, our intention will be to stick to market action and keep
economic analysis to a minimum. We will devote one chapter to a brief discussion

4 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
of the role of intermarket analysis in the business cycle, however, to provide a useful
chronological framework to the interaction between commodities, bonds, and stocks.
FOUR MARKET SECTORS: CURRENCIES,
COMMODITIES, BONDS, AND STOCKS
The key to intermarket work lies in dividing the financial markets into these four
sectors. How these four sectors interact with each other will be shown by various vi-
sual means. The U.S. dollar, for example, usually trades in the opposite direction of
the commodity markets, in particular the gold market. While individual commodities
such as gold and oil are discussed, special emphasis will be placed on the Commod-
ity Research Bureau (CRB) Index, which is a basket of 21 commodities and the most
FIGURE 1.2
A LOOK AT THE FOUR MARKET SECTORS-CURRENCIES, COMMODITIES, BONDS, AND
STOCKS—IN 1989. FROM THE SPRING TO THE AUTUMN OF 1989, A FIRM U.S. DOLLAR HAD
A BEARISH INFLUENCE ON COMMODITIES. WEAK COMMODITY PRICES COINCIDED WITH
A RISING BOND MARKET, WHICH IN TURN HAD A BULLISH INFLUENCE ON THE STOCK
MARKET.
Dollar Index Stocks
BASIC PREMISES OF INTERMARKET WORK 5
widely watched gauge of commodity price direction. Other commodity indexes will
be discussed as well.
The strong inverse relationship between the CRB Index and bond prices will be
shown. Events of 1987 and thereafter take on a whole new light when activity in the
CRB Index is factored into the financial equation. Comparisons between bonds and
stocks will be used to show that bond prices provide a useful confirming indicator
and often lead stock prices.
I hope you'll begin to see that if you're not watching these relationships, you're
missing vital market information (see Figure 1.2).
You'll also see that very often stock market moves are the end result of a ripple
effect that flows through the other three sectors—a phenomenon that carries important

implications in the area of program trading. Among the financial media and those
who haven't acquired intermarket awareness, "program trading" is often unfairly
blamed for stock market drops without any consideration of what caused the program
trading in the first place. We'll deal with the controversial subject of program trading
in Chapter 14.
BASIC PREMISES OF INTERMARKET WORK
Before we begin to study the individual relationships, I'd like to lay down some basic
premises or guidelines that I'll be using throughout the book. This should provide a
useful framework and, at the same time, help point out the direction we'll be going.
Then I'll briefly outline the specific relationships we'll be focusing on. There are
an infinite number of relationships that exist between markets, but our discussions
will be limited to those that I have found most useful and that I believe carry the
most significance. After completion of the overview contained in this chapter, we'll
proceed in Chapter 2 to the events of 1987 and begin to approach the material in
more specific fashion. These, then, are our basic guidelines:
1. All markets are interrelated; markets don't move in isolation.
2. Intermarket work provides important background data.
3. Intermarket work uses external, as opposed to internal, data.
4. Technical analysis is the preferred vehicle.
5. Heavy emphasis is placed on the futures markets.
6. Futures-oriented technical indicators are employed.
These premises form the basis for intermarket analysis. If it can be shown that all
markets—financial and nonfinancial, domestic and global—are interrelated, and that
all are just part of a greater whole, then it becomes clear that focusing one's attention
on only one market without consideration of what is happening in the others leaves
one in danger of missing vital directional clues. Market analysis, when limited to
any one market, often leaves the analyst in doubt. Technical analysis can tell an
important story about a common stock or a futures contract. More often than not,
however, technical readings are uncertain. It is at those times that a study of a related
market may provide critical information as to market direction. When in doubt, look

to related markets for clues. Demonstrating that these intermarket relationships exist,
and how they can be incorporated into our technical work, is the major task of this
book.
CRB Index
Bonds
6 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The key word here is "background." Intermarket work provides background
information, not primary information. Traditional technical analysis still has to be
applied to the markets on an individual basis, with primary emphasis placed on the
market being traded. Once that's done, however, the next step is to take intermarket
relationships into consideration to see if the individual conclusions make sense from
an intermarket perspective.
Suppose intermarket work suggests that two markets usually trend in opposite
directions, such as Treasury bonds and the Commodity Research Bureau Index.
Suppose further that a separate analysis of the top markets provides a bullish outlook
for both at the same time. Since those two conclusions, arrived at by separate analysis,
contradict their usual inverse relationship, the analyst might want to go back and
reexamine the individual conclusions.
There will be times when the usual intermarket relationships aren't visible or,
for a variety of reasons, appear to be temporarily out of line. What is the trader to do
when traditional technical analysis clashes with intermarket analysis? At such times,
traditional analysis still takes precedence but with increased caution. The trader who
gets bullish readings in two markets that usually don't trend in the same direction
knows one of the markets is probably giving false readings, but isn't sure which one.
The prudent course at such times is to fall back on one's separate technical work, but
to do so very cautiously until the intermarket work becomes clearer.
Another way to look at it is that intermarket analysis warns traders when they
can afford to be more aggressive and when they should be more cautious. They may
remain faithful to the more traditional technical work, but intermarket relationships

may. serve to warn them not to trust completely what the individual charts are
showing. There may be other times when intermarket analysis may cause a trader
to override individual market conclusions. Remember that intermarket analysis is
meant to add to the trader's data, not to replace what has gone before. I'll try to
resolve this seeming contradiction as we work our way through the various examples
in succeeding chapters.
EXTERNAL RATHER THAN INTERNAL DATA
Traditional technical work has tended to focus its attention on an individual market,
such as the stock market or the gold market. All the market data needed to analyze
an individual market technically—price, volume, open interest—was provided by
the market itself. As many as 40 different technical indicators—on balance volume,
moving averages, oscillators, trendlines, and so on—were applied to the market along
with various analytical techniques, such as Elliott Wave theory and cycles. The goal
was to analyze the market separately from everything else.
Intermarket analysis has a totally different focus. It suggests that important
directional clues can be found in related markets. Intermarket work has a more
outward focus and represents a different emphasis and direction in technical work.
One of the great advantages of technical analysis is that it is very transferable.
A technician doesn't have to be an expert in a given market to be able to analyze
it technically. If a market is reasonably liquid, and can be plotted on a chart, a
technical analyst can do a pretty adequate job of analyzing it. Since intermarket
analysis requires the analyst to look at so many different markets, it should be obvious
why the technical analyst is at such an advantage.
EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURES MARKETS 7
Technicians don't have to be experts in the stock market, bond market, currency
market, commodity market, or the Japanese stock market to study their trends
and their technical condition. They can arrive at technical conclusions and make
intermarket comparisons without understanding the fundamentals of each individual
market. Fundamental analysts, by comparison, would have to become familiar with
all the economic forces that drive each of these markets individually—a formidable'

task that is probably impossible. It is mainly for this reason that technical analysis
is the preferred vehicle for intermarket work.
EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURES MARKETS
Intermarket awareness parallels the development of the futures industry. The main
reason that we are now aware of intermarket relationships is that price data is now
readily available through the various futures markets that wasn't available just 15 years
ago. The price discovery mechanism of the futures markets has provided the catalyst
that has sparked the growing interest in and awareness of the interrelationships among
the various financial sectors.
In the 1970s the New York commodity exchanges expanded their list of
traditional commodity contracts to include inflation-sensitive markets such as
gold and energy futures. In 1972 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange pioneered the
development of the first financial futures contracts on foreign currencies. Starting in
1976 the Chicago exchanges introduced a new breed of financial futures contracts
covering Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. Later on, other interest rate futures, such
as Eurodollars and Treasury notes, were added. In 1982 stock index futures were
introduced. In the mid-1980s in New York, the Commodity Research Bureau Futures
Price Index and the U.S. Dollar Index were listed.
Prior to 1972 stock traders followed only stocks, bond traders only bonds,
currency traders only currencies, and commodity traders only commodities. After
1986, however, traders could pick up a chart book to include graphs on virtually
every market and sector. They could see right before their eyes the daily movements
in the various futures markets, including agricultural commodities, copper, gold, oil,
the CRB Index, the U.S. dollar, foreign currencies, bond, and stock index futures.
Traders in brokerage firms and banks could now follow on their video screens the
minute-by-minute quotes and chart action in the four major sectors: commodities,
currencies, bonds, and stock index futures. It didn't take long for them to notice that
these four sectors, which used to be looked at separately, actually fed off one another.
A whole new way to look at the markets began to evolve.
On an international level, stock index futures were introduced on various

overseas equities, in particular the British and Japanese stock markets. As various
financial futures contracts began to proliferate around the globe, the world suddenly
seemed to grow smaller. In no small way, then, our ability to monitor such a broad
range of markets and our increased awareness of how they interact derive from the
development of the various futures markets over the past 15 years.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the main emphasis in this book will be
on the futures markets. Since the futures markets cover every financial sector, they
provide a useful framework for our intermarket work. Of course, when we talk about
stock index futures and bond futures, we're also talking about the stock market and
the Treasury bond market as well. We're simply using the futures markets as proxies
for all of the sectors under study.
8 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Since most of our attention will be focused on the futures markets, I'll
be employing technical indicators that are used primarily in the futures markets.
There is an enormous amount of overlap between technical analysis of stocks and
futures, but there are certain types of indicators that are more heavily used in each
area.
For one thing, I'll be using mostly price-based indicators. Readers familiar with
traditional technical analysis such as price pattern analysis, trendlines, support and
resistance, moving averages, and oscillators should have no trouble at all.
Those readers who have studied my previous book, Technical Analysis of the
Futures Markets (New York Institute of Finance/Prentice-Hall, 1986) are already well
prepared. For those newer to technical analysis, the Glossary gives a brief introduction
to some of the work we will be employing. However, I'd like to stress that while
some technical work will be employed, it will be on a very basic level and is not
the primary i focus. Most of the charts employed will be overlay, or comparison,
charts that simply compare the price activity between two or three markets. You
should be able to see these relationships even with little or no knowledge of tech-
nical analysis.
Finally, one other advantage of the price-based type of indicators widely used in

the futures markets is that they make comparison with related markets, particularly
overseas markets, much easier. Stock market work, as it is practiced in the United
States, is very heavily oriented to the use of sentiment indicators, such as the degree
of bullishness among trading advisors, mutual fund cash levels, and put/call ratios.
Since many of the markets we will be looking at do not provide the type of data needed
to determine sentiment readings, the price-oriented indicators I will be employing
lend themselves more readily to intermarket and overseas comparisons.
THE IMPORTANT ROLE
OF THE COMMODITY MARKETS
Although our primary goal is to examine intermarket relationships between financial
sectors, a lot of emphasis will be placed on the commodity markets. This is done
for two reasons. First, we'll be using the commodity markets to demonstrate how
relationships within one sector can be used as trading information. This should
prove especially helpful to those who actually trade the commodity markets. The
second, and more important, reason is based on my belief that commodity markets
represent the least understood of the market sectors that make up the intermarket
chain. For reasons that we'll explain later, the introduction of a futures contract on
the CRB Index in mid-1986 put the final piece of the intermarket structure in place
and helped launch the movement toward intermarket awareness.
The key to understanding the intermarket scenario lies in recognizing the often
overlooked role that the commodity markets play. Those readers who are more
involved with the financial markets, and who have not paid much attention to
the commodity markets, need to learn more about that area. I'll spend some time,
therefore, talking about relationships within the commodity markets themselves, and
then place the commodity group as a whole into the intermarket structure. To perform
the latter task, I'll be employing various commodity indexes, such as the CRB Index.
However, an adequate understanding of the workings of the CRB Index involves
monitoring the workings of certain key commodity sectors, such as the precious
metals, energy, and grain markets.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK 9

KEY MARKET RELATIONSHIPS
These then are the primary intermarket relationships we'll be working on. We'll begin
in the commodity sector and work our way outward into the three other financial
sectors. We'll then extend our horizon to include international markets. The key
relationships
are:
1. Action within commodity groups, such as the relationship of gold to platinum
or crude to heating oil.
2. Action between related commodity groups, such as that between the precious
metals and energy markets.
3. The relationship between the CRB Index and the various commodity groups and
markets.
4. The inverse relationship between commodities and bonds.
5. The positive relationship between bonds and the stock market.
6. The inverse relationship between the U.S. dollar and the various commodity
markets, in particular the gold market.
7. The relationship between various futures markets and related stock market
groups, for example, gold versus gold mining shares.
8. U.S. bonds and stocks versus overseas bond and stock markets.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK
This chapter introduces the concept of intermarket technical analysis and provides
a general foundation for the more specific work to follow. In Chapter 2, the events
leading up to the 1987 stock market crash are used as the vehicle for providing an
intermarket overview of the relationships between the four market sectors. I'll show
how the activity in the commodity and bond markets gave ample warning that the
strength in the stock market going into the fall of that year was on very shaky ground.
hi Chapter 3 the crucial link between the CRB Index and the bond market, which is
the most important relationship in the intermarket picture, will be examined in more
depth. The real breakthrough in intermarket work comes with the recognition of how
commodity markets and bond prices are linked (see Figure 1.3).

Chapter 4 presents the positive relationship between bonds and stocks. More and
more, stock market analysts are beginning to use bond price activity as an important
indication of stock market strength. The link between commodities and the U.S. dollar
will be treated in Chapter 5. Understanding how movements in the U.S. dollar affect
the general commodity price level is helpful in understanding why a rising dollar
is considered bearish for commodity markets and generally positive for bonds and
stocks. In Chapter 6 the activity in the U.S. dollar will then be compared to interest
rate futures.
Chapter 7 will delve into the world of commodities. Various commodity indexes
will be compared for their predictive value and for their respective roles in influencing
the direction of inflation and interest rates. The CRB Index will be examined closely,
as will various commodity subindexes. Other popular commodity gauges, such as
the Journal of Commerce and the Raw Industrial Indexes, will be studied. The
relationship of commodity markets to the Producer Price Index and the Consumer
Price Index will be treated along with an explanation of how the Federal Reserve
Board uses commodity markets in its policy making.
10 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
FIGURE 1.3
BONDS AND COMMODITIES USUALLY TREND IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. THAT INVERSE
RELATIONSHIP CAN BE SEEN DURING 1989 BETWEEN TREASURY BOND FUTURES AND THE
CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX.
Bonds versus CRB Index
International markets will be discussed in Chapter 8, where comparisons will
be made between the U.S. markets and those of the other two world leaders, Britain
and Japan. You'll see why knowing what's happening overseas may prove beneficial
to your investing results. Chapter 9 will look at intermarket relationships from a
different perspective. We'll look at how various inflation and interest-sensitive stock
market groups and individual stocks are affected by activity in the various futures
sectors.
The Dow Jones Utility Average is recognized as a leading indicator of the stock

market. The Utilities are very sensitive to interest rate direction and hence the action
in the bond market. Chapter 10 is devoted to consideration of how the relationship
between bonds and commodities influence the Utility Average and the impact of that
average on the stock market as a whole. I'll show in Chapter 11 how relative strength,
or ratio analysis, can be used as an additional method of comparison between markets
and sectors.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK 11
Chapter 12 discusses how ratio analysis can be employed in the asset allocation
process and also makes the case for treating commodity markets as an asset class
in the asset allocation formula. The business cycle provides the economic backdrop
that determines whether the economy is in a period of expansion or contraction.
The financial markets appear to go through a predictable, chronological sequence of
peaks and troughs depending on the stage of the business cycle. The business cycle
provides some economic rationale as to why the financial and commodity markets
interact the way they do at certain times. We'll look at the business cycle in Chapter
13.
Chapter 14 will consider whether program trading is really a cause of stock
market moves—or, as the evidence seems to indicate, whether program trading is itself
an
effect
of
events
in
other markets. Finally, I'll
try to
pull
all of
these relationships
together in Chapter 15 to provide you with a comprehensive picture of how all of these
intermarket relationships work. It's one thing to look at one or two key relationships;

it's quite another to put the whole thing together in a way that it all makes sense.
I should warn you before we begin that intermarket work doesn't make the work
of an analyst any easier. In many ways, it makes our market analysis more difficult
by forcing us to take much more information into consideration. As in any other
market approach or technique, the messages being sent by the markets aren't always
clear, and sometimes they appear to be in conflict. The most intimidating feature of
intermarket analysis is that it forces us to take in so much more information and to
move into areas that many of us, who have tended to specialize, have never ventured
into before.
The way the world looks at the financial markets is rapidly changing. Instant
communications and the trend toward globalization have tied all of the world markets
together into one big jigsaw puzzle. Every market plays some role in that big puzzle.
The information is there for the taking. The question is no longer whether or not
we should take intermarket comparisons into consideration, but rather how soon we
should begin.
!
2
The 1987 Crash Revisited -
an Intermarket Perspective
The year 1987 is one that most stock market participants would probably rather forget.
The stock market drop in the fall of that year shook the financial markets around the
world and led to a lot of finger pointing as to what actually caused the global equity
collapse. Many took the narrow view that various futures-related strategies, such
as program trading and portfolio insurance, actually caused the selling panic. They
reasoned that there didn't seem to be any economic or technical justification for the
stock collapse. The fact that the equity collapse was global in scope, and not limited
to the U.S. markets, would seem to argue against such a narrow view, however, since
most overseas markets at the time weren't affected by program trading or portfolio
insurance.
In Chapter 14 it will be argued that what is often blamed on program trading is in

reality usually some manifestation of intermarket linkages at work. The more specific
purpose in this chapter is to reexamine the market events leading up to the October
1987 collapse and to demonstrate that, while the stock market itself may have been
taken by surprise, those observers who were monitoring activity in the commodity
and bond markets were aware that the stock market advance during 1987 was on very
shaky ground. In fact, the events of 1987 provide a textbook example of how the
intermarket scenario works and make a compelling argument as to why stock market
participants need to monitor the other three market sectors—the dollar, bonds, and
commodities.
THE LOW-INFLATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE BULL MARKET IN STOCKS
I'll start the examination of the 1987 events by looking at the situation in the commod-
ity markets and the bond market. Two of the main supporting factors behind the bull
market in stocks that began in 1982 were falling commodity prices (lower inflation)
and falling interest rates (rising bond prices). Commodity prices (represented by the
Commodity Research Bureau Index) had been dropping since 1980. Long-term interest
rates topped out in 1981. Going into the 1980s, therefore, falling commodity prices
signaled that the inflationary spiral of the 1970s had ended. The subsequent drop
12
THE LOW-INFLATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE BULL MARKET IN STOCKS 13
in commodity prices and interest rate yields provided a low inflation environment,
which fueled strong bull markets in bonds and stocks.
In later chapters many of these relationships will be examined in more depth.
For now, I'll simply state the basic premise that generally the CRB Index moves in
the same direction as interest rate yields and in the opposite direction of bond prices.
Falling commodity prices are generally bullish for bonds. In turn, rising bond prices
are generally bullish for stocks.
Figure 2.1 shows the inverse relationship between the CRB Index and Treasury
bonds from 1985 through the end of 1987. Going into 1986 bond prices were rising
and commodity prices were falling. In the spring of 1986 the commodity price level
began to level off and formed what later came to be seen as a "left shoulder" in a

major inverse "head and shoulders" bottom that was resolved by a bullish breakout in
the spring of 1987. Two specific events help explain that recovery in the CRB Index
FIGURE 2.1
THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOND PRICES AND COMMODITIES CAN BE SEEN FROM
1985 THROUGH 1987. THE BOND MARKET COLLAPSE IN THE SPRING OF 1987 COINCIDED
WITH A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN COMMODITIES. THE BULLISH "HEAD AND SHOULDERS"
BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX WARNED THAT THE BULLISH "SYMMETRICAL TRIANGLE" IN
BONDS WAS SUSPECT.
Bonds versus CRB Index
14 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE
in 1986. One was the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Russia in April 1986 which
caused strong reflex rallies in many commodity markets. The other factor was that
crude oil prices, which had been in a freefall from $32.00 to $10.00, hit bottom the
same month and began to rally.
Figure 2.1 shows that the actual top in bond prices in the spring of 1986 coin-
-ided with the formation of the "left shoulder" in the CRB Index. (The bond market
is particularly sensitive to trends in the oil market.) The following year saw side-
ways movement in both the bond market and the CRB Index, which eventually led
to major trend reversals in both markets in 1987. What happened during the en-
suing 12 months is a dramatic example not only of the strong inverse relationship
between commodities and bonds but also of why it's so important to take intermarket
comparisons into consideration.
The price pattern that the bond market formed throughout the second half of
1986 and early 1987 was viewed at the time as a bullish "symmetrical triangle."
The pattern is clearly visible in Figure 2.1. Normally, this type of pattern with two
converging trendlines is a continuation pattern, which means that the prior trend
(in this case, the bullish trend) would probably resume. The consensus of technical
opinion at that time was for a bullish resolution of the bond triangle.
On its own merits that bullish interpretation seemed fully justified if the tech-
nical trader had been looking only at the bond market. However, the trader who was

also monitoring the CRB Index should have detected the formation of the potentially
bullish "head and shoulders" bottoming pattern. Since the CRB Index and bond
prices usually trend in opposite directions, something was clearly wrong. If the CRB
index actually broke its 12-month "neckline" and started to rally sharply, it would
b? hard to justify a simultaneous bullish breakout in bonds.
This, then, is an excellent example of two independent technical readings giving
simultaneous bullish interpretations to two markets that seldom move in the same
direction. At the very least the bond bull should have been warned that his bullish
interpretation might be faulty.
Figure 2.1 shows that the bullish breakout by the CRB Index in April 1987 co-
incided with the bearish breakdown in bond prices. It became clear at that point
that two major props under the bull market in stocks (rising bond prices and falling
commodity prices) had been removed. Let's look at what happened between bonds
and stocks.
THE BOND COLLAPSE- A WARNING FOR STOCKS
Figure 2.2 compares the action between bonds and stocks in the three-year period
prior to October 1987. Since 1982 bonds and stocks had been rallying together. Both
markets had undergone a one-year consolidation throughout most of 1986. Early in
1987 stocks began another advance but for the first time in four years, the stock rally
was not confirmed by a similar rally in bonds. What made matters worse was the
bond market collapse in April 1987 (coinciding with the commodity price rally). At
the very least stock traders who were following the course of events in commodities
and bonds were warned that something important had changed and that it was time
to start worrying about stocks.
What about the long lead time between bonds and stocks? It's true that the stock
market peak in August 1987 came four months after the bond market collapse that took
place in April. It's also true that there was a lot of money to be made in stocks during
those four months (provided the trader exited the stock market on time). However,
the action in bonds and commodities warned that it was time to be cautious.
THE BOND COLLAPSE-A WARNING FOR STOCKS 15

FIGURE 2.2
BONDS
USUALLY
PEAK
BEFORE STOCKS.
BONDS
PEAKED
IN
1986
BUT
DIDN'T
START
TO
DROP UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1987. THE COLLAPSE IN BOND PRICES IN APRIL OF 1987 (WHICH
COINCIDED
WITH
AN
UPTURN
IN
COMMODITIES)
WARNED
THAT
THE
STOCK
MARKET
RALLY
(WHICH PEAKED IN AUGUST) WAS ON SHAKY GROUND.
Bonds versus Stocks
Many traditional stock market indicators gave "sell" signals in advance of the
October collapse. Negative divergences were evident in many popular oscillators;

several mechanical systems flashed "sell" signals; a Dow Theory sell signal was given
the week prior to the October crash. The problem was that many technically oriented
traders paid little attention to the bearish signals because many of those signals had
often proven unreliable during the previous five years. The action in the commodity
and bond markets might have suggested giving more credence to the bearish technical
warnings in stocks this time around.
Although the rally in the CRB Index and the collapse in the bond market didn't
provide a specific timing signal as to when to take long profits in stocks, there's
no question that they provided plenty of time for the stock trader to implement a
more defensive strategy. By using intermarket analysis to provide a background that
suggested this stock rally was not on solid footing, the technical trader could have
monitored various stock market technical indicators with the intention of exiting long
positions or taking some appropriate defensive action to protect long profits on the
first sign of breakdowns or divergences in those technical indicators.
16 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE
Figure 2.3 shows bond, commodities, and stocks on one chart for the same three-
year period. This type of chart from 1985 through the end of 1987 clearly shows the
interplay between the three markets. It shows the bullish breakout in the CRB Index,
the simultaneous bearish breakdown in bonds in April 1987, and the subsequent
stock market peak in August of the same year. The rally in the commodity markets
and bond decline had pushed interest rates sharply higher. Probably more than any
other factor, the surge in interest rates during September and October of 1987 (as a
direct result of the action in the other two sectors) caused the eventual downfall of
the stock market.
Figure 2.4 compares Treasury bond yields to the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Notice on the left scale that bond yields rose to double-digit levels (over 10 percent)
in October. This sharp jump in bond yields coincided with a virtual collapse in
the bond market. Market commentators since the crash have cited the interest rate
FIGURE 2.3
A COMPARISON OF BONDS, STOCKS, AND COMMODITIES FROM 1985 THROUGH 1987. THE

STOCK MARKET PEAK IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 WAS FORESHADOWED BY THE RALLY
IN COMMODITIES AND THE DROP IN BOND PRICES DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THAT
YEAR.
Bonds versus Stocks versus CRB Index
THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR 17
FIGURE 2.4
THE SURGE IN BOND YIELDS IN THE SUMMER AND FALL OF 1987 HAD A BEARISH INFLUENCE
ON
STOCKS.
FROM
JULY
TO
OCTOBER
OF
THAT
YEAR, TREASURY
BOND
YIELDS
SURGED
FROM 8.50 PERCENT TO OVER 10.00 PERCENT. THE SURGE IN BOND YIELDS WAS TIED TO
THE COLLAPSING BOND MARKET AND RISING COMMODITIES.
Interest Rates versus Stocks
surge as the primary factor in the stock market selloff. If that's the case, the whole
scenario had begun to play itself out several months earlier in the commodity and
bond markets.
THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR
Attention during this discussion of the events of 1987 has primarily focused on the
commodity, bond, and stock markets. The U.S. dollar played a role as well in the au-
tum of 1987. Figure 2.5 compares the U.S. stock market with the action in the dollar.
It can be seen that a sharp drop in the U.S. currency coincided almost exactly with

the stock market decline. The U.S. dollar had actually been in a bear market since
early 1985. However, for several months prior, the dollar had staged an impressive
rally. There was considerable speculation at the time as to whether or not the dollar
had actually bottomed. As the chart in Figure 2.5 shows, however, the dollar rally
18 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE
FIGURE 2.5
THE FALLING U.S. DOLLAR DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 ALSO WEIGHED ON STOCK
PRICES.
THE
TWIN
PEAKS
IN THE
U.S. CURRENCY
IN
AUGUST
AND
OCTOBER
OF
THAT
YEAR
COINCIDED WITH SIMILAR PEAKS IN THE STOCK MARKET. THE COLLAPSE IN THE U.S. DOLLAR
IN OCTOBER ALSO PARALLELED THE DROP IN EQUITIES.
Stocks versus the Dollar
peaked in August along with the stock market. A second rally failure by the dollar in
October and its subsequent plunge coincided almost exactly with the stock market
selloff. It seems clear that the plunge in the dollar contributed to the weakness in
equities.
Consider the sequence of events going into the fall of 1987. Commodity prices
had turned sharply higher, fueling fears of renewed inflation. At the same time interest
rates began to soar to double digits. The U.S. dollar, which was attempting to end

its two-year bear market, suddenly went into a freefall of its own (fueling even more
inflation fears). Is it any wonder, then, that the stock market finally ran into trouble?
Given all of the bearish activity in the surrounding markets, it's amazing the stock
market held up as well as it did for so long. There were plenty of reasons why
stocks should have sold off in late 1987. Most of those reasons, however, were visible
in the action of the surrounding markets and not necessarily in the stock market
itself.
SUMMARY 19
RECAP OF KEY RELATIONSHIPS
I'll briefly restate the key relationships here as they were demonstrated in 1987. In
subsequent chapters, I'll break down the relationships more finely and examine each
of them in isolation and in more depth. After examining each of them separately, I'll
then put them all back together again.
• Bond prices and commodities usually trend in opposite directions.
• Bonds usually trend in the same direction as stocks. Any serious divergence
between bonds and stocks usually warns of a possible trend reversal in stocks.
• A falling dollar will eventually cause commodity prices to rally which in turn
will have a bearish impact on bonds and stocks. Conversely, a rising dollar will
eventually cause commodity prices to weaken which is bullish for bonds and
stocks.
LEADS AND LAGS IN THE DOLLAR
The role of the dollar in 1987 isn't as convincing as that of bonds and stocks. Despite
its plunge in October 1987, which contributed to stock market weakness, the dollar
had already been falling for over two years. It's important to recognize that although
the dollar plays an important role in the intermarket picture, long lead times must
at times be taken into consideration. For example, the dollar topped in the spring
of 1985. That peak in the dollar started a chain of events in motion and led to the
eventual bottom in the CRB Index and tops in bonds and stocks. However, the bottom
in the commodity index didn't take place until a year after the dollar peak. A falling
dollar becomes bearish for bonds and stocks when its inflationary impact begins to

push commodity prices higher.
Although my analysis begins with the dollar, it's important to recognize that
there's really no starting point in intermarket work. The dollar affects commodity
prices, which affect interest rates, which in turn affect the dollar. A period of falling
interest rates (1981—1986) will eventually cause the dollar to weaken (1985); the
weaker dollar will eventually cause commodities to rally (1986—1987) along with
higher interest rates, which is bearish for bonds and stocks (1987). Eventually the
higher interest rates will pull the dollar higher, commodities and interest rates will
peak, exerting a bullish influence on bonds and stocks, and the whole cycle starts
over again.
Therefore, it is possible to have a falling dollar along with falling commodity
prices and rising financial assets for a period of time. The trouble starts when com-
modities turn higher. Of the four sectors that we will be examining, the role of the
U.S. dollar is probably the least precise and the one most difficult to pin down.
SUMMARY
The events of 1987 provided a textbook example of how the financial markets in-
terrelate with each other and also an excellent vehicle for an overview of the four
market sectors. I'll return to this time period in Chapters 8, 10, and 13, which dis-
cuss various other intermarket features, such as the business cycle, the international
markets, and the leading action of the Dow Jones Utility Average. Let's now take a
closer look at the most important relationship in the intermarket picture: the linkage
between commodities and bonds.
3
Commodity Prices and Bonds
Of all the intermarket relationships explored in this book, the link between
commodity markets and the Treasury bond market is the most important. The
commodity-bond link is the fulcrum on which the other relationships are built.
It is this inverse relationship between the commodity markets (represented by the
Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index) and Treasury bond prices that
provides the breakthrough linking commodity markets and the financial sector.

Why is this so important? If a strong link can be established between the
commodity sector and the bond sector, then a link can also be established between
the commodity markets and the stock market because the latter is influenced to a
large extent by bond prices. Bond and stock prices are both influenced by the dollar.
However, the dollar's impact on bonds and stocks comes through the commodity
sector. Movements in the dollar influence commodity prices. Commodity prices
influence bonds, which then influence stocks. The key relationship that binds all
four sectors together is the link between bonds and commodities. To understand why
this is the case brings us to the critical question of inflation.
THE KEY IS INFLATION
The reason commodity prices are so important is because of their role as a leading
indicator of inflation. In Chapter 7, I'll show how commodity markets lead other
popular inflation gauges such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer
Price Index (PPI) by several months. We'll content ourselves here with the general
statement that rising commodity prices are inflationary, while falling commodity
prices are non-inflationary. Periods of inflation are also characterized by rising
interest rates, while noninflationary periods experience falling interest rates. During
the 1970s soaring commodity markets led to double-digit inflation and interest rate
yields in excess of 20 percent. The commodity markets peaked out in 1980 and
declined for six years, ushering in a period of disinflation and falling interest rates.
The major premise of this chapter is that commodity markets trend in the same
direction as Treasury bond yields and in the opposite direction of bond prices. Since
the early 1970s every major turning point in long-term interest rates has been ac-
companied by or preceded by a major turn in the commodity markets in the same
direction. Figure 3.1 shows that the CRB Index and interest rates rose simultaneously
20
THE KEY IS INFLATION 21
FIGURE 3.1
A DEMONSTRATION OF THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND
10-YEAR TREASURY YIELDS

FROM
1973
THROUGH
1987.
(SOURCE-
CRB
INDEX WHITE
PAPER:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING APPLICATIONS FOR CRB INDEX
FUTURES, PREPARED
BY
POWERS
RESEARCH, INC.,
30
MONTGOMERY
STREET,
JERSEY
CITY,
NJ 07302, MARCH 1988.)
CRB Index versus 10-Year Treasuries
(Monthly averages from 1973 to 1987)
during the early 1970s, trended sideways together from 1974 to 1977, and then rose
dramatically into 1980. In late 1980 commodity prices began to drop sharply. Bond
yields topped out a year later in 1981. Commodities and bond yields dropped together
to mid-1986 when both measures troughed out together.
For those readers who are unfamiliar with Treasury bond pricing, it's important
to recognize that bond prices and bond yields move in opposite directions. When
Treasury bond yields are rising (during a period of rising inflation like the 1970s),
bond prices fall. When bond yields are falling (during a period of disinflation like
the early 1980s), bond prices are rising. This is how the inverse relationship between

bond prices and commodity prices is established. If it can be shown that interest rate
yields and commodity prices trend in the same direction, and if it is understood that
bond yields and bond prices move in opposite directions, then it follows that bond
prices and commodity prices trend in opposite directions.
COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
It isn't necessary to understand why these economic relationships exist All that
is necessary is the demonstration that they do exist and the application of that
knowledge m trading decisions. The purpose in this and succeeding chapters is to
demonstrate that these relationships do exist and can be used to advantage in market
analysis. However, it is comforting to know that there are economic explanations as
to why commodities ana interest rates move in the same direction
During a period of economic expansion, demand for raw materials increases
along with the demand for money to fuel the economic expansion. As a result
prices of commodities rise along with the price of money (interest rates). A period of
rising commodity prices arouses fears of inflation which prompts monetary author-
ities to raise interest rates to combat that inflation. Eventually, the rise in interest rates
chokes off the economic expansion which leads to the inevitable economic slow-
down and recession. During the recession demand for raw materials and money
decreases, resulting in lower commodity prices and interest rates. Although it's
not the mam concern in this chapter, it should also be obvious that activity in
the bond and commodity markets can tell a lot about which way the economy is heading
MARKET HISTORY IN THE 1980s
Comparison of the bond and commodity markets begins with the events leading up
to and
following
the
major
turning points
of the

1980-1981
period which ended
the
inflationary spiral of the 1970s and began the disinflationary period of the 1980s
This provides a useful background for closer scrutiny of the market action of the past
five years. The major purpose in this chapter is simply to demonstrate that a strong
inverse relationship exists between the CRB Index and the Treasury bond market
:o suggest ways that the trader or analyst could have used this information to
advantage Since the focus is on the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index
a bnet explanation is necessary.
The CRB Index, which was created by the Commodity Research Bureau in
1956, Presents a basket of 21 actively-traded commodity markets. It is the most
widely-watched barometer of general commodity price trends and is regarded as
the commodity markets' equivalent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It includes
grams livestock, tropical, metals, and energy markets. It uses 1967 as its base
year. While other commodity indexes provide useful trending information, the wide
acceptance of the CRB Index as the main barometer of the commodity markets, the
tact that all of its components are traded on futures markets, and the fact that it is the
only commodity index that is also a futures contract itself make it the logical choice
for intermarket comparisons. In Chapter 7, I'll explain the CRB Index in more depth
and compare it to some other commodity indexes.
The 1970s witnessed virtual explosions in the commodity markets, which led
to spiraling inflation and rising interest rates. From 1971 to 1980 the CRB Index
appreciated in value by approximately 250 percent. During that same period of time
bond yields appreciated by about 150 percent. In November of 1980, however a
collapse in the CRB Index signaled the end of the inflationary spiral and began the
disinflationary period of the 1980s. (An even earlier warning of an impending top in
the commodity markets was sounded by the precious metals markets which began to
fall during the first quartet of 1980.). Long-term bond rates continued to rise into the
middle of 1981 before finally peaking in September of that year

MARKET HISTORY IN THE 1980s 23
The 1970s had been characterized by rising commodity prices and a weak bond
market. In the six years after the 1980 peak, the CRB Index lost 40 percent of its
value while bond yields dropped by about half. The inflation rate descended from
the 12—13 percent range at the beginning of the 1980s to its lowpoint of 2 percent in
1986. The 1980 peak in the CRB Index set the stage for the major bottom in bonds
the following year (1981). A decade later the 1980 top in the CRB Index and the 1981
bottom in the bond market have still not been challenged.
The disinflationary period starting in 1980 saw falling commodity markets along
with falling interest rates (see Figure 3.1). One major interruption of those trends took
place from the end of 1982 through early 1984, when the CRB Index recovered about
half of its earlier losses. Not surprisingly during that same time period interest rates
rose. In mid-1984, however, the CRB index resumed its major downtrend. At the same
time that the CRB Index was resuming its decline, bond yields started the second leg
of their decline that lasted for another two years. Figure 3.2 compares the CRB Index
and bond yields on a rate of change basis.
FIGURE 3.2
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND YIELDS CAN BE SEEN ON A
12-MONTH
RATE
OF
CHANGE
BASIS
FROM
1964
TO
1986. (SOURCE:
COMMODITY
RESEARCH
BUREAU,

75
WALL
STREET,
NEW
YORK,
N.Y.
10005.)
Rate of Change-CRB Futures Index and
Long-Term Yields (12-Month Trailing)
24 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
Although the focus of this chapter is on the relationship of commodities and
bonds, it should be mentioned at this point that the 1980 peak in the commodity
markets was accompanied by a major bottom in the U.S. dollar, a subject that
is explained in Chapter 5. The bottom in the bond market during 1981 and the
subsequent upside breakout in 1982 helped launch the major bull market in stocks
that began the same year. It's instructive to point out here that the action in the dollar
played an important role in the reversals in commodity and bonds in 1980 and 1981
and that the stock market was the eventual beneficiary of the events in those other
three markets.
The rising bond market and falling CRB Index reflected disinflation during the
early 1980s and provided a supportive environment for financial assets at the expense
of hard assets. That all began to change, however, in 1986. In another example of the
linkage between the CRB Index and bonds, both began to change direction in 1986.
The commodity price level began to level off after a six-year decline. Interest rates
bottomed at the same time and the bond market peaked. I discussed in Chapter 2 the
beginning of the "head and shoulders" bottom that began to form in the CRB Index
during 1986 and the warning that bullish pattern gave of the impending top in the
bond market. Although the collapse in the bond market in early 1987, accompanied
by a sharp rally in the CRB Index, provided a dramatic example of their inverse
relationship, there's no need to repeat that analysis here. Instead, attention will be

focused on the events following the 1987 peak in bonds and the bottom in the CRB
Index to see if the intermarket linkage holds up.
BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS
Figures 3.3 through 3.8 provide different views of the price action of bonds versus
the CRB Index since 1987. Figure 3.3 provides a four-year view of the interaction
between bond yields and the CRB Index from the end of 1985 into the second half
of 1989. Although not a perfect match it can be seen that both lines generally rose
and fell together. Figure 3.4 uses bond prices in place of yields for the same time
span. The three major points of interest on this four-year chart are the major peak in
bonds and the bottom in the CRB Index in the spring of 1987, the major spike in the
CRB Index in mid-1988 (caused by rising grain prices resulting from the midwestern
drought in the United States) during which time the bond market remained on the
defensive, and finally the rally in the bond market and the accompanying decline in
the CRB Index going into the second half of 1989. This chart shows that the inverse
relationship between the CRB Index and bonds held up pretty well during that time
period.
Figure 3.5 provides a closer view of the 1987 price trends and demonstrates
- the inverse relationship between the CRB Index and bond prices during that year.
The first half of 1987 saw strong commodity markets and a falling bond market.
Going into October the bond market was falling sharply while commodity prices were
firming. The strong rebound in bond prices in late-October (reflecting a flight to safety
during that month's stock market crash) witnessed a sharp pullback in commodities.
Commodities then rallied during November while bonds weakened. In an unusual
development both markets then rallied together into early 1988. That situation didn't
last long, however.
Figure 3.6 shows that early in January of 1988 bonds rallied sharply into March
while the CRB Index sold off sharply, hi March, bonds peaked and continued to drop
into August. The March peak in bonds coincided with a major lowpoint in the CRB
BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 25
FIGURE 3.3

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND YIELDS FROM 1986 TO 1989.
INTEREST
RATES
AND
COMMODITY
PRICES
USUALLY TREND
IN THE
SAME
DIRECTION.
Long-Term Interest Rates versus CRB Index
Index which then rallied sharply into July. Whereas the first quarter of 1988 had seen
a firm bond market and falling commodity markets, the spring and early summer saw
surging commodity markets and a weak bond market. This surge in the CRB Index
was caused mainly by strong grain and soybean markets, which rallied on a severe
drought in the midwestern United States, culminating in a major peak in the CRB
Index in July. The bond market didn't hit bottom until August, over a month after the
CRB Index had peaked out.
Figure 3.7 shows the events from October 1988 to October 1989 and provides a
closer look at the way bonds and commodities trended in opposite directions during
those 12 months. The period from the fall of 1988 to May of 1989 was a period
of indecision in both markets. Both went through a period of consolidation with
no clear trend direction. Figure 3.7 shows that even during this period of relative
trendlessness, peaks in one market tended to coincide with troughs in the other. The
final bottom in the bond market took place during March which coincides with an
important peak in the CRB Index.
The most dramatic manifestation of the negative linkage between the two markets
during 1989 was the breakdown in the CRB Index during May, which coincided with
26 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.4

THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND PRICES CAN
BE SEEN FROM 1986 TO 1989.
Bond Prices versus CRB Index
BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 27
FIGURE 3.5
EVEN
DURING
THE
HECTIC
TRADING
OF
1987,
THE
TENDENCY
FOR
COMMODITY
PRICES
AND TREASURY BOND PRICES TO TREND IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION CAN BE SEEN.
CRB Index versus Bond Prices
1987
28 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.6
BOND PRICES AND COMMODITIES TRENDED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS DURING 1988. THE
BOND PEAK DURING THE FIRST QUARTER COINCIDED WITH A SURGE IN COMMODITIES.
THE
COMMODITY
PEAK
IN
JULY
PRECEDED

A
BOTTOM
IN
BONDS
A
MONTH
LATER.
CRB Index versus Bonds
1988
BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 29
FIGURE 3.7
THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND BOND PRICES CAN BE SEEN
FROM THE THIRD QUARTER Of 1988 THROUGH THE
T
HIRD QUARTER OF 1989. THE
CORRESPONDING PEAKS AND TROUGHS ARE MARKED BY VERTICAL LINES. THE BREAKDOWN
IN COMMODITIES DURING MAY OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH A MAJOR BULLISH BREAKOUT IN
BONDS. IN AUGUST OF 1989, A BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX COINCIDED WITH A PEAK IN
BONDS.
CRB Index versus Bonds
1989
30 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.8
THE POSITIVE LINK BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND BOND YIELDS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE
THIRD QUARTER OF 1988 TO THE THIRD QUARTER Of 1989. BOTH MEASURES DROPPED
SHARPLY DURING MAY OF 1989 AND BOTTOMED TOGETHER IN AUGUST.
CRB Index versus Bonds
1989
an upside breakout in bonds during that same month. Notice that to the far right of
the chart in Figure 3.7 a rally beginning in the CRB Index during the first week in

August 1989 coincided exactly with a pullback in the bond market.
Figure 3.8 turns the picture around and compares the CRB Index to bond yields
during that same 12-month period from late 1988 to late 1989. Notice how closely
the CRB Index and Treasury bond yields tracked each other during that period of
time. The breakdown in the CRB Index in May correctly signaled a new downleg in
interest rates.
HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION
So far, the inverse relationship between bonds and the CRB Index has been demon-
strated. Now some practical ways that a technical analyst can use this inverse rela-
tionship to some advantage will be shown. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 are monthly charts
of the CRB Index and nearby Treasury bond futures. The indicator along the bottom
of both charts is a 14-month stochastics oscillator. For those not familiar with this
indicator, when the dotted line crosses below the solid line and the lines are above
75, a sell signal is given. When the dotted line crosses over the solid line and both
lines are below 25, a buy signal is given.
Notice that buy signals in one market are generally accompanied (or followed)
by a sell signal in the other. Therefore, the concept of confirmation is carried a
step further. A buy signal in the CRB Index should be confirmed by a sell signal
in bonds. Conversely, a buy signal in bonds should be confirmed by a sell signal
in the CRB Index. We're now using signals in a related market as a confirming in-
dicator of signals in another market. Sometimes a signal in one market will act as
a leading indicator for the other. When two markets that usually trend in opposite
HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION 31
FIGURE 3.9
A MONTHLY CHART OF THE CRB INDEX FROM 1975 THROUGH AUGUST, 1989. THE
INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. MAJOR
TURNING POINTS
CAN BE
SEEN
IN

1980,1982,1984,1986,
AND
1988. MAJOR TREND SIGNALS
IN THE CRB INDEX SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OPPOSITE SIGNALS IN THE BOND MARKET.
(SOURCE: COMMODITY TREND SERVICE, P. O. BOX 32309, PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA
33420.)
CRB Index-Monthly
32 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.10
MONTHLY CHART OF TREASURY BOND FUTURES FROM 1978 THROUGH AUGUST, 1989. THE
INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. MAJOR
TURNING
POINTS
CAN
BE
SEEN
IN
1981,1983,1984,1986,
AND
1987.
BUY AND
SELL
SIGNALS
ON THE TREASURY BOND CHART SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OPPOSITE SIGNALS IN THE
CRB
INDEX.
(SOURCE:
COMMODITY
TREND
SERVICE,

P.O.
BOX
32309,
PALM BEACH GARDENS,
FLORIDA 33420.)
T-Bonds Monthly Nearest Futures Contract
directions give simultaneous buy signals or simultaneous sell signals, the trader
knows something is wrong and should be cautious of the signals.
The analysis of the stochastics signals will be supplemented with simple
trendline and breakout analysis. Notice that at the 1980 top in Figure 3.9, the monthly
stochastics oscillator gave a major sell signal for commodity prices. The sell signal
was preceded by a major negative divergence in the stochastics oscillator which then
turned down in late 1980. The actual breaking of the major uptrend line in the CRB
Index didn't occur until June of 1981. From November of 1980 until September of
1981, bond and commodities dropped together. However, the CRB collapse warned
that that situation wouldn't last for long. Bonds actually bottomed in September
of 1981 when the stochastics oscillator also started to turn up and the inverse
relationship reestablished itself.
HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION 33
The next major turn in the CRB Index took place in late 1982, when a major down
trendline was broken, and commodities turned higher. The bond market started to
drop sharply within a couple of months. In June 1984 the CRB Index broke its up
trendline and gave a stochastics sell signal. A month later the bond market began a
major advance supported by a stochastics buy signal.
Moving ahead to 1986, a stochastics sell signal in bonds was followed by a buy
signal in the CRB Index. This buy signal in the CRB Index lasted until mid-1988, when
commodity prices peaked. A CRB sell signal was followed by a trendline breakdown
in the spring of 1989. Bonds had given an original buy signal in late 1987 and gave
a repeat buy signal in early 1989. The late 1987 buy signal in bonds preceded the
mid-1988 CRB sell signal. However, it wasn't until mid-1988, when the CRB Index

gave its stochastics sell signal, that bonds actually began a serious rally.
Figure 3.11 shows that the May 1989 breakdown in the CRB Index coincided
exactly with a bullish breakout in bonds. That bearish "descending triangle" in the
CRB Index provided a hint that commodity prices were headed lower and bonds
higher. Going into late 1989 the bond market had reached a major resistance area
FIGURE 3.11
THE "DESCENDING TRIANGLE" IN THE CRB INDEX FORMED DURING THE FIRST HALF OF
1989 GAVE ADVANCE WARNING OF FALLING COMMODITIES AND RISING BOND PRICES.
THE BEARISH BREAKDOWN IN COMMODITIES IN MAY OF THAT YEAR COINCIDED WITH A
BULLISH BREAKOUT IN BONDS. AS THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989 BEGAN, COMMODITIES
WERE RALLYING AND BONDS WERE WEAKENING. '
Treasury Bonds
34 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.12
A COMPARISON OF WEEKLY CHARTS OF TREASURY BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM
1986 TO OCTOBER OF 1989. IN EARLY 1987 RISING COMMODITIES WERE BEARISH FOR
BONDS.
IN
MID-1988
A
COMMODITY
PEAK
PROVED
TO BE
BULLISH
FOR
BONDS. ENTERING
THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989, RISING BONDS WERE BACKING OFF FROM MAJOR
RESISTANCE NEAR 100 WHILE THE FALLING CRB INDEX WAS BOUNCING OFF SUPPORT NEAR
220.

Treasury Bonds
200 Weeks
near 100. At the same time the CRB Index had reached a major support level near 220.
Those two events, occurring at the same time, suggested at the time that bonds were
overbought and due for some weakness while the commodity markets were oversold
and due for a bounce.
To the far right of Figure 3.11, the simultaneous pullback in bonds and the bounce
in the CRB Index can be seen. Figure 3.12, a weekly chart of bonds and the CRB Index
from 1986 to 1989, shows bonds testing overhead resistance near 100 in the summer
of 1989 at the same time that the CRB Index is testing support near 220.
LINKING TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES AND BONDS
The purpose of the preceding exercise was simply to demonstrate the practical
application of intermarket analysis. Those readers who are more experienced in
technical analysis will no doubt see many more applications that are possible. The
THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERM RATES 35
message itself is relatively simple. If it can be shown that two markets generally trend
in opposite directions, such as the CRB Index and Treasury bonds, that information
is extremely valuable to participants in both markets. It isn't my intention to claim
that one market always leads the other, but simply to show that knowing what
is happening in the commodity sector provides valuable information for the bond
market. Conversely, knowing which way the bond market is most likely to trend tells
the commodity trader a lot about which way the commodity markets are likely to
trend. This type of combined analysis can be performed on monthly, weekly, daily,
. and even intraday charts.
THE USE OF RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS
There is another technical tool which is especially helpful in comparing bond prices
to commodity prices: relative strength, or ratio, analysis. Ratio analysis, where one
market is divided by the other, enables us to compare the relative strength between
two markets and provides another useful visual method for comparing bonds and
the CRB Index. Ratio analysis will be briefly introduced in this section but will be

covered more extensively in Chapters 11 and 12.
Figure 3.13 is divided into two parts. The upper portion is an overlay chart of
the CRB Index and bonds for the three-year period from late 1986 to late 1989. The
bottom chart is a ratio of the CRB Index divided by the bond market. When the line is
rising, such as during the periods from March to October of 1987 and from March to
July of 1988, commodity prices are outperforming bonds, and inflation pressures are
intensifying. In this environment financial markets like bonds and stocks are generally
under pressure. A major peak in the ratio line in the summer of 1988 marked the top
of a two-year rise in the ratio and signaled the peak in inflation pressures. Financial
markets strengthened from that point. (Popular inflation gauges such as the Consumer
Price Index—CPI—and the Producer Price Index—PPI— didnt peak until early 1989,
almost half a year later.)
In mid-1989 the ratio line broke down again from a major sideways pattern and
signaled another significant shift in the commodity-bond relationship. The falling
ratio line signaled that inflation pressures were waning even more, which was bearish
for commodities, and that the pendulum was swinging toward the financial markets.
Both bonds and stocks rallied strongly from that point.
THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERM RATES
All interest rates move in the same direction. It would seem, then, that the positive
relationship between the CRB Index and long-term bond yields should also apply
to shorter-term rates, such as 90-day Treasury bill and Eurodollar rates. Short-term
interest rates are more volatile than long-term rates and are more responsive to changes
in monetary policy. Attempts by the Federal Reserve Board to fine-tune monetary
policy, by increasing or decreasing liquidity in the banking system, are reflected more
in short-term rates, such as the overnight Federal funds rate or the 90-day Treasury Bill
rate, than in 10-year Treasury note and 30-year bond rates which are more influenced
by longer range inflationary expectations. It should come as no surprise then that the
CRB Index correlates better with Treasury notes and bonds, with longer maturities,
than with Treasury bills, which have much shorter maturities.
Even with this caveat, it's a good idea to keep an eye on what Treasury bill and

Eurodollar futures prices are doing. Although movements in these short-term rate
markets are much more volatile than those of bonds, turning points in T-bill and
36 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
FIGURE 3.13
THE BOTTOM CHART IS A RATIO OF THE CRB INDEX DIVIDED BY TREASURY BOND PRICES
FROM 1987 THROUGH OCTOBER 1989. A RISING RATIO SHOWS THAT COMMODITIES ARE
OUTPERFORMING BONDS AND IS INFLATIONARY. A. FALLING RATIO FAVORS BONDS OVER
COMMODITIES AND IS NONINFLATIONARY.
Bonds versus CRB Index
Eurodollar futures usually coincide with turning points in bonds and often pinpoint
important trend reversals in the latter. When tracking the movement in the Treasury
bond market for a good entry point, very often the actual signal can be found in the
shorter-term T-bill and Eurodollar markets.
As a rule of thumb, all three markets should be trending in the same direction.
It's not a good idea to buy bonds while T-bill and Eurodollar prices are falling. Wait
for the T-bill and Eurodollar markets to turn first in the same direction of bonds
before initiating a new long position in the bond market. To carry the analysis a step
further, if turns in short-term rate futures provide useful clues to turns in bond prices,
then short-term rate markets also provide clues to turns in commodity prices, which
usually go in the opposite direction.
THE IMPORTANCE OF T-BILL ACTION
One example of how T-bills, T-bonds, and the CRB Index are interrelated can be seen
in Figure 3.14. This chart compares the prices of T-bill futures and T-bond futures in
the upper chart with the CRB Index in the lower chart from the end of 1987 to late
THE IMPORTANCE OF T-BILL ACTION 37
FIGURE 3.14
THE UPPER CHART COMPARES PRICES OF TREASURY BILLS AND TREASURY BONDS. THE
BOTTOM CHART COMPARES THE CRB INDEX TO PRICES IN THE UPPER CHART. MAJOR
TURNING POINTS IN TREASURY BILLS CAN BE HELPFUL IN PINPOINTING TURNS IN BONDS
AND THE CRB

INDEX. DURING MARCH
OF
1988,
BILLS
AND
BONDS TURNED
DOWN
TOGETHER (WHILE COMMODITIES BOTTOMED). IN THE SPRING OF 1989, A MAJOR UPTURN
IN T-BILLS MARKED A BOTTOM IN BONDS AND WARNED OF AN IMPENDING BREAKDOWN
IN COMMODITIES.
Treasury Bonds versus Treasury Bills
1988/1989
1989. It can be seen that bonds and bills trend in the same direction and turn at the
same time but that T-bill prices swing much more widely than bonds. To the upper
left of Figure 3.14, both turned down in March of 1988. This downturn in T-bills
and T-bonds coincided with a major upturn in the CRB Index, which rose over 20
percent in the next four months to its final peak in mid-1988.
The bond market hit bottom in August of the same year but was unable to gain
much ground. This sideways period in the bond market over the ensuing six months
coincided with similar sideways activity in the CRB Index. Treasury bill prices con-
tinued to drop sharply into March of 1989. It wasn't until T-bill futures put in a
bottom in March of 1989 and broke a tight down trendline that the bond market
began to rally seriously. The upward break of a one-year down trendline by T-bill
futures two months later in May of 1989 coincided exactly with a major bullish
Ratio of CRB Index Divided by Bond Prices
CRB Index
38 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS
breakout in bond futures. At the same time the CRB was resolving its trading range on
the downside by dropping to the lowest level since the spring of the previous year.
In this case, the bullish turnaround in the T-bill market in March of 1989 did two

things. It gave the green light to bond bulls to begin buying bonds more aggressively,
and it set in motion the eventual bullish breakout in bonds and the bearish breakdown
in the CRB Index.
"WATCH EVERYTHING"
The preceding discussion illustrates that important information in the bond market
can be found by monitoring the trend action in the T-Bill market. It's another example
of looking to a related market for directional clues. To carry this analysis another step,
T-Bills and Eurodollars also trend in the same direction. Therefore, when monitoring
the short-term rate markets, it's advisable to track both T-Bill and Eurodollar markets
to ensure that both of them are confirming each other's actions. Treasury notes, which
cover maturities from 2 to 10 years and lie between the maturities of the 90-day T-bills
and 30-year bonds on the interest rate yield curve, should also be followed closely
for trend indications. In other words, watch everything. You never know where the
next clue will come from.
The focus of the previous paragraphs was on the necessity of monitoring all
of the interest rate markets from the shorter to the longer range maturities to find
clues to interest rate direction. Then that analysis is put into the intermarket picture
to see how it fits with our commodity analysis. A bullish forecast in interest rate
futures should be accompanied by a bearish forecast on the commodity markets.
Otherwise, something is out of line. This chapter has concentrated on the CRB
Index as a proxy for the commodity markets. However, the CRB Index represents a
basket of 21 active commodity markets. Some of those markets are important in their
own right as inflation indicators and often play a dominant role in the intermarket
picture.
' Gold and oil are two markets that are inflation-sensitive and that, at times, can
play a decisive role in the intermarket picture. Sometimes the bond market will
respond in the opposite direction to any strong trending action by either or both of
those two markets. At other times, such as in the spring of 1988, during the worst
drought in half a century, the grain markets in Chicago can dominate. It's necessary
to monitor activity in each of the commodity markets as well as the CRB Index. The

respective roles of the individual commodities will be discussed in Chapter 7.
SOME CORRELATION NUMBERS
This work so far has been based on visual comparisons. Statistical analysis appears to
confirm what the charts are showing, namely that there is a strong negative correlation
between the CRB Index and bond prices. A study prepared by Powers Research, Inc.
(Jersey City, NJ 07302), entitled The CRB Index White Paper: An Investigation into
Non-Traditional Trading Applications for CRB Index Futures (March, 1988), reported
the results of correlation analysis over several time periods between the CRB Index
and the other financial sectors. The results showed that over the 10 years from 1978
to 1987, the CRB Index had an 82 percent positive correlation with 10-year Treasury
yields with a lead time of four months.
In the five years from 1982 to 1987, the correlation was an even more impressive
+92 percent. Besides providing statistical evidence supporting the linkage between
SUMMARY 39
the CRB Index and bond yields, the study also suggests that, at least during the time
span under study, the CRB Index led turns in bond yields by an average of four
months.
In a more recent work, the CRB Index Futures Reference Guide (New York Futures
Exchange, 1989), correlation comparisons are presented between prices of the CRB
Index futures contract and bond futures prices. In this case, since the comparison
was made with bond prices instead of bond yields, a negative correlation should
have been present. In the period from June 1988 to June 1989, a negative correlation
of -91 percent existed between CRB Index futures and bond futures, showing that
the negative linkage held up very well during those 12 months.
The 1989 study provided another interesting statistic which takes us to our next
step in the intermarket linkage and the subject of the next chapter—the relationship
between bonds and stocks. During that same 12-month period, from June 1988 to June
1989, the statistical correlation between bond futures prices and futures prices of the
New York Stock Exchange Composite Index was +94 percent. During that 12-month
span, bond prices showed a negative 91 percent correlation to commodities and a

positive 94 percent correlation to stocks, which demonstrates the fulcrum effect of
the bond market alluded to earlier in the chapter.
The numbers also demonstrate why so much importance is placed on the inverse
relationship between bonds and the commodity markets. If the commodity markets
are linked to bonds and bonds are linked to stocks, then the commodity markets
become indirectly linked to stocks through their influence on the bond market. It
follows that if stock market traders want to analyze the bond market (and they should),
it also becomes necessary to monitor the commodity markets.
SUMMARY
This chapter presented graphic and statistical evidence that commodity prices,
represented by the CRB Index, trend in the same direction as Treasury bond yields and
in the opposite direction of bond prices. Technical analysis of bonds or commodities
is incomplete without a corresponding technical analysis of the other. The relative
strength between bonds and the CRB Index, arrived at by ratio analysis, also provides
useful information as to which way inflation is trending and whether or not the
investment climate favors financial or hard assets.
4
Bonds Versus Stocks
In the previous chapter, the inverse relationship between bonds and commodities was
studied. In this chapter, another vital link will be added to the intermarket chain in
order to study the positive relationship between bonds and common stocks. The stock
market is influenced by many factors. Two of the most important are the direction of
inflation and interest rates. As a general rule of thumb, rising interest rates are bearish
for stocks; falling interest rates are bullish. Put another way, a rising bond market is
generally bullish for stocks. Conversely, a falling bond market is generally bearish for
stocks. It can also be shown that bonds often act as a leading indicator of stocks. The
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the strong positive linkage between bonds
and stocks and to suggest that a technical analysis of stocks is incomplete without a
corresponding analysis of the bond market.
Treasury bond futures, which have become the most actively traded futures con-

tract in the world, were launched at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1977. In keeping
with the primary focus on the futures markets, our attention in this chapter will be
concentrated on the period since then, with special emphasis on the events of the
1980s. Toward the end of the book, a glance backward a bit further will reveal a larger
historical perspective.
FINANCIAL MARKETS ON THE DEFENSIVE
As Chapter 3 suggested, the 1970s were a period of rising inflation and rising interest
rates. It was the decade for tangible assets. Bond prices had been dropping sharply
since 1977 and continued to do so until 1981. The weight of rising commodity prices
kept downward pressure on bond prices as the 1970s ended. During that decade, bond
market troughs in 1970 and 1974 preceded trading bottoms in the equity markets. A
bond market top in 1977, however, pushed stock prices lower that year and kept the
stock market relatively dormant through the end of the decade. In 1980 a major top in
the commodity prices set the stage for a significant bullish turnaround in bond prices
in 1981. This bullish turnaround in bonds set the stage for the major bull market in
stocks that started in 1982.
To put things in proper perspective, the period from 1977 to 1980 was also
characterized by a falling U.S. dollar, which boosted inflation pressures and kept
downward pressure on the bond market. The U.S. dollar bottomed out in 1980, which
THE BOND MARKET BOTTOM OF 1981 AND THE STOCK BOTTOM OF 1982 41
was mainly responsible for the bearish top in the commodity sector. The rising dollar
in the early 1980s provided a supportive influence for financial assets like bonds and
stocks and was mainly responsible for the swing away from tangible assets.
THE BOND MARKET BOTTOM OF 1981
AND THE STOCK BOTTOM OF 1982
The comparison of bonds and stocks will begin with the events surrounding the 1981
bottom in bonds and the 1982 bottom in stocks. Then a gradual analysis through the
simultaneous bull markets in both sectors culminating in the events of 1987 and 1989
will be given. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are monthly charts of Treasury bonds and the Dow
FIGURE 4.1

MONTHLY CHART OF TREASURY BOND FUTURES FROM 1978 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1989.
THE INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. A
MONTHLY CHART IS HELPFUL IN IDENTIFYING MAJOR TURNING POINTS. TURNS IN THE
BOND MARKET USUALLY PRECEDE SIMILAR TURNS IN THE STOCK MARKET. THE BOTTOM IN
BONDS IN 1981 GAVE AN EARLY WARNING OF THE MAJOR BULL MARKET THAT BEGAN IN
STOCKS THE FOLLOWING YEAR. (SOURCE : COMMODITY TREND SERVICE, P.O. BOX 32309,
PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA 33420.)
T-Bonds Monthly