Searching for new security paradigms israel and south koreas defense transformation

SEARCHING FOR NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS:
ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA’S DEFENSE
TRANSFORMATION (1990-2011)


BY


MICHAEL RASKA


A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHTY

LEE KUAN YEW SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE







OCTOBER, 2011









ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

This dissertation has evolved throughout my studies, research, and experiences in South
Korea, Israel, and Singapore. In all three states, strategic and defense studies in the context of
public policy have been of crucial importance, given the many critical factors that have
historically shaped their military and security situation. Accordingly, understanding the
complexity in the continuity and change of their security paradigms, defense strategies,
operational concepts, and evolving security challenges cannot be accomplished without the

close consultation of selected policy practitioners, military officers and soldiers, defense
analysts, leading academics, and journalists that have devoted their professional lives to
ensure the continued existence and security of their nation-states. This dissertation thus
inevitably treads along signposts and paths mapped out by others, who have provided me with
insightful comments, thoughts, and observations that sharpened my ideas, concepts, and
widened my intellectual horizons. While any errors in this dissertation are mine, and mine
alone, the following lines are dedicated to a number of special individuals; for their undivided
support, encouragement, expertise and trusted advice.

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my three
mentors, who have guided me at various stages on my dissertation journey: Chung Min Lee,
Darryl S. Jarvis, and Richard Bitzinger. Long established in their respective fields and areas,
each has had a profound influence on this project. Prof. Lee, Dean of the Graduate School of
International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul has been at the conceptual genesis of this
thesis, suggesting the idea for a comparative study of Israeli and South Korean Air Power
strategies, as a way to enhance the emerging air power studies in Korea. Moreover, Prof. Lee
has defined my historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented foundations in security studies, and
served as my intellectual beacon for more than a decade. Prof. Jarvis at the Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, has been my main thesis advisor,
reading every chapter draft, and providing critical advice on the organizational structure,
research methodology, and nearly all other aspects of the dissertation. In doing so, Prof.
Jarvis has taught me the tools for survival in the world of publishing and academia. Last but
not least, Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies
at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has redefined my conceptions of the
RMA debates, substantially deepened my knowledge of the field.

In the process of my fieldwork in both Israel and South Korea, I have interviewed many
unique individuals, who provided me at least some access to primary and authentic
information on security/defense related issues, and honored me with their confidence and
trust. In Israel, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Ilan Mizrahi, former Head of Israel’s

National Security Council; Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, Head of the Security Studies Program, Tel
Aviv University; Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, former Head of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary
Research at IDF’s Command and Staff College; Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland, Senior Fellow
at the Institute for National Security Studies; Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph, Chair of the Division of
International Relations, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa; Dr. Dima
Adamsky, Research Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; Dr. Deganit Paikowsky,
Research Fellow at the School of Government and Policy, Tel-Aviv University; Prof. Efraim
Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University; Brig.
Gen. (Ret.) Asaf Agmon, Head of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies; Maj.
Gen. (Ret.) Uzi Dayan, former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff and National Security Council
Chairman; Dr. Yoram Evron at the University of Haifa; Dr. Amir Horkin, research director at
Maagar Mochot, , Zivi Berman at the IDF, and the librarians at the Truman Research Institute
for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

iii

At the same time, my journey in Israel wouldn’t be the same without the special and life-long
friendship of Arnon Eshel, who has always encouraged me to believe in my ideas and find the
courage to go beyond my limits; Adriana Cooper – my former classmate at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and experienced journalist, sharing some incredible “adventure”
assignments with me; and Meytal Nasie and Iris Nasie – for their undivided love, support, and
inspirational audacity that can’t be described in words.

In my interviews in South Korea, I have benefited greatly from the insights, thoughts, and
observations of Prof. Jae Chang Kim, former Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S Korea
Combined Forces Command; Prof. Chung-in Moon at the Political Science Department at
Yonsei University; Prof. Lee Jung-Hoon at the Graduate School of International Studies,
Yonsei University; Prof. Sung-Pyo Hong, Head of the Department of Military Strategy
Studies at the Korean National Defense University; Dr. Taewoo Kim, Senior Research Fellow
at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses; Maj. Lee, Jin-Young, ROK Air Force; and Dr.

Kim, Min Seok, Senior Writer at the JoongAng Ilbo. My studies and experiences in South
Korea also wouldn’t be same without the support and encouragement of my dear friends: Jae-
Sang Koo, CEO and President of Mirae Asset; Dr. Yoo-Dongi; Yeon-Kyung Jeon, Hye-Jin
Park; Richard Marusyk, Veronika and Lukas Vildman, and many others who went through the
gates of Yonsei University.

Last but not least, I have written this dissertation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy, National University of Singapore, which I am proud of have been in the first Ph.D.
cohort. The School has provided me not only with a generous research support, state-of-the-
art facilities, but most importantly, an amazingly diverse body of faculty and students from
around the world, who in many ways shaped my worldview and intellectual curiosity.
Indeed, the LKY School has been my home for nearly five years, and I have had the honor to
study under many inspiring professors. I would like to thank LKYSPP faculty members,
particularly Prof. Kishore Mahbubani; Prof. M Ramesh; Prof. Wu Xun; Prof. Suzaina Kadir;
Prof. Scott Fritzen; Prof. Mukul Asher; Prof. Dodo J. Thampapillai; Prof. Caroline Brassard;
Prof. Gopi Rethinaraj for providing their unique perspectives in teaching public policy;
research methods; and policy analysis. In the same token, I am grateful to Ruth Choe for
facilitating my path in the School’s administration; Sung Lee and Kirsten Trott at the
Research Support Unit; and James Dorsey for placing my articles on editorial pages of major
newspapers.

Ultimately, I am grateful for all my fellow classmates, colleagues, and friends; in particular,
Jean-Marc Rickli, Tim Junio, and Anthony D’Agostino for reading my thesis and providing
insightful comments and suggestions. Alex He Jingwei, Amarendu Nandy, Allen Lai, Aneliya
Nazirova, Azad Bali Singh, Beat Habegger, Bernard Loo Fook Weng, Cris and Terri Mora,
Chris Bronk, Daniel Jassem, Daria Makarova, Denni Cawley, Eva Pejsova, Friedemann
Schreiter, Gary Schaub, Gloria Pagliari, Henriette Litta, Iftikhar Lodhi, Ishani Mukherjee,
Jan Seifert, Jitka and Petr Cirkl, Kaajal Wallia, Kei Koga, Leong Ching Ching, Luisa
Gaspani, Luluk Nur Hamidah, Lyn Toh, Martin Duda, May-May Pichamon, Mikio Kumada,
Najwa Fathimath, Petra Wodecka, Priyanka Bhalla, Reuben Hintz, Sandra Egger, Savita

Shankar, Shabnam Siddiqui, Schuyler House, Shigeru Togashi, Shilpi Banerjee, Simon Lacey,
Sonja Moraz, Sun and Alan Tan, Tamara Anne Lynch, Tan Teck Boon, Toby Carroll, Vikas
Kharbanda, and many others around the world for their encouragement and sharing a part of
the journey with me.

In closing, my greatest debt – and one impossible to specify – is to my family (Christine, Jiri,
Christian), and to Anita (PonPon) – for their patience, love, and faith in my long, and often
winding, endeavors around the world. Thank You!

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS:



Acknowledgements ii
Summary vi
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Abbreviations x

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Global Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate 1
1.2 Research Objectives 9
1.3 Defining Small States: Absolute vs. Relational Definitions 14
1.4 Rationale and Policy Significance 17
1.5 Why Israel and South Korea? Initial Observations 23
1.6 Chapter Themes & Arguments 26

Chapter 2 . Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate: “Five Waves”

2.1 Missing Links in the RMA Debate 31
2.2 Conceptual Diffusion of the RMA 33
2.2.1 First Wave: Soviet MTR 34
2.2.2 Second Wave: RMA and its Early Adaptation in the West 38
2.2.3 Third Wave: RMA “Technophilia” 47
2.2.4 Shift to Defense Transformation 53
2.2.5 Second and Third Thoughts: Modernization Plus 67
2.3 Organizational Interpretations and Contending Schools of Thought 71
2.3.1 Scope of the RMA Debate 71
2.3.2 Between RMA Proponents and Skeptics – Is there an RMA? 72
2.3.3 Five RMA Images – What constitutes an RMA? 75
2.3.4 RMA Diffusion and Adaptation: When, Why, and How RMAs Diffuse? 78
2.4 Toward a Sixth RMA Wave? 82

Chapter 3 . Research Methodology and Analytical Framework
3.1 Methodological Approaches to RMA Diffusion, Adaptation, and Innovation 84
3.2 Research Strategy, Map, and Analytical Framework 93
3.2.1 Patterns of RMA Military Innovation 96
3.2.2 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 98
3.2.3 RMA Limitations & Constraints 100
3.3 Case Selection Criteria 101
3.3.1 Geostrategic Predicaments 101
3.3.2 Defense Management Capacity 104
3.3.3 Defense-Industrial Base 106
3.3.4 Combat Proficiency 108
3.4 Data Collection: Sites and Sources 109
3.4.1 Data Triangulation 109
3.4.2 Interview Process 111
3.5 Research Limitations & Threats to Validity 113

v

Chapter 4 . Israel’s Strategy, Security Debates, and Conceptual Innovation:
Continuity and Change
4.1 The RMA Debate in Israel: Opposing Viewpoints 115
4.2 Understanding Israel’s Traditional Security Paradigm 120
4.2.1 Conditions of “Geostrategic Challenge” 121
4.2.2 Three Elements of Israel’s Defense Strategy 125
4.2.3 Patterns in IDF’s Operational Conduct 131
4.3 Israel’s RMA-Oriented Conceptual Adaptation Trajectory 138
4.3.1 Conceptual Roots: The Yom Kippur War 139
4.3.2 1980’s: The Offense-Defense Debate and Early RMA Tactics 143
4.3.3 1990’s: Future Battlefield Concepts and Systemic Operational Design 150
4.3.4 2000’s: The Rise and Fall of the SOD Debate and Concept of Operations 159

Chapter 5. South Korea's Evolving Strategy and RMA Debates:
From Emulation to Adaptation
5.1 South Korea's Progressive Security Dilemmas 168
5.2 Revisiting South Korea’s Traditional Security Conceptions 174
5.2.1 Conditions of Geostrategic Inferiority 176
5.2.2 Three Pillars of South Korea’s Defense Strategy 181
5.3 Toward a Korean RMA? 187
5.3.1 Understanding RMA Diffusion Path in South Korea 187
5.3.2 1990s: ROK's Future Battlefield Concepts 191
5.3.3 2000s: U.S ROK Defense Transformation 204

Chapter 6. Assessing the Impact of the RMA Diffusion on Israel and South
Korea’s Military Modernization: Paths, Patterns, Drivers and Constraints
6.1 Path Divergence 216
6.2 Metrics Revisited 219
6.3 Israel 222
6.3.1 Israel’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller and Smarter IDF? 222
6.3.2 Israel’s RMA Diffusion Paths, Patterns, and Drivers 230
6.3.3 Limitations & Constraints 236
6.4 South Korea 240
6.4.1 ROK’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller, Advanced Elite Force? 240
6.4.2 South Korean RMA Diffusion Paths,Patterns, and Drivers 246
6.4.3 Limitations & Constraints 252
6.5 Explaining the Variance: Contending Theories 256
6.5.1 Neorealist Perspectives 258
6.5.2 Organizational / Societal Perspectives 260
6.5.3 Cultural Perspectives 262

Conclusion: Theoretical and Policy Implications
7.1 Summary 265
7.2 Theoretical Implications: RMA Diffusion and Small States 266
7.3 Policy Implications 271

Bibliography 275

Biographical Note 296




vi

SUMMARY:

Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) debate over the last two decades, the vast majority of writings have been silent or
ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on military modernization and innovation
trajectories of advanced small states and middle powers. The intellectual thrust in exploring
the RMA over the last two decades has focused primarily on the U.S centered RMA debate
that has evolved in concert with shifts in the U.S. military strategy and use of force. In
particular, there have been at least five progressive stages or “RMA waves” in the ongoing
debate: (1) initial intellectual discovery by the Soviet military thinkers in the early 1980s, (2)
conceptual adaptation, modification, and integration by in the U.S. strategic thought during
the early 1990s, (3) climax of the RMA debate during the mid-to-late 1990s, (4) a shift to the
broader “defense transformation” and its partial empirical investigation in the early 2000s,
and (5) a shift to “modernization-plus” in conjunction with second and third thoughts
questioning the RMA paradigm from 2005 onwards. With the persisting focus on the
American RMA debate however, there is a significant deficit in the existing literature,
particularly in the conceptual, technological, and operational dynamics surrounding the RMA
diffusion - the international transmission and strategic interaction of RMA-oriented concepts
and technologies in divergent geostrategic settings and environments.

This dissertation attempts to fill-in the void, investigating the paths, patterns, and impact of
RMA diffusion in military modernization trajectories of selected advanced small states -
Israel and South Korea. Both states have historically faced an array of persistent security
challenges and uncertainties brought by the realities of their external and internal security
conditions, asymmetries of their location, size, and geopolitical constraints. With the end of
the Cold War and subsequent shifts in the international and regional strategic environment,
the sources and characteristics of threats have been changing. Their security environment has
been increasingly characterized by the convergence of even more complex “hybrid” security
threats, which combine conventional, asymmetrical, low-intensity, and non-linear threat

dimensions. With the changing strategic realities, both Israel and South Korea have been
searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater
flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy under conditions of strategic uncertainty. In doing so,
both Israel and South Korea have studied, benchmarked, and debated selected RMA concepts,
while attempting to leverage and exploit emerging RMA technologies.

Israeli and South Korean RMA trajectories, however, show considerable variation in the pace,
direction, and character of their diffusion and adaptation. Israel’s RMA path reflects a unique
pattern of early adoption/implementation, speculation, and experimentation in the context of
multiple operational adaptations to changing strategic realities. Israel has been one of the first
countries to apply RMA-related technologies in combat in the early 1980s under the
conceptual umbrella of “integrated battle.” IDF’s experiences have partly shaped American,
Soviet, and European strategic perspectives and debates on the future of warfare. However,
until the late 1990s, the IDF has not viewed the emergence of the RMA as a relevant
paradigm shift, nor has initiated a comprehensive and disruptive defense transformation drive.
Rather, Israel’s RMA discourse has reflected a continuous debate between the proponents of
traditional concepts and reformers - those arguing for new military thinking within the IDF.
The changing threat spectrum and operational experience over the last two decades forced the
IDF to rethink its traditional concepts, and experiment with innovative combat tactics at
different levels of warfare. Israel’s combat experiences concomitant with action-oriented
lessons-learned from high-low intensity conflicts have arguably accelerated IDF’s ‘bottom-
up’ user-oriented military innovation by increasing the pressure to find practical solutions
rather than focus on theoretical conceptualizations. RMA diffusion in Israel should be thus
conceptualized in the context of continuity and change in Israel’s security conceptions and the
need to retain IDF’s “qualitative edge” in its operational capabilities.
vii

In contrast, the RMA diffusion trajectory in South Korea’s military modernization shows
patterns of speculation and experimentation in terms of selected concepts and technologies,
but relatively limited implementation in the organizational force structure and the use of

force. Since the early 1990s, South Korea has been attempting to undertake a comprehensive
military modernization in order to respond to the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate
technological and interoperability gaps with the U.S. forces, and eventually attain self-reliant
defense posture. In the process, South Korea attempted to emulate and adapt selected U.S
RMA-oriented defense transformation concepts, which have gradually permeated into the
U.S ROK combined training and operations, and subsequently shaped the character and
direction of South Korea’s military modernization. However, the compelling and relatively
ambitious character of Korean RMA-oriented defense reform plans have been in sharp
contrast to the prevailing structural and political realities, including contrasting calibrations of
defense requirements, structural dependence on the U.S ROK Alliance, static, defensive
force posture, and asymmetric organizational force structure that have sustained the relevance
of traditional security paradigm. Moreover, South Korea’s military has lacked diverse
operational combat experiences that would encourage military innovation. Accordingly, there
has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual innovation toward a new theory of
war.

Taken together, Israel and South Korea’s varying RMA trajectories reflect evolutionary,
rather than revolutionary process of change over the past two decades. Both states have faced
a number of organizational, institutional, and resource impediments, anchored primarily in
their traditional security paradigms, which have precluded a major defense transformation and
inhibited military innovation. In particular, both the IDF and ROKA had to cope with
complexities of defense planning under uncertainty: (1) identifying and prioritizing between
current and future-oriented defense requirements; (2) ascertaining the feasibility, costs, and
performance of selected advanced weapons technologies, and (3) adopting and adapting
largely unproven conceptual, organizational, and technological innovations in the use of
force. Paradoxically, by improving their defense capabilities through high-value weapons
systems, niche technologies, and innovative organizational and operational concepts, both
states have experienced limitations in their use of force by raising the destructive potential
and cost of conflict. Their adversaries, state and non-state, have adapted by finding strategies
and exploiting capabilities of asymmetric negation.

The empirical cases of Israel and South Korea confirm that RMA diffusion trajectories can
take multiple facets and rarely proceed in a synchronized rate, path, or pattern. Given the
range of external and internal variables - enablers and constraints that shape the receptivity of
states to absorb military innovation, RMA-oriented diffusion is not sequential nor does it
follow a particular model. Technological innovation may precede conceptual and
organizational adaptation, or conceptual speculation may lead to exploration and
experimentation, but not implementation. Only if military innovation meets implementation
in both policy and strategy, one can theorize about ‘disruptive’ RMA-oriented defense
transformation. While existing literature may explain the varying RMA trajectories through
neorealist, organizational/societal, and cultural theories, this thesis suggests that changes in
strategy resulting from operational lessons-learned in diverse combat experiences may
increase the adaptability of military organizations to implement military innovation. The
findings of this study therefore challenge traditional “hierarchical” schools of thought as well
as “spatial” models explaining military innovation and its diffusion in linear perspectives.
Ultimately, Israel and South Korea’s RMA trajectories project important theoretical as well as
policy-oriented implications particularly in terms of small state’s ability to recognize,
anticipate, exploit, and sustain military innovation. Arguably, selected small states may
translate military innovation into a relative strategic advantage or usable strategic opportunity
at least until it will be offset by countervailing responses by opposing forces or new military
innovations. The analytical framework used in this study should help policy-makers to make
more accurate assessments in this direction.
viii

LIST OF TABLES:


Table 3.1 Primary Sources by Expertise 111
Table 5.1 North-South Korea Conventional Balance of Forces (2010) 178
Table 6.1 ROK’s Force Structure (1980-2010) 246

ix

LIST OF FIGURES:


Figure 1.1 RMA as a Theory, Process, and Debate 6

Figure 1.2 Conceptualizing RMA Diffusion Trajectories: Paths, Patterns, and Levels 13
Figure 1.3 Policy Challenges of RMA-oriented Military Modernization 21
Figure 1.4 Asymmetric Responses & Limitations to the RMA 22
Figure 2.1 Overview: Five “RMA Waves” 34
Figure 2.2 RMA Elements (1992) 40
Figure 2.3 Patterns of Military Revolutions (1994) 44
Figure 2.4 Owen’s System-of-Systems Concept 50
Figure 2.5 Network-Centric Warfare Concept 62
Figure 3.1 RMA Diffusion Diagnostics Model 87
Figure 3.2 Assessing Military Capabilities 91
Figure 3.3 Overview of Conceptual Lenses to the Study of RMA 92
Figure 3.4 Analytical Framework: RMA Patterns, Drivers, and Constraints 96
Figure 3.5 Patterns of RMA-Oriented Military Innovation – Main Indicators 98
Figure 3.6 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 99
Figure 3.7 RMA Adaptation Constraints 100
Figure 3.8 Taxonomy of Defense-Industrial Innovation 107
Figure 3.9 Assessing Defense-Industrial Innovation based on Arms Exports
108
Figure 3.10 Overview of Case-Selection Criteria 109
Figure 5.1 South Korea’s Post-Cold War Conflict Spectrum 188
Figure 6.1 Israel and South Korea’s RMA Diffusion Paths and Patterns 222
Figure 6.2 Israel’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns 233
Figure 6.3 Israel’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 235
Figure 6.4 Limitations and Constraints to Israeli RMA 240
Figure 6.5 South Korea’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns 248
Figure 6.6 South Korea’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 251
Figure 6.7 Limitations and Constraints to South Korean Defense Reforms 255
Figure 7.1 Future Studies: Conceptualizing R&D Trajectories of Global Defense Industries 273

x

ABBREVIATIONS:


ALB AirLand Battle
APS Active Protection System
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BCT Brigade Combat Team

BMS Battlefield Management System
BVR Beyond-Visual-Range
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information
CCRP Command and Control Research Program
CENTCOM Central Command
CFC Combined Forces Command
COG Center of Gravity
DAP Digital Army Program
DBK Dominant Battlespace Knowledge
DIB Defense Industrial Base
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DOD Department of Defense
DRP Defense Reform Plan
EBO Effects-Based Operations
FAD Forward Active Defense
FCS Future Combat System
FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area
FOFA Follow-on Forces Attack
GCC Ground Corps Command
GFC General Forces Command
GS General Staff
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
IAF Israel Air Force
IAS Integrated Advanced Soldier
IDF Israel Defense Forces
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IN Israel Navy
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
KPA Korean People’s Army
MBT Main Battle Tank

MCZ Military Control Zone
MND Ministry of National Defense
MTR Military-Technical Revolution
MPR Military Participation Ratio
MR Military Revolution
MWS Major Weapon Systems
NCW Network-Centric Warfare
NDP National Defense Panel
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
OFT Office of Force Transformation
ONA Office of Net Assessment
OPG Operational Maneuver Groups
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense
OTS Off-the-Shelve
OTRI Operational Theory Research Institute
xi

PGM Precision Guided Munitions
R&D Research and Development
RDE&T Research, Development, Evaluation, and Testing
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKA Republic of Korea’s Army
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RUK Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SOD Systemic Operational Design
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
UA Unit of Action

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UACV Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

xii

“Often do the spirits of great events stride on before the events, and in today
already walks tomorrow.” [Friedrich Schiller]

1
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Global Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate
Over the past two decades, there has been an intense debate in international security
studies, military history, defense economics and public policy concerning an emerging
paradigm shift in the character and conduct of warfare - the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA). Driven largely by the quantum leaps in information and communications
technologies and amplified by the changing character of conflicts of the post-Cold War era,
RMA proponents have argued that modern military organizations are on the verge of a
profound discontinuous, disruptive, and a ―revolutionary‖ paradigm shift in the means, modes,
and methods of warfare.
1
Notwithstanding the existence of often differing RMA definitions
and schools of thought that have evolved since its early inception as a Military-Technical
Revolution theory by Soviet strategic thinkers in the early 1980s, its underlying premise has
been anchored in three main arguments:
(1) The application of new information technologies into a significant number of military
systems coupled with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation will
fundamentally alter the character and conduct of warfare by producing a dramatic increase
in the combat potential and effectiveness.
2


(2) Attaining qualitatively new levels of military effectiveness that transcends marginal
improvements will essentially mitigate the widening spectrum of security challenges of the
21

st
century, stipulated by the convergence of conventional, low-intensity, asymmetrical,
and non-linear types of conflict.
3


(3) States and military organizations adopting RMA-oriented concepts, advanced defense
technologies, and relevant force structures will possess a considerable strategic advantage
over those that do not.
4


1
Bitzinger, R. (2008). "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Global Defense Industry: Reactions
and Interactions." Security Challenges 4(4): 1-12.; Loo, B. (ed.) (2009). Military Transformation and
Strategy: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Small States. New York, Routledge.
2
Krepinevich, A. F. (1994). "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." National
Interest Fall 1994(37): 30-43.
3
Cohen, E. A. (1996). "A Revolution in Warfare." Foreign Affairs 75(2): 37-54. Knox, M. and W.
Murray (2001). The Dynamics of Military Revolution (1300-2050). Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. Hundley, R. (1999). Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the
History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell us About Transforming the U.S. Military? Santa
Monica, RAND; Mazarr, M. J. (1994). The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for
Defense Planning. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
4
Mahnken, T. and J. FitzSimonds (2003). "The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the
Revolution in Military Affairs." Newport Papers(17).

2
While the RMA has been often characterized by analogy as a ―high concept‖ in the
field of strategic studies
5
, particularly for its ―discontinuous‖ or ―disruptive‖ character; in
practice, it has been increasingly linked with a continuous conceptual, technological,
organizational, and operational military innovation aimed to increase both the efficiency and
effectiveness in how militaries prepare for, fight, and win wars.
6
Andrew Ross notes that in
historical perspective, most defense/military innovations have been distinctly less than
revolutionary or transformational, consisting of incremental, often near-continuous,
improvements in existing capabilities.
7
Indeed, one could argue that the information-led
RMA has been more profound in shaping the pace, direction and character of military
modernization, defined as ―relevant upgrades or improvements of existing military
capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed weapons
systems and supporting assets, the incorporation of new doctrines, the creation of new
organizational structure, and the institutionalization of new manpower management and
combat training regimes.‖
8
Nonetheless, its rather less disruptive character has not mitigated
its significance or utility; the development of RMA-oriented concepts, technologies, and
organizations has been increasingly perceived as a synonym for ―modern‖ defense policy-
making, shaping defense management processes and, ultimately, the use of force in the 21
st

century. In this context, the promise of an impending RMA bringing about fundamentally
new strategic advantages and military effectiveness by means of utilizing ―smart weapons,

sensors, and concepts‖ in the air, land, sea, or space has inspired and even compelled many
modern military organizations to rethink nearly all aspects of warfare.


5
Gray, C. (2002). Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History.
London, Frank Cass.p.1-20.
6
Michael Horowitz, for example, uses the term Major Military Innovations (MMIs) and defines it as
―changes in the conduct of warfare, relevant to leading military organizations, designed to increase
the efficiency with which capabilities are converted to power.‖ See: Horowitz, M. (2010). The
Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics. Princeton,
Princeton University Press. p.22.
7
Ross, A. (2010). ―On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework.‖ IGCC Policy Brief
(1): 14-17.
8
Tellis, A. J., M. Wills, et al. (2005). Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of
Uncertainty. Seattle, WA, National Bureau of Asian Research.p.15.

3
At the forefront of an RMA-oriented conceptual, technological and organizational
military innovation has been the United States, with the world‘s most sophisticated defense-
industrial base and military forces.
9
The U.S. has taken the lead in conceptualizing visions of
future wars, while developing next generation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs),
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms (ISR), command, control,
communications, computers, and information systems (C4I), space-based intelligence assets,
and integrating them with ―network-centric‖ operational concepts and precision-firepower

capabilities. These have been consistently tested, modified, and adapted as a ―new way of
war‖ in various conflicts and military campaigns – from the Persian Gulf War (1991), through
the Air War in Kosovo (1999), and subsequently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2003-
2010). While the intellectual thrust on what defines and drives the ―American‖ defense
transformation,

its strategic templates, and key operational terms, have changed over the past
decade, its underlying aim has remained intact: to transform the U.S. military into a more
agile, mobile, integrated, and lethal force, capable of directly ―shaping‖ the strategic
environment and defeating any existing or future adversary in line with U.S. global
geopolitical aspirations and interests.
10

Accordingly, one could argue that the mainstream RMA discourse has reflected
predominantly U.S centered theory, processes, and debate. To begin with, since the mid-
1990s American RMA proponents have conceptualized the RMA in a broader context of the
information revolution and its concomitant societal, economic, and political ramifications;
projected to bring a paradigm shift from the ―industrial-age‖ toward 21
st
century
―information-age warfare.‖
11
In other words, the underlying theme behind the varying RMA
conceptions has been not only the speed, but more importantly, the magnitude of change, and

9
One could argue that the U.S. as a global superpower has the motives, resources, organizational and
technological capacity to implement and actively exploit a comprehensive RMA-style defense
transformation.
10

See official U.S. documents and publications of the past decade, which have examined the impact of
the changing global strategic context for the U.S military as well as the rationale for attaining new
levels of military effectiveness: the Joint Vision 2010 (1995), Joint Vision 2020 (2000), Global
Posture Review (2005), National Defense Strategy (2005), the Quadrennial Defense Review (2007).
11
Toffler, A. a. H. (1993). War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston, Little,
Brown & Company.p.27-64.

4
its implications for the military domain that may render traditional principles of uncertainty in
war and conventional engagements [as characterized by Carl von Clausewitz‘s principles of
war] obsolete.
12
For example, RMA advocates have argued that the combination of systems
and advanced technologies, including wide area of electronic sensors for long-range, all-
weather, target detection and acquisition, would essentially enable near real-time situational
awareness of the battlefield, and in doing so, mitigate the adverse effects traditionally
synonymous with the fog of war – or the pervasive nature of uncertainty, ambiguity, fear and
friction of battle.
13
Traditional battlefield ―friction‖ or probability of error would be
significantly reduced in future conflicts. In the words of Elinor Sloan, ―more than precision
munitions or the contribution of any particular military platform, it is the potential of new
military technologies to reduce the ‗fog of war‘ that could change the way wars are fought.‖
14

At the same time, the networking of individual weapons systems, platforms, and
―sensors and shooters‖ of the various military services through innovative operational and
tactical RMA concepts and technologies would significantly enhance their interoperability,
bringing about unprecedented levels of organizational synchronization, agility, and speed in

the use of force. Together with a range of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and their inter-
service application, RMA-oriented military organizations would be able to conduct rapid,
standoff, and precision strikes beyond the reach of enemy‘s defenses. In theory, this would
significantly mitigate the scope and magnitude of collateral damage, shorten the duration of
conflicts, and also minimize combat casualty rates traditionally associated with high-intensity
conventional wars. In doing so, an RMA-based force would yield a decisive military
advantage at virtually all levels of warfare, shortening the costs and duration of conflicts, and
ultimately, ensure the defeat of any adversary on one‘s terms.
15


12
Krepinevich, A. (1994). "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." National
Interest Fall 1994(37): 30-43.
13
Alberts, D., J. Garstka, et al. (1999). Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging
Information Superiority. Washington D.C., Command and Control Research Program.
14
Sloan, E. (2002). The Revolution in Military Affairs. Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press.p.6.
15
As FitzSimonds and Van Tol noted, ―the essence of an RMA‖ is ―not the rapidity of the change in
military effectiveness relative to opponents‖ but ―the magnitude of the change compared with

5
In the early 2000s, the relatively ambitious premise behind the IT-RMA has gradually
permeated into U.S. defense planning and management processes. Under the umbrella of a
broader ―defense transformation‖, broadly defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
as ―the process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation
through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our
nation‘s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic

position,‖ the DOD accelerated a number of ambitious force modernization programs.
16
Each
military service – the Air Force, Navy, Army, and the Marines also conceptualized their
roadmaps and strategic templates of future warfare and their operational requirements that
provided the rationale for the acquisition, procurement, and integration of specific RMA
―network-centric‖ weapons systems, platforms, and technologies. Specifically, the U.S.
military would require new automated planning and battle management systems; advanced
battle field fire-management systems; precision-guided munitions; advanced sensor
technologies capable of long-range, all-weather, target detection and acquisition, including
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); advanced satellite/imagery systems; 4
th
and 5
th
generation
combat aircrafts; stealth technologies; smaller & faster navy ships.
17

With its ambitious and wide-reaching aims and scope, however, the RMA has ignited
intense policy debates concerning its validity, applicability, and utility. The key questions
powering the ―RMA debate‖ over the past two decades have focused on: (1) the definition,
metrics, and impact of the revolution; (2) the pace, direction, and cost of technology in
warfare, and (3) its relevance amid changes in the sources and character of security threats.
With the increasing sophistication in the development of RMA-oriented military technologies
and R&D programs, many questions also emerged regarding the affordability, feasibility, and

preexisting military capabilities.‖ FitzSimonds, J. and J. Van Tol (1994). "Revolutions in Military
Affairs." Joint Forces Quarterly Spring(4): 24-31.
16
U.S. DOD. (2004). Elements of Defense Transformation. Washington D.C., Office of Force

Transformation.
17
Ross, A. (2004). ―Transformation: What is it? What does it mean for Industry?‖ Defense
Transformation in the Asia-Pacific: Meeting the Challenge. Honolulu, Hawaii.

6
desirability of a comprehensive defense transformation.
18
Some of the most pressing
questions included: is there an RMA, and if so, what does it mean – what is new or
revolutionary? Is it a process signifying a real ―disruptive‖ shift in warfare or a mere
continuation of technological progress and modernization of armed forces? If the RMA
indeed stipulates a paradigm shift in warfare, what are the defense resource allocation
priorities, force structure requirements and procurement needs in the context of future defense
planning? Is there a need to pursue the RMA? And ultimately, how effective is the RMA in
dealing with the complexity of the security challenges of the 21
st
century, characterized by the
increasing volatility and uncertainty through the convergence of traditional security threats
and non-linear/asymmetric threats? With these questions, the RMA debate has projected a
range of contending theoretical perspectives, differing views, and beliefs about the essence of
military power in the 21
st
century.

Figure 1.1 RMA as a Theory, Process, and Debate

Source: Author


18
Bruner, E. (2004). "Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress."
CRC Report for Congress (RS20787).
Theoretical/
Descriptive
Policy-Oriented/
Prescriptive
Theory
Process
es

Debate
DEFENSE
MANAGEMENT:

RMA shaping defense
transformation processes
that require sustained and
substantial conceptual,
technological, and
organizational policy-
driven innovation in
defense planning and
management,
organizational structures,
operational concepts,
weapons procurement,
and the use of force.
KEY PREMISE:

Attaining qualitatively new
levels of military
effectiveness and
capabilities (beyond
marginal improvements)
across a broad spectrum of
conflict will reduce security
risks over time by improving
the ability to use force,
changing the framework of
war, and altering the

capacity of states to create
and project military power
for political ends.
CONTENDING DEBATES:
RMA debate on the definition,
magnitude, and impact of the revolution
or change in itself; the pace, direction,
and cost of technology in warfare, and
the extent of the policy-making
imperatives to implement the changes.
RMA

7
As the intellectual thrust focused on the U.S. RMA theory, processes, and debate,
there has not been a substantial research interests in investigating RMA diffusion paths and
patterns in divergent strategic settings, particularly its impact on military modernization and
defense innovation trajectories of small states and middle powers. This is puzzling because a
number of small states and middle powers, especially in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East,
have been modernizing their forces by procuring selected advanced military systems and
technologies, and adapting selected RMA-oriented concepts in their military doctrines.
19

Ongoing force modernization trends in both regions show the procurement of advanced air
assets, air-defense systems, missiles, naval assets, stealth technologies, and upgrade and
modernizations of ISR and C4I within ground forces. In terms of military expenditures, for
example, over a 10-year period 1999-2008, defense spending in East Asia increased by 56%
with many countries planning major military purchases.
20
Between 1990 and 2002, the Asia-
Pacific region alone acquired more than $150 billion worth of arms, making the region the

largest arms market in the world.
21
Recent studies show that nearly every country in the Asia-
Pacific currently possesses at least some ―fourth-generation‖ fighter aircraft that provides
greater lethality, precision, range, and overall power projection capabilities.
22

Underscoring this thesis is the basic assumption that notwithstanding the scope,
magnitude, and sophistication of the ongoing U.S. RMA-oriented defense transformation, its
theory, process, and debate - cannot be confined solely to U.S. perspectives alone.

Indeed, as
Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla argue ―as technologies become increasingly available to a wide
range of states – including those not considered advanced, industrial economies – global

19
Lee, C. M. (2003). "East Asia's Awakening from Strategic Hibernation and the Role of Air Power."
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 15(1): 219-274.
20
SIPRI (2010). ―Recent Trends in Military Expenditure.‖ Stockholm: SIPRI.
Available at:
21
Tellis, A. J., M. Wills, et al. (2005). Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of
Uncertainty. p. 15.
22
A―fourth-generation‖ fighter includes aircrafts such as the Russian Su-27, Su-30, or Mig-29, the U.S.
F-16 or F/A-18, and the French Mirage-2000 – capable of firing standoff active radar-guided air-to-
air missiles, such as the U.S. AMRAAM or the Russian AA-12. See: Bitzinger, R. (2004). "The
Asia-Pacific Arms Market: Emerging Capabilities, Emerging Concerns." Asia-Pacific Security
Studies 3(2):1-5.

8
diffusion, and thus, military modernization, become increasingly likely.‖
23
While the pace,
character, and impact of the RMA diffusion may vary across different geographical regions,
organizational structures, and strategic cultures, there are at least three underlying drivers that
may support and accelerate its diffusion: (1) the persisting geopolitical insecurity, regional
rivalry, and uncertainty stemming from the emergence of complex types of conflicts and
threats of the 21
st
century that broaden national defense requirements and operational needs;
(2) the increased economic growth rates, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that
increase the capacity to purchase cutting-edge weapons systems and accelerate force
modernization programs, and ultimately (3) the rapid technological change embedded in the
globalization, consolidation, and competition of global arms markets and defense industries
that have to diversify their commercial interests through export-oriented strategies and
innovation.
24

In addition, there are a number of historical, institutional and socio-cultural factors
that may facilitate [as well as constrain] diffusion of RMA-oriented concepts and
technologies. For example, as Goldman and Ross illustrate, diffusion can take multiple
interactive paths – technological, doctrinal, organizational, and administrative as well as
cultural.
25
This is because military organizations can be considered both as comparative and
competitive institutions that closely monitor each other, and calibrate their performance in
relation to other militaries. External competitive pressure may provide strong incentive for
states to emulate the military practices of the most successful states in the system.

26
A
military capability proven successfully on the battlefield can stimulate responses abroad - to
emulate, offset, or innovate. In contrast, RMA-related concepts and processes can be also
transmitted through collaborative processes, norms, and practices within alliance frameworks.
―Lessons learned‖ from recent operational experiences are often filtered through strategic

23
Isaacson, J., C. Layne, et al. (1999). Predicting Military Innovation. Santa Monica, RAND.p.1.
24
Bitzinger, R. (2003). Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? Oxford, Oxford University Press.
25
Goldman, E. and A. Ross (2003). ―Concluding Chapter.‖ In: The Diffusion of Military Technology
and Ideas. E. Goldman and L. Eliason (eds.). Stanford, Stanford University Press: 371-403. See also:
Goldman, E. and T. Mahnken (eds.) (2004). The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia.
New York, Palgrave.
26
Goldman, E. and L. Eliason (eds.) (2003). The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas p.5.

9
cultures of organizations attempting to adopt, adapt, or respond to the innovations elsewhere
[See Chapters 2, 3]. Overall, there are a number of complex external and internal factors that
shape the pace, direction, and character of global RMA-oriented military modernization.
27

However, as Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason noted,
Despite the vital concerns at stake, academics are just beginning to investigate the
process of [RMA] diffusion: how military knowledge, broadly defined to include
hardware (e.g. technology) and software (e.g. doctrine, tactics, organizational form)
diffuses through the international system, or what factors enhance or inhibit incorporating

innovations into defense structures…despite the large body of scholarship on military
innovation, remarkably few studies explore wither historical or contemporary processes
of diffusion of military innovations.
28



1.2 Research Objectives
The relative dearth of scholarly literature on global RMA diffusion paths and patterns
represents the key departure point for this study. In particular, this dissertation attempts to
contribute to the scholarly and policy-oriented literature in strategic and international security
studies by addressing the broad puzzle of how the global RMA diffusion – the process of
international transmission, communication, and interaction of RMA-oriented concepts and
technologies - has shaped the paths, patterns, and scope of military modernization and
innovation trajectories of selected small states? In a reverse mode, how have selected small
states influenced the conceptualization and transmission of the RMA theory, processes, and
debate? Furthermore, why and when do selected small states decide to pursue an RMA-
oriented military modernization? And what are the key theoretical and policy ramifications of
RMA diffusion? In particular, what are the key determinants as well as limitations and
challenges shaping the different RMA diffusion trajectories? Implicit in these questions is
the hypothesis that RMA diffusion outside the great power context – its pace, character,
drivers, extent, and impact have varied based on the state‘s ability to recognize, anticipate,
exploit, and sustain military innovation – conceptual, organizational, and technological
innovation intended to enhance the military‘s ability to prepare for, fight, and win wars.

27
Boot, M. (2006). War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History 1500 to Today.
New York, Penguin.
28
Goldman, E. and L. Eliason (eds.) (2003). The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. p.7.

10
In a theoretical perspective, conventional schools of thought in international relations
and public policy have argued that the diffusion of military innovation is typically
hierarchical – the direction and character of military innovation is propelled by strategic
competition between great powers, and then selectively adopted or emulated by less advanced
―peripheral‖ or smaller units. For example, as Kenneth Waltz noted, ―contending states
imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity.
And so the weapons of the major contenders and even their strategies begin to look much the
same over the world.‖
29
Similarly, spatial theories of diffusion processes predict that military
innovation will proceed rapidly among geographically, culturally, and politically ―proximate‖
states or states with an established sense of ―regional‖ identification created by similar
political traditions, structures, or alliances.
30
There are at least four additional schools of
thought on military innovation that put forward various ‗top-down‘ approaches and debates.
These emphasize either civil-military relations, inter-service politics, intra-service politics or
organizational culture as the main sources of innovation.
31
Specifically, Barry Posen‘s theory
suggests that military innovation can be stimulated only through civilian-intervention, major
operational failures, or persistent resource constraints forcing military organizations to
innovate.
32
In contrast, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that it is the inter-service competition
that drives the diffusion of military innovation.
33
While the sources of military innovation

may differ, the prevailing view has been that diffusion of military innovation has been a
hierarchical process that shapes state‘s choices in adopting particular innovations.



29
Waltz, K (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York, McGraw-Hill.p.127.
30
Hall, J. and J. Ikenberry (1989). The State. Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
31
Foley, R., S. Griffin, et al. (2011). "Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern
War." International Affairs 87(2): 253-270; Farrell, T. and T. Terriff (eds.) (2002). The Sources of
Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
32
Posen, B. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World
Wars. Ithaca, Cornell University Press
33
Rosen, S. P. (1991). Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca, Cornell
University Press.

11
However, historical and empirical evidence of RMA diffusion outside the great
power context suggests much broader variation in the responses to new military technologies,
ideas and knowledge.
34
As this thesis shows, RMA diffusion dynamics in small states
includes both internal processes of military innovation as well as external processes of
military/strategic adaptation or emulation.
35
In this context, RMA-oriented military

modernization may not always require simultaneous technological, doctrinal, and
organizational breakthroughs, but may span in the spectrum between incremental
modernization and discontinuous transformation. Indeed, one can triangulate RMA diffusion
trajectories in three inter-related vectors:
36

(1) Paths - emulation, adaptation, and innovation;
(2) Patterns - speculation, experimentation, and implementation;
(3) Magnitude - exploration, modernization, and transformation;

Military emulation paths involve importing new tools and ways of war through
imitation of other military organizations. Adaptation can be defined through adjustments of
existing military means and methods, in which multiple adaptations over time may lead to
innovation. Military innovation then involves developing new military technologies, tactics,
strategies, and structures.
37
Farrell and Terriff observe that ―it is only when these new
military means and methods result in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures that
innovation, adaptation, and emulation lead to major military change.‖
38
Similarly, according
to Thomas Mahnken, RMA-oriented military innovation may occur in three distinct but often
overlapping phases: (1) speculation; (2) experimentation; and (3) implementation.
39

Speculation phase can be defined through novel ways for solving existing operational
problems or acknowledging the potential of emerging technologies. As speculation turns into

34
Goldman, E. and L. Eliason (eds.) (2003). The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford,

Stanford University Press.
35
Terriff, T., F. Osinga, et al. (2010). A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European
Military Change. Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.
36
Ross, A. (2010). ―On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework.‖ SITC Policy Brief (1):
14-17; Raska, M. (2011). ―RMA Diffusion Paths and Patterns in South Korea‘s Military
Modernization.‖ Korean Journal of Defense Analyses (23)3: 369-385.
37
Farrell, T. and T. Terriff, (eds.) (2002). The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics,
Technology. London, Lynne Rienner. p.6.
38
Ibid.
39
Mahnken, T. (1999). "Uncovering Foreign Military Innovation." Journal of Strategic Studies 22(4):
26-54.

12
greater awareness, military services establish experimental organizations, battle laboratories,
and units tasked with experimenting with new concepts, force structures, weapons
technologies, and warfare methods. With the broadening and deepening experimentation
processes a consensus emerges, when the military leadership and services decide to adopt,
adapt, and later refine selected experimental operational concepts, warfare methods,
organizational force structures, or new generations of weapons systems and technologies. The
implementation phase is evident in a range of indicators: i.e. the establishment of new
military formations; doctrinal revision to accommodate new ways of war; resource allocation
supporting new concepts; development of formal transformation strategy; establishment of
innovative military units; new branches and career paths; and ultimately, field training
exercises with new doctrine, organizations, or technologies.
40

By triangulating military
innovation paths and patterns, one can distill the magnitude of RMA-oriented diffusion
trajectory in three distinct levels: (1) exploration, (2) modernization, and (3) transformation.
41

Exploration includes both speculation and emulation, with initial attempts to develop new
areas of technological expertise; military modernization involves continuous upgrades or
improvements of existing military capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or
indigenously developed weapons systems and supporting assets;
42
Transformation can be
then characterized in the context of a ―discontinuous‖ or ―disruptive‖ military innovation that
meets both policy and strategy. In the words of Andrew Ross,
Disruptive, revolutionary innovation is the result of the confluence of discontinuous
technological, doctrinal, and organizational changes; it occurs when discontinuous
hardware and architectural changes coalesce and come together in a coherent, integrated
whole. Existing capabilities are not optimized but rendered obsolete and displaced. New
dominant technologies, doctrines, and organizations are established and integrated as
never before. New performance metrics are embraced.
43





40
Ibid.
41
Ross, A. (2010). ―On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework.‖ SITC Policy Brief
(1): 14-17.

42
Tellis, A., M. Wills, et al. (2005). Strategic Asia 2005-06 : Military Modernization in an Era of
Uncertainty. Seattle, WA, National Bureau of Asian Research.p.15.
43
Ross, A. (2010). "On Military Innovating: Toward an Analytical Framework." p.15.

13
Similarly, Stephen Peter Rosen conceptualizes disruptive military innovation as:
Change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of
operation and its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional
missions. Such innovations involve a new way of war, with new ideas of how the
components of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, and new
operational procedures conforming to those ideas. They involve changes in critical tasks,
the tasks around which war-plans revolve.
44



Figure 1.2 Conceptualizing RMA Diffusion Trajectories: Paths, Patterns, and Levels

Source: Author; Based on Mahnken, T. (1999); Farrell, T. and Terriff, T. (2002); Ross, A. (2010);


In a policy-oriented perspective, understanding RMA-oriented diffusion trajectories
is important for the security of small states given their underlying strategic advantages and
risks. On one hand, the RMA as a theory promises to offset geostrategic vulnerabilities and
security challenges of small states by leveraging advanced weapons systems and technologies
as ―force multipliers‖ and by developing innovative operational concepts and capabilities. As
Martin Libicki noted, ―by making use of the technologies of the revolution in military affairs,
small countries can tilt the odds against an invading army and remove the certainty of success
that once made aggression worthwhile.―
45
This is not to say that in earlier periods,
technological means and innovations mitigating small states‘ vulnerabilities have not been

44
Rosen, S. P. (1988). "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International Security
13(1): 134.
45
Libicki, M. (1999). "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar?" Foreign Policy(117): 30-43.
Speculation

Experimentation
Implementation
Emulation
Adaptation
Innovation
Diffusion
Paths
Patterns
of Diffusion
Transformation
Modernization
Exploration