Forging a regional security community a study of the driving forces behind ASEAN and east asian regionalism 3

115
CHAPTER THREE

IS ASEAN A ‘NASCENT’ SECURITY COMMUNITY?


Southeast Asia stands out as the region that most closely approximates a
community. In a region with great diversity, ASEAN fostered a collective
Southeast Asian identity. As a result the likelihood of war has been
significantly reduced among a diverse group of states with histories of
conflict.
1


Despite the accumulating file of self-congratulatory visions it may be the
paucity of measurable achievements in its announced policy goals and
ambitions that has led to a new emphasis on creation of an ASEAN
‘identity’
as the major accomplishment of an organization now forty years old.
2



Synopsis
Since 2001, a growing number of constructivist scholars have claimed that
ASEAN is either a nascent security community, or is already one. This claim
is highly contentious. It is important to re-assess this claim as it affects our
understanding of the driving forces shaping the evolution of Southeast Asian
regionalism. My argument is that after 43 years, ASEAN has made
remarkable progress in promoting closer regional economic and political

cooperation, but it has not yet become integrated into a regional security
community. ASEAN has still not become a ‘we-feeling’ community and a
‘non-war’ community. Mutual trust is still at a low level. Militarized
conflicts have taken place over territory and natural resources. Continuing
increases in regional defence budgets focussed on the acquisitions of power-
projection capabilities show that war remains an option, and highlights an
underlying sense of insecurity. The use of force remains thinkable.
Nationalistic mindsets on issues deemed to affect core interests show that the
ASEAN states remain strongly Westphalian in orientation, which are serious
obstacles to forging a strong sense of regional identity and security country.










1 Bahara Rumelili, Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and
Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p.126.

2 Donald Weatherbee, “ASEAN’s Identity Crisis” in Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget
Welsh eds., Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008, pp. 358-59.


116
Introduction

The nature and dynamics of Southeast Asian regionalism is hotly contested. Realists
and Constructivists hold strongly opposing viewpoints. The two quotations by
Rumelili and Weatherbee show the wide gap in scholarly thinking on whether
ASEAN is a regional security community. There are two main scholarly schools of
thought in this debate, the Constructivists (optimists) and Realists (sceptics). In 2001,
the Constructivist scholar Amitav Acharya formally claimed that ASEAN can be
regarded as a nascent security community because the peaceful norms of the ASEAN
Way have prevented war in Southeast Asia since 1967.
3
Acharya’s claim has been
strongly supported by among others, Rodolfo Severino & Alice Ba. But realists
remain very sceptical. As pointed out by Tim Huxley in his (1996) review of
Southeast Asian security studies, some analysts like Sopiee, Buzan, and Simon were
already claiming by the late 1980s that ASEAN could be regarded as a ‘security
community’.
4


3 Constructivist scholars would include: Amitav Acharya, “The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’?” Pacific
Affairs 64 (2) Summer 1991: 159-78. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community
in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of Regional Order, London and New
York: Routledge, 2001. The second edition of Acharya’s book was published in 2009.
Khong Yuen Foong, “Making bricks without straw in the Asia Pacific?” The Pacific
Review 10 (2) 1997. Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN
Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: ISEAS,
2006. Alice D. Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Stanford: Stanford University Press,
April 2009.

Writing in 1991, Acharya argued that ‘ASEAN has indeed become a

4 Realist critics would include: Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in the study of
International Relations”, Pacific Review 9 (2) 1996: 199-228, cited in Tan See Seng
ed. Regionalism in Asia London and New York: Routledge, Volume I: 42-71.
Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s model of Regional
Security, Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, Adelphi Paper No. 302, 1996. N.
Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, Singapore: ISEAS, 1999.
Andrew Tan, Intra-ASEAN Tensions, Discussion Paper No. 84, London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN Measure
Up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community”, The Pacific

117
security community in the sense that its members do not foresee the prospect for
resorting to armed confrontation to resolve existing bilateral disputes’. In contrast,
sceptics (Realists) point to the continuation of historically-based mistrust and
contemporary economic-political rivalries to argue that the ASEAN states do not yet
constitute a regional security community. As David Jones and Michael Smith have
argued, ASEAN is not a genuine regional community: It is only an ‘imitation
community’ “making process, not progress”.
5

As is often the case, the truth seems to
lie somewhere in between these two extreme positions. Scholarly debates are useful
and important in the sense that it shows intellectual vibrancy and a forward-looking
quest for greater understanding of complex phenomena. However, it is also timely
that we should occasionally re-examine the situation in the light of changing
circumstances.
Aim of this Chapter
The main aim of this chapter is to re-examine the claim that ASEAN has become

integrated into either a nascent security community, or is already one. I will use the
two core criteria of a “we-feeling” community, and “non-war” community (Chapter
Two). For the former, I will examine whether the ASEAN members share the
following commonalities: the overall state of bilateral relations among the ASEAN
states, especially among the core group of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; do
they share common political values like democracy and respect for human rights;

Review, 15(1) February 2002: 89-117. John Garofano, “Power, Institutions, and the
ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?” Asian Survey 42 (3)
May/June 2002: 502-21. Alan Collins, “Forming a Security Community: Lessons
from ASEAN,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (2) March 2007: 203-25.

5 David M. Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “ASEAN’s Imitation Community”, Orbis
46(1), Winter 2002: 93-109.


118
whether a high degree of economic integration has been achieved; the existence of a
national versus regional market (mutual sensitivity to each other’s legitimate
interests); and regional affinity and trust levels. Are there strong positive feelings
about each other, and whether there is a strong sense of ASEAN identity and
citizenship? Based on the writings of Deutsch, Adler/Barnett, and Acharya, I have
come up with a framework (See Table 1) to attempt an analysis of the extent of ‘we-
feeling’ and ‘non-war’ community among the ASEAN states.
My overall approach in this chapter is to do the assessment, state the main
findings, followed by interpretation and analysis.

119

Table 3.1
List of Indicators to Assess the Extent of “we-feeling”
Community within ASEAN

(A) Overall state of
bilateral relations
among ASEAN
states. Can vary from
very bad to very
worst.
Very bad. Roller-
coaster (historical
animosities and
economic rivalry).
Business-like, friendly.
(minimal grievances
and resentments)
Very warm (little or
no grievances or
resentments). Has
developed mutually-
beneficial mindsets.
(B) Degree of
Regional Economic
Integration
Low
Medium
(e.g. ASEAN)
High

(e.g. The EU)
(C) Extent of shared
political values
(Democracy and
respect for Human
Rights)
Cultural-religious
background
Level of national
economic development
Type of domestic
political system
(D) National versus
Regional Mindset
‘War on Terrorism’
Attitudes/Policies
towards the US and
China; Myanmar issue
Regional Haze Issue
(E) Extent of
Identification as
“ASEAN Citizen”
Findings from
opinion polls and
surveys carried out by
scholars, the ASEAN
Secretariat


(F) Degree of Affinity

and Trust (low to high
level) among ASEAN
members
Low
Medium
High
(EU; US-Canada;
Australia-New
Zealand)

Source: Author’s conceptualization based on Deutsch (1957), Adler and Barnett
(1998), and Acharya (2001).


120
Has ASEAN become integrated into a “we-feeling” community?
My purpose in this section is to examine whether there is a strong sense of ‘We-
feeling’ among the ASEAN states. Based on Table 1, I will (a) examine the overall
state of bilateral relations among the ASEAN states, b) the degree of regional
economic integration, c) the extent of shared political values (democracy and respect
for human rights), d) ‘national versus regional’ mindsets, e) the extent of
identification as ‘ASEAN Citizen’, and f) the degree of affinity and trust among the
ASEAN member-states.

(A) Overall State of Bilateral Relations among the ASEAN States
Singapore-Malaysia Relations
Over the past forty-seven years, Singapore-Malaysia relations have been characterized
by ups and downs. Malaysia is essential Malay-Muslim. Singapore is a Chinese-
dominant city state. Race, language, and religion continue to exert a powerful
influence on the overall tone of Singapore’s relations with its two immediate Muslim

neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia.
6


6 Leo Suryadinata ed. Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The
Case of the Ethnic Chinese. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),
2004.
Contentious bilateral issues include water, the
territorial dispute over Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Putih), the relocation of the
Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ), over-flights by RSAF planes,
withdrawal of CPF monies by Malaysian workers in Singapore, and land reclamation.
Singapore and Malaysia are two core members of the original ASEAN-5. They are
among the more developed and prosperous of the ASEAN states. A detailed analysis
of their bilateral political-strategic relations is important in helping us to evaluate

121
whether ASEAN is truly a regional security community. A striking feature of
Singapore-Malaysia relations is the bitter legacy of their August 1965 Separation.
7

The Kuala Lumpur government led by the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) wanted a Malay-Malaysia. In contrast, the Singapore government led by the
Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) favoured a Malaysian-Malaysia.
8
Culture-Religion
continues to play a major role in determining Singapore-Malaysia relations. The
overall tone of their bilateral relations also depends to a great extent on the personality
and character of their leaders.
9
Under the abrasive and mercurial Prime Minister

Mahathir, bilateral relations were often turbulent. An acrimonious bilateral issue is
over water. Within seven months of Singapore’s independence, in March 1966,
Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman issued a veiled threat to Lee Kuan
Yew that Singapore’s lifeline (water supply) was with Malaysia.
10


7 Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia”: Decolonization and the Politics of
Merger, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008. Takashi
Shiraishi ed. Across the Causeway: A Multi-Dimensional Study of Malaysia-
Singapore Relations. Singapore: ISEAS, 2009. Donald E. Weatherbee, International
Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy. (2nd edition). Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

During the 1970s
and 1980s, whenever there were disputes between the two states, threats to cut off the
water supply from Johor to Singapore were invariably made by firebrands within

8 See Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global
Issues. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, Singapore Politics
under the People’s Action Party. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Andrew
Tan Tian Huat, Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in
the Second Front in the War on Terror. University of California: Edward Elgar,
2004. Michael Barr and Carl A. Trocki eds. Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in
postwar Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

9 Barry Wain, Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

10 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000.

Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2000. See also K. Kesavapany and Saw Swee-Hock,
Singapore-Malaysia Relations under Abdullah Badawi. Singapore: ISEAS, 2006.


122
UMNO Youth. During a meeting between Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir in 1978, the former recounted the
following conversation:
He (Mahathir) said clearly that he accepted an independent Singapore and
had no intention of undermining it. My reply was that on this basis we could
build a relationship of trust and confidence. So long as we believed that they
wanted to do us in, we would always be distrustful, reading sinister motives
into every ambiguous move.
11


The above quotation showed that Singapore’s leaders were concerned that the city-
state’s sovereignty would be respected by its neighbours. Any signs that Singapore’s
independence would be undermined by any of its immediate neighbours tended to be
viewed with alarm by the island-republic’s leaders. In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew
pointed out that during his 1978 talks with Mahathir, he had stated that if the Water
Agreement between Singapore and Malaysia “were breached, we would go to the UN
Security Council. If water shortage became urgent, in an emergency we would have
to go in, forcibly if need be, to repair damaged pipes and machinery and restore the
water flow ”
12
The two Water Agreements are lodged with the United Nations.
They will expire in 2011 and 2061. To de-securitize the water issue, Singapore has
considerably expanded its self-reliance by using advanced water production
technology (NeWater) and signed water supply agreements with Indonesia.

13


11 Irvin Lim, Joey Long, and Kog Yue Choong, Beyond Vulnerability? Water in
Singapore-Malaysia Relations, IDSS monograph No. 3, 2002.


12 Lee Kuan Yew 2000, op cit., p. 276. In April 2002, Johor’s ex-Mentri Besar (Chief
Minister) Muhyuddin Yassin revealed that in the 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew had
threatened war with Malaysia if the city-state’s water supply from Johor was cut-off;
cited from Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and
Breaching Regional Bridges, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 91.

13 Joey Long Shi Ruey, Irvin Lim fang Jau, and Yue Choong Kog, Beyond
Vulnerability?: Water in Singapore-Malaysia Relations. Singapore: Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2002.

123

There are a number of reasons for the roller-coaster nature of Singapore-
Malaysia relations. The first factor has to do with the continuing salience of
primordial sentiments of race, language, and religion. As Lily Zubaidah Rahim has
argued, Singapore’s relations with her immediate Malay neighbours are “fraught with
tensions and misunderstandings” and that the causes are historical animosities,
competitive economic pressures, and perceptions of Singapore as a regional
‘outsider’.
14
Singapore is dependent on Malaysia for half of its water supply. In her
study of the history of water negotiations between Singapore and Malaysia, the
Canadian scholar Diane Mauzy found that Malaysia had used water as leverage in

many of the bilateral disputes between the once-joined states.
15


14 Rahim 2009, op cit. Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs behind the Man.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000. See also Bilveer Singh,
Arming the Singapore Armed Forces: Trends and Implications, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 153, 2003. Singh has
argued that “Malaysia is perhaps the most conspicuous factor in Singapore’s security
calculations. Singapore-Malaysia relations can be deemed the most tempestuous and
unpredictable amongst all countries in the ASEAN region”, p. 23.

Mauzy’s observations
are significant because it showed that it was the Malaysian side which first threatened
the use of force against Singapore, starting in 1966 and continuing on-and-off into the
1980s depending on the vagaries of domestic Malaysian politics. By the early-1990s,
the SAF had built up a credible defensive and war-fighting capability. In response,
Singapore has counter-threatened the use of force if its water supply is cut off. From

15 Diane Mauzy, “Water Wars: Singapore versus Malaysia”, University of British
Columbia, 24 February 2004. See also Agence France Presse (AFP), “Water issue
could spark Malaysia-Singapore military conflict: report”, 3 February 2002:
Ex-Malaysian general Zaini
Mohammad Said was quoted as saying that the close ties of the people of the two
ASEAN member-states ‘was insufficient to prevent a military conflict.’ Mahathir had
also made public remarks about skinning a cat: “There are many ways to skin a cat.
There are also many ways of skinning Singapore.” Such hostile remarks are counter-
productive to forging harmonious bilateral relations. See Chen Jun An, “Malaysia
should ditch Cold War Mindset”, Straits Times, 3 November 2009, p. A18.

124
a policymaking viewpoint, the 2000 memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew are significant
because it showed that he had serious doubts that Singapore’s independence was fully
accepted by its nearest neighbour. As a small city-state surrounded by potentially
hostile neighbours, Singapore is sensitive to any signals that suggest that its
sovereignty is less than respected by its neighbours. This piece of Realpolitik
conversation in 1978 between the top two leaders of Singapore and Malaysia suggests
that both sides agreed only to business-like ‘peaceful coexistence’. Eric Thompson
has pointed out that in its early days of independence, Singapore’s leaders portrayed
the island-state as “a Chinese state in a Malay ocean”, a situation comparable to that
of Israel in the Arab world.
16
Singapore’s sense of vulnerability has since been
considerably reduced as a result of its prosperity and the relentless build-up of the
SAF into a credible deterrent force. Malaysian analysts and policymakers recognize
the dramatic transformation of the SAF. In a June 2009 study, three Malaysian
analysts with the Universiti Utara Malaysia, noted that Singapore had “become the
strongest and finest in military and defense compared to other Southeast Asian
nations The offensive defense doctrine practiced such as forward defense, poison
shrimp, pre-emptive strike and strategic weaponry ownership had raised concerns
among leaders in the Southeast Asian countries.”
17


16 Eric C. Thompson, “Singaporean Exceptionalism and its Implications for ASEAN
Regionalism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(2) August 2006: 183-206.
One needs to keep in mind the
difference between the smiling diplomacy represented by various ASEAN summit
meetings (‘photo opportunities’) and the underlying suspicions and tensions.

17 Mohamad Faisol Keling, Md. Shukri Shuib, and Mohd Naeim Ajis, “The Impact of
Singapore’s Military on Malaysia’s Security”, Journal of Politics and Law, 2 (2) June
2009: 68.

125
Appearances of surface calm can be deceptive about the underlying dynamics of
competition and rivalry in intra-ASEAN relations.

One longstanding feature in Singapore-Malaysia relations is the abang-adik
(“big brother-little brother”) mentality of some UMNO leaders to interfere in
Singapore’s domestic politics. The presumption is that the Singapore adik is expected
to defer to the Malaysian abang. Tensions arise when such expectations are not
fulfilled. The situation can deteriorate very quickly, especially during periods of
domestic political uncertainty in Malaysia. The vagaries in domestic Malaysian
politics, especially during periods of UMNO political leadership crises and economic
turbulence, have a major impact on bilateral Singapore-Malaysia relations. Lee Kuan
Yew has described the problem as follows: “Antipathy for and envy of Singapore
always tempted Malay leaders to seek popularity with their Malay grassroots by
hitting out against Singapore.
18
The significance of the roller-coaster nature of Singapore-Malaysia relations
has to do with its impact on the overall tone of their bilateral relations. When Prime
Minister Mahathir was succeeded in late 2003 by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, bilateral
Singapore-Malaysia relations improved significantly. Badawi was less confrontational
This asymmetrical expectation remains a persistent
problem in bilateral Singapore-Malaysia relations, as seen in the highly emotionally-
charged Malaysian response to Israeli President Chaim Herzog’s official visit to the
city-state in 1986.

18 Lee Kuan Yew 2000, op cit., p. 279. Rahim 2009, op cit., pp. 43-45. For example,
when Johor was hit by heavy flooding in January 2007, UMNO Johor politicians
were very quick to blame Singapore, but without getting their facts right first. At the
UMNO General Assembly meetings in 2005 and 2006, Education Minister
Hishamuddin Onn (a rising young UMNO leader, and the son of Malaysia’s third
Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn) unsheathed a Malay warrior’s “keris” (sword) to
signal his determination to defend Malay Special Rights against perceived
encroachments by non-Malays. See also Bilveer Singh 2003, op cit., pp. 23-27.


126
and able to transcend the emotional baggage of the Separation. Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi’s pragmatic policies have been continued by his successor, Najib
Tun Razak. Both governments now concentrate on enhancing bilateral economic
cooperation in the post-Mahathir years. In terms of the level of political trust between
the island-republic and Malaysia, it would appear that it has not increased to a level
that we can be very confident of expectations of peaceful change, especially where
“core, vital national interests” are at stake. From Singapore’s viewpoint, the UMNO-
dominated government still believes in a Malay-Malaysia.
19
In a 2009 study, Joseph
Liow argued that over the past few decades, Malaysian politics has taken a strong turn
towards Islamism, and that this trend is actually being spearheaded by the ruling
UMNO itself, and not because of electoral competition from the Muslim-based Partai
Islam (PAS). Liow posits that this Islamist trend in Malaysia ‘will be very difficult to
reverse, and that has dire consequences not only for the ethnic and religious minorities
of Malaysia, but also for their democratic system as a whole.”
20

19 Joseph Liow Chin Yong, Piety and Political Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia.
US: Oxford University Press, 2009.
In contrast,
Singapore takes pride in its meritocracy. This remains a basic divide between
Singapore and Malaysia. Despite the surface calm over the past seven years of the
post-Mahathir era, there are strong under-currents that can easily undermine
cooperation and trust in bilateral relations. Michael Leifer’s 2000 observation that
Singapore’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia are characterized by a sense of
vulnerability would, however, appear to be less valid today given the city-state’s
success in transforming itself into a global city, the strengthening of its economic,
political and security relationships with the outside world, especially the US and other

20 Ibid., product description.

127
Western Powers, and most critically, the relentless growth of the Singapore Armed
Forces (SAF) into a credible fighting force.
21


The last point is noteworthy because it
highlights the city-state’s capability and political will to defend itself against any
aggression, including the use of force, if necessary.

Singapore-Indonesia Relations

As in the case of Malaysia, Singapore-Indonesia ties are also characterized by ups and
downs. Arising from the tensions of the Indonesian Confrontation, the Singapore
Embassy in Jakarta was wrecked by howling mobs in 1967 after the island-state

carried out the death sentence by hanging two Indonesian marines convicted of
bombings.
22
Their recent tensions were highlighted by the trauma caused by the
Asian Financial Crisis of (AFC) of 1997-98. During the crisis, Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew’s publicly questioned Indonesian Vice-President Habibie’s suitability to
succeed Suharto in 1998, saying that it may adversely affect foreign investor
confidence in Indonesia. As President, Habibie took offense at the remarks. Habibie
latter mocked Singapore as a “little red dot” surrounded by a sea of green, and he
belittled the amount of Singapore’s financial aid to Indonesia during the AFC.
President Habibie also scolded Singapore as not being a real friend in times of need.
23


21 See Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, London and New
York: Routledge, 2000.

His unfriendly remarks against Singapore were made in the context of severe

22 Lee Khoon Choy, Diplomacy of a Tiny State. (second edition). Singapore: World
Scientific, 1993, p.233. Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto:
Aspiring to International Leadership. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996.

23 Southeast Asian Affairs (ISEAS) 1999. See also Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Indonesia
and Singapore: Structure, Politics and Interests”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 31 (2)
August 2009: 249-271.


128
domestic and political uncertainty within Indonesia in the aftermath of the AFC. In

November 2000, at a closed-door meeting at the Indonesian embassy in Singapore, an
erratic Indonesian President Abdulrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) made a
veiled threat of force against Singapore. Reacting to a perceived slight from Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew concerning the longevity of his administration, Wahid
accused Singapore of being arrogant in its relations with other ASEAN states and of
“looking down on the Malay people”.
24
Another example of an unfriendly act took place on 5 February 2007 when the
Indonesian government unilaterally banned the export of land sand to Singapore.
Indonesia knew that Singapore would be vulnerable to the export ban because the
city-state was seeking to build two world-class tourism-related Integrated Resorts.
The Indonesian Navy was mobilized to enforce the export ban. Regarding the sand
export ban, Indonesia appeared to have ambivalent motivations. There were a number
of embarrassing flip-flops in policies from the Indonesian side: some Indonesian
officials claimed that the ban resulted from serious environmental damage to
Indonesia. But some senior ABRI leaders were reported to have said that the ban was
aimed at putting strong pressure against Singapore to be more cooperative on
Jakarta’s demand for an extradition treaty against rich Indonesian-Chinese
businessmen who were alleged to have parked their ill-gotten gains in Singapore
It is worth noting how deeply-held
perceptions (and mis-perceptions) of race-religion continue to colour interactions in
intra-ASEAN relations. Wahid reportedly said that Indonesia, acting in concert with
Malaysia, may consider stopping the supply of fresh water to Singapore.


24 This point is based on an article by Arief Budiman, “Indonesia: the Trials of President
Wahid”, Southeast Asian Affairs 2001: 147. Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The
Beliefs Behind the Man. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000.

129
banks.
25
The bilateral negotiations on a bilateral extradition treaty had been going on
for the past twenty years with no success. The Indonesian attempt at coercion sparked
an unusually strong debate in the Singapore Parliament with some Members of
Parliament (MPs) criticising Indonesia as engaging in the “politics of envy”. These
MPs also pointed out that the Indonesian leaders had conveniently forgotten the big
role that Singapore played in rallying international financial aid for the December
2004 Aceh Tsunami victims.
26
The significance of these periodic downturns in Singapore-Indonesian
relations is that when it comes to calculations of core national interests, it seems that
the ASEAN states put their national interests first, and then the interests of its
neighbours as an afterthought. As observed by Indonesian analyst Agung Wicaksono,
with national elections in Indonesia looming in Indonesia in 2009, ‘economic
nationalism’ was again rearing its ugly head.
In response to these Indonesian attempts at economic
coercion, Singapore started seeking new sources of supply of sand/granite from other
neighbouring states, like Myanmar, Thailand, and China.
27


25 This piece of information was accessed from the Singapore Institute of International
Affairs:

Under the administration of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), relations between Singapore and Indonesia have
improved considerably. But the legacy of tensions and mistrust arising from
President Sukarno’s aggressive and violent Konfrontasi campaign against the creation

/>29

26 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( www.mfa.gov.sg). Transcripts of Remarks
by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in Parliament during Committee of
Supply Debate on 5 March 2007.

27 Agung Wicaksono, “Indonesia’s Economic Strategy: Nationalism First”, Straits
Times, 29 December 2008: A15.


130
of the Malaysian Federation (which consisted of Singapore) 1963-65 provides a
reminder of potential Indonesian hegemonic ambitions within Southeast Asia.
Provided it gets its own domestic political house in order, Indonesia clearly has the
potential to become the most powerful state in maritime Southeast Asia. This could
be achieved with the rise of a new Indonesian strongman, who would combine the
charisma of a Sukarno and the quiet determination of the developmentalist
inclinations of a Suharto. The history of brutality perpetuated by the Indonesian
Armed Forces (ABRI), as studied by Leonard Sebastian and other analysts, at
Tanjong Priok (1984), the Lampung Incident (February 1989), the Dili killings in East
Timor (1991), the Madura killings (1993), and in Aceh over the past three decades
have been well-documented.
28


The Indonesian military’s record of brutal crushing of
domestic dissent is also likely to weigh heavily in the memories of Singapore’s
leaders as they contemplate military contingency planning to safeguard the city-state’s
national interests.
Singapore-Thailand Relations

The evolution of Singapore-Thailand relations over the past four decades highlights
the point that changes in the domestic politics of one state can dramatically and
adversely affect relations with its neighbours. In general, bilateral Singapore-Thailand
relations have been good. But this cordial situation can easily change for the worse


28 Leonard Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Force, Singapore:
ISEAS, 2006, pp. 138-139. See also Shaun Narine, “ASEAN in the twenty-first
century”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22(3) 2009: 374. Bilveer Singh,
ABRI and the Security of Southeast Asia: the role and thinking of General L. Benny
Moerdani. Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1994. Richard
Tanter, Gerry van Klinken, and Desmond Ball. Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s
Military and Violence in East Timor, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.


131
and lead to uncertainty with a change of government in Thailand arising from Thai
domestic political crisis. During the era of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-
September 2006), bilateral ties strengthened greatly, to the extent that some analysts
believed a new Thai-Singapore axis within ASEAN was emerging.
29
But the Shin
Corp deal of January 2006 (in which the Singapore government-owned Temasek
Holdings bought over the Thai telecommunications conglomerate Shin Corp from
Prime Minister Thaksin in a US$1.9 billion deal, in which the latter did not have to
pay taxes from the proceeds) became embroiled in domestic Thai politics. It provided
Thaksin’s opponents with more ammunition to intensify opposition against him, and
culminated in the Thai military coup against Thaksin on 19 September 2006. In
January 2007, Thai military coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin accused the
Singapore government of using Shin Corp to spy on Thailand. Under normal

circumstances, we would not expect the leaders of states which have been very
friendly towards one another to make such an unprecedented accusation. There were
also demonstrations against Singapore in Bangkok, outside the Singapore Embassy,
flag-burning, and threats made Singaporean diplomats. Singapore strongly denied
General Sonthi’s accusation.
30


29 John Burton, “Thai-Singapore Axis set to unravel”, Financial Times, 20 September
2006.
Ex-Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir apparently
supported the accusation by the Thai coup leaders. The Thai newspaper The Nation

See also Alan Chong, “Singapore’s Political Economy, 1997-2007: Strategizing
Economic Assurance for Globalization”, Asian Survey, November/December 2007,
47 (6): 952-976. Shaun Narine, “ASEAN in the twenty-first century: a sceptical
review”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22(3) 2009: 379.

30 Singapore MFA spokesman’s comments on Thai MFA spokesman Kitti Wasinondh’s
remarks of 24 January 2007.
Accessed on 18
November 2007.


132
reported Mahathir as saying: “Singapore doesn’t really care about the opinion of its
neighbours, adding that Singapore’s decision was ‘unfeeling and not sympathetic.”
31

An implication of such deeply-held sentiments about a neighbouring state is that it is
likely to set limits on the extent and depth of inter-state trust and cooperation. The
significance here is that bilateral Thai-Singapore relations have not developed or
become integrated to the stage where peaceful change can be expected when regime
interests are deemed to be at stake. From a policymaker’s viewpoint, cordial
interstate relations cannot be taken for granted. Beneath the veneer of friendship,
there could be areas where resentment and envy are present and could erupt,
especially under conditions of severe domestic political challenges and crises.
Malaysia-Indonesia Tensions

Similar racial-kinship ties may not be a guarantee of harmonious bilateral
relationships.
32


31
Although both countries are Muslim-majority, Indonesia has
historically tended to see itself as the regional big brother, especially during the
belligerent Sukarno presidency (1949-1966). Since 2000, Malaysia and Indonesia
have a record of highly nationalistic and destabilizing militarized naval disputes,
including the highly emotional conflict over ownership of the islands of Ligitan and
Sipadan in the Celebes Sea. In December 2002, the International Court of Justice
awarded sovereignty over the two islands to Malaysia. This indicated that, among
some sections of the political-military elite, the immediate reflex when regime
interests or situations of domestic instability are at stake is the threat to use force.

(Accessed on 18 November 2007).

32 Joseph Liow Chin Yong, The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin,
Two Nations. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

133
Militarised naval conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia can be seen in
their 2005 Ambalat territorial dispute (Sulawesi Sea). Between February and April
2005, Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in a serious maritime/natural resources
dispute over part of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea off the east coast of Borneo
(Kalimantan to Indonesia).
33
Mutual accusations of violations of territorial
sovereignty were made. As diplomatic relations soured, both sides deployed military
forces. On 3 March 2005, President Yuydhoyono, to protect his own nationalist
credentials, ordered the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI) to augment
Indonesia’s Eastern Fleet Task Force. This brought the Indonesian Navy’s presence
up to eight vessels supported by four F-16 fighter jets. Royal Malaysian Navy
(RMN) and marine police vessels were deployed to the disputed area. There was
strong nationalistic fervour in the Indonesian parliament. Fortunately, cooler heads
prevailed through sensible diplomacy.
34


33 Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on
Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. IX, no.
4, Fall 2005. Malaysia’s national oil company Petronas had unilaterally issued
exploration licences to its own exploration arm, Petronas Carigali, in partnership with
Royal Dutch/Shell Group in February 2005. Unfortunately, their conflicting claims
overlapped each other. The Ambalat block and the East Ambalat block were licensed
to Italian oil major ENI and US-based oil multinational Unocal in December 2004
respectively.
The dangers of xenophobic nationalism
threatening bilateral relations were again highlighted in September 2009: Indonesian

nationalist rhetoric turned nasty over claims of ‘theft’ of a Balinese dance by the
Malaysian tourism authority. The bilateral dispute was serious enough that the

34 Yang Razali Kassim, “ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to
Bilateral Disputes,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. IDSS Commentaries, 6 April 2005.
See Southeast
Asian Affairs 2006.


134
Indonesian Antara news agency reported that President Yudhoyono would discuss this
issue during his visit to Malaysia in October 2009.
35
J.N. Mak, a veteran Malaysian political observer, has pointed to the worrying
trend of the militarization of maritime disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Besides their dispute over the Ambalat seas, both countries are also involved in
maritime disputes off the west coast of Sarawak-Kalimantan in the Gosong Niger
zone.

36


These periodic eruptions of emotional and wild anti-Malaysia sentiments in
Indonesia highlight a number of points. First, they could have been instigated by
powerful domestic vested interests to signal their unhappiness and opposition against
the Yudhoyono administration. Here bilateral relations become hostage to the
vagaries of domestic Indonesian politics. Second, references to similar blood and
cultural kinship ties may amount to nothing under dire conditions of rising economic
mismanagement and political uncertainty, and are likely to spill-over to adversely

affect the overall tone of bilateral relations. Third, the level of affinity and trust
between Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia did not appear to have very strong
foundations.







35 Stephen Fitzpatrick, “Ancient hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia turn ugly,”
The Australian 12 September 2009. Gangs of thugs armed with sharpened bamboo
spears roamed Jakarta streets demanding ID cards from car occupants, looking for
Malaysians to intimidate. See also: “Anti-Malaysia fever migrates to Net”, Straits
Times 12 September 2009, p. C6.

36 J.N. Mak, “Sovereignty in ASEAN and the Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the
South China Sea”, in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers eds., Security and International
Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime,
London and New York: Routledge, 2009.


135
Thai-Cambodian Tensions

Since mid-2007, Thai-Cambodian tensions have descended into periodic armed
border skirmishes over territorial disputes and historical animosity. Historically,
before the arrival of French colonialism in the 19
th
century, the declining Khmer

kingdom was squeezed by the expanding Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms. Not
surprisingly, Cambodians today are understandably mindful of their continued
vulnerability in relation to their stronger immediate neighbours, Vietnam and
Thailand. In January 2003, Cambodia and Thailand were involved in a serious
conflict over insensitive remarks made by a Thai actress (Suwanna Konying) which
portrayed the ancient Angkor Wat temple complex as historically an integral part of
Thai territory. The remarks led to violent riots by Cambodians against the Thai
Embassy in Phnom Penh.
37
The very emotional anti-Thai riots highlighted the extreme nationalist
emotions involved on matters concerning ethno-nationalism, or ‘national prestige and
identity’. There is no guarantee that either side will not resort to the possible use of
force in settling interstate disputes. Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, and prevented a
rapid escalation of the underlying tensions. Given their historical rivalries and
suspicions, Thai-Cambodian relations today are uneasy, despite their growing
economic ties. There is Cambodian resentment that they are being exploited
economically by the Thais. More signs of inherent volatility of underlying territorial
tensions in Thai-Cambodian relations were seen in September-October 2008 over the
disputed Preah Vihear temple. In July 2008, UNESCO designated the Preah Vihear



37 “Analysis: The Tensions behind the Cambodian riots,” British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), 30 January 2003.


136
temple as a World Heritage site, based on an application by the Cambodian
government. The Thai government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej apparently
supported the application by Cambodia, which led extremist Thai nationalists to

accuse it of yielding Thai territory in return for business concessions from Cambodia.
Both sides mobilized their armed forces, and tensions escalated. Elites in Thailand
and Cambodia stoked up nationalist emotions for domestic political (electoral)
advantages. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s regime reportedly encouraged
nationalist sentiments in the run-up to crucial parliamentary elections. Things came to
a head when Thai and Cambodian military forces opened fire against one another for
about 10 minutes on 16 October 2008, in which two Cambodian soldiers were killed.
Fortunately, aided by behind-the-scenes ASEAN mediation, there was no large-scale
and sustained violence. On 25 January 2010, Thai and Cambodian troops again
fought a 20-minute gun battle over allegations of border intrusions.
38
The point here
is, as pointed out by Shaun Narine, ASEAN states are still capable of engaging in
violent conflict against one another.
39


38 Wassana Nanuam, “Cambodian, Thai troops in shoot-out”, Bangkok Post, 25 January
2010.
Border fighting again erupted between Thai and
Cambodian troops in early-April 2009 over the disputed Hindu temple at Preah
Vihear. Under new Thai Prime Minister Abhisit, bilateral relations have soured
further. Hun Sen has commented publicly that the charges against ousted Thai Prime

39 Richard Parry, “Thai and Cambodia temple dispute spills over into deadly fighting”,
Times of London, 16 October 2008. See also Voice of America, 3 April 2009. Thai-
Cambodian political tensions again escalated in early November 2009 when
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
as an economic advisor. This action was a political embarrassment to the Thai
government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. Both countries recalled their

Ambassadors (
Shaun Narine
2009 op cit., p. 379. Voice of America (VOA), “Thai-Cambodia Dispute raises
Nationalist Sentiment in Bangkok”, 16 December 2009.

137
Minister Thaksin are politically motivated. He added that his relations with Prime
Minister Abhisit were the worst compared with his personal ties with Thailand’s
previous three leaders. Bilateral Thai-Cambodian tensions have since deepened. In
January 2010, Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya said that there would be no
normalisation of bilateral relations ‘until the Cambodian government revoked the
appointment of Thaksin Shinawatra as a financial adviser’.
40

This is another
example of the gap between rhetoric and practice, highlighting the persistence of very
nationalistic mindsets and the influence of traditional suspicions and hostilities.
Thailand-Myanmar Relations
Historically, there is no love lost between Thailand and its next-door neighbour,
Myanmar. Thai analyst, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, puts it well:
Relations between Thailand and Myanmar have always been rather
unpredictable. On Thailand’s side, the relationship has long been held
hostage to history: the bitter memory of Ayutthaya, Siam’s old capital, being
invaded and ransacked by the Burmese in 1767. This past has been often
exploited by Thai elites to shore up their political legitimacy through the
manipulation of nationalism.
41

The quality of bilateral Thailand-Myanmar relations is dependent on their respective
national priorities. During the Thaksin years (2001-06), Thailand was more interested
in promoting economic and trade links, especially through the exploitation of
Myanmar’s natural resources like gas and hydropower resources, teak, gems and


40 Tim Johnston, “Thai ultimatum to Cambodia on Thaksin”, Financial Times, 11
January 2010. In October 2009, Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as a
financial adviser.
41 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand-Myanmar Ties: Economics trumps Politics,”
The Straits Times, 5 May 2008, p.21. Pavin is a Visiting Research Fellow at ISEAS,
Singapore. See also Rumelili op cit. Rumelili argues that ASEAN’s engagement
policy with Myanmar can be understood in terms of ‘collective identity’, as part of
‘Self’.


138
precious stones, and low-wage workers from Myanmar. This Thai preoccupation
with reaping the economic advantages has carried over into the Thai administration of
Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej’s People’s Power Party. Both Thaksin and Samak
put little emphasis on Western demands for democratic reforms in Myanmar and the
release of detained Opposition leader Ms Aung San Suu Kyi. Under Prime Minister
Abhisit, bilateral relations have been kept on an even keel. But given Abhisit’s pro-
democracy orientations, there are likely to be tensions over the Aung San Suu Kyi
issue. Thailand-Myanmar relations are based on pragmatic, economic considerations.
There would appear to be very little sense of common identity or real solidarity
between the two neighbours. The outbreaks of Thai-Myanmar tensions and
militarized conflicts indicate that both sides appear unable to develop post-nationalist
mindsets.

(B) 2008 Thompson-Chulanee Survey of University Students’ Perceptions
about ASEAN

A strong sense of a “we-feeling” regional community must include not only that of
the elites, but ultimately also at the grassroots level. In this regard, an interesting
survey of the perceptions of varsity students about ASEAN was published in 2008 by
Eric Thompson (Sociology Department, National University of Singapore), and
Chulanee Thianthai of Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University.
42


42 Eric Thompson and Chulanee Thianthai, Attitudes and Awareness Towards ASEAN:
Findings of a Ten-Nation Survey. Singapore: ISEAS, 2008. It surveyed
undergraduates from leading universities for all the ten ASEAN states. There were a
total of 2170 respondents, with between 197 and 272 respondents for each university.
The average age of the respondents was just over 20 years old. The survey was
commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat. It was conducted from September to
November 2007.
Overall, Thompson
and Chulanee painted a fairly positive and optimistic view of the perceptions of


139
university students in Southeast Asia about their attitudes towards ASEAN. But their
conclusions are subject to different interpretations. I do not think that we should
interpret the findings too optimistically. The overall findings of the Thompson-
Chulanee survey about ASEAN are actually quite mixed. It depends on whether one
takes a ‘half full, or half empty’ viewpoint. First, Thompson and Chulanee concluded
that students across the region have relatively good knowledge of ASEAN and
considered themselves as ‘ASEAN citizens’ and demonstrated generally positive

attitudes towards the Association. But the survey results actually showed quite a large
proportion of students who held the contrarian view: Singapore 50.7%; Myanmar
40.4%; Thailand 33.0%; Philippines 30.4%; and Indonesia 27.1%.
43
Second, the survey found that economic cooperation, tourism and
development assistance were ranked as the most important areas for regional
integration.
Singapore,
Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia are four of the five original founders of ASEAN
in 1967.
44
This is not surprising and is in line with the 1999 findings about the
process of West European integration by Walter Mattli
45


43 Thompson and Chulanee op cit., p. xii.
: regional integration tends to
proceed from economic cooperation (‘low politics’) to the more difficult ‘high
politics’ areas of political-security cooperation. The latter would involve the sensitive
issue of ceding some measure of political sovereignty to a supranational entity. The
extent of regional economic integration is an indicator of a “we-feeling” community.
Third, the survey showed that the students pragmatically placed greater emphasis on

44 Thompson and Chulanee op cit., p. 7.

45
Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999.