The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 2

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Acknowledgements

It is my great pleasure to express my gratitude for people who supported me
while preparing this thesis. If there is something good in this thesis, it is due to
their help while all mistakes and shortcomings are entirely mine. First and
foremost, my greatest debt is to my supervisor, Associate Professor Brian
Farrell. He gave me invaluable comments and suggestions since I first sent
him an e-mail from Japan five years ago. I would also like to express deep
gratitude to my co-supervisors: Associate Professor Teow See Heng and
Associate Professor Malcolm Murfett. At various stages, they gave me
encouragements, support and advices. I am grateful to Mr. Peter Lugg for
proof-reading this thesis, to Ms Kelly Lau, a management officer of
Department of History, for giving me help and support since I came to
Singapore, and to Professor Hirama Yōichi and Associate Professor Ito Shinya
for kindly replying to my questions via e-mails. Thanks are also due to my
friends in Singapore. Without them, it was impossible for me to complete this
thesis. In particular, I wish to convey thanks to Zhang Jing, Orihara Minami,
Grace Mak, Hu Wen, and Ho Chi Tim.
I would like to express my gratitude to librarians and archivists of
following libraries and archives in Japan, Britain and Singapore: the Library of
the National Institute of Defense Studies of the Japanese Ministry of Defense,
the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the
National Diet Library, libraries of the University of Tokyo, the Library of
National Showa Memorial Museum, the Library of National Defense

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Academy in Yokosuka, the National Archives in Kew, the Library of the

National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, and the Central Library and the
Chinese Library of National University of Singapore. In particular, I would
like to mention Mr. Kitazawa Noritaka, a former archivist of the Library of the
National Institute of Defense Studies, who helped me to locate documents
which I needed, and Ms Tham Wai Fong, a librarian of the Chinese Library of
National University of Singapore, who always gave me support and help.
My study in Singapore and researches in Japan and Britain was
supported by NUS Research Scholarship. Without this scholarship, it was
impossible for to complete this thesis.

YAMAMOTO FUMIHITO













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Table of Contents


Acknowledgements i

Summary vi
List of Abbreviations viii


Introduction 1
Historical Background 5
Previous Studies 13
Japanese Military Organisations 29



Chapter 1
Japan, Britain, the Singapore Naval Base
and Naval Disarmaments 1921-36 35
Preparation for the Washington Conference 36
The Washington Conference and the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty 43
The Aftermath of the Washington Conference 56
The London Naval Conference and the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion 70
To the abrogation of Article 19 77
Conclusion 85

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Chapter 2
The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public 90
The First Perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base 94
Cancellation of the Plan 100
Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy over the Singapore Naval Base 106
The Singapore Naval Base in the Japanese Public in the late 1920s 112

The Vogue of War Scare Literature and the Singapore Naval Base 121
The Singapore Naval Base in Anti-British Movements 131
Conclusion 140


Chapter 3
The Origin of the Plan to Attack Singapore 143
The Origin of the South-bound policies 146
Revising Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin 157
Advocates of South-bound Policies 160
Evolution of Operation Plans to Attack Singapore 1936-1940 165
Conclusion 191






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Chapter 4
The Road to Singapore 197
Influence of the European War on Japan 198
The Road to the War 227
The Army’s Preparations to Attack Singapore 251
Conclusion 267


Conclusion 272

Bibliography 293
Appendices 320
Maps 326











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Summary

The British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval
Base to defend its Eastern Empire from Japan in June 1921. Until 1939,
however, Japan did not have any plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore.
Throughout the period between the two world wars, the Japanese Navy did not
examine seriously any plan to attack Singapore from the sea side. The origin
of the plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore was an operational plan
against Britain included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939”
designed by the Japanese Army. In this plan, the Japanese Army would land in
Singora in southern Thailand, go down the Malay Peninsula, and attack
Singapore from the land side. From the very beginning, the Japanese Army
considered attacking Singapore from the land side.

From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936, the Japanese
Navy had a unifying view on the Singapore Naval Base. It was not desirable
but acceptable on the condition that Britain agreed to Article 19 of the
Washington Treaty which prohibited the United States from establishing naval
bases in Guam and the Philippines. For the Japanese Navy which regarded the
United States as its only hypothetical enemy, prohibiting American bases in
Guam and the Philippines was far more important than the British Singapore
Naval Base. With the termination of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy
lost its reason to accept the Singapore Naval Base in 1936.
In 1939, the Japanese Army drew up its first substantial operational
plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore. However, it was not until

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Germany dominated European continent in May and June 1940 that the
Japanese Army examined a possibility of attacking Singapore seriously.
Mesmerised by the German Blitzkrieg, the Japanese Army turned its eyes to
the south for the first time in its history. For the Japanese Army, which had
regarded the Soviet Union as its principal hypothetical enemy, it was a
complete turnabout in its policy. It supposed that it could capture natural
resources areas in Southeast Asia concurrent with German attack on Britain.
But Britain drove the Germans back by the Battle of Britain.
The traditional policy of the Japanese Army against the Soviet Union
revived when the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet
Union on 22 June 1941. Suddenly, a great chance to attack the Soviet Union
came. Accordingly, the Japanese Army mobilised its force to Manchuria to
prepare war against the Soviet Union. But on 9 August, the Japanese Army
judged that it would be impossible to finish war against the Soviet Union by
the coming winter. Rather, it would be better to use the coming winter to
capture natural resources in the south to prepare war against the Soviet Union
which, the Japanese Army supposed, might happen in the spring of 1942. The

primary reason why the Japanese Army considered it would be necessary to
attack British Malaya and Singapore was to capture natural resources the
Japanese Army needed to prosecute war against the Soviet Union.





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List of Abbreviations

BBKS: Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshibu (The Military History Department,
the Agency of Defence), Japan.
DRO: Diplomatic Record Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
MOFA: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
NIDS: Library, the National Institution of Defense Studies, the Ministry of
Defense, Japan.
NGB: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents Series)
TNA: The National Archives, Kew, UK.