The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 10

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Appendices

1. Article 19 of the Washington Treaty


Article XIX
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the
time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and
naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions
specified hereunder:
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may
hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of
the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the
Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now
holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of
110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the
Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific
Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the
Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or
possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

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The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that
no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and
possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing

naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no
increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions
above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and
replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and
military establishments in time of peace.
From: Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York:
Russell and Rusell, 1970), p. 378.










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2. TNA, ADM 116/2149, 158-160, Note by Admiral Chatfield on 8 Dec
1921.



NOTE BY ADMIRAL CHATFIELD

Captain Yamanashi visited me this afternoon. He said he had come on
behalf of Admiral Kato who was slightly indisposed. He said he wanted to ask
my advice on the question of the Pacific bases with reference to what I had
already told Admiral Kato previously, namely that he should accept the ratio if

he had a guarantee as regards the strategic status quo. He then produced a
chart and explained the position of the principle Japanese bases, namely the
Pescadores, Keelung, in the north of Formosa, Oshima and the Bonin Islands.
He said the Pescadores had a naval base where 5 Light Cruisers could be
anchored and a Light Cruiser docked. Keelung was a mercantile harbour, but it
was defended with some guns, and a fleet could be anchored there. Oshima
was practically undeveloped. No naval money had been spent on it and they
did not wish to do so as they had not got any to spare. The Island in the Bonin
group had some military fortifications in it put by the army, but nothing of a
naval nature. He asked me if I thought should Japan consent to leave these
bases exactly as they were ( they would be willing even to remove the guns
from the Bonin Island if necessary) if they did this would the United States
consent to leave Manila, Guam and Hawaii also as they are at present. I said I

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thought they would agree as regards Guam and Manila but I doubted their
agreeing as regards Hawaii, though I had not discussed the matter with them.
Hawaii was a defensive base and it might be claimed that the Japanese fleet
could not proceed east of Hawaii if the American fleet was there without first
bringing it to action. Anyhow it was 3,000 miles away, further than England
from America, and it was unreasonable to consider it an offensive base against
Japan.
I pointed out to him the difference between naval bases and
fortifications and I said if the United States, from amour propre, wished to
have the right to fortify their islands, should they wish to do so, I though Japan
could perfectly will consent, thereby retaining the right to fortify their own
islands in defence. But of course Japan could not agree to naval bases being
established which would be a threat to Japan, especially oil fuel installations,
air-craft bases and dockyards. Captain Yamanashi agreed. He then with a very

sly look said “what about Hong Kong and Singapore? would you be willing to
maintain the status quo there also?” I said I had no instructions on this matter
from my Delegates, but as regards Hong Kong we should undoubtedly be
affected by what Japan did in Pescadores and Formosa, and I had no doubt that
we should reach a satisfactory agreement with them on that point. He then
again said “what about Singapore?” I said my personal view was that our fleet
had been reduced as low that it did not cover our strategic requirements and
this would have to be taken into consideration when considering the future of
Singapore, since Singapore was the entrance to the Indian Ocean and we might
require to take some action there. He said of course Japan would have no

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objection. They would be quite agreeable but would the United States agree as
Singapore was not very far from the Philippines. I said, of course, that I had no
idea.
He then said, “then Admiral, I understand your view to this. That you
think it would be all right if we proceed to maintain the status quo as regards
bases in the Pescadores, Formosa, Oshima, Bonin Islands, Philippines, Hong
Kong and Guam?” I said, yes, I thought that would be quite reasonable, and
that under such circumstances Japan would have fully safeguarded her
interests.
I then asked him why he had come to me as I understood the matter
was to be dealt with in future by the Delegates and not by naval advisers. He
said “we though it would be necessary for the Admirals to agree technically on
this point”. I said that I hope that this did not mean another technical meeting
apart from the Delegates, as if so we should not settle the matter for another
month; and the matter instead should be dealt with entirely by the Delegates,
the Admirals being called in to the meeting if require to advice on this point.
He said he quite agree and would tell Baron Kato this.

I hope my remark on this matter is approved by Mr. Balfour, though,
of course, it was only an informal suggestion.
Captain Yamanashi finally asked whether I advised him to consult
Admiral Courts on this matter before Baron Kato saw Mr. Hughes. I said I
really could not advise on such a matter as that and that he must use his own
discretion and that of course our conversation was strictly confidential and he
must not quote anything I had said to Admiral Courts, as my remarks were

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only intended to help him out of difficulty. He said that was quite understood
and that he was very grateful.

8.12.21



Note: Yamanashi Katsunoshin promoted to Real-Admiral on 1 December 1921,
one week before, but Chatfield wrote as “Captain Yamanashi” in this paper.