Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 6

Chapter 6 Conclusion: Experiences and Implications

The Difference between Political Survival and
Breakdown is a Question of “Political Crafting”.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan
1


Democracy can be crafted to be attractive.
Giuseppe Di Palma
2



The idea of elite as a democracy-promoting actor has attracted vast interest in
the past several decades in Western academia. This study has concentrated on the
political elites at several levels as the primary actors in process of village elections in
China: national, provincial, county and township, and village.
This thesis therefore has traced the roles of political elites in Chinese village
elections via an examination of their crafting and manipulation, and demonstrated that
the elite perspective does capture the important elements of the process of rural
democratization and may provide important insight into village democracy and even
into the future of democratization in the whole country of China. After years of village
self-governance, it has been increasingly and obviously recognized that the role of
political elites at different levels is a critical determinant of the democratic quality of
village elections. Thus, without the forward oriented efforts of insightful political
elites’ democracy may remain a remote goal for rural Chinese people.


1
Alfred Stepan, “Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South

American Comparisons,” (with Juan Linz), in Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 138.

2
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkley, Los
Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), 156.

247
6.1 Main Findings
There is no doubt that village elections and self-governance are based on the
experiences of the peasants in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, who established
villagers’ committees on their own. But, as an institution, village self-governance and
its improvement could not have occurred without a reformist leadership that initiated
institutionalizing Guangxi farmers’ experience, formulating the laws, rules and
regulations concerned, making relevant policies, and pursuing them; in other words
this could not have occurred without the crafting of political elites at different levels.
Political elites in China function as a “helping hand” for village elections, and thereby
promoting rural democratization.

6.1.1 Path toward Democratization: Political Elites Lead China’s Rural
Democratization
This study can come to the conclusion that China has and will continue to
move towards democracy along the elite-led road, whereas neither the model of liberal
democracy nor the model of popular democracy is realistic choices. Although the term
elitism sounds more like an accusation than recognition of superior qualities, the way
to democracy led by the elite is realistic and feasible. The achievements up to the
present with rural democracy in China have been obtained mainly through the
endeavours of elites. This, however, does not mean that this study denies the
contributions of peasants and other actors to village democracy.
The success of democracy in rural China defies some prevailing theories that

stipulate preconditions for democracy: rural China is not an industrialized, developed
economy; rural China is short of civic culture and especially short of democratic

248
tradition. Chinese democracy is thus best understood by focusing, not mainly on its
socioeconomic determinants, but on how it is crafted by political elites.
The Chinese experience is not completely unique. Terry L. Karl finds that
democracies that came about through elite-directed compromise have tended to be the
most stable.
3
Andrew Nathan thinks, “Elite democracy in many countries was a step
toward full democracy because it allowed competitive institutions to become
established before mass participation began.”
4
Taiwan’s democratization illustrates
the points that the prospects for a competitive system are best when a democracy is
the result of transition through government-led transformation.
5
Tien Hungmao argues
that Taiwan had all the necessary conditions for democracy, but the democratic
transition had to await the ruling elite’s support for further reforms and the opposition
leadership’s willingness to cooperate with these reforms. Chiang Ching-Kuo, the
paramount leader of the KMT, is generally acknowledged for his critical role in
implementing Taiwanese liberalization reforms and democratization. His flexible
tactics in responding to challenges of democratization are very important to Taiwan’s
democratic development.
6

This elite-led transition to democracy is limited; on one hand “while elites may
have been self-motivated by power struggles or concerns with inner party legitimacy

at the start of the reform crisis, over time the dominant role of central decision makers


3
Karl, Terry Lynn, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” in Comparative Political
Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, eds. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New
York: Harper Collins, 1991), 180-1.

4
Andrew Nathan, “Chinese Democracy: the Lessons of Failure,” in China and Democracy: the
Prospect for A Democratic China, ed. Zhao Suishen (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 27.

5
Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins eds., The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and
Democracy (Harwood academic publishers, 1999), 338.

6
See Tien Hung-mao, “Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” in Taiwan’s Electoral
Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave, eds. Charles Chi-hsing Ching et al
(Armole, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 3-26.

249
in the reform process declines.” On the other hand this model usually bears a striking
characteristic of artificialness, changing with the change of leaders’ understanding,
attention, and willpower. People would believe “other factors begin to play a more
important role in forcing change.”
7
However, to transcend the elite-led
democratization, there is still a long way to go.

6.1.2 Major Roles
The roles of political elites at different levels are summarized in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Political Elites’ Roles at Different Levels in Their Crafting Village Democracy in China
Elites at different
levels
Major representatives Major tasks Types of Politics
Senior National Elites Peng Zhen
Bo Yibo
Institutional choices,
Political support.
Symbolic Politics
Elites at National
Level (MCA)
Li Xuejue
Bai Yihua
Wang Zhenyao
Zhan Chengfu
Crafting, engineering
new institutions,
democratic
institutional design
and summing up the
local experiences and
then spreading them
Reform Politics
Elites at Provincial
Level
Zhang Xiaogan
Zhang Zhenlang

Crafting, diffusing,
distributing, summing
up the local
experiences and then
spreading them
Distributive politics
Elites at County-
Township Level
Feng Yongcheng
Zhou Lianjun
Liu Zhenlong
Li Guomin
Crafting,
manipulating,
distributing, operating
Loyal Politics
Local Politics

Elites at Village Level Han Xingfu
Han Mingsen
Zhu Qiming
Li Si
Zhang Baijiang etc.*
Organizing,
manipulating creating,
crafting, challenging,
doing democracy
Citizenship Politics
* This list of names is from < >

7
Daniel V. Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Shen Mingming, “The Prospects for Democratization in China:
Evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study,” in China and Democracy: the Prospect for A Democratic

250
The above table can be represented in another way (see following figure).

Figure 6.1 Political Elites’ Roles at Different Levels in Their Crafting of Village
Democracy in China

National Policy Guidance
Ministry of Civil Affairs >
Outlines central government relevant

Laws, rules and regulations on village
Self-governance
|
|
Provincial Policy Guidance
Provincial Department > Diffuses National polices and laws; provides
Of Civil Affairs provincial laws of implementing “the Organic
Law”, measures, policies
|
|
County and Township County and Township Policy Guidance
Authorities >

Set out policies for village self-governance at
Locality; specify measures and ways
|
|
Village > Doing Democracy

Employs all of the laws, policies, measures
provided by superiors, and resources, means
to practicing village democracy

In the case of village elections, party-governmental officials have contributed
to the process of crafting village democracy. This study finds that the internal
structure and composition of political elites are crucial to our understanding of how
political elites may contribute to democratic development in rural China.
The
emergence and implementation of village elections in rural China is best described as
one initiated and guided by political elites at different levels of governments. After the
implementation, village elites and other actors appeared on the scene, being an
important power for crafting village democracy.



China, ed. Zhao Suisheng (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 190.

251
National: Building Democratic Institutions and Making Laws and Policies
Among the top Chinese leaders, Peng Zhen in league with Bo Yibo and Song
Ping were the most important people who strongly supported village self-governance.
Their roles imply symbolic politics. The reform-oriented officials at MCA were
empowered to administer the village elections and self-governance work under the

support of national top leaders. Of them, Wang Zhenyao and his colleagues played a
crucial role.
The elites clustered around the Civil Affairs system were the core for the
implementation and promotion of village self-governance. Without these officials,
there would not be fruitful achievements in rural democracy. This study regards the
role of political elites at national level as an engine on the way to rural democracy, a
designer and promoter for rural democratic institutions. In crafting village democracy
within administrative levels, political elites at the national level play the role of
reforming rural politics. They designed electoral laws, supplied policies concerned,
arranged relevant institutions, summed up and spread grassroots experiences and
innovations, and guided and supervised the implementation of village elections and
self-governance at lower levels. Their crafting is reform politics.

Provincial: Delivering and Implementing the Policies
The unevenness of democratic quality of village elections among provinces
effectively demonstrates the importance of provincial elites’ roles. This thesis has
noted this phenomenon: the process of village self-governance in the past two decades
has been characterized by a variety of levels of democratic quality of village elections
amongst the provinces. The geographic basis of the village self-governance situation
is clearly tied to which provincial political elites are supportive and how they craft

252
village democracy. A core group of provincial officials worked together to develop
election practices; their capacity became a crucial factor in implementing village self-
governance. This study finds that the leading officials at provincial departments of
Civil Affairs and their networks play a vital role in implementing village self-
governance. The core role is to diffuse central law and relevant rules and policies.
Crafting at this level belongs to distributive politics.
The core role is to diffuse central law and relevant rules and policies. Crafting
at this level belongs to a distributive politics.

County and Township: Implementing the Policies and Organizing Elections
County and township authorities have played complex and diverse roles,
which can not be classified simply as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. All things considered,
crafting and manipulating are two main performances of elites at county or township
level when they are faced with implementing village elections and self-governance.
Obviously, local authorities play a role of forming a connecting link between
leaderships above and the masses below, from national and provincial governments all
the way down to the villages. They are the crucial piece in the political elites’ chain of
crafting village democracy, operating as a “hinge” at the meeting point of state and
society. If the national and provincial elites are the makers and providers of the laws
and institutions concerned, the officials at county and township levels are the carriers.
As the carriers, they mainly send out the instructions, policies, and laws from higher
authorities. Therefore, their most important role is to implement the laws, rules and
regulations concerned.
In essence, local elites’ crafting village democracy is a loyal politics, because
whether and how they can implement village self-governance is an indicator of

253
whether they are loyal to higher authorities. Meanwhile, local elites’ crafting village
democracy is a local politics, because the process of the implementation is obviously
characterized by localism, either active or nonexistent construction of village
democracy.

Village: Handling and Operating Elections
After the implementation of village elections, village elites and other actors
appeared on the scene as an important power for crafting village democracy. There is
a considerable degree of regional variation of village elites’ functions and attitudes
toward village elections among village elites.
Village elites are the spokespersons of villagers and of community interests,

practitioners and operators of village elections, and the creators of the new political
participation mechanisms. They have some channels and abilities for helping
safeguard peasants’ legitimate interests and rights. Since they have popularity, power,
and various resources for political mobilization village elites are considered the main
practitioners and operators of village democracy. They have more information
channels, are more articulate in explaining their interests, and can skillfully follow the
democratic procedures. Of what they do, election campaigns are probably the most
worth noticing in village elections. Village elites have definitely played a crucial role
in crafting village democratic participation mechanisms although we cannot attribute
all these mechanisms to them alone. Among the innovations, the most significant and
influential were “sea election” and “the villager-representative assembly”.
Meanwhile the village party branch secretaries have made a strong impact on
village elections because of their special position in the village power structure. Their
basic attitude toward village elections is passive, while control or manipulation is the

254
secretary’s main act. However, with the introduction of village elections, as the core
leadership position, the party branch authority is being challenged.

6.1.3 Crafting Strategies
The picture of village democracy varies from one place to another and depends
on the political elites as the artists. The quality of village elections and the fate of
village self-governance and democracy are affected at length by political elites’ deeds
and strategies. Localities with remarkable achievement in village elections and self-
governance usually have gained strong support from provincial or county or township
authorities. In addition, the political elites that comprise these authorities can employ
suitable strategies to implement village elections. Rural democracy is a “fraudulent”
one, meaning it is the result of the strategic choice by the political elites who have
been in charge of the rural elections and self-governance, and have adopted some
tactics which are beneficial to rural democratic development, so as to lessen the

resistance from opponents and the kinds of worries for rural stability and the party’s
control of rural communities.

National Level
Three kinds of resources the elites employed have been identified and
analyzed: top leaders’ support, expectations and pressures from peasants, and their
own interest in the pursuit, through which they can and have effectively constructed a
sound environment, formulated the law, rules and regulations, and policies, built
institutions, and trained the executors for village elections and self-governance. All in
all, these elites have efficiently used various means, methods, and strategies to build a
momentum for village self-governance, and then force the issue onto local agendas.

255
Political elites at national levels crafted village democracy mainly through (1)
Building a sound circumstance; (2) Making laws, rules and regulations, and polices; (3)
Institutional building; (4) Relying on the China Council for the Promotion of Basic-
Level Governments and Mass Organizations; and (5) Three co-operation projects:
Chinese Rural Cadres Training Center Programme, Chinese Village Affairs
Management Training Programs: the Co-Operation between MCA and EU, and the
Standardization of Villagers’ Committee Election Procedures.

Provincial Level
Although political elites’ initiative and innovation are a political precondition
for developing village self-governance, they need some agents to implement the
policies concerned and develop village democracy. Whether this type of network
exists and how strong it is, in a sense, are also important to the democratic quality of
village elections. The political elites at the provincial level have employed five major
strategies to craft village democracy: (1) Elite cooperation; (2) Local legislature; (3)
Political responsibility; (4) Political programming; and (5) the Art of balancing
between the party leadership and village elections.

County-Township Level
These authorities can be a positive force if they feel sure that village elections
will help with their work rather than erode their power. To a large extent, the success
of the village election depends on whether or not county and township leaders can see
the benefits of rural democratization.

Positive Acts Local leaders at county and township levels are capable of a
more positive role, and can be a necessary and indispensable force for rural elections

256
and democracy. Strategic acts include the followings: (1) Focus on Putting the Laws
and Regulations into Effect. More and more local leaders have realized that working
in accordance with the law is a basic precondition for smoothly conducting village
elections. “Conducting village elections in accordance with the law” is a commonly
used slogan. (2) Finding Typical Cases and Set Them as Examples. In China, the
setting of examples and then spreading their experiences to other places is a
traditional and important way to implement a policy or build an institution, commonly
employed by authorities of all levels. (3) Development Strategy. Local officials who
willingly promote village democracy always emphasize and highlight the significance
of village self-governance to rural economic development. (4) Balancing the Several
Relationships. Three relationships are crucial if local leaders intend to decrease all
kinds of obstructions to effectively implement village self-governance: the
relationships between township and village, between implementation of government
affairs and autonomy, and between the party leadership and village self-governance or
village party branch and village committee (liang wei hui).
However, only when these strategies are translated into more specific
measures or activities can local officials effectively implement village self-governance
and promote village democracy. The followings are the main measures:
propagandizing, mobilizing and organizing elections, providing models for

regulations, making plans and setting an agenda for the elections, the trainings of
personnel, and financial support.
Negative Acts
As democratic Machiavellianism, local leaders are double-
faced. Most manipulators were township officials. Manipulation can be found during
the election and after the election, first in the control of the electoral procedure, and
then in the control of the elected village cadres. This study here mapped the various

257
means local elites chose to control or manipulate village elections. (1) Putting
emphasis on local rules and regulations at the expense of national ones, and the
control of information. (2) Local governments control through the setting up of
leading groups for the village election. (3) Holding meetings to let village cadres
know the township government’s view of who are the ideal candidates for the
committee; (4) Influencing villagers’ attitudes and behaviours. Local leaders and
particularly township officials do their best to influence the attitude and behaviour of
the villagers through their authority and personal prestige. (5) Directly interfering with
the candidates’ nomination. Another manifestation of local governments control is
direct interference with the nomination of candidates. (6) During the post-election
many township governments control village committees with financial means.

Village Level
This study focuses on a set of contextual factors, including institutional and
organizational dynamics, existing social network, information, and communication
channels, which condition or constrain village elites’ process of practicing village
democracy.
Village elites have taken the following strategic acts to protect villagers’
democratic rights and promote rural democracy. They make use of laws and
institutions, the masses’ emotion and interest in public issues, external forces, and
even peasant’s complaints and protest. In fact, at the village level, the crafting of rural

democracy in China is achieved through the process of how to rise to power, how to
stay in power, and how to pass it on in village elections. This study specifically
focuses on election campaigns and competition as an important democratic practice.
The study analyses the preconditions of the emergence of political campaigns and

258
factors that prompt the village elections to become more and more competitive. It also
lists some grassroots resources for village electoral campaigns, and summarizes three
strategies of village electoral campaigns: canvassing the shifting voters, “playing the
economic card”, and employing as many resources as possible with the aim to
establish campaign networks.
Furthermore, village elites created more democratic participation mechanisms,
through which the quality of village elections has been improved. Villagers’
representative assembly is a great innovation showing the political wisdom of Chinese
village politicians. The villagers’ representative assembly serves essentially as a
legislature. However, the configuration of villagers’ representative assembly and how
it works reveal the elite governing principle.
“Control” or “manipulation” is a basic tactic employed by village party
branches when facing the situation of village elections, although there is no lack of the
village party branches. They also join the ranks of crafting or developing new political
mechanisms to promote village democracy. The party branch secretaries have made
efforts and taken a number of measures to control or manipulate village elections.
First, the party secretaries are usually the heads of the village election committees.
Second, the party branch can specifically guide or manipulate the process of the
elections through nominating or checking-up on candidate qualifications. Third, these
newly elected village committees’ leaders may probably be invited to become the
vice-party secretary. Fourth, the policies concerning the important affairs are made by
both the party branch and the villagers’ committee, by which township party
committee and government can effectively control the village party branch and
thereby villagers’ committee too. However, after around two decades of the practices

of village elections and with the political reform’s going on, the party secretaries find

259
it more and more difficult to directly manipulate village elections. In view of this
situation, the party has to change its methods of control in village elections, rethinking
its attitude towards and ways to deal with the elections. So far there are many
strategies employed by the party branches to meet the challenge of village elections.
Among them, some are active, and some passive. The followings are indicative of this
change. Now party members or party secretaries would run for the positions of
villager’s committees; the practice of manipulating the candidates of villagers’
committees has given way to manipulating the selection of villagers’ representatives
and the control of the process of policy-making.

6.1.4 Two Regularities
From the trajectory of political elites’ crafting village democracy, we can find
two patterns there. One is the higher the position of political elites in governmental
hierarchy, the more willing they are to craft and promote village democracy,
conversely, the lower the position, the more possible controls of manipulating village
democracy. Comparatively speaking, provincial authority and central government are
active and positive in implementing village elections, whereas county and township
governments probably take a more passive and perfunctory attitude. Many empirical
facts show that one of the strongest forces resisting the introduction of village
elections indeed comes from township governments and village party branches. Based
on her questionnaire conducted in Yunnan in February 2003, for example, Li Shiyang
also confirms that the higher the position of governmental officials, the more active
they are toward village elections; and vice versa.
8

8
Li Shiyang, “Xianxiang ganbu dui cunweihui xuanjie di yingxiang tiaocha baogao” (“A Survey of the
Influence of County and Township’s Cadres on Village Elections”), EU-China Training Program on
Village Governance (July 2003).

260
The second is that government agency, specifically speaking, the Civil Affairs
Departments at all levels are more active than the party’s Organizational Departments
in implementing village elections and self-governance and promoting village
democracy. Party-state is not a unitary agency, but consists of different departments
and multi-level agencies with different roles, functions, and interests. Types of
craftsmen who craft village elections are also good proof. The structure of political
elites is to a great extent relevant to rural democratization. The Civil Affairs system is
responsible for village elections and self-governance, and it becomes the crucial
political force for promoting village democracy. On the other side the opposition is
more likely from the CCP’s organizational departments and local leaders. There are,
of course, exceptions to this pattern.
These two patterns show that institutional innovation and even democratic idea
from higher authorities are still a crucial force to further promote Chinese democracy,
and elite-led democratization in rural China can be called a re-division of labor.

6.2 Crafting with Striking Chinese Characteristics
Although sharing some common experiences of world democratization, the
democratization in rural China has its exceptional experiences with Chinese
characteristics.
9
This study here puts Chinese village elections in a comparative
perspective.

9
Some Chinese scholars and officials have summarized the unique characteristics of China’s rural
democracy. For example, Liu Xitang presents four characteristics: government activeness, individual
participation, benefits, and gradualism. See Liu Xitang, “Cunmin zizhi yu zhongguo xiangcun minzhu
de teshuxing” (“Village Self-governance and the Uniqueness of China’s Rural Democracy”), Zhongguo
Nongcun Jingji (China’s Rural Economy), no.12 (1998): 57-61.

261
6.2.1 Actors: the “Insiders of the System” instead of the “Outsiders of the System”
Many of the transitions to democracy in Latin American countries and Eastern
European countries were driven by “forces outside the system” (ti zhi wai).
Theoretically the attitudes, choices, and decisions of political actors in the transition to
democracy are not free from influences and pressures from other elite groups.
However, other elite groups have not had strong effects on the rural democratisation
of China, which is different from the process of democratisation of Latin American
countries and Eastern and Southern European countries. For example, the military in
Latin American countries have had a very powerful effect on the transition process.
Taiwan’s case also indicates that the incumbent elite, not the position of political
leverage, was granted a fairly free hand in limiting the scope and speed of democratic
reform and crafting new political institutions during the process of democratization.
10

Some scholars point out that a key independent variable in Chinese
democratization is the laying of institutional foundations for democracy by those who
occupy leading positions within the authoritarian regimes.
11
The rural democratization
in China was driven by political elites, the “insiders of the system” (ti zhi nei).

Actually both the opposing force and the reformers of village self-governance are
situated inside the system. The incumbent governing leaders rather than non-
governing elite and opposite political leaders contributed to the rural democratization
in China. The very fact is that many Chinese intellectuals and “democratic elites” did
not care about village elections. Thereby, as “insiders of the system”, political elites
crafting village democracy are mostly driven by policies concerned; thereby this
democracy can be called a “policy-driven democracy”. In the meantime, this


10
Chu Yun-han, “Taiwan’s Unique Challenges,” in Democracy in East Asia, eds. Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 134.


262
democracy is a “pressurised democracy”: pressures from both top-down and bottom-
up.
Furthermore, in some regions, for example, in Eastern Europe, usually the
political elites at the national but not local levels crafted democracy, whereas many
rounds of interacting and negotiating between the upper elites and local elites over
village elections resulted in democratic development in rural China. The interactions
between upper and local elites and the one between elites and the masses have jointly
contributed to the development of rural democracy in China.

6.2.2 Governmental Positions in Crafting Village Democracy
Many scholars have pointed out that political values have long been a major
focus in elite study as well as comparative politics and area studies. They believe that
democratic values and ideas are a fundamental orientation that elites tend to hold and
that are linked with behaviours.
12

Regarding village elections in rural China, the
International Republic Institute argues that at the core of the problem is the lack of
democratic tradition in China, and it is not clear whether village elections are as a
democratic right or an authoritarian privilege. “The lack of a democratic political
culture is obvious at several levels”.
13
In fact, there is no lack of such people taking
democratic value and ideas among political elites, and this study does not deny the

11
Thomas Lum, Problems of Democratization in China (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000), 87.

12
See Jacob et al., Values and the Active Community (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Almond,
Gabriel, and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978); Joel D.
Aberbach et al, Bureaucrats and politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981); Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1973).

13
Amy Epstein Gadsden and Anne F. Thurston, “Village Elections in China: Progress, Problems, and
Prospects,” IRI grogram report (January 2001):19.

263
importance of democratic ideas in crafting village democracy. However, to rural
democratization, a position is more important than democratic ideas.
14

Here we may make a comparison between Li Peng’s and Zhao Ziyang’s
attitudes towards the village election, which is interesting and meaningful. Zhao

Ziyang, former general secretary of the CCP, though thought to be representative of
China’s reformism, did not care about the village election, whereas, ironically, Li
Beng, a “conservative”, as chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC),
strongly supported the Organic Law to be enacted, knew the law very well, and was
willing to go to the countryside to do surveys on the implementation of the laws
concerned.
Wang Zhenyao once admitted that he and his colleagues had not clearly seen
the democratic value in village self-governance during the initial stage of the
implementation.
15
What is more, there is a utility or pragmatical understanding of
democracy in the political elites’ limited democratic ideas. To many Chinese people
including scholars and government officials, democracy is attractive because it brings
good things, specifically, democracy is equated with economic growth, or democracy
is necessary or conducive to development. Many political elites who are in charge of
village elections also share this understanding of democracy. In fact, democracy will
not necessarily ensure happiness or an ideal life. Democracy is nothing more than a
device, a means, to avoid disasters brought on by the arbitrariness of dictators.




14
It seems that political elites have crafted village democracy under the relative absence of the
influence of democratic value and ideas. Most of them have not been exposed much to democratic
ideals and their contents, and have no experience in running democratic institutions. On top of this,
there is a lack of mechanisms for democratic socializing under Chinese culture and China’s current
political system. Even those who are themselves called “democratic elites” or “democratic fighters”
lack democratic spirit judging from their actions.

15
Wang Zhenyao, interviewed by the author, Beijing, September 2001.

264

6.2.3 Pragmatism and “Democratic Machiavellianism”
Following the above point, we can obviously see the pragmatism spreading
over the process of village elections, which means that dynamics for promoting
village democracy are not only from political elites’ democrtic idea, but what is more,
pragmatism.
The democratization of developing countries usually consists of the state-led
processes launched and controlled by governments. Due to the state-driven actions,
the democratization possibly becomes a means of serving the government. Dankwart
A. Rustow once said, in some countries “democracy was not the original or primary
aim; it was sought as a means to some other end or it came as a fortuitous by-product
of the struggle”.
16
For example, during the colonial rule, the rural areas in Java,
Indonesia were empowered to conduct village elections. Indonesia continues to hold
village elections after its independence. But there is a crucial change since 1988. The
Indonesian government regards village elections as an important means to realize the
aim of the state’s development of rural Indonesia.
17

Linda Jakobson argues that Chinese leaders, from the top down, have the
utilitarian approach towards the concept of democracy. Democratic institutions are not
regarded as ends in themselves, rather being weighed by assessing their effectiveness
in enhancing China’s quest for wealth, power and stability or dealing with the pressing
problems of corruption, lawlessness and inequality.
18

It is better than to say that the


16
Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics
2, no.3 (April, 1970): 353.

17
See Frans Hansken, “Village Elections in Central Java State Control or Local Democracy?” in
Leadership on Java: Gentle Hints, Authoritarian Rule, eds. Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994): 119-136.

18
Linda Jakobson, “Blazing New Trails: Villager’s Committee Elections in P.R. China,” Finnish

265
dynamics of China’s political elites’ crafting village democracy are from pragmatic
consideration of democratic ideas. However, this does not mean that this study has
ignored the existence of democratic ideas of political elites who are in charge of
village elections.
Village elections indeed have a very instrumental value for the Party. From Li
Baoku’s article, we can easily catch the instrumentalism of political elites’ crafting of
village elections: Li, a former vice minister of Civil Affairs in charge of village self-
governance, called village self-governance as the most effective means to solve social
problems and resolve internal contradictions in rural China.
19
At that time many
officials regarded village elections just as a social and political stabiliser: an
instrument to regain its legitimacy and control rural social order.
Village elections can be a positive force if the local authorities are sure that

village elections will help with their work rather than erode their power. To a large
extent, the success of the village election depends on whether local leaders can see the
benefits from village elections. Local governments implement village elections and
self-governance only when they see clear personal or governmental benefits or when
national or provincial officials leave no other option. For example, when finding the
elected village leaders can help implement family plan which is one of the most
difficult administrative affairs in rural China, township governance officials are
usually willing to support village elections. However, it is understandable that to
maintain social order and stability is one of the most important goals of crafting
village self-governance, for the contemporary Chinese elites, governing and non-
governing, intellectuals，and businessmen are very concerned about chaos. Later on,

Institute of International affairs, Helsinki.

19
Li Baoku, “Yiwan nongmin dangjia zhuozhu de weida shijian” (“The Great Practice of Becoming
Masters for Hundreds of Millions Chinese Peasants”), Zhongguo Shehui Bao, 10 November 1998.

266
Bai Yihua, a former official in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, summarized village self-
governance as “four democracies”.
20

This pragmatism is called “democratic Machiavellianism”. One of the central
arguments of this study revolves around the idea of “democratic Machiavellianism”.
This notion denotes a special behaviour and attitude on the part of local leaders: they
try to learn the new rules of the game under the hegemony of electoral procedure
although they personally may hate and resist electoral laws. It is “democratic” because
local leaders and particularly the township leaders have to follow electoral laws and
their working style must be accommodated to the new democratic rule. It is

“Machiavellian” because they have to ensure stability through clever and resourceful
political skills. It is the combination of democracy and Machiavellianism because
local elites are forced to strengthen authority through certain liberties, and to achieve
unity within diversity. The practice of village elections has produced or called for the
man of “democratic Machiavellianism” who is fundamentally concerned with
stability, authority and unity through skilful employment of democratic procedure or
means. This is because some elections indeed promote stability, but others may lead to
chaos; increase the tension between the party secretary and elected village heads and
between different lineages, and mass tyranny could be created. In other words, while
authoritarian control and corruption may favour the village election and democracy, a
badly organized village election may lead to chaos and mass tyranny. Thus a balance
between liberty and authority, diversity and unity is needed and the man of
“democratic Machiavellianism” is called for to strike such a balance in the practice of
village elections.


20
Bai Yihua, “Lun zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi” (“On China’s Village Self-governance”),
Zhezhixue yanjiu (Journal of Political Science), no.1 (Jan., 1997): 14-19.

267
The notion of democratic Machiavellianism is against democratic idealism that
sees democratization as a process of achieving democratic ideas without being
polluted by the consideration of material interests. It shows that Chinese pragmatism
is at work in the sense that local elites are “seduced” into the “democratic camp” for
the utilitarian rewards that elections bring. They are now trying to learn how to
exercise new political control, and how to “technically deal with” local democracy
issues, while they do their best, at least on the surface, not to violate electoral laws and
regulations. “Democratic Machiavellianism” has improved political techniques of
control. Behind this new development electoral democracy triumphed, and the

hegemony of electoral laws which local leaders do not dare to challenge, and from
which villagers can take advantage.

6.2.4 Lack of Civil Society and Party Politics
In the Western literature, many works show the importance of civil societies
during transition to and consolidation of democracy, but, usually, civil society is not a
sufficient condition, just a necessary condition. “Civil society is as essential to
democracy, be it direct or representative, as air for a human being.”
21
For example, the
democratization experiences in developing countries clearly demonstrate the
importance of civil society to democratic transformation. However, China’s rural
democratization proceeds under the lack of civil society, which is different from other
countries’ democratization and at same time highlights the crucial role of political
elites’ crafting.
On the other hand, it is commonly known that in a sense, democratic politics is
a political competition by way of elections. According to the history of world


21
Andreas Auer, “General Conclusion,” in Direct Democracy: the Eastern and Central European

268
democracy, election campaigns need organizations, financial support, administrative
programmes, and voters’ trust, and only then can political parties meet these demands.
Thus, modern democratic politics is usually inseparable from party politics. For
instance, village elections held in India and Indonesia are permeated with party
campaigns. Due to the low institutionalization of political party, there exist few party
models to support democratic competition in East Asia, however.
22

In rural China,
there is currently no other political party except the CCP, and there are no agents of
democratic parties, since the Chinese Youth League and Women Association are not
independent political organizations. Village elections currently held in rural China do
not have any connection with multi-party politics. In view of this situation, one
scholar regards Chinese grassroots elections as a “non-party political competitive
democratic model”.
23
In fact, the CCP does not see the elections as a threat to its rule
in rural China. On the contrary, now the CCP mobilizes and encourages villagers to
participate in village elections, regarding the elections as a means and opportunity to
strengthen and improve its leadership, and regain its legitimacy in rural China.
The crafting of rural democracy in China without real political competition
between different parties and the lack of civil society are probably among the most
noteworthy in world democratization models.

6.2.5 Gradualism or Incrementalism
Many scholars have pointed out the importance of gradual transition to
democracy. Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, for example, emphasized the importance of

Experience, eds. Andreas Auer and Michael Butzer (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), 354.

22
See James Cotton, “East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits,” In Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies: Regional Challenges, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Chu Yun-han, and Tien Hung-
mao (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 100-105.

23
See Cui Ziyuan, Di er ci sixiang jiefang yu zhidu chuangxin (The Second Ideological Emancipation

269
pacing for the success of a political reform, saying “in the process of political change,
much depends on pacing. Sometimes small steps create an expectation of change in
reasonable time, and the incremental process of change can sustain that expectation
even though the change itself might be small. A packed process can reduce both and
the fears of those afraid of change and the impatience of those demanding immediate
change. One of the most difficult tasks for politicians is to find the right pace for their
actions, neither fast nor too slow, and preferably one step ahead of the expectation of
their opponents.”
24
The rural democratization in China has proved their point.
S. R. Arnstein points out that participation was a progressive concept,
regarding it as “rungs in a ladder”, with non-participation at the bottom, through
manipulation, therapy, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and
ultimately full citizen control.
25
Zhao Suisheng also said, “We could see the advent of
a gradual, elite-led democratization not unlike what happened in South Korea and
Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s”.
26

In all likelihood, further democratization in China will be the result of an
ongoing evolution of Chinese politics rather than a sudden revolution in the political
sphere. Advocates of village elections believe that gradual reform is the only means to
democratize China without major violent upheaval and a long period of destructive
political chaos. Wang Zhenyao argues that only a gradual pace can push on the
development of village elections, “We have established some very detailed electoral
procedures during over the past ten years; otherwise rural democracy would not be

and System Innovation), Hong Kong Oxford University Press (1999).

24
Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 76.

25
S. R. Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” American Institute of Planners Journal 35 (1969):
206-214.

26
Zhao Suisheng, “Three Scenarios,” Journal of Democracy 9, no.1 (Jan., 1998): 58.

270
stable, just being a political slogan”.
27
The gradualism here not only refers to the
process or stages of rural democratic development, and but also to the strategies and
measures chosen during the process. Whereas, the incremental change of rural
democratization in China has unexpectedly paved the way for genuine democracy.

6.2.6 Autonomy: A Double-edged Sword
Many local elements have been put into village self-governance. Thus, “local
autonomy” is an indispensable concept for understanding the diversity of the quality
and performances of village elections and self-governance.
Local leaders have certain autonomy in implementing village self-governance.
Autonomy can leave more room for locality to formulate laws, rules and regulations,
and ways of village elections that more consistent with local situations. Village
elections vary widely because first of all different regions have their own rules and
regulations, some of which are different and even contradictory. Currently there are
four levels of laws and rules governing village elections: national Organic Law,

provincial implementation laws, county/city and township’s rules and regulations, and
villages’ own regulations. However, it is argued that the local autonomy leads to an
increase in control or manipulation of and even thwarting of the implementation of
village elections. This may also lead to the emergence of political localization. In view
of this variation, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter urged the Chinese government
to revise the Organic Law, and adopt a national election law to standardize voting
procedures for village committee heads.
28



27
Wang Zhenyao, “Cunmin xuanju daoliao jiwei guanjian di shihou” (“Village Elections at a Critical
Juncture”), Zhongguo gaige (China Reform, rural edition), no.1 (2002): 7.

28
Jimmy Carter, “Jimmy Carter Congratulates Essay Contest Winners,” Speech at the Essay Contest
Award Ceremony (September 8, 2003, Beijing).

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