Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 3

Chapter 3 Delivery
1
: Roles and Strategies of Provincial Elites
2

Regarding policy implementation in China, a common practice is that once the
law, rules and regulations, policies of village elections and self-governance were
established and publicized, they should become effective in all the provinces at roughly
the same time. However, the implementation of village self-governance did not occur at
the same time all provinces at. This chronological disparity poses an interesting question:
What are the causes for this phenomenon? There are three factors that could be decisive
as to whether or not a locality would adopt a policy, and how it should be implemented:
intrinsic properties of the policy, a local politics, and the pressures from upper and low
levels of the Chinese government. The diffusion or implementation of policy among
provinces in China is naturally a complicated phenomenon
3
, and one factor alone cannot
offer a complete explanation.
This chapter focuses on the role of political elites at the provincial level, an
intermediate level of government in China
4
, on their networks in the process of village


1
Frederick Teiwes has noticed the importance of province level elites as the critical point of interface
between policy-makers and policy-implementers. See Frederik Teiwes, “Provincial Politics in China:
Themes and Variations,” in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, ed. John Lindbeck (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1971), 116-192.

2

Provincial level here includes provinces (sheng), autonomous regions (zizhi qu), and the centrally
administered municipalities (zhixiashi). For simplicity, province is used to signify province, autonomous
regions, and the centrally administered municipalities.

3
Regarding diffusion, it is a naturally useful conceptual framework for demonstrating how the central laws
and relevant institutions of village democracy have been implemented via local governments. So-called
diffusion refers to the process by which institutions, policies, practices, behaviors, or norms are transmitted
between individuals and/or between social systems. Diffusion naturally takes time. The Organic Law
(Provisional) passed in 1987 was in effect for ten years before all the provinces fully accepted the concept
of village self-governance. Political elites at the intermediate play a role of diffusing, but diffusion would
encounter some difficulties as it proceeds.

4
“Local” does not always refer to a small area. This term can be applied to anywhere outside the political

84
democracy, and particularly on their crafting strategies. Provincial elites play an
important role in conditioning institutional environment of village self-governance, which
is crucial to the spread of the central government’s policy. The key point is whether these
actors can succeed in activating some vital governmental agencies within their own
administrative zone to put village self-governance mechanism in action. Therefore, they
must adopt village elections, which may become models for the other provinces and then
major political elites in charge of village self-governance affair can craft and supply more
democratic institutions and policies for village democracy.

3.1 Disparity in Democratic Quality of Village Elections among Provinces
3.1.1. Key Questions
It is not difficult for people to find that the implementation of village self-
governance is different among provinces and the democratic quality of village elections

varies from place to place. In one report, the International Republican Institute (IRI) has
also found that the quality of village elections can vary greatly in different provinces and
argues that the differences are due largely to widely varying provincial interpretations of
the Provisional Organic Law of Village Committee.
5
Before putting forward and explaning key questions, it is necessary for us to
weigh the democratic quality of village elections by some measures. However, it is


center and below the national level of interaction. In Chinese political terms, “local” political units include
all subdivisions of a political system hierarchically inferior to the national state and party, usually referring
to the township, county (city), and the provincial levels. Further, as Goodman said, although provinces are
often referred to as “local” in China, “they are more accurately regarded as an intermediate level of
government”. See David S.G. Goodman, “Structuring Local Identity: Nation, Province and County in
Shanxi during the 1990s,” The China Quarterly 172 (2002): 839-840.

5
International Republic Institute, “China’s Village Elections Law Improved,” IRI Working Paper (Winter
1998), at < (accessed: 20/12/2003).

85
somewhat difficult to measure the degree of democracy. The Ministry of Civil Affairs
introduced four criteria for democratic elections at the village level: (a) that the chairman,
vice chairman, and members of village committees be directly elected by the villager
themselves, (b) that the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions, (c) that
voting be conducted by secret ballot, and (d) that the winning candidates receive more
than half the votes.
6

Yet some questions naturally arise here. Why in terms of village elections are

some provinces more democratic than others? Why can the institution of village self-
governance and village elections be successfully implemented in some areas whereas in
others areas it can’t? A further question can be asked in view of the fact that 30 provinces
in China were granted equal rights to establish village self-government by the Chinese
Constitution of 1982 and the Organic Law of 1987. One may ask why some village
elections have won praise and approval from the central government, foreign observers as
well, from the villagers, while others elections have not. Can this new institution really
grow and develop at various paces in different areas with similar political background? In
Robert D. Putnam’ words, what makes democracy work?



6
Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers assert that to be democratic, elections must not only be regular,
competitive and meaningful, they must be also free and fair. See Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers,
“Introduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China,
eds. Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 2-3. Robert A. Pastor and
Qingshan Tan assess the democratic quality of village elections by three objective criteria: openness of
nomination and selection of candidates, choice among candidates, and secret ballot. They further pointed
out that one should judge an election within the context of a country’s history. See Robert A. Pastor and
Qingshan Tan, “ The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China,
eds. Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 142-143. Wang Zhenyao et al
once present seven criteria: (1) the harmonious extent between township governments and village
committees; (2) the standardization of township governmental guidance to village committee’s work; (3)
enlargement and institutional insurance of villager’s democratic voting (4) the development and
institutional insurance of democratic policy-making; (5) fulfillment and institutional insurance of
democratic management; (7) self-governance and democratic culture. See Wang Zhenyao, Bai Gang and
Wang Zhongtiao eds., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance)
(Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Press, 2000), 291.

86
Using the above criteria, it seems that Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning, Sichuan, Hebei,
Shanxi, Hunan, and Yunan (after 2000) are ranked as top eight, while Guangxi (before
2000), Guangdong, Yunan(before 2000), Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui etc. are ranked as the
bottom ones in village self-governance at provincial level.
7
Additionally, Lishu County of
Jilin Province, Qianxi County of Hebei Province, Linyi County of Shanxi Province,
Xuchang County of Hennan Province, Linli County of Hunan Province, and Longyang
City of Fujian Province are ranked as top six at county level.
8

3.1.2. The Modernization Model and Empirical Facts
The modernization model here simply means “modernization breeds democratic
development” In other words this model is defined as economic development giving rise
to a democracy in a given society, and there may be a correlated relationship between the
level of economic development and democratic operation and quality. In Chapter 1, this
study reviewed the literature in English and Chinese on China’s village elections and
economy, finding it mostly focusing on the relationship between economic development
at village level and village election, and only in a few cases on the relationship between
regional or provincial economy and village elections. An empirical fact is that the locality
shares the same political system, whereas the central government has applied the same
institutional arrangement to every province, both coastal areas and interior provinces.



7
In Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in China, Emerson M.S. Niou ranked Jilin, Liaoning,
Xinjiang, Fujian, and Sichuan as the top five, while Yuan, Shanghai, Henan, Anhui, and Guangxi as the
bottom five. This ranking is different from my findings. It seems that there are two main reasons for this

difference: one is the difference in criteria of assessment; another reason is that Niou’s research was done in
1998, but since that year, village self-governance has developed rapidly, and its nature has changed greatly.
See Emerson M.S. Niou, “Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in China,” in How Asia Votes, eds.
John Fuh-sheng Hiseh and David Newman (New York: Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), 19-31.

8
In The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance, Wang Zhenyao et al describe the details of village
self-governance in these counties.

87
However, the quality of village elections vary greatly by province, so the progress each
provincial government can make following this institutional arrangment is going to be
different, and not necessarily successful.
The questions are then “Does economy matter” in village democracy and are
modernization approaches suitable to explain the above empirical facts? Theoretically, in
poor provinces, officials are not interested in or do not see the value of village elections,
and may pay little attention to increasing transparency and competitiveness of the
elections. Villagers in these provinces should focus their concerns on securing food and
shelter, not on methods of improving local governance. Conversely, in some wealthier
provinces, prosperity should lead villagers to increase demands for popular control and
autonomy, and officials can promote the development of village elections and self-
government. However, the reality challenges the modernization model. The truth is
different from the theoretical assumptions. For instance, Gansu, a poor province, and
Guangdong, a wealthy province by Chinese standard, are two typical examples. In Gansu,
provincial and local leaders spearheaded efforts to increase the democratic nature of
village elections, but in Guangdong, one of China’s most wealthy areas, there was the
greatest resistance to instituting electoral reforms until 1998.
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs officials, the provinces at the middle
level of economic development, like Fujian, Lianing, Jilin and Hunan, have developed
village elections most vigorously and have been the most successful. From the following

three tables, we can clearly see that there is not a linear or casual relationship between the
economic development and democratic quality of village self-governance at the
provincial level. Table 3.1 shows that among the top 7 provinces with village self-
governance, in 1990 when China began to enter a real stage of development in village

88
Table 3.1 Average Income of Rural Residents (Unit: yuan)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001

National
397.60 686.31 1577.74 2210.34 2253.42 2366.40
First group is the top 7 in village self-governance, but not in economic
development
Fujian 396.45
(12)*
764.41
(9)
2048.59
(7)
3091.39
(7)
3230.49
(7)
3380.72
(7)
Jilin 413.74
(9)
803.52
(8)
1609.60

(12)
2260.59
(11)
2022.50
(17)
2182.22
16)
Liaoning 467.84
(7)
836.17
(7)
1756.50
(9)
2501.04
(9)
2355.58
(10)
2557.93
(10)
Hebei 385.23
(15)
621.67
(19)
1668.73
(11)
2441.50
(10)
2478.86
(9)
2603.60

(9)
Hunan 395.26
(13)
664.24
(16)
1425.16
(17)
2127.46
(15)
2197.16
(13)
2299.46
(12)
Shanxi 358.32
(19)
603.51
(21)
1208.30
(21)
1772.62
(22)
1905.61
(22)
1956.05
(22)
Sichuan 315.07
(25)
557.76
(24)
1158.29

(23)
1843.47
(21)
1903.60
(21)
1986.99
(19)
Second is the top five in economic development but lower rank in village self-
governance
Shanghai 805.92
(1)
1907.32
(1)
4245.61
(1)
5409.11
(1)
5596.37
(1)
5870.87
(1)
Beijing 775.08
(2)
1297.05
(2)
3223.65
(2)
4226.59
(2)
4604.55

(2)
5025.50
(2)
Zhejiang 548.60
(4)
1099.04
(3)
2966.19
(3)
3948.39
(3)
4253.67
(3)
4582.34
(3)
Guangd-
ong
495.31
(5)
1043.03
(5)
2699.24
(4)
3628.95
(4)
3654.48
(4)
3769.79
(6)
Jiangsu 492.60

(6)
959.06
(6)
2456.86
(5)
3495.20
(5)
3595.09
(6)
3784.71
(5)
* (1) (2)…are ranks of provincial economic development levels.
Sources: (a) Rural China’s Statistics Yearbook (1991-1995) (Beijing: China Statistics Press,
1996); (b) 1986 Chinese Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1987).

elections. In some provinces (Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning) peasant income is above the
national average, and in the rest province (Sichuan, Hebei, Hunan and Shanxi) it is below
that. In 1999, the first year when the new Organic Law of Village Committee was
enacted, some provinces’ (Fujian, Liaoning, Jilin and Hebei) peasant income is above the
national average, some (Hunan, Shanxi, and Sichuan) below, whereas at the

89
corresponding period Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu were the top 5
in terms of peasant’s income across China, but the lower ranks in terms of village self-
governance, and furthermore the first village elections in Guangdong did not occur until
1998. One conclusion that can be drawn from this information is that there is not a direct
relation between provincial economy and village self-governance development level and
quality.
Emerson M.S. Niou compared village elections’ quality and economic
development among provinces in 1998 (see Table 3.2). After comparing, he argues that

no final conclusion has yet been reached on the relationship between economic elements
and village self-governance. According to Niou, the political element is a main force to
switch on village self-governance, while the economic element is at most just a motive
force.
9
Again, I choose Zhejiang, the richest province after Shanghai and Beijing in terms
of rural resident income, and Fujian, one of the most successful provinces in village self-
governance, to make a comparison. Table 3.3 well illustrates that from 1995 to 2002, for
many years Zhejiang was better than Fujian in terms of net income of rural resident and
per-capita GDP. But according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the former has lagged
behind in village self-governance, being on the verge of the lower ranks, while the latter
has been ranked as one of the top provinces in democratic quality of village elections and
self-governance. Actually even within the same province or same prefecture, some
counties with better economic development do not necessarily have better village self-
governance. We can draw the conclusion that at least within the past 20 years there is not



9
Emerson M.S. Niou, “Jingji yinsu dui cunmin zizhi fazhan de yingxiang” (“The Influence of Economic
Elements on Village Self-governance”), at < (accessed: 20/12/2003).

90

Table 3.2 Village Elections’ Quality and Economic Development among Provinces in
1998
Election Quality Economic Development
Province
Weighted Score Ranking Per Capita GDP Ranking
Jilin

Liaoning
Xinjiang
Fujian
Sichuan
Guizhou
Hebei
Jiangsu
Beijing
Chongqing
Inner Mongolia
Heilongliang
Gansu
Henan
Shandong
Jiangxi
Tianjin
Sha’anxi
Shanxi
Hubei
Zhejiang
Hunan
Yunnan
Shanghai
Hainan
Anhui
Guangxi
2.19
2.09
2.06
1.99

1.93
1.90
1.89
1.88
1.87
1.78
1.75
1.75
1.55
1.54
1.53
1.50
1.45
1.40
1.35
1.31
1.29
1.11
1.11
1.10
0.98
0.97
0.96
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
5861
9306
6295
9911
4187
2269
6435
9982
16001
4648

5048
7381
3420
4641
8063
4377
13935
3818
4638
6238
11145
4774
4279
25022
5760
4498
4038
13
7
11
6
23
27
10
5
2
17
15
9
26

18
8
21
3
25
19
12
4
16
22
1
14
20
24


a linear or casual relationship between the regional economic development and
democratic quality of village self-governance. However, this conclusion should not be
viewed as an entirely denial of economic force.
10




10
This study does not completely deny the relationship between economy and democracy, but merely
points out there is not a direct relationship between the democratic quality of village elections and the
economic level of development of the province as a whole. Actually in In Search of a Balance between
Democracy and Authoritarianism: Study on the Experiences of Zhejiang Province in Village Elections, He
Baogang and I analyze village economic development impacts on village democracy. See He Baogang and

91

Table 3.3 Main Indicators of National Economy In Zhejiang and Fujian (1995-2002)
Per-capita GDP (yuan) Net Income of Rural Residents
(yuan)
Year

ZJ Ranking FJ Ranking ZJ Ranking FJ Ranking
1995 8074 5 6787 7 2966 3 2049 7
1996 9455 5 7990 7 3463 3 2492 7
1997 10515 4 9179 6 3684 2 2786 7
1998 11247 4 10066 6 3815 3 2946 7
1999 12037 4 10797 6 3948 3 3091 7
2000 13461 4 11601 7 4254 3 3230 7
2001 14655 4 12362 7 4582 3 3381 7
2002 16838 4 13497 7 4940 3 3539 7

ZJ: Zhejiang province FJ: Fujian province
Sources: Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook (1996-2003) (Beijing: China Statistics Press), and
Fujian Statistics Yearbook (1996-2003) (Beijing: China Statistics Press).


3.1.3. Focus on Provincial Political Elites’ Roles and Strategies for Delivery
Hence, the modernization model alone cannot explain why village elections work
well in some provinces but not in others.
11

This question then arises: Why is China’s case a little different from the general
pattern at least in the short terms? There are two elements that may help to explain it. On

the one hand, as a kind of reform, village self-governance is a policy from top to bottom.
Thus how to implement this policy is directly dependent on the officials at the
intermediate zone. On the other hand, compared with economic development, the village
self-governance is a secondary task under the currently pressured political hierarchy.


Lang Youxing, Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pingheng: Zhejiangshen cunmin xuanju jingyan yanjiu (In
Search of a Balance between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Study on the Experiences of Zhejiang
Province in Village Elections) (Central China Normal University Press, 2002), 152-180.

11
Actually this model cannot explain the democratization in East Asia. See Gerald L. Curtis, “A ‘Recipe’
for Democratic Development,” in Democracy in East Asia, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 219.

92
From the point of the cost-benefit calculus of the implementation, village self-governance
is not beneficial at least to local leaders as economic development is. Thus, one strategy
many local leaders probably adopt is “bandwagoning”, because the cost of
“bandwagoning” is the smallest. The lower cost of implementing village self-governance
is also not a rigid task as are those of economic development, family birth plan and social
stability. Bandwagoning is a gradual process as it refers to not implementing village self-
governance too fast or too slowly, too actively or too passively, for pushing ahead or
lagging too far behind meant potentially political risk. While village election is just a soft
task to local leaders, conversely, to a great extent its situation depends on local leaders’
attitudes, cognitions and democratic ideas, and performances. In other words, it depends
on how political elites craft rural democracy. At the provincial level, provincial leaders’
understanding of and attitudes to village elections from Party Committee, government and
the People’s Congress, the Civil Affairs department director’s ability to organize village
self-governance affairs and the supervision from the department of local governance are

the basic forces putting forward village elections. This study assumes here that since there
is no direct relationship between economy and village democracy at the provincial level,
the quality of village elections is then directly relative to attitudes, cognition and
democratic ideas, and performances of political elites. Thus, we can further assume that if
the provincial leaders are more active in promoting village elections and self-governance,
if the provincial civil affairs agency is closer to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and if more
provincial civil affairs elites can gain support from provincial top leaders, then the
political elites in charge of village self-governance have a higher capability of crafting
village democracy and the village elections are more likely to be successful.

93
Scholars and many political elites in charge of village self-governance have taken
note of this trend. Two American scholars made a hypothesis to “explain why some
elections conform to the norms of free elections and others do not: leadership in the
provincial civil affairs ministry.”
12
In one report, MCA argues that “If leading officials of
the province support village self-government and the provincial civil affairs bureau
adopts effective measures, the election of villagers committees in that province will be
effectively organized. In a few localities where individual leaders do not endorse
villagers’ self-government, not only the implementation methodologies for the ‘Organic
Law of the villagers Committees’ will not be adopted, but the election itself will be hard
to implement. ”
13
In an interview, Mr. Yan Mingfu, a former Vice Minister of MCA who
was in charge of village elections and self-government, argued that although both
structural elements such as economic development and persons are equally important to
village elections, people must admit that persons or leaders are indeed very important.
Why are some village elections and self-governance conducted well and others not? Mr.
Wang Zhenyao’s answer focuses on local leaders’ attitudes and understandings. Zhan

Chengfu, incumbent chief of the Division of Rural Work, Department of Basic-level
Governance in MCA, pointed out that this was due to two factors, the trial nature of the
first Organic Law and the independence of provincial government in China. He illustrated
his point with Fujian province, which was leading the nation in institutionalizing
competitive village elections while Guangdong province did not even have real village



12
Robert A. Pastor and Tan Qingshan, “The Meaning of Village Elections,” 136.

13
Department of Basis-Level Government Construction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Guanyu 1995-
1996 niandu quanguo 24 ge sheng zizhiqu zhxiasi cunweihui huanjie xuanju gongzuo fenxi” (“An Anlysis
of Village Committees’ Elections in 24 Provinces in 1995-1996”), MCA Report: no.16 (September 1996).

94
elections until late 1998.
14
Liu Yudong, the director of the Department of Grassroots
power and Community Construction of Jilin’s Civil Affairs, and other officials
interviewed attribute the uneven democratic quality of village elections in China to
several factors, but they argue that the role of civil affairs departments is directly related
to it.
15

We can draw a conclusion that a majority of the development of village elections
is dependent on provincial officials’ support and crafting. One official report summarizes
this point well: “Rural democracy in China needs propaganda, propagating the laws and
regulations concerned and then let peasants know them very clearly is fundamental to

conduct village elections and implement village self-governance in accordance with the
law. Chinese rural democracy needs support, the strong supports from party and
government, and People’s congress at different levels is a political condition to perform
village elections and self-governance well. Rural democracy needs instruction, for the
specific instruction can promote rural democratization process. Rural democracy legal
institutions’ guarantee, the Organic Law, local laws and regulations, and institute
guarantee the development of rural democracy healthily.”
16
However, elite-driven
democratization is a double-edged sword. One of its defects is that the process of rural



14
Carter Center, “The Report of the Carter Center’s Fourth Observation of Chinese Village Elections,”
Carter Center Working Paper (January 2000): 4-13.

15
Liu Yudong (Jilin Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs), Fan Junming (vice director of Shangshui County
Bureau of Civil Affairs, Henan), Huang Yongjun (vice director of Junlian County Bureau of Civil Affairs,
Sichuan), and Qiu Yonghong (Longyan City Bureau of Civil Affairs, Fujian), interviewed by the author,
Beijing, September 2001.

16
Journal of Township Forum and Rural Desk of Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, 1999 niandu nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jaishe ziliao huibian (1999’ Excerpts of
Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy) (Beijing, 2000),162-163.

95
democratization will change or be affected with alternations in the leadership or in the

views or focus of the attention of any leader.
17
3.2 Key Actors and Networking
It is evident that the crafting of political elites’ matters for the elections’ success.
Then, we find that there are three aspects to consider when we examine what has shaped
the political elites’ crafting: the key political elites, their network, and the strategies they
employed to promote village democracy. This section and the following two will analyze
them respectively.

3.2.1. Institutional Space: A Prerequisite for Local Political Elite’s crafting



17
Zhejiang’s case is a typical one for indicating that in rural China, elite-driven democratization is a
double-edged sword. Zhejiang’s case also shows the important role of leading political elites in law
formulation and the implementation of the law and policies concerned. In terms of the provincial
implementation methods of the Organic Law, Zhejiang is in the leading position as the second province, a
result of top elite’s contribution. In the first half of 1987 just before the Organic Law was passed, Peng
Zhen organized one forum in Hangzhou to collect ideas and suggestions for the coming bill of the Organic
Law in the legislature. It was at this meeting that pushed Zhejiang Provincial leaders went a step further in
formulating the provincial implementation methods. Obviously, timing was of the essence for Zhejiang to
formulate this law. In 1988, just a year after the Organic Law was passed, Zhejiang passed the Methods of
Implementation of the Organic Law. This law formulation was not devoid of Peng Zhen’s influence.
However, during the 1980s, few local leaders recognized the meaning of village self-governance, even
though the Organic law had passed in 1987. Many leaders in Zhejiang did not hold identical views on this
issue, and local leaders did not willingly implemented the law. Particularly after the 1989 Tian An Men’
incident, some provincial leaders argued that the Organic law was one cause of this incident and Zhao
Zhiyang’s legacy. The central committee held one meeting in Liaxi of Shantong Province in 1990, named
the “Laixi Meeting”. While relaying the spirit of the “Laixi Meeting” the secretary of Zhejiang provincial

Party Committee at that time thought this law was ahead of its time, while other leaders also argued too that
it was like “Letting primary school students read the book meant for college students”. Further, he became
the Zhejiang’s secretary of the CCP in 1997, Zhang Dejiang (who was the former vice Minister of Civil
Affairs and Jilin’s secretary of the CCP which was one of the leading provinces in village self-government)
was not interested in village elections but instead focused his attention on Zhejiang’s urbanization. Unlike
the other provinces such as Fujian and Jilin, no leading political elites in Zhejiang paid attention to the issue
of village self-governance. As a result, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, despite being the second
province formulating the provincial implementation methods, Zhejiang has lagged behind in terms of
village self-government for some time. The source is from He Zhiquan, a formal head of Department of
Grassroots Government and Community Construction of Zhejiang Bureau of Civil Affairs, interviewed by
the author, Hangzhou, August 2, 2002.

96
Institutional space here mainly refers to the emergence of local autonomy and
decentralization, which has created the conditions for the political elites to craft, to
manipulate, or to thwart village democracy in China.
The emergence and enforcement of local autonomy resulted from two factors. The
first is decentralization. Since the beginning of the 1980s, China has gradually started to
decentralize. However, “Initiatives by central governments to decentralize significant
responsibilities to local government are growing worldwide”.
18
Decentralization is
beneficial to institutional innovation. With decentralization the local government is
granted some opportunities to carry out experiments in policy, which may promote new
ways of working and thinking. And the competition among locales is helpful for the
dissemination and acceptation of new institutions. Decision-making and policy
implementation now become more pluralist and complex with the decentralization.
The second is local economic development and expansion, which provide local
governments with more bargaining power in management of public affairs with the
central government. The transferring power to a lower level government resulted in local

economic development and the emergence of local economic powers. Economical
localism, on the other hand, may possibly be accompanied by political localism.
19
In
Selective Policy Implementation, Kevin O’Brien and Jianjiang Li analyses how local
cadres selectively implement central polices.
20
In a word, the decentralization of the



18
Jerry M. Silverman and David Gow, “Participation and Local Government,” Social Development Note,
no.28 (August 1996): 1.

19
See Wu Guoguang and Zheng Yongnian, Central-Local Relationship: an Axis Problem in Transitional
China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 4, 51-68.

20
Kevin O’Brien and Jianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation,” Comparative Politics, Vol.31, no.2
(January 1999): 167-186.

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system means more decision-making power is given to the local units of government, and
more autonomy for political elites to act on local affairs.
The Organic Law leaves political elites room to craft village democracy, but the
law also leaves them a margin for their manipulation. The Organic Law is vague in some
articles, resulting in different interpretations and implementations. Even after the formal
issuing of the Organic Law in 1998, provincial level laws and regulations are not treated

as mandatory. On the other hand Article 20 of the Organic Law also empowered the
People’s Congress of the provinces, autonomous regions and centrally-administrated
municipalities to formulate implementation methods of this law, which gives provincial
governments some leeway to address issues in the light of local conditions. What is more,
numerous institutions and policies in China seem to be ambiguous in one way or another.
An ambiguous policy leaves room for more choices and adaptations at the provincial and
lower levels, and room for local political players to act more freely.
In the final analysis, autonomy of local leaders is a double-edged sword for village
democracy. The autonomy or discretion has a variety of consequences and implications,
which are not all positive. It is argued that the autonomy may lead to an increase in
control or manipulation of village elections, thus actually thwarting the implementation of
village self-governance. It may also lead to the emergence of political localization.
Despite its possible drawbacks, however, we would like to see the decentralization in a
more positive light, viewing it as necessary for local political elites’ crafting of village
democracy.

3.2.2. Key Actors: Roles, Motives and Attitudes of Political Elites within Provincial
Civil Affairs System

98
Since the basic institutional design, rules and regulations, and policies supplied by
the central government are practically the same for all the regions and local governments,
what make a difference are the political elites at the intermediate zone, the provinces.
Here we will look at the political elites in terms of three dimensions: democratic ideas,
motives and elite structure or network.

The Elites of the Civil Affairs System as the Elite Core and Their Roles
Provinces have traditionally been important political and administrative units in
the Chinese bureaucratic state, located at the middle level that is sandwiched between the
central government and the grassroots government. Provincial elites primarily design

rules and regulations, set policies, investigate the enforcement of laws. We should
remember, however, that Civil Affairs system is in an exceptional position in village self-
governance, while its elites are regarded as the core of crafting village democracy.
Yunnan province’s case is typical for illustrating the importance of the roles
played by the civil affairs officials at the provincial level. Yunnan is one of several
provinces that did not implement the Organic Law and thus did not conduct village
elections until 1998 when the New Organic Law was passed. In 1987 when the
Provisional Organic Law was enacted, the provincial leaders argued that Yunnan was an
exception because of the significant number of ethnic minorities living within its borders,
and refused to implement this law. Moreover, the leaders of the Department of Civil
Affairs and local governments were not active in village self-governance. However,
things began to change in 1999 when the branch of grassroots power had a new leader.
With great interest in village self-governance, the new leader actively made a draft of
Yunnan’s implementation methods of Villagers’ Committee Election and other relative

99
rules and regulations, learning from the experiences of other provinces. The province
began to conduct village elections in 2000, and is now becoming a pioneer of village self-
governance.
As an institutional arrangement, village self-governance is a top-down imbuing
process, a bestowal from external actors. In this sense, we can say that village self-
governance is an essentially “distributive politics”, a process of diffusion and mediation,
while political elites at provincial level take on the role of “transmission belt”. By
distributive politics here we mean that political elites at the intermediate zone distribute
and diffuse the central laws, regulations, and policies. We can thus say these elites are
activators, inducers, mediators, integrators, and promoters of village elections. To a great
extent whether they can effectively and skillfully or creatively play these roles above
determine the quality of village elections.
The elites are not only activators, inducers, mediator, integrator, a promoter of
village elections and self-governance, but they are craftsmen too. Based on their

opportunities and willingness, we can use “crafting model” to illustrate how some elites
can creatively or skillfully implement and promote village democracy and offer more
democratic institutions and relevant policies for villagers. They are possibly the most
significant craftsmen of village democracy. Of course, these elites also have some
opportunities to manipulate village elections.
The provincial civil affairs system is designated to be in charge of the routine
work on the construction of the grassroots governance and guide the work of village self-
governance. The civil affairs’ organ therefore plays a crucial role in promoting village
democracy. The functions of the Civil Affairs Department at the provincial level mainly
include: (1) determine election dates; (2) arrange for legislation and work out

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implementation methods of laws concerned; (3) determine the basic process of elections;
(4) summarize and spread the advanced experiences and models; (5) supervise election
proceedings and correct violations.


Attitudes and Motives
As Montesquieu argues, leaders craft one institution during the process of new
regime emergence, while the institution conversely crafts its leaders later on. Probably
basing his ideas on this logic, Shi Tianjian argues that the key to democratic development
lies on the values and attitudes of ruling elites, thus paying attention to cultural
orientation of political elites and particularly the key roles in the transitional process
played by them.
21

The attitude towards grassroots elections of local bureaucrats at the provincial
level can be different, and the attitudes of the same bureaucrats may shift over time. The
first type of attitude is “bandwagoning”, also named “wait-and-see.” The second is
“pioneering.” By using the word “pioneering” here we refer to going far ahead of others

in carrying out the central policy. There are some possible factors for explaining
pioneering behavior. One is that pioneering may represent voluntary local innovations,
which are probably rooted in personal convictions and democratic ideas. Another is that
these elites may possess very favorable local conditions to experiment with village self-
governance. The third is “resisting”: local leaders do not comply with the central
government by way of either delaying the execution of village self-governance or bending



21
Shi Tainjian, “Political Culture: A Prerequisite for Democracy?” American Asian Review 18, no.2 (2000):
82-83.

101
it to serve parochial interest. Rural instability, low literacy and damaging policy
implementation are the main reasons for opposition.
Democratic practices have changed the political elites’ ideas and particularly the
Civil Affairs system elites’ ideas. Many leaders have gradually come to see their role,
regarding it as a full time job. In fact, Civil Affairs officials and villagers were initially
much more sceptical, but their doubts have gradually been replaced by modest optimism.
More importantly, village elections have transformed political elite’s political culture.
Village elections have made elites more willing to accept democratic ideas, coupled with
a strong tread toward a more pragmatic approach to village democracy.
The pace of implementation of village elections and self-governance is indeed
associated with relative distribution of the above three attitudes and the ideas of political
elites at the intermediate level. In another word, elites’ attitudes and ideas are an
important catalyst for their choices: pioneering pattern, resisting pattern, or bandwagon
pattern. There is no doubt that the governing elites’ values and attitudes are of importance
to village democracy, but it seems that their position is of more importance. The
following topic is comprised of this issue.

Internal driving force
Internal driving force here involves two main actors: first are the officials of
provincial civil affairs system, and second are local party and government chief leaders.
Every division in governmental system has both its own motive and a social
function. One should ponder how village self-governance forms or alters the incentive
structure for the actors involved, in particular, the willingness of political elites toward
this and the costs and benefits of the implementation of village self-governance. In a

102
sense we can say that the endeavors of these elites to implement village self-governance
and promote village democracy are completely a by-product of their own motive, which
is to attain the divisions’ interest. By differentiating organizations or agencies in power
and advantages, institutions help shape various organizational interests and organizations’
collective identities, which facilitate mobilizing resources and taking collective action.
22

Actually, the MCA argues in a report that since the central government has empowered
the civil affairs system with the charge of the spread of village self-governance, the
developed approach to this is why don’t we do it with perfect assurance? The MCA
encourages the civil affairs system to skillfully make use of its own administrative
functions to promote village self-governance.
The Civil Affairs officials at different levels constitute a team based on their
common goals. They wield influence upon village self-governance by virtue of their
exceptional access to resources and particular control over this affair; it is village self-
governance affairs that promote this position in government hierarchy. During the 1950s,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the predecessor of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, was very
powerful in China; for this ministry was in charge of many affairs, including public
security, but it was later reorganized. The Civil Affairs system is not currently an
important department in government. However, since being brought to international and

the Central government’s attention, village elections have become a resource for
promoting the Civil Affairs organization’s status. This situation is one of the intrinsic
motives for the elites from the Civil Affairs organization to push this project forward as
far as possible.



22
Local situation is logically similar to the MCA. This study was mentioned in chapter 2.

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This study assumes here that those pioneering provinces can improve their
reputation and receive benefits from the speed at which they promote village elections or
innovations in crafting village democracy. Fujian Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs, for
example, claims in a work summary report that Fujian has won several “Number ones” in
village elections and self-governance all over China. We can understand why from one
conference on analyzing village elections held in Ningbo City of Zhejiang Province in
November 2002. A total of 11 provincial bureaus of Civil Affairs (Guangdong, Guangxi,
Hainan, Henan, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shanxi, and Sichuan)
emphasize in their summary reports innovation in laws (procedures) or institutions of
village elections and self-governance, while Zhejiang and Hubei’s reports do not use the
term “innovation”, but their use of “Growing with Time” contains the same meaning,
Through these terms in the summary reports the work of the Civil Affairs system is
evident to chief leaders at the provincial level and then its status in government can be
promoted.
Because provincial bureaus of Civil Affairs are under dual leadership, they have
to answer directly to local governments. Provincial Civil Affairs leaders must thus get
strong supports from provincial chief leaders. The next question is have these chief
leaders been willing to support village elections in their own regions? In order to get this
support, provincial civil affairs’ motives must be consistent with those of chief leaders

and these two sets of motives should combine, which can explain why the pioneering
regions in village self-governance do not have the best in economy in their regions or in
all of China. According to previous experiences, it should be more difficult to implement
village elections in some backward regions, because local governments and particularly
township governments’ fiscal interests depend mainly on agriculture and peasants’

104
incomes. Here, the government is more willing to intervene in rural affairs. In reality this
is not always the case. The upper level governments usually worry about peasants’
protection and social instability due to the heavy burden on peasants, resulting in the high
cost for political control of rural areas. After weighing the advantages and disadvantages,
earnings and cost, the provincial governments in some undeveloped regions, may actively
promote the grassroots democracy. This result is from the struggle for power between
upper level government and grassroots and particularly township governments. This
calculation explains most of the upper level leaders’ efforts to push for expanding and
deepening the rural democratic reform.
In all, those who view village self-governance as highly beneficial would opt for
pioneering while those who regard it to be damaging would resist, all of which is
dependent on cost-benefit calculations. Whether provincial officials would pioneer or
resist or bandwagon is based on their own interests. Position or role among the
governmental system tends to affect their behaviors through its impact on interests as well
as attitudes and cognitions, which in turn facilitates village self-governance. Hence,
village self-governance is both political and bureaucratic.

3.2.3 Setting up Elites’ chain: Functional Elite Networking
David Knoke pointed out, “If a point removal results in a disconnected graph, that
actor represents a cut point in the network, and the actor appears to play a liaison or
broker role in the social system. Removal of a line without deleting its points may also
disconnect a network. Such a line represents a bridge between system actors.”
23

In the



23
David Knoke, Political Networks: the Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

105
process of rural democratization in China, the civil affairs system is a bridge linking
among governmental agencies, while its elites are playing the broker role.
Although political elites’ initiative and innovation are a political precondition to
the development of village self-governance, they need some groups to implement
concerned policies. Whether this type of network exists and how strong it is, in a sense, is
also important to the democratic quality of village elections. Many Civil affairs system
officials have acknowledged that they need to unite structurally by extensive formal and
informal networks, either with other elites or with the masses/villagers, to enable them to
influence and promote village elections. Therefore, these elites have to construct contacts
based on personal relationships. To broaden their base of support for implementing
village self-governance, they have to depend on informal institutions and particular
personal relationships.
There are some elite networks for crafting village democracy, which are mainly
attached to or centered on the civil affairs system. This network is multi-layered, with
links between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs,
between the Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs and the County’s Bureau of Civil Affairs,
between Civil Affairs and People’s Congresses at the provincial level, between Civil
Affairs and the Party Organization Department at the provincial level and even county
level. In this network, the relationship between the MCA and the DCA constitutes an
important element of local responses to village self-governance. If the relationship is
stable and strong enough, it will encourage local elites to pioneer, while localities lacking
such a network would prefer to bandwagon.

1990), 238.

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There is potential for elites to become united in the pursuit of common goals
through this network. Being embedded in the network can provide some common views
of reality, definitions of what is politically correct and wrong, and goals they ought to
pursue with respect to them. Network ties are conduits, or channels, through which a
partner can get richer information, and at the same time “possesses considerable
legitimacy or status”.
24
Actually, the actors embedded in this network can get more
information and support. Furthermore, these elites can get more information through this
stable and strong relationship.
The following table (Table 3.4) is the major staff of the Provincial Bureaus of
Civil Affairs in 1994 during a crucial stage of deciding whether or not to implement
village self-governance. At that time an uneven democratic quality of village elections
among regions was also displayed. For example, Mr. Zhang Zhenlang, the director of the
bureau of Civil Affairs, strongly supported the promotion of village self-governance.
Interestingly the outstanding achievements in village elections Fujian had made at that
time were strongly related to the efforts of his personnel and colleagues.
25

The MCA’s model counties have strong leadership with provincial support and an
excellent network with the provincial bureau of civil affairs. For example, Lishu County
of Jilin Province has formed an excellent network to supervise this work. Mr. Fei
Yongcheng (a vice secretary of Lishu party committee), Zhou Lianjun (director of Lishu
bureau of Civil Affairs), Zhang Chunjiang (vice director of Civil Affairs), and Zhang

24
Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology,
no.24 (1998): 62-65.

25
China’s Rural Village Self-governance Research Group, China’s Research Society of Basic-Level
Government, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu: zhongguo nongcun cunmin
zizhi zhidu yanjiu baogao 1993 nianjuan (Study on the Election of Villagers Committees in Rural China )
(Beijing: China’s Society Press,1994), 112.

107
Jianwen ( a cadre of Civil Affairs) make up the core of this group. More importantly, this
network has established either close work or personal contacts with Jilin’s provincial
government; in particular, the department of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
and Foreign NGOs help nourish Lishu’s grassroots democracy. It is this elite group that
has propelled Lishu’s village self-governance forward, becoming a pioneer of village self-
Table 3.4 The Major Staff of Provincial Departments of Civil Affairs in 1994
26
Region Director of the
department
Heads of the division of the grassroots government
Anhui Li Hongta Du Guanhai Wu Biao
Beijing Li Baoqun Zhang Guixing Wang Guoqiang
Fujian Zhang Zhenlang Zhang Xiaogan Zhan Xiangrong
Guangdong Xu Daosheng Huang Xianqing Lin Liqiu
Guangxi Zheng Mugui Lan Yunzhi Wei Yonghua
Guizhou Long Yingyu Zhang Qingting Deng Xling
Hainan Lu Wanchao Wang Heping

Hebei Zhao Zhenxing Liu Zhenqi Guo Xigui
Heilongjiang Du Lintao Lu Naichang
Henan Li Jintai Li Xiwen Wang Jieshi
Hubei Zhang Zhixiong Yang Zhicai Liu Chujiang
Hunan Xiao Wenhuan Cao Yuhua Yang Ze’an Li Peiwei
Inner Monolia Li Shulian Yang Jingming Wang Shoujian
Jiangsu Cheng Shaoyun Wang Jialong Xu Naibin
Jiangxi Liu Shengliang Liu Xiangsui Wang Jifeng
Liaoning Li Zhongtian Ji Lijia
Jilin Zeng Fanxu Liu Guodong
Ningxia Ma Wenli Hu Wencheng Qiu Wanyin
Qinghai Li Yue Wei Xiangyang Zhang Yuling
Sha’anxi Jiang Tiancai Tong Zhipeng
Shandong Zhang Jianjun Qi Hangjian Zhang Xiqi
Shanghai Zhang Wanbin Xu Linlong Shen Yunliang Zhu Manyao
Shanxi Zhao Shengping Yu Weiliang Zhang Zhenye
Sichuan Shi Jiaping Zhao Changjian Wang Zhijun Zhang Hong
Tianjin Wang Shuyin Xing Shijie Wang Yansheng
Tibet Zhang Dawa Cirenqunpei
Xinjiang Zhang Tong Jia Dongsheng Wang Supu Yan Peng


26
China Research Society of Basic-Level Government and China Rural Villagers Self-government
Research Group, eds., Zhongguo nongcun cunmin dabiao huiyi zhidu: zhongguo nongcun zizhi zhidu yanjiu
baigao 1994 nianjuan (The Report on Villagers’ Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China’s
Society Press, 1995), 108-109.

108