Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites

Chapter 1 Introduction: Toward a Political Elite’s Crafting Model

What conditions make democracy possible
And what conditions make democracy thrive?
Dankwart Rustow
1

Democratization is ultimately
a matter of Political Crafting
Giuseppe Di Palma
2

There have been a number of studies that focus on the elite’s dimension of
democratization in Europe and in America. This body of literature suggests that the
impact of elites, their strategies, and pacts upon democratic change is very significant.
Regarding the issue of village elections in China, although there have been some
works touching on this issue, comprehensive and systematic studies are lacking, and
consequently the issue of rural democratization in China is seriously understudied.
Dankwart Rustow’s questions quoted above are meant to remind researchers of China’s
political reform and in particular its democratic transition and democratization, of how
these conditions have made democratic elections in rural China possible and what
conditions should be involved to consolidate these elections and make them more
meaningful in terms of democratic change. Then Giuseppe Di Palma’s words are quoted
because they point to the crux of rural democratization in China. This thesis will attempt
to identify some important dimensions of the political elite’s “crafting” that have


1
Dankwart A Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2,
no.3 (April, 1970): 337.

2
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkley, Los Angeles
and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), 8.

1
contributed to village democracy in rural China, highlighting the key role and the
strategies of political elites at different levels in crafting Chinese village democracy. The
intentions of this thesis are to demonstrate that the political elites and their crafting are
crucial in accounting for the implementation of village elections and self-governance and
the process of rural democratization in China.

1.1 Village Elections: the Encouraging Sign in the Quest of Chinese
Democracy
Before discussing village elections, this study proposes to make a short detour into
the history of grassroots power structure in rural China since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China. The most important consequence of the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its nationwide
presence in almost all spheres and levels of social life. In the past formal government
organization of imperial China ended at the county level; in contrast the PRC government
organs reached down to the sub county level of ward and township, and the CCP party
organizations extended further down to residents committees in urban areas and villages
in rural areas. By the early 1960s, the primary institution of the rural areas, the people’s
commune, was fully established and would remain for over 20 years since. Below the
commune were the production brigades as the level of management and the production
teams as the basic accounting unit. This was the so-called system of “three levels of
ownership”. Under this system, the party branch formed the core of village power, the
party exercised leadership over the production brigade committee, and at the commune
level, the party committee appointed the heads of the two lower organizations. The cadres,

2

in the eyes of villagers, were spokesmen of the higher institutions rather than of the
villagers. Viewed in this light, village elections and self-governance meant a definite
break with the pattern of electing rural cadres in the Maoist era.
In fact, Chinese elites since the Opium War had been trying to democratize China
and had made some achievements in developing democracy. Indeed China was the first
country in Asia to set up a republican government. Yet, full democracy is still an
unrealized dream. That is why the village elections can be viewed as a turning point in
China’s politics history that brings to the people a democratic perspective of China. A
review of China’s quest for democracy suggests great significance of village elections.
“Among the most significant political reforms implemented by the Chinese government
since 1989 is the introduction of competitive elections into rural villages”.
3
Village
elections represent the first step in the long-term process of China’s democratization.
Historically, the PRC had indeed held elections of various sorts. During Mao
Zedong’s era, for example, the normal practice for choosing people’s commune leaders
would be for the Communist Party to decide on a slate of candidates, one candidate for
each open position, and present that slate to the voters for approval or disapproval. Voting
would generally be by a public show of hands at a mass meeting.
4
The present village
elections and self-governance have made a definitive break with the ways for electing
rural cadres during the Mao era. If we compare village self-governance with the higher-



3
Anne F. Thurston, “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China,” Untied States
Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 23 (1998): iii.

4
During Mao Zedong’ era, many production brigades conducted the elections of production team cadres.
For example, John P. Burns studied some production team cadres elections conducted in 1958-74. See his
“The Election of Production Team Cadres in Rural China: 1958-74,” China Quarterly 74 (June, 1978): 273-
296.

3
level appointments, it is not difficulty to find that this reform does involve an institutional
innovation (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 A Comparison between Village Self-governance with the Higher-level
Appointments
5
Type Orientation Ways of
mobilizat-ion
Higher
authority’s
role
Candidate
behavior
Villager
Role
Source of
legitimacy
Selecting Top- down The mass line Organizi-ng Trying to form
ties with leaders
Passive Empowered by
higher
authorities
Electing Bottom-up Open

competiti-on
Organizing
and judging
Electioneering Active Villagers’
approval

Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has quietly promoted, through the
establishment of directly elected villager committees (cunmin weiyuanhui), what may be
the world’s biggest grassroots democratic education process. The 1998 Organic Law on
Villager Committees (VC Law) requires villager committees (VCs) to implement
democratic administration and subjects them to fiscal accountability. This law
incorporates important democratic elements designed to ensure that the villagers truly
have a choice in selecting their leaders, including
• Open, direct nominations by individuals rather than groups;
• Multiple candidates;
• Secret ballots;
• The mandatory use of secret voting booths to ensure the integrity of the individual
vote;
• A public count of the votes;



5
Jin Yuejin, “Cunmin zizhi yu zhongguo tese de minzhu zhi lu” (“Village Self-governance and the
Democratic Road with Chinese Characteristics”), Tianjin Journal of Social Science, no.1 (Tianjin: 2002):
43.

4
•
Immediate announcement of election results; and

• Recall procedures.
The process of village democratization is laying a foundation for the development
of rule of law among the 900 million Chinese, who live in the countryside by teaching
them their rights and responsibilities under the VC Law and by demonstrating the benefits
of having the accountable leaders whom they can vote out of office or even, in extreme
cases, recall. The essence of village self-governance is that peasants will decide their own
affairs. The most significant aspects of the village elections in terms of political changes
are: (1) Any adult villager can vote and run for office; (2) Village elections have changed
village power structure. Elites and particularly no-governing elites have been offered
some opportunities to engage in village politics; (3) Village cadres obtain legitimacy
through electoral mandate.
As an effective type of China’s grassroots direct democracy, village self-
governance is the most influential or penetrating area of China’s political system reforms,
and also one of the most fruitful achievements. In one sense, this has fundamentally
changed the way of empowerment by upper authority. As former U.S. president Jimmy
Carter recognized that “from my own observations, the village elections in China have
been remarkably successful and popular”, village election “was an important step for
China on the eventual path to achieve full democracy”.
6
Village self-governance has fixed
the new way of producing rural public power: village elections present peasants a voice in
the selection of their local leadership, which is a major advance over higher-level



6
Jimmy Carter, “From May 4
th
Movement to Village Elections: China’s quest for Democracy”, addressed
students of Beijing University (8 September, 2003).

5
appointments of village leaders. This institutional arrangement embodies the spirit of
modern democracy.

1.2 A Review of Scholarly Studies with a Focus on Political Crafting
Scholarly Studies
There have been some studies in English and in Chinese on village elections and
self-governance in China.
7
Out of these studies, Gunter Schubert sums up four research
approaches on village elections and self-governance in China
8
:



7
Examples include Daniel Kelliher, “The Chinese Debate over Village Self-government,” The China
Journal 37 (January, 1997); Tong Zhihui, “Cunmin zizhi de yanjiu geju,” (“The Status Quo of Village Self-
governance Studies”), Journal of Political Science, no.3 (2000); Liu Yawei, “Consequences of Villager
Committee Elections in China,” China Perspective 31(September-October 2000); Xu Yong, “Jinzhan yu
qushi: zhongguo xuezhe dui cunmin zizhi de yanjiu,”(“Progress and Trend: Chinese Scholars’ Studies on
Village Self-governance”), A Keynote Speech addressed in the International Symposium on Villager Self-
government and Rural Social Development in China (Beijing, China, September 2-5, 2001);
Hu Rong,
Lixing xuanze yu zhidu shijian : Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju de gean yanjiu (Rational
Choice and Implementation of Institution: A Case Study of Chinese Village Committee Elections) (
Shanghai: Yuandong Press, 2001);
Xu Zengyang, Wang Guangzhong, and Zheng Baiqiong, “ Cunmin

weiyuanhui xuanju huiyi zongshu” (“The Summarization of the Conference on China’s Village Committee
Elections”), Journal of Chinese Rural Observation, no.1(2001); and Bjöm Alpermann, “An Assessment of
Research on Village Governance in China and Suggestions for Future Applied Research,” Report Prepared
for the China-EU Training Programme on Village Governance, Beijing, 14 April, 2003.

8
See Gunter Schubert, “Village Elections in the PRC: A Trojan Horse of Democracy?” Project Discussion
Paper no. 19 of Institute for East Asian Studies, Gerhard-Mercator University (2002): 2-18. These four
research approaches are similar to those approaches used in studying the third wave of democratization that
occurred in South Europe, Latin America, East Europe, and Asia. Since the early of 1970s, some countries,
including Spain commenced its transition to democracy, and form part of the third wave of democratisation
as described by Huntington. There have been some prevailing theoretical perspectives which try to shed
light on the question by Dankwart Rustow who asked in 1970: “What conditions make democracy possible
and what conditions make democracy thrive?” The first theoretical perspective attempts to answer the
dynamics of democratization by focusing on collective decisions and political interactions. This view is best
represented by the four-volume collection under the co-editorship of Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe
Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The second
perspective on democratisation is inspired by the neo-institutionalism, which began earned some popularity
in the political economy literature in the 1980s. The third perspective on democratisation tries to revive the
forgotten tradition of political economy by bringing back the classic analysis of the articulation between
economic logic and political logic. The fourth and most recent study on democratisation focuses on the
political elite. See Chu Yun-han, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (National Policy Research Series No.2,
1992), 2-7.

6
(1) Modernist approach, which focuses on the relationship between electoral
implementation and material welfare in the villages;
(2) Institutionalist approach, which focuses on the relationship between electoral
implementation and the generation of political legitimacy and stability in rural China;

(3) Elite approach, which looks at the actors of the electoral implementation process;
(4) Political cultural approach, which discusses the relationship between electoral
implementation and the rise of villagers’ civil/democratic consciousness.

The Main Factors Impacting on Village Elections: Modernist Approach
Many scholars stress “structural analysis” as a method to test out the “background
conditions” i.e. the prerequisites for democracy.
9
Some scholars interchangeably labeled
“structural analysis” as “modernization approach”. Seymour Martin Lipset has been
regarded as the most dominating figure; his work set off a wide range of research and
(naturally enough) criticism on how well structural factors can explain the breakthrough
and the breakdown of democracy.
10
As to village elections in rural China, among these
structural factors, some researchers have paid special attention to the relationship between
economic development and village elections.
Based on a survey conducted in some of Fujian province’s villages with different
economic development levels, Hu Rong analyzes the relationship between economic
development and village elections, his findings indicate economic development level has
a close linkage with village self-governance: economic development can promote



9
Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, “Challenges to Democratic Theory,” in The Challenge of Theories On Democracy:
Elaborations over Trends in Transitology, ed. Stenn Ugelvik Larsen (Columbia University Press, 2000),
462.

10

Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, 452.

7
villagers’ participation and is favorable to the implementation of village election
institution; the more developed the village economy, the more competitive the elections.
11

On the other hand, based on their surveys conducted in Zhejiang province, He Baogang
and Lang Youxing have found that there is a strong correlation between economic
variables and their impacts on democratic elections but a weak correlation between
village elections and their promotion of economic development.
12

In Western literature on village elections in China, Kevin O’Brien’s article
entitled “Implementing political reform in China’s villages” has often been quoted. He
finds that the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee is probably more likely to be
successfully implemented in relatively rich villages than in poor ones. O’Brien argues
that “my field research and Chinese accounts suggest that up-to-standard village
organizations appear disproportionately in wealthier demonstration villages and those
with a large number of collective enterprises”.
13
However, based on a fieldwork
conducted in a Hebei’s village, Susan Lawrence posits that some relative poor villages
lead in village democracy, which opposes to O’Brien’s finding. Lawrence finds that “it
was precisely because the villagers were so unmanageable, and performing so poorly
economically, that local authorities felt the need to experiment with new forms of village



11

Hu Rong, “Lixing xingdongzhe de xingdong jueze yu cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju zhidu deshishi,”
(“Rational Actors’ Action Alternatives and the Implementation of Villagers Committee Electoral
Institutions”), Sociological Research, no.2 (Beijing: 2002): 107-108.

12
See He Baogang and Lang Youxing, Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pingheng: Zhejiangshen cunmin
xuanju jingyan yanjiu (In Search of a Balance between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Study on the
Experiences of Zhejiang Province in Village Elections) (Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press,
2002), 152-180.

13
Kevin O’Brien, “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages,” The Australian Journal of Chinese
Affairs 32 (July, 1994): 47.

8
governance.”
14
Jean C. Oi finds that “high levels of economic development do not
necessarily bring enthusiasm for implementing democratic reforms.”
15
She states that
“there may be an inverse relationship between level of economic development and
progress in the implementation of democratic village rule”.
16
Amy Epstein supported
Ministry of Civil Affairs’ reports that the village elections at a medium level of economic
development have developed “most aggressively and with the most success”
17
, which
means that there is no linear, but a curvilinear (convex) relationship between economic

development and the implementation of village elections in rural China. Shi Tianjian
confirmed the assumption that villages in middle-developed level areas are the most
likely to have free and fair elections: “the relationship between the speed of economic
development and village elections appears to be a convex curve, that is, a higher rate of
economic development reduces the likelihood that Chinese village will hold semi-
competitive elections in a accelerated manner, that is, the higher the rate of economic
development in a county, the less likely that elections in the villages located in that
county will be semi-competitive”.
18
Later on, Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle modified their
statement, focusing on the locus of power, regarding village power as dependent on the



14
Susan V. Lawrence, “Democracy, Chinese Style,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July,
1994): 67.

15
Jean C. Oi, “Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Self-governance,” in China
Review 1996, eds. Maurice Brosseau et al (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1996),
137.

16
Ibid., 141.

17
Amy B. Epstein, “Village Elections in China: Experimenting with Democracy,” in Crisis and Reform in
China, ed. E. Bliney (New York: Nova Science Publisher, In., 1997), 150-151.

18
Shi Tianjian, “Economic Development and Village Elections in Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, Vol. 8, no.22 (1999): 436.

9
degree of village industrialization and on the nature of the peasants’ ties to the economy
outside the village. They also confirmed Epstein’s assumption.
19

However, Xu Yong denies the relevance of economic development level to the
competitiveness of village elections.
20
Zheng Yongnian also argues that economic
development level is irrelevant to the development of village elections.
21

Yet, Shen Yansheng clearly and definitely opposed the village self-government,
regarding it as a reactionary phenomenon which is not in line with the whole national
modernization progress, the currently typical development model in the world or even the
masses’ own willing. This trend refers to the fact that modern nation-states always try to
permeate their forces into every corner within their territories, establishing formal
administrative agencies.
22
Following the same perspective, Dang Guoyin questions
village self-governance, arguing that if some important materials, political and cultural
factors are absent in the society, village self-governance cannot lead to democracy, and
extended participation will lead to social disorder if the political system lacks proper
institutionalization.
23

19
Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese
Villages,” China Quarterly 162 (June, 2000): 513-539.

20
Xu Yong, “Yingxiang zhongguo cunmin xuanju jingzheng de jiben jinsu,” (“Basic Factors that Influence
the Competition of Village Elections in China”), a working paper (1999).

21
Zheng Yongnian, “Difang minzhu, guojia chongjian he zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan mushi,” (Local
Democracy, National Building, and the Model of Chinese Political Development: A Realistic Evaluation of
Chinese Democratization), Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu (Princeton: Modern China Studies), no.2 (1997): 31.

22
Shen Yansheng, “Cunzheng de xingshuan yu chongjie” (“Rise and Fall and Re-Establishment of Village
Administrative”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no. 6 (Beijing, 1998): 1-34.

23
Dang Guoyin, “Cunmin zizhi shi minzhu zhenzhide qidian ma?” (“Is Village Self-governance the
Starting Point of Political Democracy?”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no.1 (1999): 88-
96.

10
Village Election and Villagers’ Democratic Consciousness: Political Cultural
Approach
Then there are some research works that focus on political culture, discussing the
relationship between electoral implementation and the rise of peasant civil (democratic)

consciousness. It is very natural to focus on political culture in the case of China, a
country without the democratic tradition. M. Kent Jennings noticed the significance of
three different modes of participation in rural China: “cooperative (collective)
behaviour”, “voice”, and “contacting”.
24
Shi Tianjian focused on the implementation of
semi-competitive elections and the voters’ motivation to participation in village
elections.
25
After studying the present electoral system in village elections, Kevin
O’Brien posits that Chinese villager is not a citizen.
26
Li Lianjiang investigated the
relationship between resistance and peasants’ participation (and the rise of a rights
consciousness) in China.
27


Village Self-governance Institutions, Mechanisms and Electoral Implementation: the
Institutionalist Approach
Many scholars and Chinese government officials, in particular, Chinese scholars,
focused on institutions and mechanisms of village election and village self-governance.



24
M. Kent Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside,” The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 91, issue 2 (June, 1997): 361-372.

25

Shi Tianjian, “Voting and Nonvoting in China: Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-Choice
Elections,” Journal of Politics 61, no.4 (November, 1999): 1115-1139.

26
Kevin O’Brien, “Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China,” Modern China 27, no.4
(October, 2001): 407-435.

27
Li Lianjiang, “Elections and Popular Resistance in Rural China,” China Information, Vol. XVI, no.1
(2002): 89-107.

11
They look at the effect and results of the election as well as its problems during the past
two decades. In particular, they heatedly debated on the problems of electoral
implementation. The crucial question is “Does the system in itself work and if it does,
how does it work?” Some scholars regard these researches as belonging to a legal, rule-
analysis or neo-institutional analysis school. Neo-institutional analysis stresses the idea
of stable forms of behavior combined with rules. It emphasizes the roles of context
framing of the actors. Without proper institutions, “democracy will not come about, and
not be stable over time”.
28
Therefore, one can come to the conclusion that “one ‘school’
of explanation of democracy has replaced the others, making them redundant.”
29

In a 1994 report, a Wang Zhenyao-led research group systematically studied the
specific institutions and procedures of village elections: the organizational structure of
village elections, electoral mobilization and voter registration, election methods, the
selection of candidates, voting, voting results, campaigns, villagers’ participation,
dismissal and by-election, and violations and corrections. In 1995, they published another

report focusing on Chinese villager representative assemblies. In 1996, the same group
published “Legal Institutions of Village Committees in Rural China”, a study on different
levels’ laws, rules and regulations relevant to village elections and self-governance: from
central, provincial, county to township and village’s.
Some foreign organizations, in particular, NGOs like the Carter Center and the
International Republic Institute, have conducted fieldwork and presented reports
describing and analyzing the status and flaws of the laws and institutions. Robert A.



28
Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, “Challenges to Democratic Theory,” in The Challenge of Theories On Democracy:
Elaborations over Trends in Transitology, ed. Stenn Ugelvik Larsen (Columbia University Press, 2000),
451.

29
Ibid., 455.

12
Pastor and Tan Qingshan studied the successes and deficits of the implementation of the
Organic Law.
30

Roles of Chinese Civil Affairs System and Local Officials: Elite Approach
Furthermore, there are some studies on the actors of the village elections. As
Gunter Schubert said, “They focus on the strategies of these actors to adjust the tempo
and extent of this process. It is assumed that high and mid-level cadres are the most
crucial agents of change by their promotion of rural democracy.”
31

Through the case study conducted in Dachuan City of Sichuan Province, Xu Yong
found the government had played an active role in implementing village self-governance,
and government officials like the director of Dachuan City Bureau of Civil Affairs was
indispensable for that function. Xu induced six functions of the government: launching,
mobilizing, guiding, promoting, standardizing, and calling the people’s attention to the
role of local officials. His conclusive argument is that only through governmental action
can the rural democratization process be guaranteed to go orderly, and the achievements
of the democratization are consolidated.
32
In a case study of village election, Wu Yi
analyzes the advantageous position of village governing elites under village self-



30
Robert A. Pastor and Tan Qingshan, “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” China Quarterly 162
(June, 2002): 490-512.

31
Gunter Schubert, “Village Elections in the PRC: A Trojan Horse of Democracy?” 3.

32
Xu Yong, “Minzhuhua jincheng zhong de zhengfu zhudongxing: dui Sichuansheng Dachuan xian cunmin
zizhi shifan huodong de diaocha yu sikao” (“Active Government in the Process of Rural Democratization:
A case study of Dachuan City, Sichuan Province”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no.3
(Beijing: 1997): 68-74.

13
governance and describes how they exercised the new village governance rules and
regulations.

33
Tong Zhihui described village election as an elite-mobilized process, noting that
voters themselves cannot effectively form a consensus regarding their common interests
while holding a stable efficacy sense of voting. Consequently, they need a mobilization
force. “At this moment, elites come on the stage”.
34
Tong lists three kinds of elite-
mobilized jobs: expressing the common interest, working out the common interest
consensus, and strengthening efficacy sense of voting.
35

According to Anne F. Thurston, the development of village elections depends on
governmental officials rather than on grassroots or no-governmental organizations. She
argues that the most successful democratic villages are those that have received attention
from those higher-level authorities most committed to making village democracy work,
and village elections can succeed only in villages where elections officials have been
properly trained.
36
Pei Minxin argues that one reason why some villages could effectively implement
village self-governance was “attributed to the crucial role played by local governments
(specifically, the Bureau for Civil Affairs) in organizing and supervising village



33
Wu Yi, “Zhidu yinru yu jingying zhudao: xuanju guize zai cunluo changyu de yanyi” (“Institutions’
Introduction and Elites’ Domination: How Democratic Electoral Rules be Exercised in a Village Arena
One Case of a Village Election”), Journal of Central China Normal University (Humanities and Social
Sciences), Vol.38, no.2 (Wuhan, China: 1999): 10-17.

34
Tong Zhihui, “Nongmin xuanju canyu zhong de jingying dongyuan,” (“Elites’ Mobilization in Peasants’
Participation in Village Elections”), Sociological Research, no.1 (2002): 3.

35
Ibid., 3-4.

36
Anne F. Thurston, “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China,” Untied States
Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 23 (1998): x.

14
elections”.
37
After having checked the relationship between economic development level
and village elections, Amy Epstein found that “the development of local elections is
dependent on support from local and provincial officials”, further pointing out “the seeds
of democracy are being planted in Chinese villages not by dissidents or even by the
masses, but by reformers in the Chinese government”.
38

Shi Tianjian noticed the roles of the actors in the process of village elections and
self-governance: officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, national leaders, local
bureaucrats, village cadres, peasants, and foreign actors, paying a particular attention to
the leading role of officials with strong reform intention in the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
39

Shi underlined that “the intelligence, skill, and sophistication of political actors are key
factors in their understanding of institutional constraints, their formulation of preference,
and their design of strategies to pursue their goals”.

40

Criticism of the Studies
These approaches above can be classified as (a) structural or functionalist, (b)
process or genetic. The modernist approach, political cultural approach and institutionalist
approach are structural, while the elite approach is genetic.
It is true that the structural variables are important to democracy, but there are
some limitations. The main theoretical argument against the “structural approach” is the



37
Pei Minxin, “‘Creeping Democratization’ in China,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995): 75.

38
Amy B. Epstein, “Village Elections in China: Experimenting with Democracy,” in Crisis and Reform in
China, ed. E. Bliney (New York: Nova Science Publisher, In., 1997), 150 &152.

39
Shi Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” World
Politics 51 (April 1999): 390-395.

40
Ibid., 411.

15
absence of political craftsmanship or the lack of ‘political variables’ in it.
41
With regard to
rural democracy, rural structural elements in rural China such as economic development

and political culture do not seem beneficial to democratization. Why did democracy
emerge in rural China where economic development level is lower than in urban China?
The economic development level in urban China is much higher than that in rural China,
but it seems very obvious that the democratic construction in cities lags behind when
compared with rural China. Why do the provinces differ in terms of the implementation
of village self-governance? Why don’t the provinces with a relatively high economic
development level display a high democratic quality of village elections and self-
governance? “Structural approach” does not give good answers to these questions. Many
empirical studies seem to have challenged this approach. Thus we can conclude here that
there are not direct relationships between economic development and village democracy,
and Chapter 3 of this thesis will present a detailed analysis on this issue.
Furthermore, institutional analysis argues that rules, constitutions and formal
rights are necessary parts of a democratic political system. “Democracy can not be
without a stable and predictable system of rules rooted in given norms of human right.”
42

However, many scholars have pointed out that this perspective has some weaknesses. The
crucial problem is how in the first place to create institutions which will facilitate
democratic mobilization, when operating within authoritarian regimes.
43
Additionally
when institutions are weak, the relevant leaders’ direct influence on democratic politics
will be enhanced. “It is not institutional strength by itself which may be profitable to



41
Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, “Challenges to Democratic Theory,” 453.

42

Ibid., 450.

43
Ibid., 460.

16
establishment and stability of democracy, but its functioning within the overall context of
elite competition and interest bargaining which is essential.”
44
With regard to rural
democracy, the trials of establishing villagers’ committee and elections were first
practiced in some villages in Luocheng County of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
in the early 1980s, but village self-governance will not become institutional unless it gets
approval from some national top leaders and is promoted by government offices at
different levels.
Many cases have shown that “the most direct and important factor that influences
one area’s village elections is local governments’ attitudes and deeds.”
45
Yet regrettably,
many scholars have overlooked the roles and functions of political elites during the
process of around two decades’ village elections and self-governance, neglecting the
correlation between the elites and democratic institutions and laws. As Joseph Fewsmith
pointed out, “the study of elite politics has generally gone out of scholarly favor in recent
years”, “but careful analysis of elite reactions to events is an important part of the study
of contemporary China.”
46
Even the few works as mentioned above did not deal with this
issue in detail, and comprehensive and systematic consideration of political elites’ role
has not been directed at rural democratization in China. Thus, for scholars, there is still a
gap in the study of Chinese democracy. To my knowledge, this study is the first

comprehensive and systematic effort to explore political elites’ crafting village
democracy in rural China.



44
Ibid., 461.

45
Xiao Tangbiao et al., “Zhongguo xiangcun zhong de xuanju: dui Jiangxisheng 40 cunweihui xuanju de yi
xiang zonghe diaoche” (“Village Elections in Rural China: A Survey of Jiangxi Province”), Zhanlue yu
guanli (Strategy and Management), no.5 (2001): 55.

46
Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001), xi.

17
Focus on Political Elites and Their Crafting
The elite-led democratization model has a domestic political background.
Historically, traditional Chinese society was controlled and governed by the elites, the
county level and above by bureaucrats appointed by the reign (chao ting), and the rural
society by the local gentry. Elite governance politically characterized traditional China. In
fact, even up to the present, the CCP still maintains its authoritarian system marked by
elitist politics. As James K. Tounland and Brantly Womack pointed out that the CCP has
held an elitist conception of political leadership after 1949, and the Chinese political
system is a highly structured and authoritarian one that is in contradiction with
populism.
47

In China, “the masses are seen as a social stratum that is to be mobilized and

organized by political activists…rather than as individuals possessing legal and civil
right.”
48
Chinese political culture usually uses the term of “Mass” instead of “Individual”
or “Citizen”, which indicates the characteristic of Chinese politics with elitism. Chinese
masses do need to be organized and mobilized. As Tang Tsou said, a movement from
“masses” to “citizenship”, from cadres to functionaries was necessary for political stability
and the social well-being of the Chinese people. Cadres mobilize masses; functionaries
administer politics.
49
In a word, the masses of the rural population in China are the
“objects” of democratization and the political activities waiting to be mobilized. Of course,
that does not mean the villagers don’t have the initiative and creativeness.



47
James R. Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), 34.

48
Cited from Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China, xix.

49
Cited from Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China, xvii.

18
Furthermore, China is not exceptional in terms of international experiences. As
George Sorensen pointed out, the majority of the cases in the current transition toward
democracy were characterised as transition from above, that is, elite-dominated
transitions.

50
He further argued that “the development of most West European
democracies since the nineteenth century can be seen as a process beginning with elite-
dominated systems and then gradually transforming toward more mass-dominated
systems”.
51
In fact, a number of studies were undertaken to focus on the elite’s dimension
of democratization in Europe and America.
The focus on elites helps us better understand how village elections and self-
governance have evolved during the past two decades, and can provide us with a more
accurate description and analysis of the process. However, we must remember that China
is so complicated that there is not a sole element that can explain China’s affairs without
also thinking of other factors. It is important that “the method chosen needs to correspond
to the problem to be studied; if this is the case, then different approaches can all create
their valuable contributions to our understanding of the issues at hand”
52
. Like Shi
Tianjian, Tong Zhihui, and others, I would consider political elites and their crafting as
one of the central concerns of the process of village democracy in rural China.
Certainly, political elites have various interests and ideas, and not every political
elite is interested in and committed to developing village democracy. Yet, it seems



50
George Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World
(Westview Press, 1998), 82.

51
Ibid., 85.

52
Bjöm Alpermann, “An Assessment of Research on Village Governance in China and Suggestions for
Future Applied Research”. See < >.

19
reasonable to argue that the term “political elite” is applicable here as a conceptual entity.
Similarly, other actors have of course also contributed to village democratic development.

1.3 Research Methods
As stated earlier, practically all approaches, including the modernization
perspective, institutionalism and the actor-oriented approach, can be grouped into either
the structural approach or the process approach. A major concern of Giuseppe Di Palma’s
To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions is the process of “democratic
crafting” involving “negotiated agreements” between challengers of the old regime and
incumbent elites under given conditions. However, he does not specify how the structural
circumstances give significance to different techniques of crafting for the ultimate
outcome. In view of the separation of structural approach from process approach, some
scholars have expressed their intention to combine structural and process accounts of
democratization. For example, Karl and Schmitter use “from contingent choice to
structural contingency” to try to integrate these two approaches.
53

This study attempts to relate structural constraints to process-oriented approach
constituting a composite or an integrated analysis framework with its focus on elites’
crafting. However, the integration of these approaches needs a conceptual base, and
therefore this study also seeks to lay the base so as to reconcile and transcend the
contradictions.

53
Terry L. Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern
Europe,” International Science Journal, no.128 (1991): 270-71.

20
“Crafting under Structural Circumstances”
54
: Toward a Composite Analysis
Framework
This framework of course belongs to a process analysis concerned with actors, in
particular with their action strategies and choices. First, this study is a historical analysis,
dealing with how village self-governance emerged in rural China. Second, this study
focuses on the institutional construction, investigating how the political elites at national
and local levels craft village democracy by formulating relevant laws, rules and
regulations, designing relevant institutions and making policies. Third, this study is a
study of village elites, considering on the one hand how and to what extent village
election challenges village party branch authority and then changes the legitimacy of
village power, and on the other how village elites push village democracy further by
campaigning village elections, and by developing new democratic participation
mechanisms.
However, political crafting is not made in a vacuum. In order to understand
political elites’ crafting village elections, the structural contexts must be taken into
consideration. This study advances a conceptual framework that recognizes the
importance of the structural context. This study puts forward an analysis concept of
“crafting under the structural circumstances”.
Initially, the concept of “crafting under the structural circumstances” first refers
specifically to some structural conditions that enhance or restrict the options available to

54
Jeff Haynes offers the concept of “Structured Contingency”, which is similar to the term, “crafting under
Structural Circumstances” used by me, to help understand the democratic transition and consolidation in the
developing world. Hayne’s concept of “Structured Contingency” concentrates on that (1) all political
systems have structures; and (2) at the same time political outcomes are linked to what individual political
actors do. See Jeff Haynes, Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), chapter 2, 18-34.

21
actors engaged in democratic crafting. Political elites may face a variety of practical and
political constraints on their ability to implement village self-governance. Political elites
do not have the ability to craft village elections at will, because structural circumstances
constrain their crafting, whereas some structural resources are beneficial to village
elections’ crafting. Among the structural contexts, one has to take notice of the political-
institution contexts, which demonstrate how crafting village elections take place. For
example, under China’s current political system, the Civil Affairs system is limited in
terms of its ability to promote village elections, and this limitation is a structural one.
Fortunately, the Civil Affairs system cleverly chose some strategies to overcome that
limitation.
Second, it refers to some structural features of crafting. A concern for political
elites’ crafting would draw attention to the political role of different social groups/ types
of elites. This study argues that the internal structure and composition of political elites
are helpful to our understanding of who the key actors of crafting village democracy are
and how they have contributed to democratic development in rural China. In fact, not
every political elite has an interest in developing village democracy, and among various
government agencies not every agency is in charge of village self-governance affairs.
“Crafting under the structural circumstances” means a “division of labor” or functional
division among governmental agencies. Specifically, only the civil affairs system and its

officials at different levels, as well as township leaders, are key actors of implementing
village elections and self-governance. Currently there are five levels at which political
elites are in charge of self-governance: national, provincial, county and township, and
village’s levels. Meanwhile different administrative political elites play different roles
and have different crafting strategies. This means crafting village democracy shares some

22
common features with the administrative structure. Finally the strategic choices to craft
village democracy will change as reaction and adaptation to the changing circumstance.
Political crafting of new democracies means the creation of favorable conditions for the
introduction and enforcement of new rules of the political game.
The interaction between political elites’ strategies and the structural circumstances
under which the elites work can provide a more dynamic picture of how political elites
craft village democracy than can be derived from structural analysis. Therefore, the
interaction of resource, strategy, and structure provides a convenient conceptual map for
understanding political elites’ crafting of village democracy in China. Within these
structures, political elites play a key role in crafting village democracy. The village
democracy is a result of the dynamic interaction between the impetus provided by
political actors at different levels and the structural circumstances.

Research Methods
It is very important for a study to employ suitable research methods. The “what”
of our research - its substantive conclusion - is very much affected by the “how” - the
methods used to gather and analyse data.
55
Case study, interview, and questionnaire
surveys will be employed in this study.
One of the principal reasons for my decision to use a case study is that the case
study method allows me to do in-depth research through which I can gain a personal
“feel” for what has happened and who has contributed to the village elections and self-

governance. The case study can generate hypotheses, test existing theories, and throw



55
William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 57.

23
new light into the general pattern and trend, though admittedly the case study is unable to
produce a generalised theory, at least not easily.
Survey research is an important method of data gathering. “Survey research on
political elites, where it is possible, has the advantage of directness, and the
accompanying advantage of being able to pursue interesting issues and /or clarify
ambiguous responses. Furthermore, survey research enjoys the obvious virtue of being
organised around precisely those topics in which the researchers are interested. This is a
major advantage over the use of secondary data sources such as biographic directories or
printed communications.”
56
Of course, there are some potential difficulties in doing
survey research on political elites. One is with the validity of the findings, and another is
with the reliability of the method itself. Thus, one scholar suggested that a great deal of
care must be exercised in using this technique: “additional methods can be used to gain an
understanding of political elites and leadership. These other possibilities include: (1)
Interviewing persons close to elites, or whose lives are identifiably influenced by elites
(which could well involve interviewing a sample of the general population about their
attitudes toward elites); and (2) Carefully examining archival and other documentary
materials dealing with elite and leaders.”
57

Naturally, each method has its strengths and drawbacks. Thus, a researcher should

use the method that is most suited to the topic.





56
Ibid., 56.

57
Ibid., 57.

24
Types of Materials and Data
This thesis is based primarily on research projects I have participated in or
conducted over the past 5 years. Different sources of materials will be used in this study,
including surveys (questionnaires and personal interviews). My own field studies were
conducted in October-November 1998, July-August 1999, May-June 2001, June-August
2002, and October- November 2003 in Zhejiang province. I also conducted a few field
studies in August 1999 in Sichuan province, in September 2001 in Beijing, in December
2001 in Fuzhou of Fujian province, and in October 2002 in Wuhan of Hubei province.
Other materials include academic publications, government documents, political elites’
statement, newspaper reports, etc.
The following is a brief description of the research materials and data collected for
writing this dissertation.
(1) In-depth interviews
58
with political elites from the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
(2) In-depth interviews with some leaders of Civil Affairs departments in Jilin, Henan,
Sichuan, and particularly Zhejiang and Fujian provinces.

(3) In-depth interviews with local leaders of city/county and township governments in
Wenzhou, Taizhou, Lishui, Shaoxing, Ningbo, and Jinhua of Zhejiang province.
(4) In-depth interviews with over a hundred village secretaries, village committee heads,
village cadres, and common villagers in Zhejiang province.
(5) The quantitative data from the survey conducted in Zhejiang in 1998. Chapters 4 and
5 employ some statistical data, which was procured via questionnaires in October-



58
The author interviewed leaders and cadres at provincial, county, township, village levels, and villagers.
Most of the conversations with cadres and villagers took place under informal settings and visited many of
the interviewees were visited more than once.

25