The thai yellow shirts movement as a struggle for class recognition




Chapter 1:
The Yellow Shirts Movement of Thailand

1.1

Introduction
On 25 November 2008, supporters and members of the Peopleʼs

Alliance for Democracy (PAD) marched to Bangkokʼs Suvarnabhumi
International Airport and occupied it. As a result, thousands of tourists were
left stranded in the capital of Thailand (Bangkok Post, 26 November 2008).
Two days later, Don Mueang International airport was seized as well, bringing
air traffic to a complete standstill (The Age, 28 November 2008). For a country
with a rich history of social movements1, the PAD movement raised several
immediate questions: Why did the Thai middle class2, recognized as
supporters of democracy especially after the 1990s demonstration, choose to
support a movement that was apparently extra-democratic in nature? What
were their motivations for doing so? Were the accusations of corruption in the
government the main reason? If so, why did the movement continue even
after the fall of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006?
The PAD movement proved to be different from other social
movements in Thailandʼs history in several respects: firstly, despite the

























































1
 Somchai
 Phatharathananunth
 (2006)
 examined
 the
 struggle
 of
 the
 Small
 Scale
 Farmers’


Assembly
 of
 Isan
 (SSFAI)
 in
 Northeast
 Thailand
 from
 1993
 to
 2002.
 Consider
 also
 Suthy

Prasartset
 (1996)
 who
 looked
 at
 Non‐governmental
 Group’s
 (NGOs)
 movements
 in
 Thailand

since
1969
with
the
establishment
of
the
Thailand
Rural
Reconstruction
Movement
(TRRM),
the

first
non‐governmental
development
group
in
Thailand.
Jim
Ockey
(2002)
highlights
the
protest


of
22
January
1956,
arguing
that
the
protest
that
took
to
the
streets
has
been
forgotten
despite
its

influence
 in
 shaping
 much
 of
 the
 political
 sphere
 in
 Thailand
 for
 a
 couple
 of
 decades
 after
 the

event
itself.
The
point
is
that
Thailand
has
a
rich
history
of
social
movements
that
spans
over
at

least
half
a
century,
yet
none
of
them
involved
the
taking
over
of
airports.


2
 This
 was
 the
 term,
 and
 identity,
 the
 PAD
 movement
 adopted
 for
 itself.
 Here,
 I
 borrow
 its

connotations
on
their
terms
but
maintain
that
the
term
‘middle
class’
remains
highly
problematic

and
will
discuss
this
in
further
detail
below.




 1





heterogeneity within the PAD (Pye and Schaffar, 2008), a large portion of its
support base consists largely of the urban middle class. This differed from the
middle class-led movement in May 1992, which has been touted as an
epitome of democratization in Thailand (see Hewison, 1996; Ukrist, 2008).
Secondly, never has any movement in the countryʼs history resulted in such a
drastic political polarization of Thai society. The occupation of Suvarnabhumi
airport was merely an episode in a long drawn political conflict between the
PAD and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) that
peaked again in April 2010. Empirically, the question of why the Bangkok
middle class supported such a movement spills over to an important
theoretical question of the relationship between class, democracy and social
movements. Thus, this thesis aims to understand the motivation of the ʻmiddle
classʼ as well as the significance of this motivation in the recent PAD
movement.

1.2

Relevance to Contemporary work(s)

Following the 2006 coup dʼétat, work on Thailandʼs political conflicts

has been copious (see Kasian, 2006; Giles 2007; Case, 2007; Ockey, 2008a,
2008b; Connors, 2008a; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Pasuk and Baker,
2008b; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Thongchai, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; Funston,
2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009; McCargo, 2009; Montesano, 2009a;
Nostitz3, 2009). While these were certainly commendable, there are several

























































3
 Kevin
 Hewison
 (2010)
 provides
 a
 relatively
 balanced
 review
 of
 Nostitz’s
 book,
 noting
 that

while
this
written
account
is
“not
scholarly,
[but]
nor
is
it
meant
to
be”
(ibid:
523),
it
is
influential

enough
 to
 become
 “a
 book
 that
 anyone
 who
 has
 a
 serious
 interest
 in
 Thailand’s
 politics
 should

have”
(ibid:
525).
It
is
important
to
note
as
well
that,
as
Hewison
highlights,
Nostitz’s
account
is



 2





points that ought to be addressed. Firstly, scholars have attempted, directly or
indirectly, to answer the important questions of why and how the movement
emerged: these explanations revolve around two broader themes of intra-elite
struggle and Thaksinʼs corruption. Albritton and Thawildawee (2007: 23), for
instance, suggest that Thaksin was seen as competing with the king, by
“insinuating himself into ceremonies honouring the 60th year of the kingʼs
accession to the throne”. Similarly, Connors (2007: 252) emphasized that the
movement was a consequence of Thaksin attempting to replace the “old
power group – a network based around the palace, Prem, elements of the
Democrat Party, members of prominent establishment families and senior
bureaucrats – with his own network of intimates and associates” (see also
Giles, 2009b). On the other hand, scholars such as Thitinan (2008: 142)
highlighted the “controversies, contradictions, and corruption allegations” of

Thaksinʼs administration and how these contributed to the displeasure
towards the ex-premier (see also Case, 2007; Connors and Hewison, 2008;
Pasuk and Baker, 2008; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; McCargo,
2009 for more explanations4).
While these are not necessarily inaccurate, several questions remain:
why should members of the Thai middle class be involved in the movement?
What were their motivations? Moreover, if we were to approach these studies
































































































































































not
 “an
 entirely
 non‐partisan
 account
 as
 he
 shows
 sympathy
 for
 the
 red‐shirted
 campaigners”

(ibid:
523).
Nevertheless,
the
attempt
to
capture
the
developments
of
events
places
it
as
one
of

the
foremost
accounts
on
the
movement
to
date.

4
 In
 addition
 to
 these
 articles,
 others
 have
 attempted
 to
 offer
 a
 perspective
 that
 focused
 on

Thaksin’s
mistakes
in
isolating
the
Bangkokians
and
his
policy
mistakes
(see
for
instance
 Kasian,

2006;
 Connors,
 2007;
 Hewison,
 2008;
 Thitinan,
 2008;
 Montesano,
 2009b).
 Nevertheless,
 I

maintain
 that
 these
 explanations
 are
 seldom
 divorced
 from
 the
 idea
 of
 a
 conflict
 of
 interests

between
the
Thai
elites,
such
as
military
leaders
and
the
ex‐prime
minister.




 3





from a social movements perspective, as this thesis aims to do, the
explanations offered thus far may be construed as strategies of mobilization –
more specifically, as “frame alignment”. This still leaves us with the crucial
question of why. In addition, the mechanisms of mobilization have also been
largely overlooked. More intriguingly, substantive studies on the motivation of
the participants and supporters of the Yellow shirts movement have been
conspicuously neglected. Studies that come closest to this concern
themselves with explaining perceptions of democracy among the Thai middle
class (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2007) or the notion of democracy and good

governance (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2009). Even then, these studies
were not specific to the supporters of the Yellow shirts but the ʻmiddle classʼ,
or urban Bangkokians, in general. Furthermore, the focus on democracy from
the onset, I contend, restricts the viewpoint by which one perceives the
phenomenon. In other words, the explicit focus on democracy (see Thitinan,
2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) assumes that the movement had little to do
with class interests.

1.3

Statement of Problem & Thesis Statement
This brings us to one of this thesisʼs main conceptual contention – that

“class” as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and overgeneralized manner. Many authors, as well as popular media and pundits,
have tended to assume and refer to a middle class – usually understood as
occupying the ʻmiddleʼ of the socio-economic spectrum (see Diagram 1.1).
This understanding, unfortunately, confuses more than it clarifies, especially


 4





in explaining the PAD movement. Firstly, the PAD supporters are presented
as members of the Thai middle class by mainstream media. This has left
those who are less attuned to the developments of the movement with the
notion that the Thai middle class, as a whole, supports the PAD movement.
Secondly, some scholars have been quick to dismiss the Yellow (and Red)
shirts movement as a class conflict, arguing that the presence of inter-class
alliance among members of both the Yellow and Red shirts negates it from
being a simple class conflict (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010).

These two representations of the PAD supporters have, in turn, placed
serious limitations on the conceptualization of the PAD movement as a
movement for democracy, or even royalism. I contend that these arguments
tend to consider class as an immutable category, in tandem with a Marxian
perspective – that is to say, class is seen as a set of fixed categories rather
than a dynamic outcome of social and economic processes and conflicts.
Moreover, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate the fact that
there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar
interests – an important feature in Frank Parkinʼs notion of “social exclusion”.
Perhaps most importantly, in considering class from this Marxian perspective,
we are unable to move beyond understanding class as “mere incumbents of
positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin, 1979: 4).


 5





Diagram 1.1: Classes in the Marxian perspective

In light of this, I argue that a perspective based purely on Marxian
assumption and understanding hinders us from appreciating class as a
dynamic concept. More importantly, it limits the appreciation of the Yellow
shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict, overlooking the significance
of the participation of the masses. Following Parkinʼs (ibid: 13) argument that
“the relations between classes are to be understood as ʻaspects of the
distribution of powerʼ”, this thesis adopts a stance that incorporates both a
Marxian and neo-Weberian perspective, suggesting that the movement is an
attempt by particular groups of people to secure their interests in response to
the social exclusion experienced. It would be more useful then, to think of
several groups – or classes – occupying the ʻmiddleʼ stratum of society (see

Diagram 1.2). This thesis contends that conceptualization of class in Thailand
must take into consideration important issues of (class) interests and status,
particularly the interaction between members of different social position.


 6





Diagram 1.2: Society/social stratum as consisting of several status groups

Thus, this thesis is concerned with understanding the motivation
behind the involvement of the middle class for a movement, purportedly a
result of intra-elite conflict, and how this motivation is appropriated into
mobilization “frames” (Benford and Snow, 2000). Accordingly, the principle
contention of this thesis is that the PAD movement is not a movement of all
ʻmiddle classesʼ in toto, but one aimed at usurping the opportunities and
resources had been excluded from groups found in the middle stratum of Thai
society. Specifically, the thesis argues that it was Thaksinʼs increasing
monopolization of the Thai economic and political sphere, coupled by crucial
structural changes brought about by the 2007 economic crisis which led to the
exclusion, and marginalization, of the Thai economic middle class. In this
respect, the movement ought to be understood in the larger context as an
attempt by various groups in Thai society to counter and contest their gradual
exclusion by those in power.


 7






1.4

Contribution to Knowledge
In conceptualizing the PAD movement as a manifestation of class

conflict – in part but not exclusively – instead of an intra-elite struggle, this
thesis positions itself to make the following contributions to existing works on
Thai politics and social movements. Firstly, this thesis provides an account of
the emergence of the PAD movement from a social movements perspective, a
perspective that has been conspicuously missing up till now. Secondly, the
neo-Weberian perspective adopted by this thesis allows for a more nuanced
understanding of the dynamics between the military, monarchy, and the
capitalist groups – key actors in the Thai political sphere – as well as the
masses, allowing for the involvement of actors from various social positions in
society to be included in this struggle for social, economic and political
inclusion. In doing so, I suggest that the occurrences of social movements
reflect the process of class formation in Thailand as members from various
strata of society attempt to consolidate and solidify their social positions. By
taking a perspective that sees emotions as a function of class, and by
extension an expression of social relationships, we are able to avoid reifying
class and dealing with it in broad, generic terms. Instead, it allows for a more
dynamic and robust approach that takes into account the interests and
orientations of members of Thai society, and how these are aligned through
socio-economic processes, bringing a more nuanced understanding to the
notion of class in Thailand. In other words, while the movement may not be
exclusively class-based, I maintain that a class perspective allows us to


 8




appreciate the intricacies of the movement. Finally, by viewing the PAD
movement from this perspective, this thesis aims to provide an alternative
approach to understanding the precedents leading up to the rise of the Red
Shirts in early 2009.
It must be made clear here that this thesis does not claim to have
uncovered innovative findings per se. The fundamental contribution this thesis
aims to make is the provision of an alternate theoretical paradigm to existing
explanations.

1.5

Scope of Study
This thesis scrutinizes the periods between the coup in September

2006 that ousted Thaksin from power and the election of current Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in early 2009. This period is also particularly
important as it provides us with a sociological and historical context to
appreciating the demonstrations of the Red shirts, which reached its peak in
May 2010.

1.6

Methodology
Given that this thesis aims to understand the motivations behind the

supporters and members of the PAD, this study adopts a primarily qualitative
approach. In this section, I discuss and justify some of the research methods
undertaken in the process of this research. This includes methodological
issues of locating and obtaining access to informants who were interviewed,


 9





as well as a brief discussion on the challenges encountered. The limitations of
this study, arising from the methods adopted, will also be outlined briefly.
This study adopts both a qualitative methodology and a historical one
for three main reasons. Firstly, although a quantitative approach may allow us
to have a better perspective on who the participants were – facilitating a
broader overview of their identity and social ʻclassʼ – statistics would be
unable to provide us with an accurate depiction of the mechanisms behind the
workings of the movement. As such, its validity should be critically
interrogated. Secondly, qualitative methods are particularly relevant for
uncovering and understanding the meanings, especially those attached to the
discourses and rhetoric used by the PAD supporters. In other words, a
qualitative approach allows the voices of individuals to emerge through their
account of their experiences. Finally, because the phenomenon to be studied
is a historical one, it is crucial that oral accounts be collected and analyzed to
serve as a form of balance to official accounts. This is because such accounts
afford us the ability to interrogate official accounts of events available in
mainstream media, which are more often than not, influenced by those in
power. Methodologically then, this study utilizes two forms of qualitative
inquiries – (1) informal, in-depth interviews and (2) rigorous discourse analysis
of PADʼs official and supportersʼ websites.

Interviews
Informants for interviews were purposively sampled for two reasons.
First, it allows for the selection of case(s) based on “the basis of their


 10





relevance to [the] research questions, [the] theoretical position and analytical
framework…constructing a sample…which is meaningful theoretically and
empirically” (Mason, 2002: 124). This approach entails being critical in the
selection of the sample from the general populace. For this study, participants
who had been involved actively in the series of protests and demonstration
during the peak of the PADʼs movement between 2006 and 2008 were
selected. Secondly, due to my position as a foreigner, access to supporters of
the Yellow shirts was limited. Hence, I contacted people I knew in Bangkok
and requested to conduct an informal, one-to-one interview with them. I also
explained my research objectives to them and acknowledged the sensitive
nature of my topic, explaining that I would require their help in using the
“snowball” sampling technique (Lee, 1993).
In total, fifteen informants, aged 24 to 61 (as of 2010), were interviewed
over a period of two months. In terms of socio-demographics, the informants
fall into the segment between the lower-classes which execute tasks and the
dominant classes who hold the decisional power in organizations although
some also ran their own (small) business (refer to Table A on vii for a full list
of informants and their background). Interviews were conducted in a mixture
of Thai and English, with some translation, through the informant(s) who
introduced us, on the spot when required. Generally, each interview lasted
about an hour, although there was a case where it went up to two hours.
Before the commencement of each interview, issues such as informed
consent, confidentiality as well as the rights of an informant were made clear
to each interviewee. Each interview began with a short self-introduction and


 11




an explanation of my research objectives. The intention to have the interview
recorded for transcribing purposes was stated from the onset as well.
One of the biggest methodological limitations arising from qualitative
interviews is that these oral accounts, especially when the topic is centered on
a past event or occurrence, “tells us not just what people did, but what they
wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think
they did” (Hong and Huang, 2008: 71, emphasis mine). Thus, while interviews
allow for a more balanced perspective, it ought to be cross-examined with
official accounts. Consequently, much caution was exercised in taking into
account the background of the informant and the influence it may have on
their responses. Furthermore, given the nature of the topic – where support
for the PAD is almost synonymous with being nationalist or royalist – the
possibility for the informant to be defensive for his or her actions and thoughts
has to be recognized too.
Additionally, Mills (1940: 904) reminds us that
“over against inferential conception of motives as subjective ʻspringsʼ
of action, motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having
ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations. Human actors
do vocalize and impute motives to themselves and to others…Rather
than fixed elements ʻinʼ an individual, motives are the terms with
which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds. This
imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to
be explained. The differing reasons men give for their actions are not
themselves without reasons.” (emphasis in original)

Thus, motives are part of the linguistic tools of an individualʼs self-justification
and are best understood as the basics of social rhetoric of verbal action rather

than the source of social action in general. In other words, we may not be able
to draw a perfect correspondence between motives and actions but it is highly
plausible for us to assume that the way in which the respondents articulate

 12





their views is closely related to their motives and motivation – even if these
articulations and motives appear questionable.
Despite these caveats, one has to suspend a certain degree of
skepticism and recall that this thesis aims to uncover the motivations of those
involved. Accordingly, these personal, oral accounts should be supplemented
with other empirical sources (Fairburn, 1999) in order to obtain a more holistic
picture.

Discourse Analysis
In this study, newspaper reports and online resources were scrutinized
to complement my interview data. Specifically, I analyze the discourses and
rhetoric found on websites that propagate and openly support the PAD, as
well as newspapers such as The Nation and Bangkok Post. These sources of
data are particularly important for it shows how collective sentiments are
mobilized and understood by the PAD supporters on an official front. Also,
newspapers are a useful source of data in studies of collective action as it
allows “more leverage over processual and mechanistic elements in causal
explanations” (Earl, et al, 2004: 66). However, newspapers, given their
interests, tend to reflect a position that supports the state and, or, its owner(s)
(Mullainathan and Shlefier, 2002). Thus, on one hand, while newspapers
provide some basic facts, the manner in which it is structured – reflected in
the discourse and rhetoric used – influences how the movement, or an event,
comes to be perceived and understood. Sources from public websites and


 13





newspapers then serve as important evidence of the construction and
manipulation of images, rhetoric and discourses to mobilize the ʻmiddle classʼ.
All in all, the combination of qualitative interviews and discourse
analysis not only allows for a close comparison between rhetoric and
motivation, the relationship between the two, and also allows for a more
holistic construction of the phenomenon. By doing this, we can also uncover
and understand the mechanisms and processes beneath the mobilization of
the movement.

1.7

Prospectus
This thesis is thus organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is

devoted to the discussion of the theoretical framework and concepts used in
this thesis. Specifically, it aims to apply the Weberian concept of social
closure as a tool to understand the class conflict underlying the PAD
movement. In Chapter 3, a historical overview of the Thai political sphere will
highlight the strong historical links between the recent coup and the roles key
actors play. In demonstrating the contestation between these actors, I
contend that there are important historical antecedents in the emergence of
the PAD movement. The chapter that follows (Chapter 4) will examine the
motivations of some PAD supporters, illustrating the importance of emotions –
specifically fear and hope – in motivating and mobilizing support and
participation for the PAD. Next, Chapter 5 explicates how these existing

emotions are mobilized through discourse of royalism and the demonization of
Thaksin. These, I argue, are facilitated by the strategic use of ideological


 14





resources and communications network. Finally, in Chapter 6, I reiterate this
thesisʼ main argument, contributions and limitations before presenting
suggestions for future research.


 15






Chapter 2:
Social Closure and Social Movements (in Thailand)

2.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to accomplish the following goals. First, it will
consider works done on social movements in Thailand, particularly political
movements. I contend that there has been a limitation in the way movements
in the last two decades of Thai history has been studied and conceptualized
as a ʻmiddle classʼ movement. Specifically, I argue that these studies tend to
adopt a position where class is understood as set of relatively broad and fixed
social relationships revolving only around capital. However, this position limits
our understanding of the issue as a class conflict, presenting it as a clash
among different classes – in the case of the PAD movement, the ʻurban
middle classʼ and the ʻrural poorʼ (see Giles, 2009b). In addition, by

postulating that these movements are ʻmiddle classʼ movements, important
mechanisms and processes of class formation such as “exclusion” and
“usurpation” (Parkin, 1979) are glossed over while the dynamics of interaction
between the various groups, as well as their interests5, involved in the
movement are neglected. Accordingly, this chapter proposes a Weberian
slant, on top of the existing Marxian understanding, so as to better
conceptualize the notion of ʻclassʼ in Thai society. To accomplish this, I outline

























































5
 In this thesis, I employ a Weberian understanding of group interest, which points to the primary
motivation of an actor (Swedberg, 2005). This differs from Stern’s (2007) definition of interest groups
in Thailand – whereby Stern identifies interest groups as having the following characteristics: (1) a
well-defined organization with members formally allied towards clearly expressed goals; (2) not
related to the legislature or executive branch and having no intention to join them; (3) an organization
not related to the government; (4) having some level of activity in the process of formulating,
approving and/or implementing public policies.




 16





Marxʼs conception of class and its usefulness in explaining social movements
but maintain that a perspective incorporating both Marxian and Weberian
perspectives on class is more beneficial for making sense of the movement at
hand. In other words, while the Marxian perspective allows us to account for
the economic dimension, a Weberian perspective privileges the dynamic
cultural processes of class formation. Together, I argue that these
perspectives allow for a more dynamic understanding of the phenomenon.
This chapter, then, draws on Frank Parkinʼs (1979) notion of “social
closure as exclusion and usurpation” and attempts to offer an explanation
rooted in a Weberian understanding of class. In short, it emphasizes an

analytical framework centered around an understanding of social closure as
the dynamic struggle between forces of exclusion and monopolization on the
one hand and the forces of usurpation and opportunity hoarding on the other.
This would allow us to appreciate the movement as more than a push for
democracy but as a movement that emerged as a consequence of social
exclusion. In other words, a contest for opportunities lays the foundation for
the displeasure and fear felt by the ʻmiddle classʼ. This in turn, sets the stage
for their mobilization. In addition, I argue that it is these common emotions
that unite the various groups in the ʻmiddle classʼ, resulting in what we have
come to recognize – that the PAD movement is a ʻmiddle classʼ one. This
chapter maintains that the notion of class must remain a dynamic one,
especially in the study of social movements in Thailand (and elsewhere).
Therefore, the principal theoretical contention this chapter aims to make
remains as this: the recent Yellow shirts movement is a consequence of an


 17





attempt by contesting groups in Thai society to secure their own interests in
response to the social closure experienced.
Finally, this chapter will go on to survey existing literature on social
movements in general and introduce us to the dominant perspectives and
discussion in social movement literature. Effectively, leading theories on
social movements not only explain the conditions under which movements
emerge (political opportunity structure), how they are organized and mobilized
(resource mobilization theory), but also attempts to account for participantsʼ
involvement (grievances and relative deprivation). In outlining these theories, I
lay out the theoretical tools I utilized in accounting for the mechanisms behind
the emergence of the PAD movement.

2.2 Surveying the Literature: Social Movements in Thailand
Studies on the social movements in Thailand can be classified into two
broad categories. The first, in line with social movement literature, is
concerned with what has come to be associated with the middle class: “new
social movements”. The term ʻnew social movementsʼ was used to describe a
diverse range of campaigns that championed a variety of causes – such as
student movements (see for instance Rootes, 1980; Burg, 1998; Boren,
2001), gay (see Smith, 1999) and environmentalist (see also Albrecht, 1972,
Gale, 1986) movements – or movements with interests that were not directly
political or economical. These ʻnewʼ movements saw its social base coming
together from a basis other than class – such as gender, sexuality, race,
ethnicity or age. Another common feature among these movements was that


 18





they sought to establish some form of identity, lifestyle or were aiming to
assert rights of the individual instead of the “proletarian revolution associated
with classical Marxism” (Buechler, 1995: 442) of the ʻold social movementsʼ.
More importantly, there appears to be an “elective affinity” (ibid: 456) between
new social movements and the middle class. In the context of Thailand, antidams movements (Kanokrat, 2003), environmental movements (Forsyth,
2001, 2007), movements involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
(Suthy, 1996; Hirsch, 1997; Naruemon, 2002; Somchai 2002, 2006; Giles,
2009a) and religious movements (Mackenzie, 2007) constitute the main foci
of these studies.
The second category of work on Thai social movements revolves
around political ones6 - more specifically, how the middle class advanced
democracy. This branch of studies has emphasized two themes: (1) the

importance of the Thai middle class in bringing about democratization
(Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996; Anek, 1997; Surin, 1997;
Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) while paying
attention to the socio-economic context in which the movement emerged
(Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996); and (2) the role of the middle
class in relation to other actors in society (Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and
Chantana, 2001). While these illustrate the importance of historical
antecedents, structural conditions contributing to the emergence of the recent
PAD movement and the significance of networks in these movements, there

























































6
Here,
I
borrow
generously
from
Tilly
and
Tarrow’s

(2006)
definition
that
a
movement
becomes

political
when
it
involves
agents
of
governments.
In
the
case
of
social
movements,
the
state
often

takes
the
role
of
either
the
opposition
against
which
the
movement
is
challenging
or
an
actor
the

movement
is
trying
to
win
over.



 19





appears to be an important conceptual limitation: “class” as a concept has
been applied in an unproblematized and over-generalized manner. For
instance, the middle class has tended to be defined in terms of income and
occupational status (Girling, 1981; Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman,
1996). I argue that this perspective not only reifies class but presupposes that
the movement is a quest for democracy instead of a consequence of a
struggle for social position. In attempting to understand the middle class
based on purely economic factors, the relational aspect of social stratification
is overlooked. Simply put, a Marxian conception of class (over)emphasizes
the material and neglects the notion that oneʼs position is defined, or
understood, in relation to others in that society.

Scholars have been quick to contest the notion of the PAD movement
as a class conflict, noting the presence of inter-class alliance among members
of the Yellow shirts (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010). However, I
contend that such arguments are premised on the notion that class is an
immutable category. That is to say, it is contingent on socio-economic
measurements, or the Marxist idea of “haves” and “haves-not”. Nonetheless,
such a disclaimer hardly allows us to move beyond understanding class as
“mere incumbents of positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin,
1979: 4). Furthermore, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate
the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for
dissimilar interests. Instead, I argue that such a perspective hinders us from
appreciating class as a dynamic concept. Above all, it limits the appreciation
of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict. Hence, I


 20





propose and alternative to the conceptualization of class in Thailand that may
be more useful and pertinent.

2.3 The Thai ʻMiddle Classʼ
A key concept that this thesis aims to address is that of the ʻmiddle
classʼ, specifically in Thailand. Often conceptualized in terms of occupational
class and income level (see Girling, 1981), I contend that this perspective,
while effectual, is limited in allowing for a clearer approach to understanding
the PAD movement. In conceptualizing ʻclassʼ along lines such as occupation
and income level, ʻclassʼ, both as a concept and a social institution, is reified
(see Brubaker, 2005). In other words, to call the PAD movement a ʻmiddle
classʼ movement is to replicate the rhetoric and notion of class, defined along

material lines.
With this in mind, this thesis proposes a perspective that views
emotions as a function of class. That is to say, instead of defining the
participants and supporters of the PAD movements as members of the
ʻmiddle classʼ on account of their socio-economic background, this thesis
proposes that these people belong to a similar social position, identified as the
ʻmiddle classʼ, because of the common emotions they experience and display.
Emotions allow us to understand where oneʼs position is in any social
relationship. This means that the social position an individual finds himself, or
herself, in may affect the extent to which s/he feels a particular emotion. For
example, the less well off may feel a sense of anger towards those who are
richer than them. Underlying this contention is the notion of power relations


 21





and dynamics. This argument has its theoretical roots in Barbaletʼs (2002: 4)
contention that emotions arise from the “structure of relations of power and
status in which [people] are implicated”, or it is in social relationships that
emotions lie. For instance, if one has insufficient power in a relationship, one
would more likely experience fear. Similarly, in a case of racism, the emotions
of anger and hatred stems from power dynamics rather than simply income or
wealth. This is to say that oneʼs structural position is not restricted to social
class alone. This would allow us to approach the emotions evoked as more
than a matter of socio-economic inequality as well. More importantly, by
looking at emotions, we are better able to appreciate the actual social position
of an actor. This is because one may possess economic wealth but lacks
political power. In this case, s/he is still susceptible to the emotion of fear, in
relation to those who hold the power in society.

Kemperʼs (1978) work on emotion also sheds light on the notion that
people sharing homologous structural positions may experience common
emotions. Essentially, individuals, in their relationships with others who
occupy similar social situation, contribute to “the feelings of the group qua
group” (Barbalet, 2002: 5). In short, emotions tell us the social position one is
in relation to others in the same society. Instead of confining them to an
immutable category resting on socio-economic factors, emotions allow us to
adopt a relational perspective to social class. Thus, I have attempted to
categorize and conceptualize the participants and supporters of the PAD
through a perspective grounded in emotions.


 22





With these in mind, I propose then, that a ʻclassʼ can also be
understood as a group of people who experiences similar emotions, or group
emotions7, as a consequence of structural relations of power and status.
Unfortunately, ʻmiddle classʼ as a concept, and term, is an insufficient, yet
necessary, expression to capture the nuanced and complex nature of a group
of people occupying a specific social class and position. For the purpose of
differentiation, in accordance with occupational and income categorization,
people with professional occupation and small businesses shall be referred to
in this thesis as the “economic middle class8”. Accordingly, this thesis borrows
and retains the concept of the ʻmiddle classʼ but employs it with the following
understanding: in this thesis, the “affective middle class” refers to the group of
people, occupying similar social locations, who has been excluded and,
hence, display group emotions of fear and hatred arising from the exclusion.
It is necessary to address and discuss a crucial critique of using
emotions to understand and define class. Emotions can, and often do,

originate from material reasons; it would seem fallacious then, to be
emphasizing a perspective that de-emphasizes the material aspect. However,
I maintain that emotions remain an important indicator of class and social
position because it allows us to better determine the actual status of an
individual in a particular society. As we shall see, in Chapter 4, material and
economic wealth does not always translate into power in society. Emotions

























































7
Here
I
borrow
Kemper’s
(2002:
62)
idea
that
by
“group
emotion”
refers
to
a
situation
whereby


“some
aggregate
of
individuals
is
feeling
something
that
is
sufficiently
alike
to
be
identified
as
the

common
emotion
of
that
aggregate”.

8
 This
term
is
used
here
to
refer
to
the
very
group
that
other
authors
have
been
looking
at.
By

adding
the
“economic”
prefix,
I
hope
to
draw
a
distinction
between
the
middle
class
defined
and

recognized
 by
 economic
 indicators,
 and
 those
 that
 are
 identified
 based
 on
 the
 emotions
 they

display.



 23





thus allow us to appreciate the overlap between socio-economic status and
the corresponding, or lack of, power. In other words, by focusing on the
emotions displayed, we may be able to better locate the social position of an
individual who may possess wealth but lacks political voice in society, giving
us a more nuanced understanding of social class and position. Again, this
thesis is not arguing for a stance that negates a material understanding and
definition of class. Rather, it aims to broaden this conception and advocates a
perspective that takes into consideration the underlying social interactions and
relations.

2.4 Class and Social Movements – Insights from Marx, Weber and Parkin
Here, it is useful to revisit existing arguments on Yellow shirts
movement as well as important theoretical perspectives on class. As
mentioned, works on the Yellow shirts movement tended to begin with the
premise that it is a movement with a ʻmiddle classʼ social base (see Pye and
Schaffer, 2008; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). Attempts to define the Thai
ʻmiddle classʼ has been made (see Girling, 1981; Ockey, 1992; Surin, 1997;
LoGerfo, 2000; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) but these have often
embraced a conception of the ʻmiddle classʼ based on the notion that the
structure and foundation of social stratification is defined by the ownership of
property or means of production. In other words, to see the ʻmiddle classʼ as
“executives and professionals…clerks and shopkeepers chiefly outside the
government bureaucracy and many with specialized skills” (Prudhisan and


 24





Chantana, 2001: 263-264) is to adopt the Marxian understanding of class in
terms of property and means of production.

2.4.1 Marx – Class, Revolution and Social Movements
For Marx, society is structured around the central notion of ownership
of property and the means of production. Those who own the means of
production he called the capitalists, or the bourgeoisie, and those who did not,
the proletariats. Due to their contradictory interests, these two groups were
conceived as having an antagonistic relationship. This became the basis of
Marxʼs famous thesis on the proletarian revolution – and also the model for
classical social movements. However, it is important to recognize that this
conception of class is a relational one. That is to say, the capitalist class only

exists in relation to the proletariat class. This leads us to an important
question of groups found in the ʻmiddleʼ, between the capitalists and
proletariats. Marx identifies this third major group as the petty bourgeoisie, or
the middle class – people who own some property but lack control over
labour. In Marxʼs view, with the development of capitalism, this class was
expected to disappear as its successful members moved into the bourgeoisie
class while those who were not would become part of the working class.
Importantly, Marx conceived the middle class as a group that sought to
preserve their private property but often had conflicting interests to the
bourgeoisie (see Giddens, 1971; Giddens and Held, 1982; Bottomore, 1983).
It is evident from this that most works on social movements, especially
political movements, in the Thai context tend to privilege the Marxian


 25