Harmonizing the different interests of farmers in sharing water resources in the lower mekong delta of vietnam

Harmonizing the different interests
of farmers in sharing water
resources in the Lower Mekong
Delta of Vietnam
Case study in Tra Vinh province
Phan Thi Xuan Tham
MSc Thesis WM-WCM.16-04
Student number 47135
April 2016


Harmonizing the different interests of farmers
in sharing water resources
in the Lower Mekong Delta of Vietnam

Master of Science Thesis
By
Phan Thi Xuan Tham

Supervisors
Professor Will Thissen

Mentors
Associate Professor Frank Jaspers

Examination committee
Professor Will Thissen
Associate Professor Frank Jaspers
Hans van der Kwast

This research is done for the partial fulfilment of requirements for the Master of Science degree at the

UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, Delft, the Netherlands

Delft
April 2016


Although the author and UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education have made every effort
to ensure that the information in this thesis was correct at press time, the author and UNESCOIHE do not assume and hereby disclaim any liability to any party for any loss, damage, or
disruption caused by errors or omissions, whether such errors or omissions result from
negligence, accident, or any other cause.
© Tham Phan 2016.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0
International License.


Abstract
The Mekong Delta of Vietnam is not only home for more than 18 million Vietnamese people
but also the "Rice bowl" of Vietnam as it supplies about 50% food production in Vietnam.
Despite playing such an important role, the Mekong Delta of Vietnam is facing several
challenges in sustain its prosperity. Firstly, the water demand in the future keeps increasing in
the whole basin so that water scarcity may happen in the very downstream at the Delta of
Mekong River. Further, there are burgeoning developments of hydropower dams in the Mekong
basin which would significantly influence on water regime at the downstream. Moreover, the
improper in planning has caused the constraint in sharing water resource among users in the
Mekong Delta. The top-down water governance and sectoral interest planning are claimed that
are lack of stakeholder participation. This leads to the poor coordination in operating and
allocating resources which impacts on the contradicting interests of the users.
The hypothesis of this study is to examine the possibility of bring a platform where stakeholders
are involved in the planning process so that the conflicts of interests among users can be
mitigated. The case study is chosen in the Tra Vinh Province. It is covered by the two main

tributaries of the Mekong River where it meets the sea. The rice cultivation and aquaculture
farming are practiced simultaneously. At some convergence area of sweet and brackish water,
other farmers are dynamically changing the crops that best fit their interests. In that impact
sphere, the irrigating operation does not meet all needs of users.
Interestingly, there are vivid contradicting interests, the farmers do not percept as they are. And
they do not seem to be interested in organizing themselves to influence the planning by the
Government. Tracing the causes which may cause the low level of farmers’ participation, the
main reasons are originated form social historical and economic aspects. Meanwhile, the
institutional arrangement also plays the core characteristic which manipulates involve
stakeholders.
Keywords: Mekong Delta Vietnam, conflict of interests, water planning and allocation, water
governance.

i


Acknowledgements
Through six month of my thesis, I am deeply indebted to Professor Frank Jasper who restlessly
fosters me with my studying. He always kindly listens and gives advice to me as a respectful
father. Without his guidance and patience, I would not complete pursuing my dream to reach
the end of the master program of water conflict management which is challenging to my
academic background. The door to the office of Hans van der Kwast was always open when I
ran into a trouble with GIS. And, thanks to the financial support for the field work which was
provided by Niche Program via the coordination of Dr. Wim Douven (project coordinator) and
Mr. Ho Long Phi (director of WACC). I haven’t meet him, but through email Dr. Dang Kieu
Nhan (Can Tho University) gave me valuable insights about the Mekong region which I am
much appreciated.
I would like to express my gracefulness to Mr. Pham Kim Long (Tra Vinh University) and his
family, Mr. Nguyen Van Ke, Mr. Nguyen Van Dung the motorbike driver and my friend Tinh
who helped me to conduct the field research in Tra Vinh province. Without their support, I

would not have the great experience.
Also, I would like to express my profound appreciation to Robbert Vis who patiently gave me
comments and tirelessly encouraged me. And thanks to my brother-in-law Phan Manh Hung
(fellowship at the TUD) who supports me spiritually and studying reflections while I am a
thousand miles away from home.
Finally, I am cherished to be brought to this life by my late parents. I must voice gratitude to
my sisters and family in Vietnam for providing me with unfailing support and continuous
encouragement throughout my studying in the Netherlands. And my life in the Netherland
would be meaningless if I do not have amazing friends, staffs and colleagues in Unesco-IHE.
Thank you.

Tham Phan
April 2016

iii


Table of Contents
1.

2.

3.

4.

INTRODUCTION

1

1.1. Background

1

1.2. Problem statement

3

1.3. Science gap

6

1.4. Research objectives

6

1.5. Research questions

7

LITERATURE REVIEW

8

2.1. Governance the common

8

2.2. Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)

10

2.3. Organizational Structure of Water Management in Vietnam

13

2.4. Harmonizing the competing interests

16

METHODOLOGY

19

3.1. Conceptual framework

19

3.2. Qualitative research and approach

21

3.3. Case study description and data collection

24

3.3.1. Natural conditions of the case study in Tra Vinh Province

24

3.3.2. Socio-economic conditions

25

3.3.3. Study conducting

25

RESULTS

27

4.1. Water management and planning from bottom-up views

27

4.2. The conflicts of interests among managerial agencies and users in water
management

31

4.2.1. Managerial agencies

31

4.2.2. Different interests of users

31

4.3. The interest of public participation in water management of the farmers

40

4.3.1. The social facts on the groups of responders

41

4.3.2. Awareness of public participation of farmers

42
v


5.

4.4. Conclusion of the field study

44

DISCUSSION

46

5.1. Refection on the constraints of poor coordination in the Lower Mekong Delta
of Vietnam

46

5.1.1. Internal weaknesses

46

5.1.2. External challenges

49

5.2. Limitations

50

CONCLUSION AND RECOMEDATION

51

6.1. Conclusion

51

6.2. Recommendations

52

7.

References

54

8.

Appendices

61

6.

Appendix A The map of sluice gates and dykes in Tra Vinh province

61

Appendix B The map of the interview locations

62

Appendix C The pyramid of the Maslow’s hierarchy of need

63

Appendix D The cultural dimension of Vietnam

63

Appendix E Photos are taken from the field

64

Appendix F State management on the Water Sector at national level

68

Appendix G State Management on the Water Sector at local level

69

Appendix H An overview of institutions evolve in Water Sector in Vietnam

70

Appendix I The questionnaire tables.

71

vi


List of Figures
Figure 1: Compare export value and production of Rice and Aquaculture, 2012 .............................................. 2
Figure 2 Responsibilities of authorities in Water Management of Vietnam in national level ............................ 5
Figure 3: The three dimensions of Integrated Water Resources Management. .............................................. 11
Figure 4: Organisation of Vietnamese Political System. (Source: Wailbel, 2010) ............................................ 12
Figure 5: Organizational setup of irrigation management in Can Tho city. Source Benedikter and Waibel
(2012) ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 6: Process of stakeholder participation................................................................................................ 20
Figure 7: Conceptual framework of the study................................................................................................ 21
Figure 8: Research approach .......................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 9 Hierarchy Administrative Organizational structure of the Government ............................................ 30
Figure 10: Different elevation brings different interests to the rice farmers................................................... 32
Figure 11: The different interests caused by the inconsistent sowing schedule in adjacent communes which
share the same irrigation scheme .......................................................................................................... 33
Figure 12: Inconsistent planting of rice cultivation in the same tertiary canal ................................................ 34

Figure 13: Land use changing in the unplanned region ................................................................................... 36
Figure 14: Operating irrigation plan for shrimp and rice farmers in sphere of impact .................................... 37
Figure 15: Sharing canal in the intensive shrimp farming poses a high risk of virus and diseases between
ponds ..................................................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 16: Land locked areas out of the canal system face difficulties with the livelihood ............................. 40
Figure 17: The distribution of responders in term of tribes and gender.......................................................... 41
Figure 18: The education ranking of the interviewees .................................................................................... 42
Figure 19: Farmers’ perception about contrasting interests in sharing water resource .................................. 43
Figure 20: Farmers react water scarcity .......................................................................................................... 43
Figure 21: Interests of farmers in setting up a platform for harmonizing water issues ................................... 44

vii


List of Tables
Table 1 Characteristics to categorize the identification of goods ...................................................................... 8
Table 2: Methodology matrix ......................................................................................................................... 22

viii


Abbreviations
CPR
DARRD
DORNE
FAO
GDP
ICOR
IHIC
IWRM

MARD
MORNE
MRC
PT- MoaRD
SEA
SIWRP
SSC
VFA
VN-GSO

Common Pool Resource
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
Department of Natural Resources and Envionment
Food and Agriculture Organization
Gross Domestic Product
The Incremental Capital-Output Ratio
Irrigation and Hydraulic Infrastructure Company
Integrated Water Resources Management
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Ministry of Natural Resources and Envionment
Mekong River Commision
Promote Trading of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Strategic Environmental Assessment
Southern Institute of Water Resource Planning
Southwest Steering Committee
Vietnam Food Association
Vietnam General Statistics Office

ix

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Vietnam became one of ten leading countries in the world in fishery export with a turnover of
6.2 billion USD (Vietnam General Department of Fisheries statistics, 2012) and the second
largest rice exporter with the total exporting value of 3.546 billion USD (Vietnam Food
Association, 2012). The trend of exported production for rice and aquaculture commodities in
Vietnam is set to increase in the coming years to meet the demand of the population growth
domestically and the envisaged export demand. The Vietnamese government put effort to meet
the target as a rice exporter and also poverty alleviation in the Mekong Delta Province. Thus,
the Government built many water control projects since the 1990s in order to manage water
supply and water quality conditions which promote rice production (Hoanh, 2004). Rice
farmers in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam started to plant 2-3 crops a year instead of one in the
wet season when the salinity level decreases. Since then Vietnam changed from a rice importing
country to become one of the biggest rice exporters (FAO, 2006). Besides, aquaculture started
to bloom in the region since 1987. There was about a 20% area increase of aquaculture land at
777.450 ha in 2010 compared to the year of 2005 (VN-GSO, 2010). Aquaculture production of
the Mekong Region increased from 444.394 tons per year in 2001 to 2.742.888 tons in 2010;
that contributes to about 88% of total national aquaculture production (PT- MoaRD website,
2014). Occupying only 12% total area of the country, but Mekong Delta region contributes the
proportion of 50% food production in Vietnam including 51% of rice paddy production, 55%
of the national fisheries and fruit production and 61% of total national export value (VN-GSO,
2003). And almost 80% of the livelihood of the Mekong population is farming and directly
related to agriculture sector (Orr et al, 2012).

INTRODUCTION

1

Both rice cultivation and aquaculture play an important role in the daily practice of the people
in the Mekong region. However, their existence and profits seem to contradict in this region.
The profit that aquaculture brings to the farmer is outweighing rice farming, for instance, Figure
1 shows that the export value of aquaculture is almost double of the rice export value,
meanwhile, the export production is a half fold less in the period of 2012. In recent years,

Figure 1: Compare export value and production of Rice and Aquaculture, 2012
aquaculture expands in the Mekong Area in land cultivation as well as production, especially,
the land of brackish aquaculture (dominating by shrimp farming) is almost double of those of
fresh one (SIWRP, 2011). This means the hydraulic infrastructures which favour rice
production does not favour brackish aquaculture anymore. As a result, there was the
unavoidable conflict between rice farmers and shrimp farmers in Bac Lieu province when some
of the shrimp farmers had to alter to different crops that have low yields or less economics
generation, while others had to abandon their lands and even some farmers blocked secondary
canals to stop fresh water from going into their field to protect shrimp farming (Gowing et al,
2006). Moreover, in some places, shrimp farmers dispose of wastewater after cleaning their
pond directly to the canal where other shrimp farmers and rice farmers use the water for their
farming activities (Thijs C., 2015). Without treatment of the wastewater, this impacts to water
quality so that the shrimp diseases likely proliferate plagues and pests among the shrimp ponds.
In addition to that, both rice intensified cultivation and aquaculture intensified production likely
pose a risk of aquatic ecosystem degradation in the long-term (Gowing et al, 2006).
In a wider extent, the Mekong River which feeds the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, is sharing the
upper part with 5 other countries, so dam and irrigation developments of these upper countries
likely pose risks to the Mekong Delta’s activities. First, there are 24 operational dams and 12
proposed mainstream dams and other 88 tributary dams that may bring the significant change
the regimes of fisheries and irrigation in the Mekong River (SEA of MRC, 2010). The dam
INTRODUCTION

2


development is forecasted the main cause of protein losses in the region (Molle F., Foran, T.,
Kakonen, M., 2012; Orr et al, 2012). This means the water needed for aquaculture and
husbandry to compensate the protein demand is inevitably increasing in the whole region.
Second, in the book of Water Resources and Food Security in the Vietnam Mekong Delta
(Cosslett, 2013) only 6 full dam operations in Lancang River of China may reduce 160 – 165
million tons of sediment that reach the Mekong Deltas yearly which accounts about 50% of the
present load. One of the possible impacts that Francis Molle (2012) also claimed is that the
sedimentation plays an important role in preventing the coastal erosion. In addition to these
challenges, there were plans to transfer water from Mekong river system to irrigate the dried
land of the Northern China and Northeast Thailand (Cosslett, 2013) which possibly cause sweet
water shortages in the Mekong Delta region. Therefore, the rice cultivation’s prosperity in the
Mekong Delta Vietnam bears major drawbacks.

1.2. Problem statement
The different interests of water users and uses in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam are affected
internationally, nationally and locally. Firstly, water allocation between the Mekong riparian
countries has been claimed stress forthcoming years. There are about 60% of the population
which accounts equivalent to 48 million inhabitants directly depending on the Mekong Delta
River resources for their food and livelihood (Orr et al., 2012), and the population of the delta
region will increase twice to approximately 144 million people in 2050 under the scenario of
constant growth (Pech S., Sunada, K. 2008). Then, water demands for irrigation, urban and
industry keep raising in accordance with the population and development growth (Ringer C.,
2001).
Secondly, the national development plan of Vietnamese Government has promoted agricultural
activities in Mekong Delta Region since 1986. However while the rice production was
stimulated centrally, shrimp growing developed spontaneously. According to the Vietnam
Institute of Fishery Economics and Planning (VIFEP, 2009), a daughter organisation of the

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the aquaculture conditions of the
Mekong Delta are facing many challenges and difficulties that hamper the growth
unsustainable, for example: lack of planning or the planning does not meet actual farming
activities, the social issues when altering land-use from rice to shrimp farming (possibly the
bureaucratic issues impact on farmers and distort the development), the farming infrastructure
and irrigation system does not align with the shrimp aquaculture. In the dry season, the conflicts
controversy between the need for sweet water for rice cultivation and brackish/saline water for
shrimp cultivation is manifesting at various levels: between zones, between schemes and within
schemes and even within one tertiary canal. This calls for far going co-ordination arrangements.

INTRODUCTION

3


Thirdly, Moller and Phan (2005) claim that there is a lack of coordination and collaboration in
the water sector between national and lower level operating authorities. The mandates of water
agencies are overlapping and institutional frameworks are fragile so that there is "room for
manoeuvre" in implementation and sanction in lower levels (Wailbel, 2010). In addition, the
development planning of the Mekong Delta was done through many actors and stakeholder
through a top-down process (Nguyen, 2010b). Not only two main actors namely the Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD), but also other related Ministries have joined to make a development
plan for the water sector in general and for the Mekong Delta in particular. Figure 2 (Nguyen,
2010b) sketches agencies’ responsibilities involved in water resources management in Vietnam.
Also, before the merger with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry
of Fisheries had issued some other projects and decrees which were contradicting with the new
planning and regulations (VIFEP, 2009). Moreover, the water sector is under the institutional
reform which includes the merger/transfer the mandates and responsibilities of MARD to
MONRE. The transformation left many issues in the governance aspects, for instance: the

resistance of administrative engines, the overlap of the mandates of MARD and MONRE, the
issued Decrees and regulations are interwoven (Waibel, 2010).
In sum, from the angle of top-down governance, water managing activities in the Mekong Delta
region likely do not promote public participation. For instance, the centralized water
management of the Mekong Delta Vietnam is very complicated to understand and the planning
process is operationally and institutionally characterized by bureaucratic constraints (Waibel,
2010). Also, poor level of collaboration among national level and provincial level catch
attention of many studies (Kirbly et al, 2010, Hirsch, 2006). There are likely limited instruments
to solve the different interests among farmers who do rice, vegetables, fruits and aquaculture at
the grassroots level and the level of co-ordination is questionable. In this case to study the
feasibility of bringing the grassroots a platform function for making decisions on sharing water
resource is an important aspect.

INTRODUCTION

4


INTRODUCTION
Figure
2 Responsibilities of authorities in Water Management of Vietnam in national level
Source: Nguyen Thi Phuong Loan (2010a)

5


1.3. Science gap
There are countless researches and studies on improving the effective development of River
Basin Organizations (Barrow, 1998). One of the key changes of a good integrated river basin
management is to enable stakeholders participate in the process of decision making and water

resource planning at the lowest level appropriately (Jaspers, 2003). However, according to
Waibel (2010), decentralization in Vietnam tends to centralize at provincial level and that
prevents the local level to participate in the decision making process, even though many efforts
and programs are launched with the help of many international donors. Also, Kirby et al (2010),
indicate that public participation is limited in water resources management of the Mekong
region and the Mekong Delta of Vietnam particularly. Moreover, Fritzen (2006) indicated that
Vietnamese decentralized institutions are incoherent and there is a lack of delegation to local
stakeholders. Thus, it seems there is a gap between theories and daily practices with regard to
the context of RBOs in the Mekong Vietnam.
In this circumstance, this research will be conducted on the hypothesis that the decentralization
in Vietnam steps to the provincial level only; and the grassroots level seems be ignored to
participate in the decision making process of water resource planning. So the question is
relevant whether water user associations or similar organizations could be set up at the
grassroots level in the Mekong Delta area in Vietnam to trigger the participation of the farmers
in allocating, maintaining and operating the sharing of water resources among themselves?

1.4. Research objectives
The focal point of this study is to examine the how water is shared and allocated at the
grassroots. Hence, there are few objectives need to be done to get this aim. One of the main
objectives of this study is to analyse the institutions of water management of the Mekong Delta
Vietnam (i), what are the causes of the conflict of sharing resources (ii) and to identify the
possibility of a framework, which involves a participatory decision-making process to
harmonize the different interests of farmers in the Lower Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The case
study is chosen in Tra Vinh province located between two major rivers of the mouth of Mekong
River that are Tien River and Hau River. Tra Vinh Province is the epitome of fresh and salty
delineation in Mekong Delta where rice and shrimp and other crops are practiced
simultaneously.
Specific objectives
•

Analysis of institutions of water governance in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam in order
to identify how water resource is planned.

INTRODUCTION

6


•
•
•
•

Identify why the planning arrangements are not meeting the reality of water use in the
research areas leading to conflict.
Analyze the character of the different interests between farmers
Identify and analyze factors influencing the process of making water allocation
decisions by local authorities.
Propose an approach that helps farmers at their level to take part in these decisionmaking processes.

1.5. Research questions
Central research question
How is water resource allocation planning taking place in selected areas of the Mekong Delta
in Vietnam? How is it implemented? And why are the planning arrangements failing in
coordinating diverse water uses? How can they possibly be improved?
Specific research question
Question 1: Which main actors are involved in water management at the local level in the
Mekong Delta Vietnam?
Question 2: What is the character of the controversy between rice and shrimp farmers? How do
these actors interact with each other? And who makes the decisions on water allocation?

Question 3: What are challenges of the planning and or implementing the plan? How do the
situations impact on the local farmers? How do farmers see their role in the planning and
implementing?
Question 4: Are farmers willing to participate in the making of decision? What do they think
about water user associations?

INTRODUCTION

7


CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Governance the common
The common pool resources (CPR)
The definition of the CPR is: “A common-pool resource, such as a lake or ocean, an irrigation
system, a fishing ground, a forest, or the atmosphere, is a natural or man-made resource from
which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, and one person’s
consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others” (Ostrom, 1993). So, the
CPR’s characteristics are excludability and rivalry. From these two features, the goods are
divided into four categories: the toll or club goods, the private goods, the public goods and the
common pool resources.
Table 1 Characteristics to categorize the identification of goods

Frank van Laerhoven (Lecture slide, 2015)

LITERATURE REVIEW

8

In the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, the water in the canal system is the common pool resources.
Still the canal system and the hydraulic infrastructure are owned by the Government is the
public goods. In this case, the linkages between the water and the system which differentiate
CPR and public goods are vague as the farmers cannot access to water without the physical
infrastructure. The mainly focus of this study is looking at water as a CPR to the local farmers
in the region.
The tragedy of the commons
Hardin is popular with his metaphor of grazing field. Each herdsman contributes the
proportional fee for the husbandry. If one overgrazes one herd, has to pay for a fine. However,
the fine just costs a fraction of the benefit that one overgrazed herd brings. Then, the farmer
keeps overgrew his herds. So do the other farmers in the village. The collective action of these
farmers leads to the high risk of the grass land degradation. Further, the whole village will face
the tragic of having no grass for cattle grazing in future. That is how Hardin explained about
the tragedy of the commons. Ending of his metaphor is said “freedom in the commons brings
ruin to all” (Feeny D., Mccay B.J., 1990). Also, Ostrom (1999) said the commons may highly
faces the degradation because it cannot exclude people to use the resources, and one consumes
the CPR will limit the other’s uses. Because the property right is not identified, so each
individual wants to use more the CPR as if he or she doesn’t use it, the other may use it anyhow.
Each individual action accumulates to the point that the CPR is at the risk of overuses and
degradation. And the bringing affect is called the "tragedy of the commons" (Ostrom, 1999).
Governance the commons
Hardin (1968) proposed that there are two ways to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to
privatization which means alter the commons into private property; or to socialization meaning
make the commons as the public goods. By doing so, the resources could be used in better
manners because the privatization increases the excludability and rivalry, meanwhile the
socialization is put the commons under the State management. However, Feeny and Mccay
(1990) argue that these two measures could not resolve some exclusive problems. For instance,
they give the typical example about the privatizing in oil pumping in the USA that one has the

right ownership a land, the owner has the tendency of accelerating the oil pumping doubly from
the pools underneath in order to make fast profit over their investment. Or, the quotas for fishing
in the Africa water are facing the highly failure and cost in bringing enforcement on what had
done about the quotas (UN Africa, 2009).
Elinor Ostrom (1990) added a third way to avoid the tragedy of the commons which “is the
design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource
users”. In her work, she described the eight design principles that characterize successful long
enduring irrigation system in different regions. They are included: the first rule is to the limited
LITERATURE REVIEW

9


boundary of the CPR which is consumed by a group of users; the second rule is to equalize the
contributions and sharing among the users based on the physical condition; the third rules of
“collective choice arrangement”; the fourth and fifth rules are the monitoring and enforcement
as those aim to regulate the behavior of the users and; the sixth rule is to develop a graduated
“conflict resolution mechanism”; the seventh rule is to legitimate the organization
institutionally and the last one is the nested organizations which jointly and influentially
managing the CPR. The crafting principles are empirical found existing in many places of the
world, for typical examples: the cases study in the Zanjeras of northen Philipines, the Thulo
Kulo in Nepal and the Huerta of Valencia in Spain, Ostrom assumed that the CPR can be
sustainably self-governanced by the group of users. This can be derived from the increase of
the stakeholders’ involvement and stakeholders’ participation of the proposed principles. In
other words, it encourages decentralization.
However, the designed principles also got criticism. The boundary seems opaque in term of the
physical condition, administration and social interaction (Cox M. et al, 2010). The principle
two, three and four got the main critique of the complexity that social aspects are embedded in
the institutional arrangement (Cleaver F., 2012). Cleaver (2012) queries successfulness,
transparency and the inclusion of the stakeholders’ participation approach in the crafting

principles in CPR management which is named the mainstream institutionalism. The
mainstream institutionalism proposes a normative concept in CPR while the critical
institutionalism further the perception of the flexibility, fuzziness and complexity which
contextualize the institution design.
The debates of different approaches in governance the commons keeps unabated. Still, looking
for the applicable one that sustainably maintain the socio ecological system is contextual in
practice.

2.2. Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)
Where water is, where the human civilizations are shaped. Water is not only the human right
but also the postulate of human prosperity. Water is the CPR that attracts enormous attention
that needs to get “good” governance as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once declared in
2001: “Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the
future”. The concepts of water governance are determined, and among that the concept of
integrated water resource management (IWRM) is promoted widely.
IWRM concepts
Water is vital element in sustain human life and bio-sphere. It is also one of the fundamental
drivers of economic and social development. Moreover, there is no unique features of other
resources as water as its fugitive. Hence, water is the commons that is controversial to
LITERATURE REVIEW

10


governance and specifically in terms of allocation (Molle F., 2008). The five paradigms of water
resource management have been described from the pre-modern toward the concepts of
integrated water resources management over the period year of 1850 to 2000 onward by Tony
Allan (IWRM Lecture note, 2015). On this trend, water is assumed that it should be managed
in the holistic ways. According to Savenije and Van der Zaag (IWRM Lecture note, 2015), the
concept of IWRM can be understood as the process that involves users of multi-sectors in the

process of planning and managing water resources sustainably with regard to physical
conditions. That is the idea of the four dimensions is introduced so that water resources could
be managed as a whole (Figure 3). Listed the four dimension are the water resources, water
users, spatial scales, and temporal scales and patterns. Another definition, “IWRM is a process
which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000). Ideally,
IWRM concept is toward the achievement of three key principles namely equity, ecological
integrity and efficiency (IWRM Lecture note, 2015). In the training manual of Cap-Net 2005,
managing water resource by IRWM concepts could bring “coordination and collaboration
among the individual sectors, plus a fostering of stakeholder participation, transparency and
cost-effective local management”. Also, the principle 2 of the Dublin Conference 2002
emphasize on “a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policymakers at all
levels” in water resource management (Cap-Net, 2005). All in all, IWRM is believed the good
approach in governing water compressively and holistically which involves all stakeholders’
participation. One of the main critical elements of IWRM implementation is stakeholders’

Figure 3: The three dimensions of Integrated Water Resources Management.
Source: (IWRM Lecture note, 2015)

LITERATURE REVIEW

11


participation which is believed to bring transparency, accountability and sustainability. Yet,
there are some argues that IWRM concept are facing several challenges.
The implementation of IWRM
IWRM is accepted internationally the best concept to confront with the burgeoning challenges.
The first challenge is the IWRM is considered good approach while its definition “ill-defined”;

and this leads to the inappropriate implementing plan (IWRM Lecture note, 2015). Secondly,
IWRM requires the synchronous capacity and resources from involved sector in the planning
which is hardly compliant evenly. Thirdly, there is not enough attention to structure measures
that develops the infrastructure before non-structure measures that manages water resources in
the sphere of IWRM concepts. Moreover, Giordano and Shab (2014) recently assume that
IWRM developing circle has reached its declined stage as giving a number of cases that putting
water-centric did not solve the real life problems. The diverted suggestions are presumed that
water resource management should take into account the physical, social and political
circumstances.

Figure 4: Organization of Vietnamese Political System. (Source: Wailbel, 2010)

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The concept of IRWM adopted since the 1990s in Vietnam, and the country first issued the
Vietnam Law of Water in May 1998 that attempted integrate IWRM concept in its law. The
guideline law is claimed to brings the implementation flexibly which complies with the above
principles. However, the IWRM becomes fragment because of “result of the peculiar structural
features of the contemporary state in Vietnam” (Waibel et al, 2012). The governmental
bureaucracy engine is structured of heavily administrative units from top-down. The higher line
agency can give orders to the lower one, yet the other way around is impossible. And the same
line position of the agencies could not give commands to each other. Molle and Hoanh (2009)
assumes that water management and planning in Vietnam, or particularly on the Red River
Basin of Vietnam have been done dominantly by sectors. In the case, MARD was trying to
make strategic plan that utilize water resource for its development targets. Also, water sector
management is claimed to be centralized at the provincial level with its lack of participation
(Waibel et al., 2012, Fritzen S., 2006). The nested system of the governmental engines is

complicated in practice. The figure 4 schematizes this system which involves the state agencies.

2.3. Organizational Structure of Water Management in
Vietnam
According to the current legislation of the Water Law issued on June 2012, the Ministry of
Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) shall be directly responsible for the State
managing of the water resource. The related Ministries, ministerial-level agencies and People
Committees at the provincial level shall coordinate the State management tasks in regard to
water issues that stimulate their mandates. The research institutes function as the advisory units
that helps their mother agencies making planning and decisions. At local levels, People’s
Committees (provincial level) shall be responsible for state management in regard to water
resources within their boundaries. Department of Natural Resources and Environment
(DONRE) at provincial level function as the advisory units for Provincial People’s Committee.
The organizational structure of institutions that operate the State management are vertical
(Indicate in the red circle in Figure 4). Legitimately, MONRE manage water resources at macro
perspectives while MARD coordinates with MONRE to perform the State tasks. Practically,
subnational level, the water managing mandates are under the leadership of the provincial
People Committee by which People Council contemplates.
The difference between the formal and informal practices of the organizational structure are
due to the ongoing development and reform of the Constitutions. The establishment of MARD
has been through four times merge from six ministries since 1945. As it long history
development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) used to be in charge
of food production and security, water resource development, fisheries and aquaculture and
rural area planning. Up till present, the agency’s mandates still main focus on the water
resources and other issues related to the water resource development that favor agriculture
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development and flooding. However, since the establishment of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and the Environment (MONRE) in 2002, some of the responsibilities of MARD
transferred to MONRE. There are the overlaps between these two Ministries’ mandates (Loan,
2010) which highly cause the mis-cooperation and conflicts among the water management
agencies (Molle and Hoanh, 2009). The organizational structure of line agencies namely the
Ministries and ministerial-agencies in the national level is merged some units at the provincial
level also can lead to the clashing between the national level and provincial level. The nesting
of the functional agencies, the advisory agencies and the academia institutes among sectors
cumulatively makes the situation more complicated. (Illustrated in the annex B, C, and D).
Also, the reform of Constitution in 1992 drives the reforms of multi-sectors in Vietnam. There
are merges and re-divide causing the overlap of responsibilities. Consequently, the laws and
regulations have changed, revised, amended and/or replaced (Loan, 2010b). As the results, there
is likely no accountability in the implementation and sanctions procedure (Wailbel 2010, Molle
and Hoanh, 2009).
MONRE and MARD are the two main agencies in managing and exploiting water resources.
Refer to the historical development planning of the Government, agriculture has been promoted
tremendously which delegates the significant role of MARD. However, since the Reform 1992,
MARD is losing its benefits and interests that create the resistance to change and underneath
the constraints may be some driving forces and power relation. Waibel (2010) cited Bach Tan
Sinh said “In Vietnam, the informal rule is more important than the formal one … and … what
is on paper is different to reality” (extract from Waibel (2010) of the oral communication. Bonn
31.03.2009). In this transformation of the institutional arrangements in Vietnam at the local
level, who actually influence on water resource management and allocation still need to analyze
Integrated Water Resource Management in Vietnam
Water management sector of Vietnam started to develop since 1998 when Law on Water
Resources, then issued a new Law on Water Resources included principles of IWRM such as
river basin management, environmental flows, and water quality management. Follow that,
other ordinance Laws also introduced to align with the Law on Water Resources. However, the
reform of water sector management in Vietnam is facing tremendous challenges. These issues
can be categorized in these parts:

The Law on Water Resources is kind of semantics. Hence, different stakeholders
interpret the Water Law differently at the lower level (Waibel, 2010). As the results, there are
more than 300 legal documents (Laws, Government’s Decrees, Circulars and Joint Circulars of
MARD, MONRE and other ministries, Decision of Provincial People’s Committee) were issued
by the Government in order to explain procedure and regulations and ensure the sustainability
uses and development of the natural resources including water resources (Loan, 2010b).
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The legal framework is fragmented and overlapped among legal documents and
involving agencies (Loan, 2010). The Ministry of Natural Recourse and Environment obtains
the mandates that manages the natural and water resources. However, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is in charge of infrastructures which related to
water development and operation and maintenance. In addition to that, other related Laws and
Ordinances have tied in issues about environment conservation, such as: the Law on Land 2003
and the Law on Environmental Protection 2003 (MORNE’s responsibility), the Law on
Fisheries 2003 (MARD’s mandates), the Law on Inland Waterway Navigation 2004 (the
Ministry of Infrastructure mandates), etc…As these reasons, the collaboration among actors is
moderately low.
Decentralization of water management stay at provincial level (Hirsch, 2006 and
Fritzen, 2006). As the water sector is on the transition age, the systems of top-down
management and delegated lower level responsibilities between national and local agencies are
struggling to move forward. That is the reason why at the lowest level as grassroots have no
space in this arrangement and as result in low level of public participation.
There is lack of public participation and awareness in the planning and management
process of water resource (Hirsch, 2006). According to Waibel (2010) and Benedikter and
Waibel (2013) studies, the participatory role and involvement of the grassroots is shadowy even
though Grassroots Democracy Decree was promulgated since 1998.

Below figure indicates how the power stay at provincial level. This is the matrix of stakeholders
that influence on institutional arrangement in operating a community’s based-organization in
Can Tho city in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Benedikter and Waibel, 2013). In Decision No.
151/2007/QD-CP on the organisation and operation of cooperative groups said:
…cooperative groups (tổ
hợp tác) are financially autonomous
organisations (tự chủ tài chính) that are organized and operate
according to the principles of voluntariness ( tự nguyện), equality (bình
đẳng), democracy (dân chủ) and common welfare of its members (cùng
có lợi). The decree further defines cooperative groups that need to
have a minimum of 3 members and need verification from the People’s
Committee of their commune (The Government of Vietnam, 2007)

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