DSpace at VNU: Vietnam's transition global integration : Implications for national security strategy

VIETNAM’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTEGRATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
David Elliott

Vietnam has a widely expanded repertoire o f models and examples to choose
from in responding to the challenges and opportunities o f globalization. The societal
changes set in motion in Vietnam in the past several decades by internal factors
have in many ways led to a return to distinctive cultural practices and ideas that had
gone underground during the Cold War and Vietnam’s prolonged revolutionary
struggle. At the same time, the complexities of globalization pose major challenges
for Vietnam in formulating a strategy for the 21st Century.
In 1976, following the unification o f the country no informed Vietnamese
observer would have anticipated a world without an “order” that expressed the main
ideological division o f the time, between communism and capitalism, imperialism
and “progressive humanity.” The driving forces of global change had been laid out
by Marx and supplemented by Lenin. Friends and enemies were sharply defined and
the conflict between them was an essential feature o f the dynamics o f international
relations. A Vietnamese foreign policy based on the undiscriminating idea of being
friends with all who would be friends with it would have jarred the confrontational
instincts and attitudes of a triumphant leadership, still savoring the heady
experience of defeating the formidable leader of the imperialist world. The idea of
Vietnam (and China, along with a shrunken non-Marxist Russia) participating in an
interdependent global market economy and joining the World Trade Organization,
founded on capitalist principles, would have seemed fantastic. Membership in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would likewise have been
unthinkable. As for relations with the United States, what Vietnam sought was not,
as is now the case, access to the huge American market (and even a low-key
security relationship, with visits by the US Navy and the Secretary of Defense), but
reparations for war-inflicted damage.

' Pomona College USA, October 16, 2012.

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VIETNAM’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION...

1. Three Major Post Cold War Changes in Vietnam’s Thinking
The first was the rejection of the Marxist central-planning model in the 1980s,
and the related undermining of the idea that the party (and its leadership) was
always right, far-seeing, and wise. The second was the shift from confrontation to
accommodation marked by Resolution 13 (1988) and the decision to withdraw from
Cambodia, along with the related upgrading of economics as Vietnam’s top priority,
and the downgrading of military force as the ultimate guarantor of Vietnam’s
national interests. The third was the 1991 adoption of a policy o f “becoming
friends” with all countries who would agree to normal relations with Vietnam—
which implicitly rejected the zero-sum “us against the enemy” (địch - tà) foundation
of previous Vietnamese strategic thinking.
These three developments took place in a context o f crisis, but the hammerblow shock did not come until the final collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1991. This
definitively undermined any possibility of avoiding real change. It marked the
beginning o f the end for the conservative resistance to reform and opened the way
for the subsequent decisions to reconcile with former adversaries, to join ASEAN,
and to embark on a path o f deep integration with the global economy. It was not,
therefore, a single “external shock” that led to the changes, but a shock following an
extended crisis which had weakened resistance to change that was the coup de
grace for the old ways. The changes did not take place immediately following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, but unfolded in fits and starts over the next decade
until the internal debate surrounding them was resolved.
A major theme o f the reformers, which paved the way for acceptance of the
new thinking - a central topic of this book - is the growing consensus among
Vietnam’s leaders that the primary danger to Vietnam came not from hostile forces
in the capitalist world bent on destroying communism in Vietnam, but from “falling

behind” {tụt hậu). In addition to the popular dissatisfaction with the regime’s
economic mismanagement and the hardships o f life, which severely undermined the
prestige that the revolutionary leadership had gained from its wartime exploits,
Vietnamese nationalist sentiment was deeply pained by the position of the country
as an impoverished and marginalized actor in a world that was passing them by.
One of the most significant features of the mind set of the reform-minded
party leaders on the eve of the 1986 Sixth Congress was that they felt Vietnam’s
economic problems could be compartmentalized and resolved from within and by
pragmatic adjustments that would not fundamentally challenge the basic ideological
foundations and assumptions of the party. Most importantly, security issues arising
from the changing international situation were viewed as entirely separate from the
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economic issues. Resolving Vietnam’s challenges in 1986 could be done by a twotrack approach-one for internal problems and another for external challenges. Th s
compartmentalization was rendered obsolete by the events of 1989 and is
aftermath.
Looking back from the vantage o f 2006, Vo Van Kiet said, “The situation now
is not like it as at the time o f the Sixth Congress, when there were big changes in the
international situation. When the situation is at an impasse, you had to change at the
top, and change thinking, as at the Sixth Congress.” In contrast, Kiet felt that in
2006 the situation was less urgent and more favorable, and Vietnam could be
incremental and discriminating in responding to the challenges of the time. But
today’s leaders, said Kiet, are much more aware o f the linkage between the
international context and Vietnam’s internal problems. “I would put it this way: the
comrades who are in charge today have a knowledge, understanding, and ability to
engage with the outside that is many times greater than it was fifteen or twenty
years ago-to say nothing o f the wartime period. Compared with the time I worked

here [Ho Chi Minh City], the leading comrades have access to international
information and contacts to research what is going on outside which are entirely
superior, and their understanding is quite broad”.1
As Carlyle Thayer has written, the changes in the Soviet Union had a major
impact on Vietnam’s reassessment o f its foreign policy. “Vietnam’s ideologically
derived world-view began to change in tandem with a re-thinking o f Soviet foreign
policy. It was not until May 1988, however, that Vietnam’s new foreign policy
orientation was codified.” The new view was distilled in politburo Resolution 13
which called for a multidirectional foreign-policy orientation,” and was a seminal
moment in Vietnam’s response to the changes in the international system. As
Thayer points out, there was an economic aspect of this decision in that Vietnam
now defined its main task as taking advantage of favorable world conditions in
order to lay the foundation for economic development and stabilize its domestic
situation. The policy laid out in Resolution 13 “thus set in motion changes in
Vietnamese national and foreign policies which contributed to a diplomatic
settlement o f the Cambodian conflict in October 1991.”2

1. Interview with Vo Van Kiet in Saigon Giai Phong, “Vi ca nuoc, TP HCM phai CO buoc dot
pha” [For the entire country, Ho Chi Minh City has to have a breakout], Tuoi Tre online,
September 7, 2006.
2. Carlyle A. Thayer, “ Vietnam ese Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the Threat o f Peaceful
Evolution,” in Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer, eds., Vietnamese Foreign Policy in
Transition (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1990): 2-3.
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VIETN AM ’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION.

The precursor of Resolution 13, the landmark document that previewed
Vienam’s post-Cold War foreign policy and embodied Vietnam’s final decision to

wit!draw from Cambodia, was a Politbüro Resolution 32 o f July 1986, which
initated the process of new thinking about Vietnam and the world. Because there
was not a sufficient consensus within the party, and because conditions were not yet
righ (including Vietnam’s reluctance to make the necessary concessions to get a
Canbodian settlement at this time), the full impact of this decision was not felt until
two years later. But it was a watershed moment in reordering priorities, most
notibly by giving priority to economic development over military security and
redefining the main mission of diplomacy.
Phan Doan Nam stresses the importance of Vietnam adopting a view of
proíCtively {chù động) shaping the external environment. This is in contrast to its
pre\ious concern with a reactive diplomatic judo, deflecting aggressive
encioachments into its security sphere, and stress on finding ways o f exploiting
conradictions and weaknesses on the part of its opponents.1 This reactive approach
is nost suitable for the pursuit o f “possession goals” with the relatively simple
objective of defending and securing territory, as opposed to a more complex “milieu
goaf’ of proactively and cooperatively constructing a favorable external (global or
regimal) environment.2 “To escape from this difficult situation, in July 1986, the
poliburo met and issued Resolution 32 which clearly set out guidelines [chủ
trươĩg] and revised diplomatic policies, and moved toward a solution in Cambodia.
The resolution clearly stated: the external mission o f Vietnam is to . . . proactively
[chi động] create a condition o f stability for economic construction.” This would
requre pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with China, ASEAN, and the
Unied States, and building Southeast Asia into a “region o f peace, stability, and
coojeration.”3
In the face of all these concerns, Nguyen Van Linh argued, new thinking about
the ole of military force was needed. The past experience from the “liberation

1. Phin Doan Nam, “N goai giao Viet Nam sau 20 nam Doi M o£’ [V ietnam ese diplom acy after
twenty years o f doi moi], Tap Chi Cong San, 111 (2006).
2. F(r a discussion o f V ietnam ’s traditional fixation with possession goals, see David W. P.

Eliott,“Vietnam: Tradition Under Challenge,” in Trood and Booth eds., Strategic Cultures.
Fo the “strategic ju d o ” aspect o f revolutionary Vietnam’s diplom acy, see David W. P.
Eliott, “H anoi’s Strategy in the Vietnam War,” in Jayne W erner, ed., The Vietnam War:
VUtnamese and American Perspectives (NewYork: Sharpe, 1993).
3. Phin Doan Nam, “Ngoai giao Viet Nam sau 20 nam Doi M oi” [Vietnam ese diplom acy after
tw:nty years o f doi moi], Tap Chi Cong San, 111 (2006).

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Struggle” was “precious” but not relevant to the current circumstances. This article
formulated an early version of a concept that would later be termed “comprehensive
security.” “You cannot protect the Fatherland without a strong military. But
political, economic, and diplomatic [đổi ngoại] factors also play a key role i n the
mission of defending the country. We must organize and mobilize each facet:
struggle and construction, politics and economics, creating a comprehensive
strength [sức mạnh tổng hợp] to defend the Fatherland, just as we knew how 10
develop comprehensive strength to defeat the enemy during war.” 1
2. Post Cold War Vietnamese Conceptions of Security
This important formulation of Vietnam’s approach to “defending the
Fatherland” at the end o f 1989 contains many o f the seeds o f Vietnam’s emerging
post-Cold War conceptions of security. O f these, four are especially important: the
idea of comprehensive security, the importance of diversification o f external ties,
“engaging in the life o f the international system,” and the primacy of economic
development over military spending. All o f these pointed away from a traditional
approach to security. First, “comprehensive security” marked a shift from
“possession goals” toward “milieu goals” in Vietnamese thinking about security,
and reflected a relative downgrading o f the military component of security. Second,

the idea o f diversifying relationships regardless of political system implicitly
rejected a “two worlds” view of the international system. And, third, “engagiing in
the life of the international system” combined both o f these elements, in Chat it
accepted the idea o f a pluralistic constellation o f actors in the international system,
and mandated an active engagement with the system within its own parameters and
rules-again a difference from the Cold War attempt to operate only withiin the
confines of an “antisystem” of socialist countries who tried to pose an alternative to
the capitalist and Western dominated system of the post-Second World War pieriod.
The fourth element o f the emerging Vietnamese conception of security in the- postCold War era was that economic strength was the most indispensable elemient of
comprehensive strength, and that Vietnam’s relations with the outside world lhad to
be harnessed to the goal of economic development.
The period 1992-1995, spanning an interval from the collapse of the Soviet
Union and normalization of relations with China through full membership in
ASEAN and diplomatic recognition by the United States, was also a tirme of

1. Nguyen Van Linh, “Cung CO hoa binh, de cao canh giac, phat huy suc manh tong hop d c bao
ve To Quoc” [Consolidate peace, raise vigilance, develop comprehensive strength to defend
the Fatherland], Nhan Dan, December 15, 1989.
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VIETNAM’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION...

significant change in elite views of the nature of the international system, and its
implications for Vietnam. “The elimination of the world that was divided into two
opposing social systems has created new and very favorable possibilities for the
forces of production to reach their full potential,” wrote Nguyen Co Thach, using the
familiar Marxist vocabulary. Then, applying it to a new phenomenon, he went on to
say that, “The globalization of the world economy is creating conditions for a new
international division o f labor on the scale of the entire globe. At the same time,

mutual dependence [tùy thuộc lẫn nhau ] between big and small countries also has
expanded to a larger scale.” 1 The abandonment of the concept of a world sharply
divided between antagonistic systems, the prelude to the victory of the communist
world over the capitalist world, was a fundamental conceptual shift that paved the
way for viewing international relations in “win-win” rather than zero-sum terms.
Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan argued that the underlying structural
dynamic o f international change is the “trajectory” (xu thế) o f the scientific,
technological, and industrial revolution which had led to dramatically accelerated
economic growth, uneven development, and increasingly dense interdependence
(tính ràng buộc lẫn nhau ngày càng tăng). This creates the paradox o f offering an
unprecedented opportunity for less-developed countries to catch up, but at the same
makes the threat o f falling further behind even more serious. Moreover, there was
the additional paradox o f proliferating economic “opponents,” even at a time when
the threat o f military opponents had declined. “Some people have the view that in
war, there is only one enemy, while in economic competition everyone is an
opponent [đổi thu\, and because of this there is a struggle that is no less tense and
complex [than war].”2
Vu Khoan nevertheless urged Vietnam to realistically consider its options. In
the light o f the changed world, what were these options? “There are only two
choices” , he argued,“either shut yourself in completely [khép kin] or act in a way
appropriate to the trajectory of the times [he used the term xu thể, which might be
translated as “tendency,” “trajectory”, or “direction o f change”] and objective
reality.” Khoan concluded that world history had demonstrated that attempts to seal

1. Nguyen Co Thach, “Dac diem tong quat cua tinh hinh the gioi trong 50 nam qua” [Special
general characteristics o f the global situation over the past fifty years], Tap Chi Nghien Cuu
Quoc Te [ Journal o f International Studies], So Dac Biet [special issue], no. 7 (September

1995): 22.
2. Vu Khoan, “An ninh, phat trien va anh huong trong hoat dong doi ngoai [Security,

development, and influence in external activities],” Tap Chi Quan He Quoc Te [International
Studies], N o.2, December 1993, p.5.
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off a country from the international system had led those countries only to fall
further behind. And in today’s world, “total closure” is not even an option. As a
consequence, “the best choice is to adequately recognize the main tendency [xu the]
and objective reality, and find an appropriate way of dealing with it.” Going with
the main flow of global change will not only let a country better pursue its national
interests, it will educate it to avoid being taken advantage o f by other countries who
know how to make these changes work for them.1
Khoan summarized his points about international relations in the post-Cold
War era as follows: “Previously, when speaking of independence and sovereignty
often people would envision a political closed-door policy along the lines of
isolation and economic self-sufficiency. Today, with the bipolar order featuring
opposing political-military systems headed by the Soviet Union and America gone,
and the world in the process o f becoming a new order which is more diverse [đa
dạng], the concept of political and economic independence is changing.” Now, in a
diverse and multipolar world, the countries that “can create for themselves an active
and more flexible posture will be in a much better position to preserve their
independence and sovereignty.” In a globalized world, a country that can leverage
its comparative economic advantage will be able to “create a position o f maximum
influence in international relations, [and] will be that much more able to preserve its
standing and sovereignty [tư thể và tự chù].”2 This was a significant departure from
the view that sovereignty could best be protected by insulating Vietnam from an
unpredictable global system.
On the other hand, the question o f whether joining organizations and

institutions o f the new world order dominated by Vietnam’s former adversaries
would undermine the SRV’s existing institutions and challenge the essential
principles of the ruling communist party gave Vietnam’s leaders pause. The issue
was whether Vietnam would be assimilated (hòa nhập) into the post-Cold War
international system, or would integrate (hội nhập) into it. The assimilation model
implied the transformation o f Vietnam’s socialist identity and institutions. The
integration model suggested that Vietnam could maintain control over the extent to
which it chose to integrate into this system, because the “integration” or, more
literally, “joining,” would be the result of a choice by Vietnam’s leaders. The
language of voluntary association also carried the connotation that because the
joining was voluntary, the extent of its own transformation after entering into the
new international regimes and institutions could be managed by Vietnam.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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VIETN AM ’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION.

“In today’s world,” Kiet told the Politburo, “there is no antagonistic
conradiction between socialism and imperialism, but above all there is a quality of
diversity and multipolarity which is becoming the most dominant [noi troi] element
that governs the interactions [si/ vận động của các mối quan hệ] between all states
in tie world.” In addition, globalization was playing an increasingly important role
in iitemational relations and rendering the old divisions obsolete. “Many other
conradictions which existed during the period when the world was divided into two
canps, including even the contradiction between imperialism and socialism, may
coninue to exist, but they will increasingly be governed by other contradictions and
bccmse of this will not longer play their old role.”1

Kiet related post-Cold War changes in the international environment directly
to Vetnam’s decision to integrate into organizations and institutions that once were
vieved by Hanoi as bastions o f an antagonistic system. “If we don’t fully grasp the
abo'e points, it would be impossible to explain Vietnam becoming a member of
ASIAN, signing a framework agreement with the European Union, and managing
to eitablish international relations that are constantly expanding, and securing an
intenational position that is increasingly better than previously at a time when the
sociilist world no longer exists.” Kiet argued that, paradoxically, the end of the
Colt War ideological struggle actually deprived the United States and “other
reacionary forces” o f a banner to rally anti-Vietnamese global forces, “Because this
banier has lost its allure.” Kiet directly refuted the “peaceful evolution” argument
and :ontended that the end o f the Cold War had made Vietnam’s party and regime
mort secure than ever.
Switching from Marxist polemical terminology, Kiet shifted to the language of
tradtional values and defined the ultimate purpose o f political action as attaining
the ịoal o f “prosperous population, strong country, a society that is egalitarian and
civiized,” which is “the deep aspiration o f our people and, at the same time, is also
the vish o f many developing countries and progressive forces in the world.”2 This
fomulation neatly combined the traditional modernizing nationalist goal of

1. “Tiu cua Ong Vo Van Kiet gui Bo Chinh Tri Dang Cong Sap Vietnam 1995” [Letter sent by
M. Vo Van Kiet to the politburo, 1995], />Ciriously, this crucial document, sent by Prime M inister Vo Van Kiet to his colleagues in
th< politburo on August 9, 1995, is extremely difficult to find on the internet, while many
otler sensitive internal Party docum ents are widely dissem inated by politically engaged
pesons and groups both inside and outside o f Vietnam. 1 have used the most plausible
vesion o f this document that I can find.
2. Ibil.
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achieving “wealth and power” with the professed ideals o f socialism, “egalitarian
society,” while identifying Vietnam with the aspirations o f a broad category of
developing nations and “progressive forces” to downplay the accusation that
Vietnam was simply capitulating in joining the rich man’s clubs o f capitalism.
Kiet’s ultimate purpose in circulating these views a year before the Eighth
Party Congress was to underline the importance of breaking free from the
ideological constraints of the past and seize advantage o f what he argued was a
uniquely favorable moment to accelerate Vietnam’s economic development. The
alternative to “seizing the opportunity” was to fall further, and perhaps fatally,
behind. “We stand before the objective demand that our country must become rich,
the sooner the better, in order to have the strength to compete and attract all sources
[of investment] from outside, in order to maintain our independence and
sovereignty while expanding our cooperation and development. . . . As a number of
‘tigers’ in Asia have done. If we don’t do this we will miss the opportunity and lose
everything.”1
3. The Tipping Point
There appears to have been a “tipping point” at which the stalemate between
advocates and opponents o f deeper integration was broken, and the momentum
toward extensive regional and global engagement became irresistible. Until 2000,
conservative opponents o f deeper integration had been able to exercise a veto in
some key policy areas, or act as a brake on the pace and scope o f reform and
integration in other areas. The key question is, what changed around the turn of the
millennium to clear the way for a re-energized reform process? A related issue is
whether decisions taken during this period were seen by Vietnam’s leaders as an
irrevocable change o f direction, or merely another attempt to balance competing
objectives with a hedging strategy. The thesis advanced here is that it was a
departure from the hedging approach o f the 1990s.
A comprehensive survey of Vietnam’s 1975-2002 external policies noted that

although the Eighth Party Congress of 1996 had advocated a policy o f integration,
the Ninth Congress elevated this to a central focus and stressed the need for
proactive integration. The Ninth Party Congress added the element of emphasis on
deep integration to Vietnam’s external policy. “The new point in the external
mission statement this time was that the [Ninth Party] Congress strongly affirmed
proactive integration into the global and regional economy.” The pace o f integration
accelerated in the interval between the Ninth Congress and the Tenth Party
1. Ibid.
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Congress of 2006, which consolidated many of the “opening up” measures and
irreversibly committed Vietnam to them. Vietnam’s January 2007 entry into the
WTO completed this phase of the integration process.
If there is a precise point in time at which the balance between conservatives
and reformers tipped in favor o f deeper engagement it was probably mid-2000, as
indicated by Carl Thayer’s account. “The plenum concluded that there was no other
choice but to continue with regional and global integration. The meeting gave its
approval for the new trade minister to go to Washington in order to discuss U.S.
clarifications. At the same time, long-standing plans to open a stock exchange in Ho
Chi Minh City were suddenly given the green light.” 1
“A new breakthrough in thinking and theory regarding market economics
came at the Ninth Party Congress (April 2001) which was the first time the concept
that our country was implementing a market economy with socialist characteristics
was put forth.”2 Several years later, Nguyen Phu Trong, the politburo member who
was in charge of a major review of theoretical and ideological issues related to
reform wrote that “Over the two days o f 12 and 13 March, 2004, after listening to
the steering committee [of the Council on Theoretical Issues] give an overview of

their report, the politburo had a discussion and gave the following assessment: ‘This
is the first time our party has had the conditions to look back over the entire process
of doi moi over the past, an overview on a large scale, of importance, with rich
contents relating to almost all the matters relating to the policy and strategy o f
revolution in our country... To the present, although there have been not a few
difficulties, our country has undergone a fundamental and comprehensive change.”3
Perhaps the most important consequence of this comprehensive review of the
reform process was that it concluded that Vietnam’s socialism was fundamentally
secure, thus cutting the ground from under the conservatives’ continuing warnings
that “peaceful evolution” was the foremost danger Vietnam faced, and shifting the
focus to development, which favored those who had emphasized that “falling
behind” was the main threat to Vietnam. Despite the collapse o f socialism in the
1. Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam in 2000: Toward the Ninth Party Congress,” Asian Survey 41, no.
1 (January-February 2001): 181-8.
2. Le Xuan Tung, “Nhung dot pha tu duy ly luan ve kinh te thi truong o nuoc ta” [New
breakthroughs in thinking and theory regarding market economics in our country], Tap Chi
Cong San online, 65 (2004).
3. Nguyen Phu Trong, “ Doi moi tu duy ly luan vi su nghiep xay dung chu nghia xa hoi”
[Renovate theoretical thinking for the mission o f building socialism], Tap Chi Cong San
online, 76 (2005).
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the global and regional economic crises,
Trong said, Vietnam had “not been swept along [cuốn theo], and has overcome
these difficulties to advance step by step.” Vietnam had “taken the plunge,” but had
not been swept away by the current o f unpredictable change. It was now read) to
take the momentous step toward deep integration of joining the WTO.

The connection between breaking out o f the condition o f underdevelopment
and falling further behind and the Tenth Congress theme of pursuing deep
integration was further spelled out by former deputy premier Vu Khoan. “The Tenth
Party Congress set forth the goal o f ‘quickly leading our country out of the
condition o f underdevelopment’ by the year 2010... Integration into the global
economy will tie our economy into the regional and global economies on the basis
of common rules o f the game [luật chơi
The Tenth Party Congress spelled out the link between deep integration,
comprehensive reform, proactive “milieu shaping” diplomacy, and not falling
further behind in the global race for economic development. The congress mandated
“a faster rate o f development with the goal o f quickly bringing our country out o f its
underdeveloped state, to create the foundation for becoming a contemporary type of
industrialized society.” The foreign-policy corollary was that Vietnam should stress
maintaining a “peaceful environment” and creating international conditions that
were “more favorable for the program o f doi moi.”2
4. “Targets” and “Partners”: National Security in the Globalization Era
By 2006, this view o f the essential multipolarity o f the world had been
modified in recognition o f the extent to which globalization had challenged the
primacy o f old style geopolitics and the classic nation state system. “The reality
shows that the general tendency is that the process of internationalization of social
and economic questions is still a ‘unipolar internationalization’ that follows the
‘leader’s whip’ o f the country with the strongest economic potential.” For this
reason, the challenges o f deep integration should not be underestimated. “And this
naturally also brings with it economic conflicts of interest and even the potential
possibility o f political and social instability. And because we have just officially
1. Vu Khoan, “Tich cuc va chu dong hoi nhap kinh te quoc te” [Energetically and proactively
integrate into the international economy], Tap Chi Cong San, 119 (2006).
2. Nguyen Dy Nien, “Nam bat thoi CO, vuot qua thach thuc thuc hien thang loi duong loi doi
ngoai Dai Hoi X Cua Dang” [Grasp the opportunity, overcome the challenge o f victoriously
implementing the external policy o f the Tenth Party Congress ].Tap Chi Cong San online,

108(2006).
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joinid [the WTO] from an excessively low startingpoint, it is certain that we can’t
imrrediately master the basic ‘rules o f the game’ right away, to find a lot of good
fortine and advantage. Moreover, in accepting these ‘rules o f the game’ we have to
accent the complicated and sensitive new issues that they give rise to like ‘soft
borcers’ [biên giới mềm], ‘information borders’ [biên giới thông tin], ‘cyber space’
[khóĩg gian điện tử]... Finding where there is a reliable base of support and where
then are forces that need to be guarded against is not simple as a result of the
tran:formation o f ‘designated targets’ [đối tượng] to ‘partners’ [đổi tóc].” 1 In some
Vietiamese writings on international relations there is a caution that no relationship
is pire cooperation or conflict (“partner” or “target”), which can also be interpreted
as a:knowledging the disappearance of the two-world idea, in which relations on
one iide were all cooperative “partners” and on the others all adversarial.
According to Professor Pham Quang Minh, o f the University of Hanoi,
Resdution Eight of July 2003 marked a major development in Vietnam’s
adju;tment to the post Cold War shifts of alignment in Asia. Up until that time “it
was not easy to determine how to play the game, and who shared the same idea.”
Resdution Eight “provided for the first time the new definitions different from
prevous ones in Vietnamese foreign policy.” One prominent example o f this was a
newpost-Cold War definition o f those who are friends and those who are not,
whiih was no longer the traditional địch - ta, but now a distinction between “đỡ/
tóc” (partners) and “đổi tượng” (targets or, as Professor Minh translates it,
oppments - still a less adversarial category than “enemy”). These new categories
were intended to provide a more subtle and diversified approach to Vietnam’s
foregn policy and more flexibility to engage with former enemies. In his view this

was he most important Vietnamese foreign policy document since Resolution 13 of
198*. Putting this resolution in the context of Vietnam’s development requirements,
a Paty analysis stated “Resolution Eight stressed that in every relationship, whether
with partners or adversaries, there was a mix of conflict and cooperation, and in
each case it was necessary to simultaneously cooperate and struggle in each form of
intenational relationship.”2

1. Nfuyen Van Tai, “Thoi co va thach thuc doi voi sue manh quan su quoc gia khi Viet Nam
gi; nhap WTO” [Opportunities and challenges with regard to military strength when
Vi:tnam joins the WTO], Tap Chi Cong San, 121 (2006).
2. Piam Quang Minh, “Vietnam and Korea in East Asian Pacific Regionalism ,” paper
deivered at the Fourth Annual Koret Conference, The W alter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific
Re;earch Center, Stanford University, March 2, 2012.
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VIỆT NAM HỌC - KỶ YÉU HỘI THẢO QUỐC TẾ LÀN THỨ T ư

Alexander Vuvinh also highlights this document’s importance. “July 2003
marked the third turning point in the evolution of Vietnam’s grand strategy since the
1980s. It was in that month that the Eighth Plenum o f the Ninth VCP Central
Committee passed a new national security strategy that remove[d] ideology as a
criterion for selecting friends and foes. This opened the door for strategic
engagement with the United States, which had been identified as a strategic enemy
by the preceding national security strategy (adopted in July 1992 but remained
unpublicized).” 1
Resolution Eight also had implications for Vietnam’s relations with China,
since now national interest rather than socialist solidarity was the touchstone for
making decisions about Vietnam’s national security. Resolution Eight “made us
understand more clearly, profoundly, and comprehensively, the mission of

defending the socialist Fatherland.” While protecting socialism and the Party were
prominently mentioned among the national security tasks, so was “protecting the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” of Vietnam, and Resolution
Eight was cited in connection with “border defense in the new situation.”2
Another analyst remarks on the complexities of a world that cannot be clearly
divided into friends and enemies: “in the regional and international situation at
present we must simultaneously build and defend the Fatherland in a very complex
international environment, where the line between friends and enemies is not as
clear as it was before, and both benefits and costs are involved in every international
commercial relationship, as well as short and long term challenges all mixed
together.” The appropriate response to these security challenges is to make
interdependence work for you and embed yourself in as many global networks and
bilateral relationships as possible. “The more countries that have an interest in our
country manifested through all relationships, the more opportunity we have to
become interdependent with them. This is also an opportunity to protect national
security in the environment o f globalization.”3

1. Alexander Vuvinh, “Vietnam Between China and the United States: Historical Experiences.
Perceptions and Strategies,” paper delivered at the Fourth Annual Koret Conference, The
W alter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, March 2, 2012.
2. Vo Trong Viet, “Bao ve vung chac chu quyen bien gioi, vung bien cua to quoc trong tinh
hỉnh m oi” [Solidly protect the Fatherland’s borders and maritime zones in the new
situation], Tap Chi Cong San, 109-2006.
3. Doan Van Thang, “An ninh quoc gia trong boi canh toan cau hoa” [National security in the
environment o f globalization], Nghien Cuu Quoc Te, no. 58, 9-2004, 100.
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VIETN AM ’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION.

5. Is Strategy Possible in the Globalization E ra?
Since 1986, Vietnam’s overall external aims were to ensure that the external
environment would be favorable for its priority objective, economic development.
In the days o f the command economy, economic strategy was largely confined to
the domestic plan. “Strategy” was a term applied to diplomacy and military
planning. This term might suggest having to formulate contingency response to
events beyond control, and in central planning the whole point was that everything
was supposed to go “according to plan.” Foreign economic strategy, such as it was
during this period, consisted largely of soliciting foreign aid. In the age of
globalization, however, an external economic strategy is essential. “The process of
regionalization and globalization confronts all countries, especially the
underdeveloped [chậm phát triển] and developing countries with new opportunities
along with many tough challenges, for which the appropriate response is not to
isolate oneself and stand apart from that process. Reality shows that the countries
that have an appropriate external economic strategy will be able to both attract
strength from the outside (ngoại lực) and develop their internal strength to develop
firmly and fast.” 1
There are also important political reasons for defining an explicit external
economic strategy. First, the party has staked its future on achieving the status of a
developed and industrialized country as proof that its model o f “market socialism”
works. Second, the competitive demands of the international marketplace and the
potential down sides o f globalization make it risky to leave Vietnam’s fate to
chance. Finally, there is a nationalist fear of losing control o f the country’s destiny,
reflected in the following comments by politburo member Nguyen Phu Trong:
“There is the idea that, in the conditions of ‘globalization’ o f the economy, opening
the door and integrating, raising the question of and independent and sovereign
economy, is not very astute and is unrealistic, to say nothing o f being conservative
and thinking o f the old type. Today’s world is a unified market, if you need
anything you can buy it, if you are short on money you can borrow it, so why
advocate building an independent and sovereign economy (?!) [emphasis in

original]. Put this way, it sounds reasonable on first hearing, but on careful
reflection, it does not have a scientific foundation because it is too superficial and
simplistic”2.
1. Nguyen Tan Dung, “Ve duong loi va chien luoc phat trien kinh te - xa hoi cua Dang tai Dai
Hoi IX” [On the party policy line and strategy o f socioeconomic developm ent at the Ninth
Party Congress], Tap Chi Cong San, 4 (2001).
2. Nguyen Phu Trong, “Xay dung nen kinh te doc lap tu chu va chu dong hoi nhap kinh te quoc
te” [Build an independent and sovereign economy and proactively integrate into the
international econom y]. Tap Chi Cong San, 2 (2001).
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To the extent that security is discussed in the context o f economics it relates
largely to two points. First is that diplomacy and strategy are predicated on the
assumption that the near future will be relatively peaceful, and there is very little
discussion o f potential military threats to Vietnam. The issue here, however, is a
broader conception o f strategy that takes into account the Vietnamese adoption of
the concept of comprehensive security and the paramount goal of preserv ing
regional and global stability to facilitate economic development. There is also the
fact that Vietnam is not a major power on the world scene, and has only a modest
capacity to influence the course of events even in its own region.
Military strength no longer plays a controlling role as before, while the
controlling influence o f economics is constantly increasing. Because of this, in the
strategies of the big powers (Grand National Strategy) [English term and
parenthesis in original], o f the world’s nations, especially the big countries, there is
less of a tendency to rely solely on military strength, but [military strength] is
usually combined with other instruments such as economics, political influence . . .
[ellipsis in original] to maximize the attainment of their strategic objectives.”1

What do we mean by strategy? Many analysts define it narrowly as the
relationship of military force to political goals. Richard Betts writes that, “Strategy
is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally
tenable. It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how
to make one produce the other. Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force
will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure.” Even in this more
narrowly defined realm o f strategy there are still complex questions about even the
fundamental premise on which it rests. “Politicians and soldiers may debate which
strategic choice is best, but only pacifists can doubt that strategy is necessary.”2
But, says Betts, “Because strategy is necessary, however, does not mean that it
is possible. Those who experience or study many wars find strong reasons to doubt
that strategists can know enough about causes, effects, and intervening variables to
make the operations planned produce the outcomes desired. To skeptics, effective
strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy
objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to

1. Hoang Anh Tuan, “ Khai niem va viec su dung sue manh quoc gia va sue manh quan su
trong quan he quoc te hien dai” [Conceptualizing and using national strength and military
strength in contemporary international relations], Nghien Cuu Quoc Te, no. 62 (9-2005).
2. Richard K. Betts, “ Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Autumn,
2000): 5-50.
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V IETN AM ’S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION.

a specified end. When this is true, war cannot be a legitimate instrument of policy.” 1
O f course, the Vietnamese revolutionaries would argue that it was foreign
intervention that imposed the necessity for both war and strategy on them, and they
take understandable pride in formulating a very sophisticated strategy that

minimized their own vulnerabilities and maximized the vulnerabilities of their
adversaries.2
The issue here, however, is a broader conception o f strategy that takes into
account the Vietnamese adoption of the concept of comprehensive security and the
paramount goal of preserving regional and global stability to facilitate economic
development. There is also the fact that Vietnam is not a major power on the world
scene, and has only a modest capacity to influence the course o f events even in its
own region.
A brief look at China's efforts to formulate a strategy appropriate for the era of
globalization may offer some insights into the connection between strategy,
security, and diplomacy. Avery Goldstein analyzes Chinese attempts to formulate a
comprehensive and integrated approach to the world “by examining the role of
diplomacy in China’s grand strategy.” He argues that “after several years of ad hoc
attempts to deal with the new challenges that accompanied the end o f the Cold War,
a clearer consensus on China’s basic foreign policy line began to emerge among
Party leaders in 1996. This consensus, tantamount to the country’s grand strategy,
has provided a relatively coherent framework for the PRC’s subsequent
international behaviour and the expected contribution o f diplomacy to the country’s
security.”3 The definition o f “grand strategy” employed by Goldstein is the broader
view o f the term that is used here. “This consensus constitutes a grand strategy for
China in the sense the term is often employed by international relations scholars, the
distinctive combination o f military, political and economic means by which a state
seeks to ensure its national security.”4
Goldstein’s account suggests some parallels between China’s and Vietnam’s
strategic aims during the Cold War, and its adjustment to the post-Cold War era.

1. Ibid.
2. See David W. P. Elliott, “Vietnam: Tradition under Challenge,” in Trood and Booth, eds.,
Strategic Cultures, and David W. P. Elliott, “H anoi’s Strategy in the Vietnam War,” in
Werner, ed., Vietnam War.

3. Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face o f China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's
Emerging Choice”, China Q uarterly 168 (December 2001): 835-6.
4. Ibid.
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The fundamental differences between the two cases also cast light on the role of
grand strategy in Vietnam’s changing circumstances. “During much o f the Cold War,
Beijing’s overriding challenge was to ensure a relatively weak China’s security in the
face of pressing threats from the superpowers. The priority was clearly to address
core survival concerns (territorial and political integrity) and the imperatives for
Chinese diplomacy were correspondingly straightforward... Today, however, China
has greater strength and also believes it faces few immediate threats. In addition to
providing for core survival concerns, China’s contemporary grand strategy is
designed to engineer the country’s rise to the status of a true great power that shapes,
rather than simply responds to, the international system.” In order to defuse concerns
about its growing strength, “since 1996 Beijing has forged a diplomatic strategy with
two broad purposes: to maintain the international conditions that will make it feasible
for China to focus on the domestic development necessary if it is to increase its
relative (not just absolute) capabilities; and to reduce the likelihood that the U.S. or
others with its backing will exploit their current material advantage to abort China’s
ascent and frustrate its international aspiration.” 1
Vietnam must somehow adjust to an ever more powerful China with growing
regional and perhaps even global ambitions. It has periodically tried to do so with a
special form o f reassurance strategy that stresses common ideological ties and
shared interest in preserving socialism. With respect to other countries, Vietnam has
also adopted a different reassurance strategy (Vietnam wants to be friends with all
nations) as part o f its reconciliation with former adversaries and reintegration into

the Southeast Asian region. Vietnam, like China, has been concerned about possible
instability on its periphery.
As in the case of China, Vietnam’s views on the extent o f multipolarity in the
post-Cold War international order have also shifted, though the consensus
conclusion appears to be that it would be impossible for the United States to
consolidate a purely unipolar system. This has important implications for strategy
because it allows for the possibility that a form of great-power equilibrium will
assure stability, and points away from the need to form a counterhegemonic
coalition or even directly participate in the intrigues of great-power balancing. In
this regard, Vietnam can be a “free rider” on the self-regulating stabilizing
mechanism of the international system which, in turn, reduces the urgency of
thinking seriously about large-scale military conflict-in contrast to China.

1. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face o f C hina’s Grand Strategy”, 835.


VIETNAM'S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION...

Ian Johnston’s linkage of China’s development-centered grand strategy and its
status quo orientation to the international system has important implications for
Vietnam. As summarized by Katzenstein and Suh, this view holds that
“Marketization and a comprehensive security strategy thus go hand in hand in
consolidating a fundamentally status quo orientation in policy.” 1
Accepting the status quo does not mean that Vietnam is oblivious to the rapid
pacc and wide scope o f dynamic change going on in the world. But it is seen as
change within the system, not change of the system. Continuous and far-reaching
change in economics, science, and technology has the potential to be destabilizing,
but it is now viewed as a condition of modem life rather than a hostile scheme
aimed at Vietnam. Self-strengthening and international cooperation are now
considered to be the most effective defenses against the negative consequences of

change. A parallel to Vietnam’s wartime tradition o f “strategic judo” - turning the
enemy’s strengths into weaknesses-would be taking the negatives o f globalization
(disruptive change and potential for rapid movement up and down the scale of
economic success) and turning them into positives (accelerated innovation and a
chance to improve Vietnam’s position in the international pecking order).
A related point would be that Vietnam has now accepted a proactive approach
to international relations aimed at shaping the regional and global environment to
provide stability and a favorable environment for development. In a nondetermined
environment, each society has to do its best to create favorable conditions to further
its interests. “Nondetermined” does not mean that there are not larger historical
forces at work, only that they are not predictable and the outcomes are not
inevitable. Adopting this concept and the related acceptance of the idea that the
challenges posed by the impersonal forces of globalization do not represent a
specific threat from any country or group o f countries has altered Vietnam’s view of
how it will engage with the outside world and has paved the way for accepting the
risks o f deep integration in order to reap the benefits.
Vietnam has adjusted to the end of two-worlds era, but with a domestic
political system that is a holdover from that earlier era. The fact that there are still
significant areas in which Vietnam’s political system inhibits full cooperation with
even its closest partners in ASEAN is a case in point. Recall the military
spokesperson’s plea when explaining Vietnam’s first defense white paper; asked to
1. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia:
Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 27. Johnstone’s
essay in this volume (pp. 34-96) is titled “ Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is
China a Status Quo Power.”
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provide details on Vietnam’s military forces he replied, “allow me not to disclose
these figures.” 1 When Vietnam first joined ASEAN, the founding members of that
organization triumphantly insisted that it would be on the terms of the original club
members. However, the expansion of ASEAN has led to a virtual two-tier
organization, and raised questions about the cohesion of the organization and its
future-especially in the light of the inexorable growth o f Chinese power and
development of other forums which dilute ASEAN’s influence (ASEAN+3, for
example).
Still, Vietnam has made an irreversible choice for deep integration into a oneworld system. It is impossible not to wonder how long the tension between
maintaining the old domestic institutions and power structure in the face o f a
profound socioeconomic transformation accelerated by this integration will last.
The central axis o f debate in Vietnamese politics since the end o f the Cold War has
been the relative priorities to be given to regime preservation and avoiding falling
further behind in a brutally competitive world, and the extent to which these two
aims are in conflict. The old nationalist commitment to reform and deep integration,
in the interest o f seeking “wealth and power,” has apparently won out over
conservative resistance to any change that would risk the power and position of the
current elite. But this story is not yet conclusively resolved. In the era o f
globalization it is a formidable challenge to formulate a strategy which
comprehensively defends the increasingly diffuse and varied range o f national
interests. Thus the answer to the question "is strategy possible" is still elusive - arad
not only for Vietnam, but for most countries in this complex world.
References
1. A lexander V uvinh, “V ietnam Between C hina and the U nited States: H istorical
Experiences, Perceptions and Strategies”, paper delivered at the Fourth A nnual K oret
C onference, The W alter H. Shorenstein A sia-Pacific R esearch C enter, Stanford
U niversity, M arch 2, 2012.
2. Avery G oldstein, “T he D iplom atic Face o f C h in a’s G rand Strategy: A R ising Power ’s
Em erging C hoice”, China Quarterly 168 (D ecem ber 2001): 8 3 5 -6 .
3. Carlyle A. Thayer, “V ietnam ese Foreign Policy: M ultilateralism and the Threat o f

Peaceful E volution”, in Carlyle A. Thayer and R am ses A m er, eds., Vietnamese Foreign

Policy in Transition (N ew York: St. M artin’s Press, 1990): 2 -3 .

1. Frederik Balfour, “Vietnam ’s Defense White Paper Sheds Little Light on M ilitary,’’Agence
France Presse, September 24, 1998.
96


VIETNAM'S TRANSITION TO GLOBAL INTERGRATION.

4.

C arlyle T hayer, “ V ietnam in 2000: Tow ard the N inth Party C ongress” , Asian Survey
41,no. 1 (Jan u ary -F eb ru ary 2001): 181-8.

5. D avid w. P. Elliott, “ V ietnam : Tradition under C hallenge”, in Trood and Booth, eds.,
Strategic Cultures, and D avid w. p. Elliott, “ H anoi’s Strategy in the V ietnam W ar,” in
W erner, ed., Vietnam War.
5. D ang Phong, “D em truoc doi moi: Uy quyen cua long d an ”, [On the eve o f reform:
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D oan V an T hang, “A n ninh quoc gia trong boi canh toan cau hoa” [N ational security in
the environm ent o f globalization], Nghien Cuu Q uoc Te, no. 58, 9 -2 0 0 4 , 100.

S.

Frederik

B alfour,

“V ietn am ’s

D efense

W hite

Paper

Sheds

Little

Light

on

M ilitary,’’A gence F rance Presse, Septem ber 24, 1998.
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trong quan he quoc te hien dai” [C onceptualizing and using national strength and
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dot pha” [For the entire country, Ho Chi Minh City has to have a breakout], Tuoi Tre
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II. Le Xuan Tung, “Nhung dot pha tu duy ly luan ve kinh te thi truong o nuoc ta” [New

breakthroughs in thinking and theory regarding market economics in our country], Tap
Chi Cong San online, 65 (2004).
12 Nguyen Co Thach, “Dac diem tong quat cua tinh hinh the gioi trong 50 nam qua”
[Special general characteristics of the global situation over the past fifty years], Tap
Chi Nghien Cuu Quoc Te [ Journal of International Studies], So Dac Biet [special
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13..

Nguyen Dy Nien, “Nam bat thoi CO, vuot qua thach thuc thuc hien thang loi duong loi
doi ngoai Dai Hoi X Cua Dang” [Grasp the opportunity, overcome the challenge of
victoriously implementing the external policy of the Tenth Party Congress], Tap Chi
Cong San online, 108 (2006).

14. Nguyen Phu Trong, “Doi moi tu duy ly luan vi su nghiep xay dung chu nghia xa hoi”
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15. N guyen Phu Trong, “X ay dung nen kinh te doc lap tu chu va chu dong boi nhap kinh te
quoc te” [B uild an independent and sovereign econom y and proactively integrate into
the international econom y], Tap Chi Cong San, 2 (2001).

97


VIỆT NAM HỌC - KỶ YẾU HỘI THẢO QUỐC TẾ LÀN THỨ TƯ

16. Nguyen Tan Dung, “V e duong loi va chien luoc phat trien kinh te - xa hoi cua Dang tai

Dai Hoi IX” [On the party policy line and strategy of socioeconomic development at
the Ninth Party Congress], Tap Chi Cong San, 4 (2001).
17. Nguyen Van Linh, “Cung CO hoa binh, de cao canh giac, phat huy sue manh tong hop

de bao ve To Quoc” [Consolidate peace, raise vigilance, develop comprehensive
strength to defend the Fatherland], Nhan Dan, December 15, 1989.
18. Nguyen Van Tai, “Thoi CO va thach thuc doi voi sue manh quan su quoc gia khi Viet

Nam gia nhap WTO” [Opportunities and challenges with regard to military strength
when Vietnam joins the WTO], Tap Chi Cong San, 121 (2006).
19. Pham Quang Minh, “Vietnam and Korea in East Asian Pacific Regionalism”, paper

delivered at the Fourth Annual Koret Conference, The Walter H. Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center, Stanford University, March 2, 2012.
20. Phan Doan Nam, “Ngoai giao Viet Nam sau 20 nam Doi Moi” [Vietnamese diplomacy
after twenty years of doi moi], Tap Chi Cong San, 111 (2006).
21. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”, International Security 25, no. 2
(Autumn,2000): 5-50.
22. Vo Trong Viet, “Bao ve vung chac chu quyen bien gioi, vung bien cua to quoc trong
tinh hinh moi” [Solidly protect the Fatherland’s borders and maritime zones in the new
situation], Tap Chi Cong San, 109-2006.
23. Vu Khoan, “An ninh, phat trien va anh huong trong hoat dong doi ngoai [Security,

development, and influence in external activities]”, Tap Chi Quan He Quoc Te
[International Studies], No.2, December 1993, p.5.
24. Vu Khoan, “Tich cuc va chu dong hoi nhap kinh te quoc te” [Energetically and

proactively integrate into the international economy], Tap Chi Cong San, 119 (2006).

98