Labini science and the economic crisis; impact on science, lessons from science (2016)

Francesco Sylos Labini

Science
and the Economic
Crisis
Impact on Science,
Lessons from Science


Science and the Economic Crisis



Francesco Sylos Labini

Science and the Economic
Crisis
Impact on Science, Lessons from Science

123


Francesco Sylos Labini
Enrico Fermi Center and Institute for
Complex Systems (National Research
Council)
Rome
Italy

ISBN 978-3-319-29527-5
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29528-2

ISBN 978-3-319-29528-2

(eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016931354
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or
for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by SpringerNature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland


Foreword

The world is in the grip of the biggest economic crisis for more than 80 years.
Nearly all nations are affected, though, of course, some are more affected than
others. The key political question of today is: “What should be done to bring this
crisis to an end?”

In this book, Francesco Sylos Labini, who is a researcher in physics, takes an
unusual approach to the crisis by relating it to the situation in science. How is this
economic crisis related to scientific research? A little reflection shows that this link
is in fact very close. The neoliberal economic policies, which have dominated for
the past 30 or so years, are based on neoclassical economics. This looks very much
like a science such as physics, since it consists of equations and mathematical
models. But is it really scientific? Should we trust the predictions of neoclassical
economics in the same way that we trust those of physics? Sylos Labini gives good
reasons for thinking that we should not, and that neoclassical economics is more of
a pseudo-science, like astrology, than a genuine science, like astronomy.
Sylos Labini begins his argument by analyzing predictions in the natural sciences. In some areas, such as the future positions of planets and comets, predictions
can be made with extraordinary accuracy; but this is not always the case.
Predictions of tomorrows’ weather, or of when volcanic eruptions or earthquakes
will occur, are much less certain. Let us consider meteorology. Here the laws
governing the behavior of the atmosphere are precise and well established, but there
is a difficulty—the so-called butterfly effect. A small disturbance, such a butterfly
flapping its wings in Brazil, can be magnified and cause a hurricane in the United
States. This leads to what is called chaotic behavior—a subject which has been
studied mathematically, and in which Sylos Labini is an expert. Despite the difficulties caused by chaos, weather forecasting can be, and has been, improved by
better collection of observations, better mathematical models, and the use of more
powerful computers.
If we turn from this to neoclassical economics, we see that the situation is
completely different. As Sylos Labini points out, we do not know the laws of
economic development in the way that we know the laws governing the atmosphere.

v


vi

Foreword

The butterfly effect seems to apply to the world economy, however, since the failure
of a few sub-prime mortgages in a region of the United States led to a worldwide
economic recession. Yet neoclassical economists take no account of the mathematics
of chaos whose use is now standard in the natural sciences. Although weather
forecasts can be trusted up to a point, little credence should be given to those of
neoclassical economics, and yet, as Sylos Labini points out, neoclassical economics
has nonetheless achieved a cultural hegemony. In order to explain how this has been
possible, Sylos Labini turns to a consideration of the organization of research, and,
more generally, of the universities.
What is interesting is that neoliberal policies have the same general effect in the
universities as they do in society as a whole. In society, their tendency has been to
concentrate wealth in fewer and fewer hands. The richest 1 % has grown richer and
richer at the expense not only of the working class but also of the old middle class.
Similarly, in the university sector, more and more funding is going to a few
privileged universities and their researchers at the expense of the others. This is
justified on the grounds that these universities and researchers are better than the
others, so that it more efficient to concentrate funding on them. To find out which
universities and researchers are better, regular research assessments are conducted,
and they are used to guide the allocation of funds. But how accurate are these
research assessments in picking out the researchers who are better from those who
are not so good? Sylos Labini gives us good reasons for thinking that these research
assessments, far from being accurate, are highly misleading.
One striking result, which he mentions, is known as the Queen’s question.
Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008 and started the great recession. By
chance, Queen Elizabeth visited the London School of Economics to inaugurate a
new building in November 2008, and here she asked her famous question: “why did
no one see the economic crisis coming?” Of course the neoclassical economists
of the London School of Economics not only did not foresee the crisis, but they had

been advocating the very neoliberal policies that led to it. In December 2008, the
UK’s research assessment exercise reported its results. These showed that the field
that had obtained the highest score of any in the country was none other than
economics, which in the UK had by then become almost exclusively neoclassical
economics. If the results of this assessment were to be believed, then economics
was the field in which the best research in the UK had been done in the preceding
5 years—better than the research in physics, computer science, or the biomedical
sciences. Obviously this shows that something had gone very wrong with research
assessment.
Sylos Labini is an active member of Return on Academic Research (Roars.it), an
organization that is active in opposing the attempts of the Italian government to
introduce a research organization modeled on the UK into Italy. His book explains
the failings of such research assessment systems. One interesting argument he uses
concerns some of the major discoveries in physics and mathematics made in the last
few decades. In physics he discusses high-temperature superconductivity, the
scanning tunneling microscope, and graphene; and in mathematics Yitang Zhang’s
proof of an important theorem in prime number theory. Unknown individuals,


Foreword

vii

working in low-rated institutions, made all these discoveries that is to say,
researchers who would have had their research funding cut by the rigorous
implementation of research assessment exercises. The point is that scientific discovery is unpredictable, and one has a better chance of increasing important discoveries by spreading funds more evenly rather than by concentrating them in the
hands of a small elite.
In the final part of his book, Sylos Labini points out that the same neoliberal
push towards inequality is to be found in throughout Europe. Research funds are
being concentrated more in Northern Europe and less in Southern Europe. Sylos

Labini argues not only for a more egalitarian distribution of research funds, but also
for an overall increase in the funding for research and development. This is the
strategy that will produce innovations capable of revitalizing the economies and
putting them once more on a growth path. Sylos Labini makes a very strong case
for his point of view. Let us hope that a new generation of politicians will be willing
and able to implement his ideas. Meantime his book is to be strongly recommended
to anyone seeking to understand the current crisis and its ramifications.
July 2015

Donald Gillies
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Science
and Mathematics
University College London



Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Angelo Vulpiani, one of my mentors in physics. In addition to our
countless interesting discussions on the role of forecasts in science, I thank him for
painstakingly commenting on a preliminary version of this work. I am also thankful
for his unwavering encouragement.
Several friends and colleagues, who have read early versions of this work, or
specific chapters, have given me valuable advice and suggestions. In particular
I thank Lavinia Azzone, Antonio Banfi, David Benhaiem, Andrea Cavagna, Guido
Chiarotti, Francesco Coniglione, Stefano Demichelis, Luca Enriques, Donald
Gillies, Grazia Ietto-Gillies, Michael Joyce, Martin Lopez Corredoira, Laura
Margottini, Enzo Marinari, Maurizio Paglia, Daniela Palma, Roberto Petrini,
Francesco Sinopoli, Giorgio Sirilli, Fabio Speranza, and Marco Viola.
Many ideas presented in this work come from the blog Return On Academic

ReSearch (Roars.it), which has given me a privileged observation point on several
issues. I am therefore grateful to all its editors for our extensive daily discussions
ever since we embarked on the Roars.it adventure in 2011, and for sharing my
commitment to be both a researcher and a citizen. Each one of them has taught me a
lot and has influenced my ideas on some of the issues raised in this work, especially, but not exclusively, with regard to research and higher education issues.
My Roars friends and colleagues include the following: Alberto Baccini, Antonio
Banfi, Michele Dantini, Francesco Coniglione, Giuseppe de Nicolao, Paola
Galimberti, Daniela Palma, Mario Ricciardi, Vito Velluzzi and Marco Viola.
I thank Luciano Pietronero, Andrea Gabrielli, and Guido Chiarotti for our
numerous discussions on many topics touched upon in this work, and specifically
for their collaboration in the study on the diversification of national research systems, as well as for sharing with me their results on “economic complexity” that
I will discuss in Chaps. 2 and 4. I had fruitful discussions with Giulio Cimini and
Matthieu Cristelli on the use of big data in economics. I also thank Mauro Gallegati
for pointing out several references that have allowed me to deepen various concepts
regarding neoclassical economics.

ix


x

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Donald Gillies and Grazia Ietto-Gillies for many interesting
exchanges of views; their comments have helped me to clarify my views on different issues, from the problem of research evaluation (Chap. 3) to the criticism of
neoclassical economics (Chap. 2) to the relation between basic research, innovation
and technical progress (Chap. 4). In particular, Donald’s writings have greatly
influenced my outlook on research evaluation and neoclassical economics.
Fabio Cecconi, Massimo Cencini, and Angelo Vulpiani were my co-organizers
of the meeting on Can we predict the future? Role and limits of science, that

prompted me to investigate the role of forecasts in the different scientific fields
discussed in Chap. 1.
I have had the good fortune of sharing with José Mariano Gago—who alas is no
longer with us—Amaya Moro Martin, Gilles Mirambeau, Rosario Mauritti, Alain
Trauttman, and Varvara Trachana many discussions, arguments and science initiatives in Europe, which have made me think about the central role of research and
the dramatic nature of the crisis of the European Union which I discuss in Chap. 4.
Lastly, I am grateful to my wife Valeria, who has stood by my side throughout
this endeavor and encouraged me with loving intelligence and patience.
Despite having had the good fortune to receive comments and suggestions from
many distinguished friends and colleagues, everything written in this book is my
sole responsibility.
Rome
November 2015


Contents

1

Forecast. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Scientific Method . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anomalies and Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paradigms and Epicycles . . . . . . . . . .
Experiments and Observations. . . . . . .
The Empires of the Times. . . . . . . . . .
Determinism and the Butterfly Effect . .
Probability and Many-Body Systems . .
Forecasts and Decisions . . . . . . . . . . .
How Will the Weather Be Tomorrow? .
Extreme Weather Events. . . . . . . . . . .

Climate Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Be Prepared for the Unexpected . . . . .
Spread of Diseases and New Virus . . .
Recurrences and Big Data. . . . . . . . . .
Science, Politics and Forecasts . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

1
1
3
6
9
10
12
16
19
21
25
26
29
32
35
40
42

2

Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Realism and Rigor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Queen’s Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Which Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
There Will Be Growth in the Spring . . . . . . . . .
The Disappearance of the Time . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Three Pillars of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Myth of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Efficiency and Unpredictability . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mathematics as Ornament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One Hundred Years of Solitude . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Out of Equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Flight of Bird Flocks and the Market’s Panic

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

45
45
47
48
52
54
57
59
61
63
65
66
68

xi


xii

Contents

The Wild World of the Financial Markets.
Mathematical Monsters. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paradigms and Predictions . . . . . . . . . . .
Economic Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Neoclassical Dictatorship . . . . . . . . .
The Theft of a Successful Brand . . . . . . .
Economics Is Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cultural Hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Economics, Politics, Forecasts . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

70

72
75
76
78
81
83
84
87
89

3

Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Growth in Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Techno-evaluation Era . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluation and Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Misunderstanding of Competition . . . . .
History Teaches but Does not Have Scholars
The Time of the Great Navigators . . . . . . . .
Physics’ Woodstock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spaces to Make and Correct Mistakes . . . . .
Playing with a Sticky Tape . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Primes Takeaways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Selecting Pink Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Scientific Forger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tip of the Iceberg? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Dogma of Excellence. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The ‘Harvard Here’ Model . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

93
93
95
100
101
104

108
110
113
114
116
117
119
121
124
128
131

4

Politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Basic Research at the Roots of Innovation . . . . .
Micro-Macro Hard Disks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Applied Research and Applications of Basic Research
The Role of the State and Risk in Research . . . . . . .
Diversification and Hidden Abilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diversification of Nations’ Research Systems . . . . . .
The Four-Speed Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Sacrifice of Young Generations. . . . . . . . . . . . .
European Science Policy: Robin Hood in Reverse . . .
Some Ideas for a Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
They Have Chosen Ignorance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

135
135
137
140
143
150
152
155
158
160
166
167
169

Introduction

I have the privilege of devoting most of my time to trying to solve problems
of theoretical physics that are quite distant from everyday life. However, living in
Italy—a country mired in a series of crises that affect me closely both as a scientist
and as a citizen—has prompted me to bring into the public debate a number of
issues pertaining to the world of scientific research. I firmly believe that this is a
crucial imperative in times like these, when ideology and economic interests not
only drive public agendas and government policies, but have also seeped into
schools, universities and culture at large.
We are faced with an economic crisis that has brought the world economy to its
knees and is combined with an economic crisis pertaining specifically to Italy. This
situation overlaps with, and is a consequence of, a political crisis with distinctive
characteristics, causes, and developments at the international, European, and Italian
levels. First and foremost, however, this is a cultural crisis on a global scale. The
grand utopias that dominated our recent and immediate past seem to have vanished.
Equality, brotherhood, freedom seem to be words that today have nothing to do
with our reality, where inequalities have never been so great, freedom is being
reduced gradually in favor of security and solidarity is overwhelmed by arrogance
and indifference. Furthermore, because of insurmountable inequalities, the possibility of a change for the better of any individual’s situation is currently in a
regressive stage in many countries, and also what has regressed is the role of higher
education as the driving force of social mobility.
Hence, what we are currently facing is essentially a political and cultural crisis
that affects our society as a whole, and not merely an economic and social crisis.
Scientific research is far from immune: on the contrary, it is particularly hard-hit by
this crisis. On the one hand, the scarcity of research funds has become a structural
problem in many countries, particularly in Southern Europe, where many young
scientists are faced with very limited opportunities for pursuing their research
activities on a permanent basis. On the other hand, fierce competition is distressing

and distorting the very nature of research work. It seems that scientific research is
thus completely taken off track as a result of this pressure.

xiii


xiv

Introduction

The fact that the economic crisis has been tackled primarily through austerity
policies in the very countries exposed to the greatest financial distress has further
stifled scientific research and sparked a vicious cycle that prevents scientists from
undertaking innovative research projects that could actually contribute to ending the
crisis. Indeed, the very intellectual forces capable of producing new ideas and
energies have been marginalized and gridlocked in a limbo of uncertainty for which
there is no clear exit. Due to the absence of catalysts, subsequent generations may
now be isolated and deprived of prospects, both individually and collectively.
Science can provide crucial tools that could be instrumental both in comprehending the problems of our time and in outlining perspectives that might constitute
a solid and viable alternative to the rampant jungle law—a misconstrued Social
Darwinism—that is currently very widespread. The present work ponders the
interface between science dissemination and scientific policy—with some digressions into history and the philosophy of science. It therefore aims to show how the
ideas developed over the past century in natural sciences (both in general and
specifically in meteorology, biology, geology, and theoretical physics—much
neglected in the public debate), actually play a major role in understanding the
seemingly diverse and unrelated problems lying at the heart of the current crisis and
may suggest plausible and original solutions. As we advance on this voyage across
modern science, one of the main threads will be finding an answer to this crucial
question: what are the practical, economic and cultural benefits of basic research?
We will be focusing mostly on the so-called hard sciences as they have a more

immediate impact on technology. Nevertheless, several arguments developed in the
course of this work apply also to science in the widest sense, including social
sciences and the humanities. Culture, of which science is a significant albeit small
part, is the cornerstone of our society.


Abstract

The economic crisis is changing the structure of our society, introducing insurmountable inequalities, marginalizing younger energies, stifling scientific research
and so inhibiting the possibility to develop the new ideas and innovations that could
help to guide us out of the crisis. Science can provide crucial tools that could be
instrumental both in comprehending the problems of our time and in outlining
perspectives that might constitute a solid and viable alternative to the rampant
jungle law—a misconstrued Social Darwinism—that is currently very widespread.
The present work ponders the interface between science dissemination and scientific policy and it aims to show how the ideas developed over the past century in
natural sciences actually play a major role in understanding the seemingly diverse
and unrelated problems lying at the heart of the current crisis and thus suggesting
plausible and original solutions.

xv



Chapter 1

Forecast

The Scientific Method
Richard Feynman, who once referred to himself as a “Nobel physicist, teacher,
storyteller, and bongos player”, was an original and eccentric character. He is

remembered as one of the most famous theoretical physicists of the last century, the
unforgettable author of the “Feynman Lectures on Physics”,1 among the most
studied physics textbooks in the world, and the brilliant speaker who, during a
memorable lecture, explained how does scientific research work as follows2:
Let me explain how we look for new laws. In general we look for new laws through the
following process: first we guess it. Then we calculate the consequences of this guess, to
see what this law would imply if it were right. Then, we compare the computation results to
nature, to experimental experience to see if it works. If the theoretical results do not agree
with experiment, the guess is wrong. In this simple statement is the key of science. It does
not matter how beautiful your hypothesis is, it does not matter how smart is who has
formulated this hypothesis, or what is his name. If it does not agree with the experiments,
the hypothesis is wrong. […] In this way we can show that a theory capable of making
predictions is wrong. We cannot, however, show that it is correct, but we can only show
that it is not wrong. This is because in the future there could be a greater availability of
experimental data that you can compare with a larger set of consequences of the theory so
that we can perhaps find that the theory is wrong. We can never be sure that we have the
correct theory, but just do not have the wrong theory.

In a simple and effective way, Feynman explained the concept of a scientific
theory’s falsifiability, formulated in a more organic way by Austrian philosopher
and naturalized British citizen, Karl Popper.3 According to Popper, experimental
observations in favor of a theory can never prove it definitively, but they can only

1

Feynman et al. [1].
See the original video on YouTube />3
Popper [2].
2

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
F. Sylos Labini, Science and the Economic Crisis,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29528-2_1

1


2

1 Forecast

show that it is wrong. In fact, a single experiment with contradictory results is
enough for its refutation.
Popper’s criterion was however refined by 20th century philosophers of science
because, when considering a scientific theory within a mature field in which the
observed phenomena are far from theoretical predictions, various inferential steps
may mediate them, so that the rejection of a single conjecture may not imply the
refutation of the theory itself.4 As physicist and science historian Pierre Duhem first
noted at beginning of the 20th century, for a very advanced discipline, such as
physics, one cannot test a single hypothesis in isolation, because to derive empirical
consequences it is necessary to assume also a number of auxiliary hypotheses. For
this reason, a very elaborate and high-level theory may be overturned only gradually by a series of experimental defeats, rather than from a single wrong experimental prediction.5 A good criterion is the following: a theory is scientific if, and
only if, it is experimentally confirmable—that is, if the theory is able to acquire a
degree of empirical support by comparing its predictions with experiments. To be
confirmable, a theory must be expressed in a logical and deductive manner, such as
to obtain from a universal statement, in a rigidly linked way, one or more particular
consequences that are empirically verifiable.
Traditionally, therefore, the scientist’s work is to guess the theoretical
hypotheses, seeking to build a coherent logical framework that is capable of
interpreting experimental observations. These propositions are naturally expressed

in the “language of nature” mathematics, as Galileo Galilei first claimed in his 1623
book “Il Saggiatore”. Precision and mathematical rigor in the theoretical description and accuracy of experimental measurements are two sides of the same coin. In
physics we can, in fact, distinguish correct theories from incorrect ones in a simple
way: the former are more and more distinct with increasing experimental accuracy.
Moreover, as we will see later, as one proceeds to more accurate measurements, one
has access to an increasing amount of information that enables an ever-deeper
understanding of the physical phenomena.
Since the laws of nature are by definition universal and unchanging, in other
words are the same in any place at any time and space, the knowledge of these laws
makes it possible to formulate testable predictions with experiments conducted
under controlled conditions, in order to eliminate or minimize the effects of external
factors not considered by the theory. The result of these experiments is, given the
same conditions, universal, i.e. repeatable in any other place or time. The corroboration of a theory through predictions confirmed by reproducible experiments is
therefore one of the pillars of the scientific method. A physical theory, through a
mathematical formulation, provides the value of some parameters that characterize
a given system and that can be measured. If the parameters values derived from the
theory agree with the observed ones, within the limits of experimental errors, then

4

Gillies [3].
The American logician Willard Van Orman Quine then further developed this idea, and now
philosophers of science refer to it as the Duhem-Quine thesis.

5


The Scientific Method

3

the theory provides an explanation of the phenomenon. Let us consider a few
historical examples to illustrate the use of previsions as a test of scientific theory
correctness.

Anomalies and Crisis
Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn are the only planets visible by the naked
eye in the sky. Until the late 1700s, it was thought that no others existed, but, in
1781, the British astronomer William Herschel, during an observational campaign
of double stars (that is stars orbiting around each other), accidentally discovered a
body, which would have then proved to be the planet Uranus. Observing the body’s
orbital motion around the Sun, he found anomalies with respect to the previsions of
Newton’s law of gravity. At that time, these anomalies represented a major scientific problem. In fact, in the 19th century, astronomy was a reference science,
which aimed to measure with great accuracy the positions of celestial bodies and to
interpret the observations by Newton’s theory of gravity: these measurements and
the corresponding theoretical calculations were at that time more accurate than in
any other scientific discipline. Indeed, the regularities of the motions of heavenly
bodies were known since ancient times, but only in the Renaissance, thanks to the
work of Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei, were a large amount of
very accurate observations recorded. Isaac Newton used this knowledge to identify
the mathematical laws that can precisely explain the different observations.
Newton’s laws of motion were shown to be so precise that any other observation in
any other scientific field that did not prove compatible with them could not be
considered correct. Indeed, these laws were also applied to chemistry and engineering problems and provided the rationale for the entire technological progress
that had occurred since their discovery. In addition Newton, thanks to the introduction of the other hypothesis that the force of gravity weakens in a certain way
with distance, was able to find a comprehensive explanation of planetary orbits,
comets and tides. In particular, the Newton’s law of gravitation assumes that the
force of gravity decreases as a power law6 as a function of the distance between two
bodies: doubling the distance between two bodies weakens the gravitational force
between them by a factor of four.

To interpret the anomalies in the trajectory of Uranus, rather than to question the
correctness of the law of gravitation of Newton, it was hypothesized that they were
due to the gravitational effects of an eighth planet that had still not been observed.
This hypothesis corresponded to the introduction, for the first time in astronomy, of
“dark matter”: dark matter was therefore hypothesized to explain some differences
6

A power law is described by a function of the type f(x) = a * xb, where a and b are two constants;
particularly b is called the exponent of the power law. In the case of the force of gravity, the
variable x corresponds to the distance between two bodies, the exponent is b = −2, and the constant
a is equal to the product of the masses of the two bodies and the gravitational constant.


4

1 Forecast

between observations and theoretical predictions through its gravitational effects on
the position of an already known planet. The problem was then to find other
independent evidences of the existence of this object. In current times, a conceptually similar situation is found in the cosmological model that is generally
accepted: to explain some observations, which would not be in agreement with the
predictions of the model, it is necessary to introduce dark matter (and now also dark
energy). We will discuss later about the role of dark matter in modern astrophysics;
in 1846 the search for an explanation of the anomalous motion of Uranus would
have led to the discovery of the eighth planet, Neptune. In that case, therefore, the
hypothesis of the existence of dark matter through its gravitational effects was
verified by direct observations led by the calculations done in the framework of
Newtonian gravity.
The calculations of the mass, distance and other orbital characteristics of the new
planet were carried out by French astronomer Urbain-Jean-Joseph Le Verrier and

British astronomer John C. Adams. Technically they had to solve, for the first time,
the inverse perturbations problem, that is instead of calculating the orbital parameters of a certain object determined by the presence of another planet with known
characteristics, the properties of the object were calculated from the knowledge of
the orbital anomalies of Uranus. The planet thus hypothesized, named Neptune, was
then observed for the first time less than a degree from the position predicted by Le
Verrier: for theoretical astronomy, it was really a remarkable triumph as Newton’s
gravitation law was spectacularly confirmed.7
A similar, but in a way opposite, situation to that of Uranus occurred again in the
19th century in the case of Mercury. Indeed, small irregularities in its trajectory
were observed; to interpret them it was assumed, as for Uranus, the existence of
another planet within its orbit. This hypothetical planet was named Vulcan, and was
held responsible, through its gravitational effects, for the observed anomalies of
Mercury’s orbit. However, in this case “dark matter” was found not be the correct
explanation and Vulcan, in fact, was never observed.8
According to the Kepler’s first law, derived from Newton’s law of gravity, the
planets revolve around the Sun along elliptical orbits with the Sun at one of the two
focal points.9 This law is derived neglecting the gravitational action of the other
planets, which, however, are responsible for small perturbations caused by the
planets’ relatively small masses. These perturbations generate the precession of the
point where the planet is closest to the Sun (perihelion): this means that the planet’s
trajectory does not lie in a single ellipse. In fact the orbit does not close, with the
resulting effect that the ellipse does not remain the same but “moves”, having as the
Sun as one of the foci, and therefore makes a rosette motion. In this way, the

7

Morton [4].
Baum and Sheehan [5].
9
Differently from a circle, defined as the curve for which the distance from the centre is a constant,

the ellipse is characterized by two special points called foci: an ellipse is the curve for which the
sum of distances from the foci stays constant.
8


Anomalies and Crisis

5

perihelion changes position in time. During the 19th century, the precession of
Mercury’s perihelion was measured as equal to 5600 s of arc for century.10 The
motion of the Mercury’s perihelion was calculated using Newton’s theory, considering the sum of the gravitational effects of the Sun and of the other planets. The
value derived from the theory, however, was different, although by a small amount,
from the observed one.
American astronomer Simon Newcomb in 1898 provided the value of this difference as 41.24 arc seconds per century,11 with a measurement error of only 2 arc
seconds per century. Newcomb considered several causes to explain this anomaly:
the fact that the Sun is non-spherical, the presence of a ring or a group of planets
inside the orbit of Mercury, a great expanse of diffuse matter similar to that
reflecting zodiacal light, and, finally, a ring of asteroids located between Mercury
and Venus. By making the calculations for the different cases, in the same
framework of Newton’s theory, Newcomb however concluded that none of these
possible causes could explain the observations.
The hypothesized planet Vulcan was never observed, and Albert Einstein instead
explained the anomalies of Mercury, in his famous work of 1915 when in which he
introduced the theory of general relativity. In particular, Einstein presented calculations providing a value for the precession of the abnormal Mercury’s perihelion of
42.89 arc seconds per century, well within the measurement error reported by
Newcomb.12 The Mercury’s perihelion precession became very quickly one of the
three main observational confirmations of general relativity, together with the
deflection of light passing close to the Sun and the redshift of the light13 emitted
from a type of very compact star called a white dwarf. Einstein’s new theory of

gravitation completely changed astrophysics and modern cosmology, providing a
new conceptual framework for relating the effects of gravity, space and time.
In fact, general relativity describes gravitational force no longer as the action
between distant mass bodies that occurs in the ordinary three-dimensional space, as
happened in the Newtonian theory, but as the effect of a physical law that binds the
distribution of mass and energy with the geometry of space-time itself.14 The
equations formulated by Einstein that describe the force of gravity are similar to
those that characterize the properties of an elastic medium. In this description, the
gravitational effects are due to the distortion of this medium caused by presence of a
large enough mass—like a star. For example, the Sun locally deforms the elastic
medium in which it is embedded, that is space-time: the force of gravity is thus
interpreted as a local curvature of space-time. As a result of this deformation, light

10

This measurement refers to the angular position in the sky and it is expressed in arc seconds. One
degree corresponds to 3600 arc seconds.
11
That is, less than 1/80 of a degree per century.
12
Roseveare [6].
13
The shift towards red (redshift) is the phenomenon in which the frequency of the light, when
observed in certain circumstances, is lower than the frequency it had when it was emitted.
14
Richard et al. [7]. For a brilliant and simple introduction to General Relativity see: Ferreira [8].


6

1 Forecast

rays may not propagate in a straight line: for this reason, the position of a star in the
sky when it is appears along the line of sight with the Sun (observable during a total
Solar eclipse) is slightly different from that observed when the Sun is located away
from this position.
This is an example of overturning the theory that was described in the
Feynman’s speech reported above. General relativity is a theory that extends
Newtonian gravitation, which can still be successfully applied to ordinary situations
on Earth or in the solar system (with a few exceptions, as the precession of the
perihelion of Mercury). Only highly precise measurements, with an accuracy of the
order of a few meters, such as those required by the GPS (Global Positioning
System) navigation and positioning satellites system employed today in all
smartphones, may reveal the differences between Newton’s and Einstein’s theory of
gravity. On the other hand, general relativity is applied to calculate the characteristics of astrophysical systems with large mass (such as the effects of gravitational
lenses in clusters of galaxies) or rotating objects with great speed (such as binary
pulsars) which otherwise could not be explained by Newtonian gravitation.
Today, the frontier research in physics tries to develop a theoretical framework
that can unify the various forces of nature, thus seeking a new formulation also of
the force of gravity. At the moment, however there are various possible directions
that have been undertaken from a theoretical point of view. But none has yet been
subjected to a stringent empirical verification since there are only very limited
observations and the relevant experiments are very difficult to perform.

Paradigms and Epicycles
Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn in his famous 1962 essay, “The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions”15 has developed a theory of scientific progress, with reference to the hard sciences,16 that has quickly become a landmark in the philosophy
of science. According to Kuhn, science develops through periods of “normal science”, characterized by the predominance of a certain paradigm, but that are
occasionally interrupted by “revolutions” at the end of which the old paradigm is
replaced by a new one.17 For most of the time, science develops in a normal way:

this is when all scientists working in a certain field, except maybe a few dissidents,
accept the same dominant paradigm. Under this paradigm, scientists make progress
steadily, though perhaps a bit slowly. Their work can be seen as the one of “puzzle”
solvers, i.e., of difficult problems whose solution requires knowledge of the field’s
state of the art and mastery of its techniques.

15

Kuhn [9].
For social sciences the situation is quite different, as we shall see in the next chapter.
17
Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as “a scientific result that is universally recognized and that,
for a certain period of time, provides a model and solutions for a given community of scientists.”
16


Paradigms and Epicycles

7

From time to time, however, a period of revolution takes place, during which the
previously dominant paradigm is criticized by a small number of revolutionary
scientists. Although most researchers in a certain scientific field agree with the
dominant paradigm, and therefore consider the new revolutionary approach absurd,
the small group of revolutionary scientists can develop a new paradigm enough to
persuade their colleagues to accept it.18 In general, a paradigm shift is induced by
the introduction of a refinement of some experimental techniques, which in turn
occurs as a consequence of a technological innovation. Thus occurs a revolutionary
shift from an old to a new paradigm.
Even the great physicist Ludwig Boltzmann in the second half of the 19th

century had developed an analogous idea19:
The man on the street might think that new notions and explanations of phenomena are
gradually added to the bulk of the existing knowledge […]. But this is untrue, and theoretical physics has always developed by sudden jumps […]. If we look closely into the
evolution process of a theory, the first thing we see is that it does not go smoothly at all, as
we would expect; rather, it is full of discontinuities, and at least apparently it does not
follow the logically simplest path.

Although revolutions occur only occasionally in the development of science,
these revolutionary periods correspond to the most interesting times as a certain
scientific field undergoes to a major advance. Kuhn’s model of scientific development is considered a good interpretive scheme of the history of science, and it
applies not only within the natural sciences considered by Kuhn, but also to science
in a broader sense, including mathematics and medicine.20
Historically the most representative example of this situation, e.g. the general
model of scientific revolutions, is surely the Copernican revolution.21 From the
days of ancient Greece up to Copernicus, astronomy had been dominated by the
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic paradigm, in which the Earth was considered to be stationary
at the centre of the universe. The various movements of the heavenly and sublunary
bodies were described by the mechanics of Aristotle and, according to Ptolemy
The goal that an astronomer must have is: to show that the phenomena of the sky are
described as circular and uniform motions.22

His book, whose Arabic name is “The Almagest” and dated to around 150 AD,
was, in fact, the first organic and mathematical treatise that offered a detailed
explanation and quantitative analysis of celestial motions. It remained the primary
reference of astronomy for more than a thousand years.

18

The famous German physicist Max Planck argued that ideas do not change because they are
proven to be wrong, but because in the end their supporters die.

19
Falcioni et al. [10].
20
Gillies [11].
21
Kuhn [12].
22
Baryshev and Teerikorpi [13].


8

1 Forecast

The astronomer had to describe and predict the movements of the Sun, Moon
and planets, as accurately as possible, by using the Ptolemaic epicycles scheme.
The epicycle has been introduced because it was observed that the planets did not
remain at the same distance from Earth as expected if they had followed circular
orbits: this is shown by their apparent changes in brightness over time. It was also
observed that the apparent motion of the planets in the sky is not always directed
toward the west, as the Sun and the Moon: from time to time, in fact, the movement
of the planes in the sky is retrograde, in an eastward direction. This fact appears
difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that the planets follow circular and uniform
orbits around the Earth. Therefore it was hypothesized that a planet rotates in a
smaller circular orbit, the epicycle, whose centre was placed on the main circular
orbit (the deferent) with the Earth at the center. As the observations become more
precise, the number of epicycles grew, so that today the word epicycle has become
synonymous with “ad hoc hypotheses”.
This was the normally accepted science at the time of Copernicus, who, trying to
solve the problem of planetary motion that Ptolemy and his successors were not

been able to explain satisfactorily, introduced as a side hypothesis the Earth’s
motion. By trying to reform the techniques used in the calculation of the planets
positions, Copernicus challenged, therefore, the dominant paradigm, suggesting
that the Earth revolved around its axis, while moving around the Sun. His results
were based on mathematical calculations with a level of sophistication and detail
equal to those of the Ptolemaic system. These calculations were published in his
book “De revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium” in 1543. This publication inaugurated a revolutionary period, constituting perhaps the point of transition from
medieval to modern society, during which the old Aristotelian-Ptolemaic paradigm
was overthrown and replaced by a new paradigm that was later formulated in detail
by Isaac Newton in his “Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica” (1687).
The triumph of the Newtonian paradigm has therefore initiated a new period of
normal science in astronomy that lasted from around 1700 to around 1900. During
that time, the dominant paradigm was composed of Newtonian mechanics and the
Newton law of gravity, and a normal scientist was expected to use these tools to
explain the movements of celestial bodies and comets, the perturbations of the
orbits of the planets, and so on. The hypothesis of the existence of unobserved
bodies, responsible for gravitational perturbations, like Neptune and Vulcan, can be
seen as the introduction of epicycles in the Ptolemaic model: in order not to change
the paradigm some ad hoc hypotheses were introduced. However these assumptions
were then compared with the, observations, and, as we have seen in the cases of
Uranus and Mercury, the result was quite the opposite. On the one hand, Neptune
was discovered due to the perturbations of Uranus. On the other hand, the
Einsteinian revolution, taking place between 1905 and 1920, provided a new
explanation for the motion of Mercury. This was not interpreted as the effect of
another plane (Vulcan) that, in fact, was not observed, but as a result of a different
theory of gravitation, the theories of special and general relativity theories that
replaced the Newtonian paradigm.