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CHINAS ADJUSTMENTS OF FOREIGN STRATEGY FROM THE 19TH CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TO PRESENT AND ITS IMPACTS

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CHINA'S ADJUSTMENTS OF FOREIGN STRATEGY FROM THE 19TH CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TO PRESENT
AND ITS IMPACTS
I. The effects of the background of the world and Asia-Pacific on the adjustment of
strategy of China
1. Several important policy adjustments of the US under the control of Donald Trump
have strongly affected the international face, Asia-Pacific region as well as US-China
relationship.
Since Donald Trump’ s inauguration in January 2017, several foreign adjustments of the
US has been made in the manners: (i) Practically, top priority for interests of the US , shortterm economic benefits are more important than long-term values and strategies, deployment of
foreign strategy for the purpose of addressing domestic problems firstly (employment, trade,
investment, ……); Willing to implement the exchanges including sensitive issues in relationships
with rivals and allies and partners; (ii) Military is more appreciated than diplomacy, bilateral is
more appreciated than multilateral (increasing 9-10% of defense budget, reducing 30% of
diplomatic budget and environmental protection); (iii) Disaffirming the legacy of the predecessor
(declare "death" of the "rebalancing" policy, deciding to withdraw the US from the TPP, reapplying the previous policies to Cuba, withdrawing the US from the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), ... );(iv) Unpredictable, easy to make changes due to being in the period of
forming policies, facing great difficulties and obstacles from within the US and strongly
influenced by Trump's personality (somewhat erratic, aggressive, personal preference and allergy
to criticism).
The above adjustments have reduced the credibility from countries, especially from allies
and partners of the US, negatively affected the soft power and global leadership role of the US.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the US’s withdrawal from the TPP has created an economic "power
vacuum" for China to exploit. At the global level, the fact that Trump’s government is carrying
out a trade protection policy, reducing international commitments, in some ways, has facilitated
China to promote globalized "leadership" role, seize the power to lead forces to serve the
intention of becoming a world power later.
By the second year of the term, President Trump has continued to adjust policies to
China. In the National Security Strategy (12/2017) and the Military Strategy (1/2018), the US
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has publicly identified China as a strategic rival for the first time. In the field of science and
technology, the US continuously pressured to curb China's rise, prevent and neutralize the "Made
in China 2025" Plan set by China since 2015, typically by prohibiting Chinese leading
telecommunications corporations such as ZTE to import modern components (chips, microchips)
from the US companies such as Intel and Qualcom. In terms of economy and trade, the US has
continuously "struck" China with the imposition of high import duties of $250 billion so far for
Chinese goods exported to the US in 2018, are planning to continue to impose taxes on Chinese
goods which are `worth of hundreds of billions of dollars 1 . In fact, the US launched a trade war
with China on a large scale. Regarding regional security issues, unlike previous governments,
Trump’s government is changing its approach to the issue of Korean peninsula by more
harmonious and direct dialogues with North Korea’s government for disarming nuclear while
separating North Korea from traditional Chinese orbit. In respect of Taiwan and South China Sea
issues, Trump’s government is also increasingly showing a tough approach, not afraid of
colliding.
All of adjustments of the US mentioned above directly have affected to the strategic
environment around China as well as the intention to become a world power in the middle of the
twenty-first century as mentioned in "two goals lasting for hundreds of years ".
2. Relationships between major countries in manner of both cooperation and struggle,
but more increasingly fierce in the strategic competition
Rapid changes in the strength correlation between the US and other power centers make
the strategic competition between major countries increasingly fierce. Before Mr. Trump’s
government, while the background of the US has been relatively weak, China and Russia have
been the most powerful challenges of the world order dominated by the US and the West, leading
the strategic competition in relationships of China-US and Russia-US to get more and more
intense.
Therefore, it should be clearly realized that, regardless of the any implementations of any
aspects, the nature of the point is that the strategic competition of China - US and Russia - US
compete ally. Besides the conflict of geographical – strategic interests, anti-China and antiRussian forces within the US are relatively strong, making it difficult for any US president to
1 The US imposed an additional tax of 25% on US $ 50 billion of Chinese goods, and then continued to

impose a 10% to 25% tax on US $ 200 billion of Chinese goods. At the same time, President Trump also
expected to continue to impose more taxes to the Chinese goods valued at of 267 billion USD.

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implement a policy of peace with China and Russia. Contrary to initial expectations when Trump
was elected, so far the prospect of improving the relationship of US-Russia or US’s "playing
Russian cards" in the strategy of curbing Chinese (like Nixon used to “playing Chinese cards” to
curb the Soviet Union) becomes very difficult. Although Trump still set the possibility of
strategic cooperation with Russia open, internal battles and the drastic resistance of the “antiRussia” conservative forces within the US (especially the relentless issue of Russia’s back-up
forwarded Trump’s crew to get win in contested US presidential election 2016) and Republicans
made Trump very difficult to implement the will to improve US-Russia relationship soon.
Remarkably, the pressure of long-term embargo of the US and the West applied to Russia after
the issue of that Crym has been merged to Russia has pushed Russia toward China in both
economic and security – the counterbalancing strategy to the US.
The new point is that showing powerfully political trend in the relationship with major
countries is clearer than before. Major countries are ready to use force against small countries as
the opponent's "satellite" for the purpose of determent, "try" the limits of each other, especially
in US-Russia and US-China relationships. The cases that the US has bombarded Syria and let the
aircraft carrier approach the Korean peninsula for 3 times in 2017 are deterrent messages forward
Russia and China. However, major countries still seek the cooperation in common interests such
as counter-terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The competition has the
limit that leading to no confrontation or broken relationships; the cooperation has the limit that
leading no large strategic compromises have been set or large strategic compromises have not
been set yet.
3. The trend of populism and nationalism is emerging strongly, significantly affecting
the process of globalization, regionalization, multilateralism as well as the role of
international law.
Populism and nationalism are rising strongly and affecting internal politics and foreign

policies of several countries. The new point is that this wave is emerging strongly in the region
and the developed capitalist countries that have provided the most powerful advocacies for
globalization including Europe and North America. On the political scene of the US and the UK
and several key members of EU, populist forces have either gained the power or won a larger
role. Meanwhile, developing countries, especially Asian countries, have expressed a view to

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protect globalization (according to the survey, 75% of Chinese and 68% of Indians have a
positive view of the globalization).
Under the influence of the populist and nationalist movement, countries tend to value
national - ethnic interests over regional and international common interests. In particular, the
reductions of the interest & commitment & resources of the US for the United Nations and
climate change response .......under Donald Trump’s government, also have strongly affected the
behavior of countries in the manner of reducing confidence in the multilateral institutions and the
role of international law, showing more cares for selfish national interests and enlistment of
major countries.
4. The Asia-Pacific region continues to be at the forefront of economic development
and economic links but security is increasingly unstable; the situation of "double supers,
multiple powers" is increasingly being formed with the dominant role of the US and China
Compared to the world background, the Asia-Pacific region is moving faster due to a
number of factors: (i) This is the most dynamic developmented area in the world, with the
prospect of becoming the world's new center of power in the 21st century, with the presence of
most of the world's most powers which have fierce strategic competition with each other; (ii)
This is one of the areas with the highest concentration of potential hotspots directly related to
strategic competitions of major countries as well as non-traditional security challenges in the
world; (iii) Compared to other regions such as Europe and America, multilateral institutions in
the Asia-Pacific region have not developed to the extent that they can handle security challenges
in the region. There is also no collective security system like many other areas in the world.

The US and China have a superior overall strength compared to other major powers
including Japan, Russia and India. Only the US and China have a GDP of over USD 10,000
billion (in 2016, the GDP of the US is USD 18,561 billion and of China is USD 11,391 billion
compared to about USD 4,900 billion of Japan, USD 2,500 billion of India and USD 1,500
billion of Russia). The US and China are also 2 powers with the largest military budget in the
world: In 2016, the US spent US $ 596 billion, accounting for 40% of global military costs while
China's figure was US $ 147 billion and 9.7%.
By 2017, China has become the largest trading partner of over 130 countries and
territories. In which, nearly all regional countries, including close allies of the US such as Japan,
South Korea, Australia .......have the number one trade relationship with China. This is an
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important advantage for China to have important leverage in gathering forces in the region. In
contrast, the US still has the strength of investment (just behind Japan and EU on investment in
Southeast Asia) and still dominates the system of "axes and spokes" - the backbone of the
regional security structure of Asia- Pacific. Basically, regional countries still "go with China on
economics, go with the US on security."
The East Asia region has become the place of several most traditional and nontraditional security hotspots of the world while the regional structure is still in the process of
forming, multilateral institutions are weak and lack of binding , not able to solve problems in the
region .The four hotspots of potential conflicts in the region including the Korean Peninsula, the
East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea have directly related to the China-US
strategic competition and will undoubtedly entice the direct military intervention of the three
strongest powers in the world including the US, China and Japan, if the conflict occurs. In those
hotspots, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are considered hotspots that are most at
risk of conflict.
ASEAN has formed the Community with a population of 630 million USD and at the time
of starting the construction of Community, a total GDP of 2,400 billion USD has been achieved
(ranked 7th in the world and is expected to be the fourth largest economy in the world by the
year 2050). The role of ASEAN is still respected by major countries and partners. However,

ASEAN has not become a unified entity with a larger role than before, even the "central role" of
ASEAN is showing signs of reduction due to internal challenges and policy adjustments of major
countries. Before the XIX Congress, the ASEAN Community was established over a year, but
the level of cooperation was actually relatively low. ASEAN is essentially an intergovernmental
organization, not really a Community with common policies. The level of internal economic
integration is very low: trade among ASEAN countries accounts for only about 24% of ASEAN's
total trade, while this rate in EU is about 60%.
ASEAN is facing internal challenges and external challenges. In terms of internal issues,
except Singapore, 4 out of 5 founding member countries of ASEAN are experiencing domestic
problems that need to be addressed. Countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar also face
various difficulties related to politics, economy, and separatism due to religious and ethnic
conflicts, in which Cambodia and Laos have seriously depended on China. That reality is giving

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the negative affects to the unity, the consensus of the ASEAN, especially on the South China Sea
issue.
In particular, the South China Sea issue continues to be complicated in the field as well as
in the politics-diplomatic, legal and gathering forces. China has completed the construction of
structures in Changsha 2 ; on the one hand, strengthened the presence in the field, aggressively
combined militarization with civilization to force regional countries to gradually accept the new
status, besides, expressed diplomatic harmony to differentiate regional countries, creating
division between countries of ASEAN, not allowed ASEAN to become a unified entity that could
be relative counterbalance on China, prevented ASEAN countries from falling towards the US,
prevented the US, Japan and India ..... from participating in the South China Sea issue. The US
has not considered the South China Sea as a priority in regional policy, still focused on dealing
with more important issues to the US including the Korean nuclear and trade deficit with China.
In 2017, despite strengthening the military presence in the South China Sea more than the
Obama’s era, Trump’s government still has no clear, formal policy on the South China Sea, not

interested in gathering the political - diplomatic force or overall combination of military, political
- diplomatic and economic - commercial measures to prevent China’s violations of international
law in the South China Sea. Other major countries such as Japan, India and some of the major
powers in the EU have shown signs of wanting to engage more deeply in the South China Sea,
but due to constraints of resources, they cannot afford to influence China's behavior.
This situation makes the South China Sea more and more beneficial to China and more
disadvantageous for the countries of ASEAN in dispute, including Vietnam. The gap in
comparision of forces of China and the claimant countries in the South China Sea is increasingly
diluting in favor of China. The uncertainty and trust in the US security commitment forward to
the region also makes the internal ASEAN more divided and weakened regarding the South
China Sea issue. Not only practical countries like Cambodia and Philippines, but also some
scupulous countries such as Singapore and Indonesia have also adjusted their approachs towards
a more gentle approach to China. The field situation as well as the gathering of forces for the
South China Sea issue are creating a basis for China to make the "Nine-dash line" claim possible
to control and proceed to achieve the goal of monopolizing the South China Sea.
2 In the three years from 2014-2017, China has created a total of 1,300 hectares on 7 structures in
Changsha, 20 times larger than the total area of all other countries with dispute in Truong Sa combined in
the past 40 years.

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II. China's international strategy determined at the XIX Congress
Xi Jinping's political report presented at the XIX Congress of the CCP has identified
great and important goals and tasks for the next phase of China's development, which specify
long-term strategic objectives is to make China become a modern socialist power with a national
synergy and the world-leading influence by 2050 (implying a clear superpower goal). To achieve
that goal, China will continue the full azimuth diplomatic layout, and foreign policy of major
country with Chineses features in many fields and levels.
The report of Xi Jinping has pointed out that, in the last 5 years after the 18th Congress

(October 2012), China has achieved great achievements with historical and comprehensive
characteristics, bringing several profound & basic changes for China; has solved very difficult
problems that could not been solved for many years, made great things that past years have not
been able to carry out. In which, in terms of economy and society, China continued to maintain a high
average growth rate, GDP from RMB 54,000 billion in 2012 (equivalent to USD 8.130 billion) increased to
RMB 80,000 billion (USD 12,000 billion), hold the position of world's second largest economy,
contributing over 30% to global GDP growth; trade turnover, offshore investment and foreign
exchange reserves are constantly leading the world; people's income is higher than economic
growth. In terms of foreign policy, the full azimuth diplomatic layout continues to be expanded
and with depth, the foreign policy of major country with Chineses features are comprehensively
deployed in many fields and levels; maintaing the peace & stability of external environment of
China, China's international influence, the abilility for calling upon and tectonic capacity are
enhanced to the next level; China has implemented a series of major initiatives such as "Belt and
Road," Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank; has organized many important events such as APEC
Summit (11/ 2014), G20 Summit in Hangzhou (9/2016), High-level International Forum "Belt
and Road" (5 / 2017), BRICS Summit in Xiamen (9/2017); China has made great new
contributions to regional peace and development and the world.
However, Xi Jinping's report at the XIX Congress has also pointed out, besides the
achievements, China has still had many difficulties and challenges: unbalanced, uneven
development have not been resolved; quality and efficiency of development are not high;
creative capacity is not strong; the level of economic development is really low; the task of
protecting the environment is still difficulty; issues of livelihood of the people such as
employment, education and health still face many difficulties; the development and income gaps
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between urban and rural areas are still large; many reform measures have not been implemented
completely; national security is facing a complex new situation because unstable, unidentified
factors are emerging, regional hotspots are complicated, non-traditional security risks continue to
spread.

Based on the full assessment and analysis of achievements and limitations over the past
5 years, Xi Jinping's Political Report at the XIX Congress has identified great and important
goals and tasks for the next stage of China's development, in which the long-term strategic goal
is to bring China to become a modern socialist power, with the national synergy and the worldleading influence by 2050. Xi Jinping has emphasized that the XIX Congress brought China into
a new era 3 of socialism with Chinese features and moved to the third stage of development, after
China "stood up" (under Mao Zedong’s era), was "rich" (under the Deng Xiaoping’s era), now
will be "strong" (under Xi Jinping’s era). At the same time, China's strategic goals and foreign
policy in the following stage will also have new changes which produce profound affects to the
situation of the world, region and international political situation in the following years.
1. Strategic objectives and tasks
Xi Jinping's political report continues to affirm the strategic development goal in the
new era to successfully implement the socialist modernization, until the middle of the 21 st
century, China will become the rich and modern, strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious and
beautiful socialist power; to emphasize that the period from the XIX Congress to the XX
Congress (2022) is the period of interference of two "goals of 100-year" whereby the first "goals
of 100-year" must be successfully implemented with the formation of a entirely well-off society
by 2021 (celebrating 100 years of establishment of the Party) while must open a new process,
create momentum for the completion of the second "goals of 100-year" by 2049 (100 years of
establishment of the Nation ).
On that basis, Xi Jinping, for the first time, has identified a two-step roadmap to
concretize the implementation of the second "goals of 100-year": (i) from 2021 to 2035, the basic
completion of the modernization of socialism is made; (ii) from 2035 to 2049, building China
into a modern, rich &strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious and beautiful socialist power is
finished. Basically, the long-term goal in China's global strategy after the XIX Congress is still
3In the Political Report, read by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the XIX Congress, the phrase
"new era" appears 34 times.

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to rise to become the world's leading power, playing a leading role and having a decisive voice
for global issues.
In which, Xi Jinping has emphasized that the international objectives and tasks
would expand the development space to create the new international position and influence,
and

international strategies would contribute directly and importantly

to the successful

implementation of the strategy development goals for medium-term & long- term mentioned
above. The political report of Xi Jinping at the XIX Congress has determined the key objectives
and tasks of China in the international strategy for the next time: Persistently promoting the
construction of “common community for human destiny (on the basis of upgrading the
"common community for Asian destiny"); promoting the establishment of a new type of
international relationship (on the basis of upgrading "a new type of relationship of major
countries" proposed to the US from 2013); building a global partnership network; resolutely
protecting the sovereignty, security and national development benefits.
In the article on the Diplomatic Thought of General Secretary Xi Jinping, Chinese
Foreign Minister -Wang Yi –right before the XIX Congress also has pointed out the key goal and
task of foreign policy for next time that "opening a new situation for foreign diplomacy of major
nation with Chinese features” by promoting the establishment of "the common community for
human destiny”, building “international relationship with new style”, raising " global partnership
network” while clarifying the implications of these concepts, in which: common community for
human destiny is a policy to build the world with 5 characteristics including lasting peace, broad
security, prosperity together, openness, longanimity, beauty and freshness; new-style international
relationship with the content of mutual respect, justice, cooperation instead of antagonism,
victory together instead of monopoly; building a network of global partnerships is a policy of
expanding friendships under the principle of no association, no alliance, raising equal and
peaceful and generous partnership, no division of front, no assumed enemy, no aim toward the

third party 4 .
Based on the overall objectives and tasks stated in the XIX Congress, China will focus
on implementing a number of objectives and tasks on the following aspects:

4Article published on "Learning Times" - Journal of China Central Party School, September 1,
2017.

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About security: The most important objective and task is to maintain a peaceful, stable
external environment, to consolidate a favorable international environment in order to maintain
and extend the period of strategic opportunities for China's development; firmly protect "core
interests"

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especially sovereignty and territorial integrity, national security and development

interests; strengthening the gathering of forces, promoting the formation of new regional security
frameworks and orders based on national interests.
About development: Maximize the scope and space of national interests through
strengthening interwoven interests with countries, promoting the establishment of a global
partner network on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation, sharing benefit distribution
developed as a binding agent; thoroughly exploit the strengths of the regional and world markets,
especially the energy and resource markets, actively attract foreign capital, techniques and
management experience to serve domestic development, strengthen the National Capability. The
key task in this phase is to promote implementation of initiatives, regional and inter-regional
economic connections that established and lead by China, especially the "Belt and Road"
strategy to continue to push strong strategic power to expand the area for developing the marine

economic.
About international position: Continue to expand the scope of influence, further
improve the role and voice of China in international issues, first of all in the Asia-Pacific region;
strive to create and reinforce the image of "responsible big country" actively participating in
leading international political-economic-mechanism and institutions, actively participating in the
construction of "game rules," shaping the agenda in global issues. China's deep goal is to create a
new international position commensurate with the increasing National Capability, step by step
promoting the formation of regional and international order that towards China’s benefits.
2. Guidelines and ways to achieve strategic goals
Xi Jinping's speech at the XIX Congress continued to affirm China's strategy of next
time: Persistently go on the path of peace development, implement the strategy of opening doors
with mutual benefits and winning; persevering in a new way in the relationship between the
country and the country is mutual respect, equal negotiation, non-confrontational dialogue,
5The white paper of "Chinese Development of Peace" issued in September 2011 defines the
"core interests" of China, including the following six points: (i) national sovereignty; (ii) national
security; (iii) territorial integrity; (iv) unification of the country; (v) the national political regime
stipulated by the Constitution and stabilizing the social bureau; (vi) basic assurance for
sustainable development of socio-economy.

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friendship but no alliance; persistently resolve disputes by dialogue and negotiation; persist in
the right view of morality and benefits; actively contribute to world peace, and global
development as well as preserving world order. At the same time, China also defined a number of
major principles and principles in international affairs: Implementing peaceful, independent and
autonomous diplomacy policies; promote the development of new-style international relations
with mutual respect, fairness, righteousness, cooperation and winning; respect the human’s right
of choosing the path of development, keep the international justice and righteousness, oppose to
impose their will on others, oppose the intervention of other domestic affairs, oppose the big

country abuse small ones. Emphasizing that China decided not to develop itself by sacrificing the
interests of other countries, also decided not to give up its legitimate rights, anyone should not
have an illusion that China will "bite the bullet." to harm its interests. China's development does
not pose a threat to any country; no matter what level of development it is, China will never
confess, never expand.6
In the view of the XIX Congress and the guiding thought of Xi Jinping, about strategic layout to
expand the global influence to focus on:
About foreign politics, actively developing global partnerships, expanding the benefits of
interference with countries; building a comprehensive and stable overall framework of big
country relations; deepening relations with neighboring countries from the perspective of
"friendly, sincere, mutually beneficial, mercy" 7 and the motto of "being friendly with neighbors,
making friends with neighbors;" strengthening solidarity and cooperation with developing
countries from the perspective of "heartily, real, friendly, sincere" 8to strengthen cooperation with
other political parties and political organizations of other countries, promote external exchanges
of the Parliament, the Political, the military, the local and the mass organizations.
About foreign economic, persistently open foreign relations, actively promote
cooperation and build "Belt and Road;" promote aid to developing countries, especially the least
developed countries, promote narrowing the development gap between the South and the North;
support multilateral trade institutions, support liberalization, trade and investment facilitation;
promote the trend of economic globalization in the direction of increasingly open, mercy,
balanced and win-win.
6Source: Political report of XIX Congress.
7Friendly, sincere, mutually beneficial, mercy.
8Heartily, real, friendly, sincere.

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About promoting key role, lead in multilateral mechanisms, actively contribute Chinese
intelligence and plans in international issues; actively participate in reforming and building a

global governance system, promote democratization of international relations, maintain equality
among nations; supporting the United Nations to promote an active role, support the expansion
of representation and voice of developing countries in international issues.
3. Implementation measure
In the Political Report presented at the XIX Congress, Xi Jinping emphasized several
important points about how to implement the strategy to achieve the international strategy,
including:
Comprehensive implementation of foreign policy
The focus of China's foreign strategy in the coming time is to promote the building of a
"Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics" that is worthy of National Capability,
especially economic and military power are growing. In particular, the implementation measure
is to further deepen the external aspect of "global, multi-sectoral, multi-level" aspects through the
strong deployment of external activities on all five levels are: major countries diplomacy,
neighbor and regions diplomacy, developing countries diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy and
people's diplomacy; expand the establishment of cooperative partnerships around the world,
create a "circle of friends," which is essentially a gathering of forces based on the development
of benefit sharing; consolidate and enhance China's proactive strategic position in international
relations, gradually becoming more evident in the role of "world power."
Take "actively act" instead of “wait for time ”
With the goal of making China to become the world's leading power in the middle of the
twenty-first century, Xi Jinping's viewpoint at the XIX Congress is a milestone that shows that
China has completely abandoned the diplomacy motto "wait for time ”(initiated by Deng
Xiaoping) to transition to the diplomatic period "actively act". Accordingly, in terms of both
foreign thinking and behavior, China will make adjustments in a proactive way and more
assertively in the implementation of a large foreign diplomacy, actively promoting the
development of a new international relations framework under the banner of "common destiny of
humanity" (essentially building the main structure international rule in which China is perceived
as a new center of power of the world); more resolute and firm in implementing strategic
objectives as well as protecting national core interests, especially territorial sovereignty; actively
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create rules to achieve long-term strategic objectives; not immediately challenging but
determined to step by step change the status of security and economy, proceeding to raise a new
economic-security political order in the region in a way that benefits China; no alliance but
seeking to establish a global partner network in a more pragmatic trend, not relying on ideology
but more on national interests; do not intervene but conditionally participate, opting for
international political and security issues to play a role and protect their interests; actively taking
part in regional and inter-regional mechanisms that benefits China and directing these
mechanisms to the content that maximizes the interests of China.
4. Key points for policy implementation after the XIX Congress
For major countries
The major foreign diplomacy is a key point in China's overall foreign affairs strategy,
with major implementation directions: (i) establish and consolidate the long-term stable
relationship framework with world power centers, especially the US, Russia, EU and India to
expand China's strategic location; (ii) promoting the formation of a multi-polar, multi-center
world order, implementing a "coherent" strategy that gathering forces to make China become a
powerful polar of the world, incorporating a "continuous" strategy to split, differentiate of
restraint forces; (iii) actively involved in building a new "play rule" in international relations,
especially international economic relations in a way that is more beneficial to China; (iv)
building an image of responsible big country, actively participating in shaping global agendas
and participating in resolving world security hotspot issues.
With the US: China determined that this is the most important pair of relations, leverage
to achieve the goal of becoming a stable, balanced and well-developed overall relations
framework; maintaining stable China-US relations and cooperation is a favorable condition for
China to focus on implementing the strategic development objectives set out at the XIX
Congress. China's policy measures towards the US will basically continue to inherit the longstanding guidelines, in which the basic strategy is to manage US-China relations within the
framework of "both cooperation, both competing "towards China-US relations in orbit "no
conflict, no resistance, mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation". China continues to
pursue a two-sided policy and postponing tactics, avoid confronting the US directly; On the other

side, it shows the willingness to cooperate, wishing to share with the US interests,
responsibilities and roles in the region, towards the "win-win"; however, even more firm in the
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problems China considers to be related to core interests such as Taiwan and the South China Sea;
continue to compete for influence with the US on a global scale.
In specific policy implementation, China will focus on: (i) continue to promote prime
diplomacy, maintain high-level exchanges with the US, strengthen and expand new strategic
dialogue mechanisms established between the two sides

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to strengthen trust, promote

cooperation, control disagreements; (ii) enhancing interwoven benefits and levels of mutual
dependence, promoting substantive cooperation with the US in the fields of economics, trade,
investment, science and technology, and cultural exchange to make it possible turn on the
cooperation side, calming conflicts and disagreements; (iii) settling down or escalating with the
US in a number of economic issues (trade balance, anti-dumping, intellectual property), human
rights democracy, cyber security, North Korean nuclear to stabilize China-US relations; (iv) in
the issue of the East China Sea, the South China Sea, China will implement a strategy to firmly
maintain the "red limit" while compromising and flexible adaptation, without creating an excuse
for the US to increase its military presence, avoiding direct challenges, threatening US's
"maritime security interests"; (v) pursue a tougher stance on Taiwan, forcing the US to comply
with the "one China" policy, drastically stopping US sales weapons to Taiwan.
In general, at the XIX Congress, in the coming time, China-US relations will continue to
be the most influential pair in the area of Asia - Pacific in specific and the world in general. At
the XIX Congress, China acknowledged that in the long term both China and the US tried to
limit direct conflict, promoting cooperation on areas of common interests. However, China

judges, because the strategic conflict between the two sides will be increasing, so it is unlikely
that China-US will return to the level of collusion and compromise as happened in history, which
may occur. making unpredictable "variables" in bilateral relations, especially those that might
come from US 's initiative (this prediction of China has come true when the US promotes
protectionism and war trade aimed at China. Competition for China-US influence will have a
profound impact on the interests and ways of securing the interests of regional countries, which
will not force countries to "choose sides" between China or the US, but in some specific issues,
countries will face greater difficulties in maintaining a balanced standpoint.
9From April 2017 until now, China - US has established 5 high-level Dialogue mechanisms
including: Foreign Affairs - Security Dialogue, General Economic Dialogue, Dialogue on Network
Enforcement and Security, Cultural and Social Dialogue, Staff Department Dialogue between the
two military.

14


With Russia: China basically maintained the policy framework and enhance extensive
cooperation both unfair competition with Russia, including comprehensive cooperation is the
main trend, so both sides need gather forces to counterbalance with the US-Japan alliance,
promoting the formation of multi-polar world order. China's policy motto with Russia is: (i)
maintain reliable, stable political relations and implement mechanisms for extensive exchange
and cooperation on diplomacy, security and defense; (ii) expanding substantive cooperation in
the areas of economic - trade, investment, connecting the Belt (economic belt along the Silk
Road) with the Europe-Asian Economic Union, building infrastructure, energy, science and
technology, military technology, weapons; (iii) strengthening mutual support in matters related to
"core interests" such as national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity; entice Russia to
support China's position on the South China Sea, East China Sea; (iv) actively coordinate stance
and action in multilateral frameworks (United Nations, G20, APEC etc), global security issues
and regional hotspots such as the North Korean nuclear, Syria , Iran, Afghanistan etc; (v)
coordinate the establishment of non-participatory of US in regional economic and security

institutions such as CICA, SCO, BRICS.
Many argue that the current China-Russia relationship is not yet a form of "alliance" but
has all the elements of a closer cooperation model than the usual strategic partnership framework
even somewhat an expression of "close allies" or "almost allies" relations. However, the close
relationship between China and Russia is still situational, without strong factors. This may only
be a temporary alliance when Russia's interests have not yet conflict with China's interests and
the two sides need to cooperate in response to US and allied control strategies. In fact, ChinaRussia relations still have limitations because of competition between the two countries in
Central Asia (which is the security area of Russia's border) and Russia's internal concerns. on the
ambition of expansion, expanding China's influence in the Far East, recognizing China is a threat
to Russia's strategic interests in these regions in the long term.
With Japan: China has always considered Japan a direct competitor on the path to
becoming a regional power. Different from the relationship between China and its neighboring
countries in East Asia, China-Japan is a competition between the two major countries in terms of
economy, culture and military, reflected in the following: (i) Japan's political, economic, and
cultural development model is still a challenge for China in terms of efficiency and
attractiveness; (ii) Japan has created a region of significant influence in the region, especially in
15


Southeast Asia, as a result of long periods of political, economic and cultural development in this
region; (iii) Japan has strong economic and defense potential to cope with China in maritime
conflicts, and the combined power of US-Japan allies is creating a challenge to the strategy.
China's expansion of influence to the East; (iv) in the leadership and people of the two countries,
especially China, are still psychologically ill-minded and suspicious of each other.
In response to Japan's aggressive deployment of global vision and global policy with the
most important pillar of strengthening alliance with Japan and the US and increasing influence in
Southeast Asia, China will pursue a policy of promoting cooperation and competing for control.
On the one hand, it continues to emphasize improving relations with Japan on the basis of four
Chinese-Japanese political documents10 taking advantage of mutually beneficial cooperation with
Japan in economy, science and technology; on the other side promote strategic competition,

scramble for influence with Japan in a more comprehensive way in disputes in the East China
Sea, Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands, historical issues, regional initiatives 11 and in multilateral forum,
increasing restraint and competition to prevent Japanese involvement in the South China Sea
issue.
With India: China will still maintain the trend of strengthening cooperation and strategic
competition, in which China will strengthen its economic and trade cooperation with India,
expand investment in areas where India have large demand is in line with China's interests,
boosting the exploitation of India's huge market for Chinese goods and capital; taking economic
cooperation as a lever to promote political relations, improving strategic trust, reducing mutual
distrust between the two countries on land border borders, security, democracy and human rights,
preventing and minimizing the impact of India's alliance with the US-Japan-Australia (in the
"diamond quadrilateral" of the Indian-Pacific strategy), thus creating an arc of encircling China.
At the same time, in response to India's comprehensive diplomatic strategy of "Linking to the
West and the East", China will implement strategic competition in the direction of: (i) on
economic, intensifying competition for influence in South Asia through the initiative "Belt and
road," to boost investment in the two economic corridors China - Pakistan and Bangladesh India - China - Myanmar, promoting the connection of a series of seaports in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, (ii) on security, using territorial issues and strengthening relations
of strategic cooperation on defense. security with Pakistan to restraint the development of India.

16


(iii) on democracy, human rights, continue to pressure India in a number of issues related to
China's "core interests" such as Tibet and Taiwan.

10

Four political documents directing China-Japan relations: (i) In 1972, China and Japan established diplomatic relations,

Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. (Ii) In 1998, during the visit by Chinese

President Jiang Zemin to Japan, the two sides declared a "cooperative partnership for peace and development cooperation." (iii)
In September 2006, during a visit to China by Japanese Prime Minister Abe, the two sides agreed to establish a framework of
"cooperative cooperation for mutual benefit." (iv) May 2008, during the trip. visiting Japan by Chinese President Hu Jintao, the
two countries signed a Joint Statement on comprehensive promotion of "mutually beneficial strategic relations."
11

Japan proposes a "free and open Indian Ocean-Pacific" strategy to compete with China's "Belt and Road" strategy.

In general, although there is a conflict of strategic interests, compared to other relations
such as China-US and China-Japan relations, the China-India competition is somewhat less
intense due to National Capability and India's international political position is inferior to China
and India has not yet directly challenged China's regional power. In contrast, due to border
security, anti-terrorism and economic benefits, China speculates that India cannot stand entirely
on the US to restraint China, but also to strengthen its security relation and development with
China.
For neighbors
Xi Jinping's remarks at the XIX Congress determine that China continues to consider the
development of comprehensive relations with neighboring countries in the region, especially the
ASEAN countries as the focus of foreign policy

12

. China will positively affirm its important

role, promote propaganda on policies items such as “friendly, peaceful, enrich" (friendly with
neighbors, peaceful with neighbors, enrich with neighbors) and the meeting point of " friendly,
sincere, mutually beneficial, mercy"; promote the development of a framework of friendly
relations in the neighbor, comprehensive cooperation and long-term stability with countries at
different levels. China implements neighboring diplomacy with more flexible and practical
measures, focusing more on interaction, benefit interference with neighboring partners and

making the most of its advantages. economic, combining hard power and soft power to expand
its influence on neighboring countries, considering it a step to becoming a world power,
competing with the strategic engagement of major countries, create a solid security belt and
deeply affect the surrounding area; maintaining a stable environment for China's reform and
development.
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In general, China continues to pursue the motto "use economic to promote politics" and
foreign affairs policy "stick and carrot". For countries without territorial sovereignty disputes and
regional strategic competition with China, China will radically adopt "seductive" foreign affairs
policy to strengthen good relations and use soft power economic (aid, investment) to entice,
increase influence. For countries with territorial sovereignty disputes and a strategic competitor
to China in areas such as Japan, India and some Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam,
Philippines), China will have a multidimensional approach, taking advantage of cooperation,
deterring and imposing, may even use firm measures to handle territorial sovereignty disputes.
As for ASEAN: China will continue to implement a two-sided policy, both calming and
imposing. On the one hand, actively mobilizing about the "diamond decade" in China-ASEAN
cooperation, promoting the idea of building a community of destiny and new cooperation
framework; enticing ASEAN countries to participate in the establishment of the "21st Century
Maritime Silk Road" to mobilize a number of related countries to participate more deeply in the
Mekong - Lan Thuong cooperation initiative. On the other side, thoroughly using economic and
financial leverage to guide Southeast Asian countries into cooperative trajectories led by China,
seeking to entice, divide ASEAN on the issue of East Sea and Security regional security,
proactively discourages the involvement of the US and other countries outside the region. The
deeper involvement of China and other major countries in the region will continue to create great
challenges to ASEAN's solidarity, unity and leading role in regional mechanisms.
For multilateral mechanisms
China defines multilateral diplomacy as an important "international arena", a "stage" to
express the image of "responsible big country"; actively advocate, actively participate in the

reform process and build a global governance system with the aim to: (i) towards building new
mechanisms and institutions that benefit China; (ii) protect and promote China's security and
development interests outside; (iii) promote multilateralization of international order, re-establish
new rules and rules in the region and the world; (iv) enlisting forces in global agendas,
improving China's international status.
In the coming time, China will continue to actively promote diplomatic activities in
international and regional mechanisms / forums that benefits China, actively promote its role,
voice and strength "vote" in important multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and
UN agencies, thereby influencing and participating in leading the reform process, perfecting the
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global governance system, promoting forming multi-polar, multi-center international politicaleconomic order that benefits China; continue to have a strong voice in support of the role of
multilateral trade institutions, demonstrating the leading image of protecting economic
globalization, combating protectionism, promoting trade-investment liberalization international;
actively lead and shape the agenda in a number of important international economic
mechanisms / forums such as WEF, WTO, G20 and APEC.
Promoting mechanisms and initiatives on regional security and economy
About security, China will promote the development of mechanisms and reshaping
regional security structures through strengthening and expanding the role of organizations /
forums that China has a lot of influence such as CICA, SCO , Xiangshan Forum, ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM +); actively coordinating with Russia to play a leading role
to enhance SCO's position in the region, on the one hand to promote the formation of an
important alliance in the framework of this mechanism to prevent three forces "terrorism,
separatism, extremist religion" maintains peace and stability in China's border areas, on the other
hand enlists a non-US and Western organization to promote China's role and influence in
international and regional issues. Besides, for some security initiatives such as "new Asian
security concept" which has not achieved significant results in the past, China will continue to
"raise" this issue at the multi-forum. regional and international directions to maintain their
strategic interests, continue to raise the contention of "Asia's work by Asians" to limit and move

away from the involvement of powers of foreign countries, especially the US. About fact, China
wants to "zone" Asia in its area of influence, wiping out US influence from the region.
About economics, China with increasing economic and financial potential, is and will
seek to challenge the world economic order led by the US after the Second World War through
the following steps: (i) The focus is to drastically implement the initiative "Belt and Road,"
especially key projects along the "Silk Road Economic Belt" (taking the old Silk Road as the
main) to promote connection with the Eurasian Economic Union, expand the space and influence
of China's economy in Asia and Europe; (ii) consolidate and expand new financial and economic
institutions in parallel with existing institutions such as AIIB Bank, BRICS Bank, SCO Bank,
Silk Road Fund (currently with a total capital of about USD 200 billion, separate USD 40 billion
Silk Road Fund); (iii) focus on promoting bilateral and multilateral FTAs, especially the RCEP
Agreement (which is a non-US mechanism), ACFTA 2.0 (China FTA with new ASEAN
19


countries, instead of the actual version) from 2010, FTAAP (FTA of the entire Asia-Pacific
region) to compete with institutions led by the US and Japan; (iv) continue to promote the
internationalization of the Yuan, creating a position as a key currency of payment and reserves of
the world; (v) promote the implementation of the Mekong - Lan Thuong cooperative initiative to
compete with existing cooperation mechanisms between the Mekong sub-regions with Japan,
South Korea, India and the US.
Deploying strategy of sea power
On the basis of the potentials, objectives and strategic interests in the rise to global
power, in the coming time, China will continue to promote the implementation of the "sea
power" strategy on all aspects, including The South China Sea will become the key direction.
China's implementation of this strategy in the context of territorial and maritime disputes
between China and neighboring countries that have not been resolved and increasingly
complicated will make sovereignty disputes between China and other countries. In the area is
getting more and more severe, if there is no effective control measures, the occurrence of a
collision, even a local conflict, is not excluded. About thinking and behavior, China on the one

hand will maintain a maximum of harmonious and stable factors to promote cooperation,
especially "joint exploitation" but on the other hand will be more resolute and tougher in
protecting maritime sovereignty and interests 13; increase mobilization, pressure on both bilateral
and multilateral channels to force countries to compromise low intensity, even China can accept
small-scale collisions and conflicts with some individual statues to convey the message of
deterrence, on the premise do not upset the big face, keep the environment relatively stable, do
not affect the goal of focusing on economic development and building the world power of China.
About the South China Sea issue, China continues to apply a two-sided policy with more
flexible and practical measures. On the one hand, promoting dialogue and cooperation, affirming
the policy of resolving disagreements by peaceful measures, persisting the stance of dealing with
the South China Sea by the "two orbits" method.

14

; continue to push countries in the "joint

exploitation" issue to actively work out cooperation projects, using economic benefits to entice
and differentiate ASEAN, seek to narrow the scale of the South China Sea issue in the overall
China-ASEAN relations; promote propaganda to calm public opinion, prevent the involvement
of the US and countries outside the region.

20


14

(i) Relevant disputes brought by direct negotiations through friendship negotiations to seek peaceful settlement;

(ii) Peace and stability in the South China Sea are jointly protected by China and ASEAN countries.


On the other hand, China still maintain a strong and assertive viewpoint and action in
matters relating to maritime and maritime sovereignty disputes; continue to carry out field
activities to break the status quo in the South China Sea, disable the decision of the Arbitration
Court (PCA) such as renovating and expanding artificial stone islands, and intensifying insidious
inconvenience, strengthen actual control within the "Nine-dash line", gradually controlling the
strategic situation in the South China Sea, but at the same time avoiding large-scale military
conflicts or breaking ties with other countries.
III. Some assessments on China’s strategy adjustment after the XIX Congress up to
now and its impact
1. As for internal politics, foreign control has shifted from a highly focused "collective
leader" to a "nuclear leader" focus on Xi Jinping.
Xi Jinping affirmed the supreme leadership position, made important reforms to enhance
China's role and position: establishing Xi Jinping's diplomatic thought is the guiding thought
of all activities facing China, expressed in 8 main functions: (i) Clarify the strategic objectives
and mission of foreign affairs in the new situation; (ii) Affirming self-confidence in the socialist
country with Chinese characteristics; (iii) Emphasize to build a community of same destiny; (iv)
Enhance global diplomacy with the goal of developing global partnerships; (v) Determining the
construction of the "Belt and Road" to dominate the new external opening layout; (vi)
Demonstrate the determination (actually harder) in protecting national sovereignty security
interests; (vii) Provide innovative global governance concepts and practices (essentially
competing for world leadership with the US and the West); (viii) Emphasize the absolute
leadership of the Party in foreign affairs (essentially the leadership role of Xi Jinping).
Accordingly, the international strategic focus of China under Xi Jinping, as presented by
the Chinese state diplomacy, aims to revive the Chinese nation with the emphasis on "actively
act" instead of "wait for time", actively leading new order formation at the regional and global
level based on the main pillars is to build "new international relations" and "the common
community of humanity ", In which the" Belt and Road "initiative is the main tool and method of
deployment. China has upgraded the sub-group leads the central foreign affairs into the Central
21



Foreign Affairs Committee, breaking the unwritten rule "7 up 8 down."

15

(from a State

perspective) brought former Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Wang Qishan (70 years old) as Vice President and Member of the Central Foreign Affairs
Committee. Although only a member of the committee, Wang Qishan is considered by the public
to be the main responsible for directing and managing China's foreign affairs, having a higher
voice than the Vice Chairman of the Committee Prime Minister Li Keqiang and is only behind
the Chairman of the Committee, General Secretary and President Xi Jinping

16

. In terms of

personnel, China has used and promoted top diplomats and enthusiastically supported Xi
Jinping: former State Councilor Yang Jiechi was elected as a full-time Politburo member in
charge of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Committee; Foreign Minister Wang Yi is
allowed to join the State Councilor (equivalent to Deputy Prime Minister)

17

. In terms of

resources, China increased its budget for diplomacy, increasing by 15.6% in 2018, reaching 9
billion USD, nearly doubling the level of the national defense budget of 8.1%. In leading,
gathering forces, China consulted the experiences of world powers, established the Department

of International Development Cooperation like USAID model, KOICA and JICA to build and
coordinate the general Foreign aid.
In addition, China has stepped up its foreign policy adjustment, strengthening its
diplomatic diplomacy, with a focus on promoting large foreign diplomacy and neighboring
diplomacy, taking large foreign diplomacy as a leverage in handling relations with neighbors,
taking neighboring diplomacy as a tool to gather forces, competing with major countries. In its
overall foreign policy, China has put the relationship with the US on top priority with the goal of
not letting the China-US relations fall into conflict, confrontation, to sustain the party
environment. in addition to peace, stability, creating favorable conditions for China to rise in
peace, to achieve the victory of two "goals of 100-year" and the Chinese Dream. China's
treatment of Taiwan, the China-US trade dispute and the case of the Zhongxing Group (ZTE)
show that China is firm in principle, but flexible and pragmatic in strategy.

16

According to some sources, the recent moves of China in dealing with relations with the US, Japan and the Korean issue are all

advised and advised by the Vice President Wang Qishan.

22


17

Before the XIX Congress, Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi all wrote articles praising diplomatic thoughts of Xi Jinping, contributing

to creating a public opinion for China to formally establish diplomatic thought of Xi Jinping at the Conference. external relations
(June 22-23, 2018).

On the other hand, China willing to push up the dispute, however there are concessions

necessary, to push the US into negotiation and dialogue to keep the situation under control.
Besides accepting President Trump's claims about ZTE Corporation, China also directed
domestic press to limit criticism of President Trump, reducing the commentary on the "Made in
China 2025" strategy.
2. China has completely abandoned the motto "wait for time" even at regional and
international levels
In fact, since the XVIII Congress in 2012, China has taken a strategic adjustment,
gradually shifting from "wait for time" initiated by Deng Xiaoping to "actively act" with the aim
of bringing China from the "stand up" (under Mao Zedong) period, "getting rich" (under Deng
Xiaoping) to a "strong up" period (under Xi Jinping). But it is not until the XIX Congress of
2017, China's position and power as well as international and regional conditions, especially the
seemingly "shrinking" US expression under Trump to focus on domestic issues, China has
completely abandoned the motto "wait for time", openly expressed ambition and strategic
intentions at both regional and global levels. Accordingly, the XIX Congress marks China's total
abandonment of the motto "wait for time". 18 shifted to "actively act", affirming "great diplomatic
with Chinese characteristics in the new era". XIX Congess is also the first time China has
publicly identified a three-step roadmap to become a world superpower in 2049, publicly
affirming its ambition to become a "world leader", arguing that China "has ever gotten closer to
the world central arena". This is considered a "declaration of war" directly to other major
countries, especially the US. In practical implementation, China's total abandonment of “wait for
time" is reflected in three main points:
Firstly, China tends to further expand the scope of national interests, demonstrating a
more rigid approach in matters of sovereignty claims: after officially raising the South China Sea
to "core interests" (7/2017) 19, bringing the island's achievements to the Political Report at the
XIX Congress, after the XIX Congress and the Congressional Session (the first session of the
2018-2023 term), China has taken the Initiative "Belt and Road ”(BRI) into the Constitution
amends, announcing the" White Book of Arctic Policy "(1/2018) etc. In the East Sea, in addition
to suppressing disputed countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, for
23



non-disputing countries like Indonesia, China also increased pressure, opposing Indonesia's
partial renaming of the East Sea to "North Natuna Sea".
Second, direct competition with the US over not only geographical - economy and
strategy as before, but also both models / values. The internal difficulties of the US and EU
through the phenomena of Donald Trump and Brexit make China think that the Western multiparty democracy model has problems. Therefore, China has moved from being passive to active.
Xi Jinping claims that the Chinese model is a new option for countries, demonstrating China's
wisdom and approach to solving human problems. At the congregation meeting in early 2018, Xi
Jinping confirmed that other countries should consult China's "new political system model".
Although it still insists that it does not seek to "revolutionize export", that fact shows that China
is seeking to disseminate its model / value system outside.
Third, promote propaganda to show the "responsible big country" image in handling
regional and global issues such as promoting globalization in opposition to US protectionism,
more proactive leading international efforts to respond to climate change after the US announced
its withdrawal from CORP-21 etc XIX Congress stressed that China will actively contribute
"Chinese wisdom and plans" to international issues, actively participating in the formulation and
shape of global governance. Xi Jinping's speech at Boao forum confirmed that China continues
to reform, open the door, promote globalization and win-win cooperation.
In parallel with focusing on handling relations with the United States, China is also
actively taking advantage of the US shrinking to strengthen its internal strength and the EU falls
into a difficult, internal rift like Brexit, anti-protectionism. globalization etc to promote global
roles and influences, promote the actual implementation of the "Belt and Road" initiative (BRI),
demonstrating the "lead" image at multilateral fora (WEF Davos, G20, APEC), especially in
economic globalization, trade liberalization, significantly improving diplomatic influence,
international status and soft power on a regional and global scale. The Asian Power Index report
of the Lowy Institute, Australia (May 8, 2018) shows that China now has the largest diplomatic
influence in the region, exceeding the US for the first time.20 10
About the gathering of forces, for the first time, the concept of global values of China
such as "Common destiny community" and "new international relations" are mapped with the
1020 In terms of overall strength, the United States ranked highest with 85/100 points, China ranked

second with 75.5 points; But with the diplomatic power criteria, China reached 89.4 points, the US
achieved 83.8 points.

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motto "win-win cooperation". Unlike the United States, China continues its non-coalition policy
but strengthens the construction of a "global partnership network" and "circle of friends" under
the motto of flexibility, without relying on ideology but grounds. into national interests and on
the basis of development benefits. By the end of 2017, China has built a strategic partnership and
comprehensive partnerships with more than 100 countries and regional and international
organizations (including more than 50 strategic partners are countries).
For the current international institutional system, China: (i) make the most of the
institutions that are in their favor, including the United Nations and the WTO; (ii) pressuring
global governance reforms, especially in areas and issues that China does not match with its
potential and benefits and (iii) building institutions that exist but compete with the institutions
dominated by the US and the West. Specifically, China strives to promote the Boao Forum to
counterbalance the World Economic Forum Davos, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
counterbalance with ADB, Xiangshan Forum to counterbalance with Shangri-la Dialogue. China
also seeks to institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms that are dominated by
itself and without the participation of the United States, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA) etc
The "Belt and Road" initiative is promoted to implement in reality, more clearly
expressed through BRI to expand strategic space, gather forces, lead the shaping of regional
order by China plays a key role. By early 2018, BRI attracted more than 80 countries with a total
population of 70%, GDP 30% and trade 25% of the world. As of April 2018, China signed 101
cooperation agreements with 86 countries and international organizations within the BRI
framework; signed 16 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 24 countries and territories such as:
Korea, Pakistan, ASEAN, Peru, Chile etc. In the five years 2012-2017, the total trade turnover

between China and BRI countries reached over USD 5,000 billion. Particularly in 2017, trade
turnover between China and BRI countries reached 1.440 billion USD, China invested 14.4
billion USD in BRI countries, the total contract value of construction projects reached 144.3
billion USD. Along with AIIB, other Chinese banks also pledged about $ 900 billion for projects
within the BRI framework. Recently, China continues to offer the initiative "4 + 1"

21 11

In order

to promote economic cooperation with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, together
1121 This initiative was first raised by Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang during his official visit to
Indonesia in May 2018.

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×