Towards an effective european single market implementing the various forms of european policy instruments across member states

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Towards an Effective
European Single Market

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Michael Kaeding

Towards an Effective
European Single Market
Implementing the Various Forms
of European Policy Instruments
across Member States

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Michael Kaeding
(Ph.D., Leiden University),
Brussels, Belgium

ISBN 978-3-531-19683-1
DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-19684-8

ISBN 978-3-531-19684-8 (eBook)

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© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2013
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Acknowledgements
The idea for this book started life initially in 2006 when I drafted the conclusions

of my Ph.D. thesis ‘Better regulation in the European Union: Lost in Translation
or Full Steam Ahead? The transposition of EU transport directives across
Member States’ (Leiden University Press). Until then, regulations and directives
had been the dominant policy instrument in the European Union. The use of new
modes of governance at the European level had already increased in salience and
attracted some scholarly attention, but a systematic comparison of implementation patterns in hard and soft law traditions had been lacking ever since. The year
2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the Single Market. In order to guarantee its
effective functioning, which will also be strategically important for the success
of the EU 2020 strategy, we need, however, to understand and unleash the
potential of the existing EU regulatory framework, including the complete
toolbox of European policy instruments. This volume will help to overcome
many of the impediments to using alternative policy instruments at the European
level as effective responses to pressing European and global policy issues.

This research would have been impossible without discussions and collaboration
with colleagues from the NWO financed research group ‘Analyzing EU Policies:
The Transposition of Directives’ program at the Department of Public Administration (including B. Steunenberg, K. van Kersbergen, F. van Waarden, A.
Dimitrova, M. Haverland, M. Rhinard, S. Berglund, I. Gange and M. Romeijn)
and the GAK financed project ‘Hervorming Sociale Zekerheid’ at the Department of Tax Law and Economics (including K.P. Goudswaard, .C.L.J. Caminada, G.J.J.H. van Voss, M. Versantvoort, O. van Vliet, B. ter Haar, H. Nijboer
5

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and A. Eleveld) of the University of Leiden. Some of the thoughts that turned
into chapters were also presented at seminars and conferences, where I received
valuable feedback (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI): Bringing Civil Society in: The European Union and the rise of representative democracy, Florence in 2009; ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 in Lisbon and 2010 in Münster). Lukas Obholzer and Leonard Geyer provided research support for which I
am very grateful. I would also like to thank European Union Politics and the
Journal of European Integration for giving me permission to use parts of previously published material.

In addition, I am indebted to the European Institute of Public Administration
(EIPA) for granting me study leave for three months at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (USA), during which I finalized the manuscript, and generously
financed by the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board. Warmest thanks go to the
(extended) family and close friends who have always supported me in every way
possible. I dedicate this book to my parents.

The views expressed in this book are that of its author and do not commit nor
reflect that of his institution of employment, nor its staff. I am solely responsible
for any mistake or inaccuracy.

Dr Michael Kaeding
Brussels and Madison,
March 2011

6


Table of Contents
Illustrations
Abbreviations and Acronyms

9
11

INTRODUCTION
1.

Implementing the Various Forms of European Policy
Instruments across Member States

13

PART I: TAKING LEGISLATIVE ACTION
2.

Implementing Classic Directives across Member States

27

3.

Implementing Flexible Directives across Member States

53

PART II: TAKING NO LEGISLATIVE ACTION
4.

Implementing Self Regulations across Member States

71

5.

Implementing Recommendations across Member States

99

6.

Implementing Open Methods of Coordination across
Member States

127

CONCLUSION
7.
8.

Towards an EU Regulatory Framework for an Effective
Single Market

143

Epilogue – From Europe 2020 to the TSCG and Solvit-Centres

149

Annexes

157

References

161

Curriculum vitae

173

7


Illustrations
List of Tables
Table 1

Effects of the timeliness of national transposition processes

Table 2

Categorisation of national legal instruments in nine Member
States

Table 3

Determinants of transposition delay: Ordered Multinomial
Logit

Table 4

Lamfalussy Background and Institutional Architecture

Table 5

MIFID, Market Abuse, Transparency and Prospectus

Table 6

FSAP directives

Table 7

Duration of enactment before and after (in months)

Table 8

Comparing the pace of legislative activity

Table 9

Transposition delay (in months)

Table 10

Transposition pattern

Table 11

Typology of EU agreements (Art. 155(2) TFEU)

Table 12

Degree of correctness of implementation of the 2002
Autonomous Agreement on Telework

Table 13

Timeliness of national implementation of the 2002
Autonomous Agreement on Telework

Table 14

Commission recommendations on better transposition

Table 15

Political priority

Table 16

Nature of administrative coordination

Table 17

Involvement of national parliament

Table 18

Nature of national legal instrument

9


Table 19

Evaluation of Member States’ implementation of
Commission recommendation

Table 20

Transposition deficit (in percentage)

Table 21

Total social expenditure as percentage of GDP

Table 22

Total expenditures as for 1% of population aged 65+ and
percentage of GDP controlled for unemployment rate

Table 23

The milestones of the EU 2020 strategy

List of Figures
Figure 1

Number of implementing measures per year

Figure 2

Attendance of the European Social Committee

Figure 3

Countries with decreasing, constant or increasing
total social expenditures pattern

10


Abbreviations and Acronyms
CBI

Voice of Business

CEBS

Committee of European Banking Supervisors

CEEP

Centre of Employers and Enterprises
providing Public services

CEIOPS

Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors

Celex

Communitatis Europeae Lex

CESR

Committee of European Securities Regulators

Commission

European Commission

Council

Council of Ministers

DGB

Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund

EBC

European Banking Committee

ECI

European Citizens’ Initiative

EFC

European Financial Committee

EFCC

European Financial Conglomerates
Committee

EIOPC

European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Committee

ESC

European Securities Committee

ETUC

European Trade Union Confederation

EU

European Union

FSAP

Financial Services Action Plan

FSC

Financial Services Committee

11


HR

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy

Parliament (EP)

European Parliament

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development

OMC

Open method of coordination

TFEU

Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union

TSCG

Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union

TUC

Trades Union Congress

UEAPME

European Association of Craft, Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises

12


1
Implementing the Various Forms of European
Policy Instruments across Member States

1.1.

The various forms of European policy instruments - neglected?

Rules are essential for economic growth, social and environmental protection
and overall well being. Unfortunately, they are often introduced as a knee-jerk
reaction to a particular problem reflecting the so-called ‘regulate first’ culture in
both the European Union and its Member States. Although legally-binding
instruments often seem to be the most appropriate choices to achieve policy
objectives, this volume argues that they might sometimes only be ‘second best’
imposing unnecessary costs on citizens and businesses and dampening innovation with significant implications for competition and economic performance.
Instead an alternative policy instruments may be available and more effective.
Furthermore, legally-binding acts do not entail any guarantee for full compliance. In 20 years the European Single Market has not been completed; in fact
non-compliance with EU law represents a serious and alarming threat to the EU
project as a whole. If we are to compete successfully in an increasingly aggres13
M. Kaeding, Towards an Effective European Single Market,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-19684-8_1,
© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2013

sive global market, whilst many other economies continue to get stronger, all
parts of the EU, Member States and the EU institutions, must put the Single
Market ‘back on stage’. And we need to regulate smarter.
The answer therefore is not to give up on rules, but rather to develop
and implement good-quality regulations. Presenting both timely and relevant
cases for the many forms of European policy instruments this volume provides
useful data regarding what policy instruments work and under what circumstances to overcome many of the impediments to using alternatives as appropriate responses to European policy challenges. Drawing from recent examples
covering different policy areas (transport, financial services, work conditions,
public administration and social protection) data show that alternative policy
instruments come along with many advantages, but are not a panacea for full
compliance. Breaking with a long-standing mantra, this volume suggests that
only correctly implemented alternative policy instruments are potentially
quicker, cheaper, more flexible, innovative, transparent and effective.

1.1.1 Why to regulate in the first place?

States do regulate to achieve outcomes which might otherwise not be put into
effect, induce or get around outcomes in different locations to what might
otherwise happen, or induce or frustrate outcomes over different time units than
would otherwise occur. In fact, there history of government regulation is rich.
Common examples of regulation include controls on market entries, institutional
reforms, standards of production for certain goods, freedom to provide services,
employment for certain people in certain industries or pollution effects.

14


Classic regulations are justified using a variety of reasons. In economics
the existence of a market failure, i.e. the inefficient allocation of goods and

services by free market (Bator 1958), is often used as a justification for government. Market failures are associated with inadequate information, noncompetitive markets (risk of monopoly), unseen externalities (Arrow 1969), and
collective action problems (Samuelson 1954; Buchanan 1965). Other schools of
thought stress aspects of endogenous preferences, collective desires, diverse
experiences, irreversibility or interest group transfers.1
More generally, regulation is a direct mechanism for changing behaviour based on the assumption that those subject to the regulation are required to
comply with its provisions. Policy instruments are ‘means of controlling and
coordinating both public and private actors’ (Bähr 2010). If not they face financial or custodial penalties. Policy instruments that one way or another ‘involve
the utilization of state authority or its conscious limitation’ (Howlett 2005).
There is a reassuringly direct link between the regulation and the expected
outcome for the policy maker, government and citizen alike, assuming that
governments are able to enforce effective compliance thereof. In summary, rules
are crucial for economic growth, social welfare, environmental protection and
over-all well being.

1 Developing in parallel with the growth of capitalism, Weber understands the body of coherent and
calculable law in terms of a ‘rational-legal authority’, which forms a precondition for modern
political developments and the modern bureaucratic state. Central to the development of modern law
is the formal rationalisation of law on the basis of general procedures that are applied equally and
fairly to all. Durkheim (1893) argues that as society becomes more complex, the body of civil law
concerned primarily with restitution and compensation grows at the expense of criminal laws and
penal sanctions. Over time, law has undergone a transformation from repressive law to being an
indicator of the mode of integration of a society.

15


1.1.2. Pitfalls of the classic regulatory approach in the European Union
In practice, however, things look different. Too often the first response by
governments to a perceived policy issue is a traditional knee jerk ‘command and
control’ regulation. In addition, effective compliance is an illusion. In the European Union (EU), for example, things do not look promising. The European

Single Market, which describes the European project to create free movement of
people, goods, services and capital within the EU and to mould Europe into a
single economy, is yet incomplete – after 20 years. A recent Commission scoreboard illustrates that 74 Single Market directives had not yet produced their full
effects due to lack of national transposition measures in one or more Member
States (Commission 2010: 13). In addition, Member States grant themselves too
often an extra 6-9 months after the deadline has expired to adopt the implementing legislation (Commission 2010). Next to delayed transposition (Mastenbroek
2003; Kaeding 2006; Toshkov 2008), European Single Market directives are too
often applied incorrectly (Versluis 2004; Falker, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber
2005), which leaves us with a highly fragmented Single Market, i.e. a ‘regulatory
patchwork’, deterring citizens and businesses from exercising their rights.
More generally, the knee-jerk ‘regulate first’ approach may often be
only the ‘second best’ policy instrument. More effective and efficient alternative
policy instruments may have been simply overlooked despite the considerable
range of modes of regulation available and the fact that scholars have been
studying policy instruments for centuries (Hood 2007). This however could be
fatal. They lie in particular at the heart of the policy process (Dahl and Lindblom
1953: 16-18). The use of ‘second best’ policy instruments may often impose
unnecessary costs on citizens and businesses and dampen and restrict competitive pressure and innovation with significant implications for competition and
16


economic performance. In the long run, delayed and incorrect enforcement of
EU legislation are highly problematic since they potentially jeopardize the
credibility and reputation of the Single Market.

1.1.3. Ensuring effective regulation and reinforcing implementation
Doubtlessly delayed and incorrect compliance2 with EU legislation is a serious
and alarming threat to the EU project as a whole. With the Single Market we
intended to design an EU which creates economies of scale, allows the establishment of Europe-wide commerce and enables faster growth. If we are to
compete successfully in an increasingly aggressive global market, whilst many

other economies continue to get stronger, all parts of the EU, Member States and
the EU institutions, need to regulate smarter in order to guarantee the functioning
of the Single Market. The answer is not to give up on rules, but rather to develop
good quality regulatory framework with a variety of policy instruments.3 A
good-quality regulatory framework based on a handful of alternative policy
instruments will result in more effective and efficient answers to policy prob2 Implementation concerns 'incorporation into national law in all Member States. Three aspects are
important: Are the EU standards actually transposed in good time, on an appropriate scale, and in a
correct manner?' (Falkner et al 2005: p. 4).
3 Equity, fairness, simplicity and coherence considerations have a being on the choice of policy
response too, because the distribution of benefits and costs can differ between groups in society
and/or geographic areas. The perceived fairness of different instruments can influence the public’s
acceptance of the instrument, and hence the level of compliance. In turn, this has implications for the
effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument. The degree of political accountability also has an
important influence on perceptions of fairness. Those taking decision should be subject to some
oversight to ensure that they implement regulations as intended. Transparency can be an important
mechanism for ensuring accountability of regulators, next to existing avenues of appeal. Those
subject to the regulation should feel that there is an opportunity for review by an independent body if
they disagree with decisions or actions of the regulator. Therefore, equity and fairness considerations
are best embodied in policy instruments which are transparent in their operation and impacts; and
contain appropriate appeals mechanisms (Bovens, Curtin and ‘t Hart 2010).

17


lems. Effective in the sense that they resolve the problem they were introduced
to address; efficient in the sense that they minimise both the direct compliance
costs borne by those subject to the regulation, and other, often more indirect,
costs which may be imposed on the public.
This argument is not new. Both the OECD and the EU preach the
‘command of alternatives’ since the mid-90s. Consideration of alternative policy

instruments is a key element in the 1995 OECD checklist for regulatory decision-making and greater guidance to policy makers can help ensure that alternatives are more fully considered (OECD 1995; 2004). Since the 2000 European
Council in Lisbon the EU better regulation agenda foresees the consideration of
alternative policy instruments. A recent OECD report confirms that the explicit
examination of regulatory alternatives is increasing at a substantial pace. However the extent of their use remains still low (OECD 2008: p. 6). In 2005, only
18 countries had a systematic requirement that the use of alternatives to regulation be considered in all cases, while 8 countries required it in only some cases
(OECD 2008: p. 6). Four countries reported no requirement for the consideration
of alternatives at all. In sum, only half of the OECD countries had developed
guidance material to assist in the evaluation of suitable alternative approaches.
By now, the impact assessment guidelines set out strict requirements on how
new policy instruments should be designed.

1.1.4. Regulation can take many forms
Regulations can take many forms. The range of options varies according to the
hierarchy of policy instruments from prescriptive regulations and traditional

18


directives to flexible directives; self-regulatory instruments; recommendations;
and the open-method of coordination.4
-

Prescriptive (classic) regulations, directives and decisions

There are three forms of traditional EU law (Art. 288 TFEU). Regulations are
the most direct form. They are different from directives, which are binding as to
the goal to be achieved, but leaving national authorities the choice of form and
methods of complying instruments. Decisions apply in specific cases only,
involving particular authorities or companies.
-

Flexible directives (framework directives)

Since traditional directives can be sometimes over-prescriptive and inflexible,
creating complex requirements that are difficult to comply with. Framework
directives, on the other hand, can be more flexible by creating an overall framework that clearly sets out the objectives, then leaving open the means of achieving them. So-called flexible directives give Member States and economic operators the flexibility to implement provisions in ways suited to their markets and
avoiding the rigidity of a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Flexible directives, ideally,
draft the essential framework aspects of legislation, i.e. ‘(...) as far as possible, be
general in nature and cover the objectives, periods of validity and essential

4 This list is not exhaustive (Offe 1975; Scharpf 1976; Hood 1983; König and Dose 1993) Marketbased instruments (fiscal measures such as taxes or subsidies), for example, work by using market
signals (prices) to provide an incentive to businesses and citizens to act in a way which will achieve
the government’s policy objective. Maintaining the status quo is another important scenario. ‘Taking
no action’ should be part of the range of delivery options for consideration, except where the Treaties
require EU action which is enshrined in the legal provisions of the Treaties by the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality. Subsidiarity is the principle whereby the EU does not take action,
except in those areas which fall within its exclusive competence, unless such action is more effective
than action taken at the national, regional or local level. According to the principle of proportionality
any action should be as simple as possible to minimise the financial and administrative burdens on
governments, economic operators and citizens (see also Best 2008).

19


aspects of legislation, while technicalities and details should be a matter of
executive measures or be left to Member States.’ (Commission 2005c).
-

Self-regulation

The Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (2003: p. 3) defines
self-regulation as ‘the possibility for economic operators, the social partners,
non-governmental organizations or associations to adopt amongst themselves
and for themselves common guidelines at European level (particularly codes of
practice or sectoral agreements).’ Consequently, self-regulation requires markets
to regulate their own activities, without the requirement or agreements being
underpinned by legislation. The group is responsible for developing selfregulatory instruments, monitoring compliance and ensuring enforcement. EU
involvement is usually limited to encouraging or facilitating the process; perhaps
with the threat of legislation should it not be successful.5
-

Recommendation

Recommendations are adopted by the Commission or Council suggesting
courses of action. They are not binding for Member States (Art. 288 TFEU).
Though without legal force, they are negotiated and voted on according to the
appropriate procedure and therefore do have a political weight. A recommendation is an instrument of indirect action aiming at preparation of legislation in
Member States, differing from the directive only by the absence of obligatory
power. Issuing a recommendation can signal that the EU thinks action should be

5 There is often some cross over between self-regulation co-regulation (Best 2008), as the Commission is sometimes quite closely involved in self-regulation. For clarity, co-regulation involves some
sort of legal underpinning and can therefore be described as self-regulation with a legislative backstop.

20


taken in an area and is often a warning to industry that it needs to act or face the
likelihood of future legislation.
-

Open method of coordination

The open method of coordination (OMC) takes place in areas which fall within
the competence of the Member States, such as employment and social policies
(Art. 5 TFEU), protection and improvement of human health, industry, culture,
tourism, education, youth, sport, civil protection and administrative cooperation
(Art. 6 TFEU). It provides a framework for cooperation between the Member
States, whose national policies can be directed towards certain common objectives. It is based principally on jointly identifying and defining objectives to be
achieved (adopted by the Council); jointly established measuring instruments
(statistics, indicators, guidelines); and benchmarking, i.e. comparison of the
Member States’ performance and exchange of best practices (monitored by the
Commission). Member States are evaluated by one another (peer pressure), with
the Commission's role being limited to surveillance. Depending on the areas
concerned, the OMC involves so-called ‘soft law’ measures which are binding
on the Member States in varying degrees but which never take the form of
directives, regulations or decisions.

21


1.2.

Scope of the volume

Alternative policy instruments are not per definition a panacea for more effective
policies. If the EU wants to re-launch the Single Market successfully we have to
make every endeavour to address simultaneously the issue of what modes of
regulation are the most appropriate, and to take enforcement very seriously
(Monti 2010: p. 96). Breaking with a long-standing mantra this study argues that
also alternative policy instruments risk being not fully implemented. But timely

and correctly implemented alternative policy instruments are potentially quicker,
more flexible, cheaper and in the end more effective.
There seems to be considerable experimentation with the use of alternatives in EU countries. However, policy makers remain reluctant to seriously
consider the use of them or do they pay insufficient attention to the implementation of the instrument. The impediments to the wider use of alternatives are in
part due to a lack of knowledge of what alternatives exist in the policy instrument toolbox, and the circumstances under which they are successfully implemented.
This volume will therefore make useful information available in order
to increase acceptance of alternative instruments as effective responses to policy
issues6. This volume offers the first systematic comparative analysis of how new
and older policy instruments are implemented to determine the extent of compliance and determine reasons for non-implementation. Obviously, the aim is not
necessarily for 100% compliance. The trade-off between high level of compliance and increased monitoring and enforcement costs may be such that less than
full compliance is optimal. Central to being able to assess the effectiveness of a
6 See also Kohler-Koch (1998); Knill and Lenschow (2004); Scharpf (2006); Börzel (2009); Bähr
(2010).

22


policy response will be the time aspect. A timely implementation of the EU
instrument is a principle condition for correct implementation and enforcement
and more than ever pivotal in a fast developing global world economy. Consequently, this volume extends the earlier works of the OECD and the EU on
alternatives to traditional regulation by assessing the implementation of various
forms of regulations. Drawing from examples of different policy areas (transport,
financial services, work conditions, public administration and social protection)
which are of particular importance for the EU’s economic, social and environmental competitiveness and well-being, this volume will ensure that the analysis
is both timely and relevant to national and European policy makers.
The study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 suggests that Member
States have been struggling to cope with the volume and complexity of traditional regulation they are required to implement according to the EU Treaties.
The quantitative analysis, which covers the EU transport acquis, unearths that
the EU has a serious.
Departing from these findings, chapter 3 assesses the so-called Lamfalussy governance structure, which was set up to develop the financial service

industry regulations across EU Member States. While the financial market’s
importance for Europe’s global competitiveness is unquestionable, experts have
argued that the particular four-level Lamfalussy governance structure seem more
transparent, with better involvement of external stakeholders and enhanced
political cooperation between all the institutions, implying a general boost in the
quality of legislation on financial services and an acceleration of the legislative
process due to its higher degree of flexibility. This study will challenge these
mantras. Over the last ten year, the length of the decision-making processes
could not be significantly reduced, and the EU seems to face very similar implementation problem in financial services as other regulatory policy sectors.
23


Entering the section of non-legislative action chapter 4 offers an analysis of the effectiveness of so-called self-regulatory autonomous agreements
between European social partners. Underlining the lack of power of European
social partners vis-à-vis their national member organisations and anticipating a
‘regulatory patch-work’ at national level due to very diverse traditions of industrial relations, scholars have been sceptical about the prospects for implementation of self-regulatory European autonomous agreements. Empirical evidence
from the implementation of the 2002 Telework Autonomous Agreement suggests, however, that European autonomous agreements and their implementation
across Member States are taken seriously by all actors involved. European social
dialogue made a qualitative leap forward by galvanising national social actors.
Chapter 5 evaluates the effectiveness of recommendations. In light of
the functioning of the Single Market, the chapter’s general concern is to explore
how Member States have converged around the Commission’s administrative
best practices for the transposition of EU legislation. The study finds evidence
for converging tendencies since 2004 towards the recommended administrative
model in the Member States.
Chapter 6 scrutinizes the effectiveness of the open method of coordination (OMC) – which has renewed the notion of policy convergence/divergence
across EU Member States. This chapter examines the role of European integration in shaping and changing social welfare systems. Based on 2007 OECD
social expenditure data and controlled for cyclical and demographic effects, this
analysis finds that social expenditures of EU Member States have converged and
increased on average since 1991. On the other hand, non-EU Member States

have diverged, suggesting a tangible effect of European integration on Member
States’ social policy regimes.

24


The concluding chapter 7 draws together the results from the five case
studies based on which a number of recommendations are developed. Implementing these recommendations could make a real difference to the EU regulatory landscape.
The epilogue in chapter 8 adds some afterthoughts to the ongoing debates surrounding the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union, the Europe 2020 strategy and national Solvit
centres.

25


2
Implementing Classic Directives across Member States

2.1. The implementation of transport directives in the EU – lost in translation?7
This chapter is posed to unravel the EU implementation puzzle what factors
determine delays when implementing EU directives across Member States while
focusing on the time aspect of national transposition processes, which represents
a particularly salient form of non-compliance (Mastenbroek 2003; Berglund,
Gange and van Waarden 2006). In the following, this chapter refers to the
national transposition outcome as a game between bureaucratic and political
transposition actors who must agree, within an allotted time frame, on a new
national policy complying with EU law. Who ends the game and when depends
on the players’ expected payoff. The expected flows of payoffs to an actor equal
the difference between benefits and costs. Moreover, the costs of the new policies are not equally distributed among the actors, who may then engage in a war
of attrition as they attempt to redistribute or simply delay the realization of these

7 This chapter draws from Kaeding, M. (2008b) ‘Lost in translation or full steam ahead? The
transposition of EU transport directives across EU Member States’, European Union Politics 9(1):
pp. 115-144.

27
M. Kaeding, Towards an Effective European Single Market,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-19684-8_2,
© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2013