Tài liệu Organization-internal Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A Qualitative Case Study pptx

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Case Study
Organization-internal Transfer of
Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A
Qualitative Case Study
Thomas Kalling*
Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, Sweden
This paper reports a case study of a knowledge transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC,
and suggests that firm-internal knowledge transfer programmes are exercises requiring a great
deal of recipient motivation. In contrast to existing theory, which has a tendency to address the
role of cognitive factors such as tacitness, causal ambiguity and absorptive capacity, this paper
suggests that motivation needs to be in place first. In the studied case, differences in local per-
ceptions of transfer ventures, aspiration and strategic ambitions, internal competition, the view
on the nature of knowledge and local communication seem to explain success and failure in
transfer ventures. If motivation is not in place ‘naturally’, it can be managed in different
ways, including local and corporate management control routines as well as organization struc-
ture. Consequently, we argue that knowledge transfer theory should not presume that organi-
zational units are interested in the knowledge transferred, or that knowledge is always ‘good’.
Knowledge is contextual, meaning it fits certain operations and strategies better, even in
instances where intra-organizational units are homogeneous. Hence motivation is central to
transfer success. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge transfer within an organization may be
thought of as the process by wh ich an organization
makes available knowledge about routines to its
members, and is a common phenomenon that can
be an effective way for organizations to extend
knowledge bases and leverage unique skills in a
relatively cost-effective manner. With the increas-
ing resource-based focus in strategy research,
knowledge and ways to develop and leverage it

have become key strategic issues (Barney, 1991;
Peteraf, 1993).
Much of the research focuses on cognition, the
nature of knowledge and organizationa l issues, in
describing success and failure of knowledge tran s-
fer. Although there are debates about the finer
details of the roles of these factors, the factors that
are highlighted are relatively common from study
to study. However, there are relatively few in-
depth studies of the ways in which people involved
in knowledge transfer ventures behave, how they
perceive these ventures, and whether these factors
are connected to the subsequent success or failure
of knowledge transfer. Thus the purpose of this
paper is to provide some insight into how knowl-
edge transfers are perceived and managed by those
involved, and how this perception can affect learn-
ing strategies and subsequent success.
The paper is structured in the following way.
The next section discusses and summarizes theory
on knowledge transfer, and the following section
holds a discussion of the interpretive methodology
applied. Then follows an empirical section describ-
ing a knowle dge transfer initiative, framed by the
Knowledge and Process Management Volume 10 Number 2 pp 115–126 (2003)
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/kpm.170
Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
*Correspondence to: Thomas Kalling, Institute of Economic
Research, School of Economics and Management, Lund Univer-
sity, P.O. Box 7080, SE-220 07 LUND.

E-mail:
structure provided by interpretations of accounts.
We have interviewed more than 30 managers and
employees in SCA Packaging (a European paper
packaging supplier), representing both the sources
and recipients of transferred knowledge, about the
programme. The effects of the transfer programme
have also been measured, enabling comparison
between successful and unsuccessful plants. In
the subsequent sections we discuss the possible
explanations to transfer success and its relation to
existing knowledge transfer theory.
THEORY
Knowledge transfer theory has obvious overlaps
with general knowledge management, the latter
being defined as the individual and organizational
activities by which organizations develop or lever-
age their knowledge base. The specific focus of
knowledge transfer is the processes by which mem-
bers within an organization learn from each other,
without interacting with the environment.
Knowledge transfer theory attempts to explain
the factors that drive or hamper transfer. But in
terms of the dependent variable, the majority of the
empirical research has used ‘accomplished transfer’
(von Hippel, 1994; Darr et al., 1996; Szulanski, 1996),
rather than, say, product quality, or even perfor-
mance effects (exceptions include Ingram and
Baum, 1997; Levin, 2000; Tsai, 2001, McEvily and
Chakravarthy, 2002). Accomplished transfer has

been measured in different ways. Sometimes it is
based on individual assessments about whether
the transfer has been successful, requested through
questionnaire surveys (Szulanski, 1996). In other
studies, accomplished transfer has been measured
in terms of whether routines have been improved,
for instance whether labour cost per unit of output
has been improved (Epple et al., 1991).
The explanatory factors are subject to greater
variation. The nature of the transferred knowledge
is often addressed as an important factor (von
Hippel, 1994). For instance, the more tacit and com-
plex, the more difficult it becomes to accomplish
transfer (Simonin, 1999; Argote et al., 2000; McEvily
and Chakravarthy, 2002). The mo re ambiguous the
causes and effects of the knowledge, the more dif-
ficult it is to transfer (Szulanski, 1996, 2000; Stein
and Ridderstra
˚
le, 2001). Besides the knowledge
transferred itself, the cognitive abilities of both
the source of knowledge (Foss and Pedersen,
2002) and the recipient (Gupta and Govindarajan,
2000; Tsai, 2001) are key factors. Absorptive and
retentive capacity of the recipient, i.e. how well
equipped they are to take in, absorb, and apply
the knowledge, is of course central in transfer
situations (Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999; cf.
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Furthermore, the value
of the stocks of knowledge at the source is a poten-

tial factor. The more valuable it is, the more likely it
is that the recipient will attempt to use it (Gupta
and Govindarajan, 2000). The absorptive capacity
will determine whether it will work or not. Another
factor, related to competitive advantage, is the
uniqueness and inimitability of the knowledge. If
knowledge transferred internally can also be trans-
ferred externally, to competitors, for instance
through personnel migration or intelligence activ-
ities, there is a risk that the effects, say on costs,
can be duplicated by competitors. This can lead
to cost reductions across the industry, meaning
there is a risk that price and profit levels are
reduced overall. Here, the commonalty of knowl-
edge across actors will determine the risks of fail-
ure (Zander and Kogut, 1996).
Another risk refers to drawbacks that result from
the articulation of knowledge necessary in order to
be able to transfer it. Articulation requires simplifi-
cation, which means that finer aspects of the
knowledge might have to be removed or be unin-
tentionally lost (Boisot et al., 1997). Some argue
that the risks associated with articulating and
transferring tacit knowledge are so high that it is
more effective to avoid transferring such knowl-
edge and accep t the higher costs associated with
coordinating a diverse set of organizational skills
(Grant, 1996). However, it has also been argued
that organizations must try to diffuse knowledge,
otherwise it will be difficult to reap the leveraged

benefits of knowledge (Sanchez, 1997).
Apart from cognitive factors, organizational con-
text is often addressed. Geographical or perceived
proximity helps intensify communication between
individuals in different units. Phone calls, meetings
and personal acquaintances across units are nor-
mally associated with successful transfer (Epple
et al., 1991; Darr et al., 1996; Ingram and Baum,
1997). Intensive integrative practices, such as cross-
functional meetings and broad participation from
multiple functions further increase the chances of
successful transfer (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999). The
richness of communication channels (integrative
mechanisms such as liaison positions, task forces
and interpersonal familiarity) is another factor
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), as is the pre-exis-
tence of social subnetworks, referred to as the inter-
relations between organizational members, tools
and tasks (Argote and Ingram, 2000). In terms of
interrelations, arduousness (ease of communication)
as well strategic similarity (the extent to which units
are related strategically) impact transfer success
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
116 T. Kalling
(Szulanski, 1996; Tsai, 2000). Unsurprisingly, the
relative network centrality of the recipient, defined
as the number of communication linkages the unit
has, is positively associated with transfer as well
(Tsai, 2001). Furthermore, the perceived trust-
worthiness of the source of the knowledge is

reported to be a factor (Tsai, 2000).
A third group of factors falls under motivation.
However, the role of motivation appears debatable
and is less clear, according to research. Relatively
few empirical studies claim that motivation is
important. Stein and Ridderstra
˚
le (2001), drawing
on Polanyi (1962), suggest that motivational pro-
blems, such as unwillingness to absorb or share
knowledge, could be dealt with through socialisa-
tion, compensation, documentation, toleration, com-
munication and rotation. Motivation was also found
to drive source units to transfer knowledge (Gupta
and Govindarajan, 2000), but not all studies have
been able to corroborate this, either because they
have not studied it, or because they found it to be
unimportant. Szulanski (1996) studied a range of
factors and found no link between motivation and
transfer accomplishments. Cognitive and relational
factors were more important and therefore, Szulans-
ki suggested, it is better to stimulate learning capa-
cities and relations than incentives. In a subsequent
study (Szulanski, 2000), the downsides to motiva-
tion were elaborated upon. Highly motivated adop-
ters might ‘exacerbate problems of implementation
by prematurely dismissing outside help, expanding
seemingly straightforward modifications into major
projects, making unnecessary modifications to pre-
serve pride of ownership and status or to let out

hidden resentment , or switching to new prac-
tices at a suboptimal moment because of unchecked
enthusiasm’ (Szulanski, 2000, p. 24).
Thus, the theories on knowledge transfer rest
solidly on cognition, organizational context, and,
to a lesser extent, motivation. With this as a plat-
form, a very simple theoretical frame of reference,
this paper aims to shed light on perceptions of and
actions in relation to knowledge transfer, and
whether and how this influences success or the
antecedent factors of cognition, organization and
motivation.
METHODOLOGY
This is a case study, and the object of study is the
transfer of manufacturing knowledge in SCA
Packaging (SCAP). Epistemologically, the study
bears resemblance to grounded theory approaches
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967), but deviates slightly in
its focus on interpretation rather than positivistic
findings. We do not claim to be able to generalise
the empirical findings to a larger population, but
simply to highlight things in relation to existing
theory about the ways in which knowledge transfer
can be perceived and managed and how it might
influence the results of transfer processes. Further-
more, we deviate from grounded theory in our use
of an a priori theory as guidance. Grounded theory
is normally seen as purely inductive, free from the-
ory or pre conceptions. Some claim that a clear
mindset is important in order to avoid interpreting

in accordance with existing theories (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978), whereas others (Miles,
1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994) claim that an a
priori theory is important for positioning emergent
theory and stimulating analysis. This study
acknowledges the latter logic and takes its starting
point in the theories described above (see interview
guide, Appendix A). However, the overarching
ambition is to be able to develop or refine knowl-
edge transfer theory, which is done through a ‘pat-
tern-matching’ method (Yin, 1994).
THE CASE
The reported case concerns a corporate-spanning
knowledge transfer programme initiated in SCAP
in 1997. The objective of the programme is to
spread best production practices throughout the
plants in order to improve performance in the
less well-performing plants. The programme is
referred to as an exercise in improving production
skills with the result that cost improvements (less
labour and raw material per unit of output) and
price or sales volume improvements (through stan-
dardized qualities, reliable supply) are antici pated.
SCAP has over 200 plants, but only some 40 (per
2001) are included in the programme discussed in
this paper. The plants (profit centres) are spread
across Western Europe, primarily. The knowledge
inherent in the programme is absorbed both intern-
ally (from knowledgeable plants) and externally
(from the field of science, consultants, alliance part-

ners, machine suppliers etc.), and is continuously
growing and updated. Knowledge may be articu-
lated as production methods and procedures, or
as recommendations, suitable under certain condi-
tions and for certain machine types. Methods to
reduce machine downtime, improve maintenance
routines and eliminate waste are examples. Meth-
ods are documented in memos, reports and in data-
bases, accessible over the corporate intranet and
direct distribution. Three basic outputs are mea-
sured per machine: average machine speed, direct
productivity and waste; these results are reported
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 117
monthly from plants to head office. Each machine
team sets targets annually, and follows up perfor-
mance regularly. Benchmarking is made feasible,
and plants who want to improve performance on
a particular machine can easily track sister plants
across Europe who are performing well on that
machine, and approach them for their experience
and solutions. Successful machine teams are
awarded annually, on the basis of their improve-
ments, at an award ceremony attended by top man-
agement and runner-up machine teams. The
programme is administered centrally, by a techni-
cal department, including technical experts as
well as one data administrator. At plant level, the
production manager is normally responsible for
internal communications and the performance.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The main data collection method used was inter-
viewing. We basically asked respondents how
they perceived the programme and its pros and
cons, which the success factors are, if and why
they have succeeded, their view on the nature of
knowledge, the way they manage the system cen-
trally and locally, organizational interrelations,
control routines, local team work, and so forth
(see Appendix A for the interview guide). We
singled out five to six people at six of the plants
(the general manager, the production manager,
the sales manager, a supervisor, and one or two
operators), located in different countries in Western
Europe. We also interviewed staff at the central
technical department. In total 36 interviews were
made, all personal. Interviews were semi-struc-
tured, including some closed questions and some
open to ensure exploration. Here, the factors given
by theory were further investigated, but we also
asked open-ended questions regarding respon-
dents’ views. One researcher conducted all the
interviews, but fellow researchers assisted in the
interpretation of accounts, checking too radical
interpretations.
Interviews lasted between 60 and 200 minu tes,
and the average run length was approximately
120 minutes. Interviews were taped and tran-
scribed. Where appropriate, for instance regarding
accounts of events, we used respondent validation

(Van de Ven and Poole, 1990) to ensure reliability.
Interviewees were selected in order to provide a
broad representation of those involv ed. The case
company has no direct influence on the intervie-
wees sampled.
To provide a context for the relative success of
each unit we also studied up-front what sort of
improvements that had been made, at each of the
40 plants. Had they succeeded in improving
average machine speed, direct pro ductivity and
waste? This is of course an important issue if one
is interested in determining whether the local per-
ception and management of the knowledge transfer
programme potentially affects the results. As it
turned out, four successful plants had improved
significantly on waste performance. The other two
failed to improve at all. In terms of average
machine speed, even the two less successful plants
managed to improve a few percent, but nowhere
near the other four, which improved in a range
between 15% and 40%. In terms of direct produc-
tivity (annual output per full-time equivalent
machine workers), one of the two less successful
did improve on par with the average of the other
four, but the other unsuccessfu l plant actually
experienced a reduction of productivity of 20%.
(The six plants are briefly described in Appendix B.)
In accordance with the grounded approach, the
structure of the presentation of the empirical find-
ings below is based on observations, not primarily

on pre-existing theory, and on six dimensions in
relation to which successful and unsuccessful
plants differed.
EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATIONS
In the empirical study, we enquired about a range
of different potential factors behind transfer success
or failure. Six such factors appeared to discriminate:
the perception of the transfer programme, aspira-
tions and strategic ambitions, the view on (firm-
internal) competition, the view on the nature of the
knowledge transferred, programme management
and control, and local communication. This section
is structured accordingly. The (theoretical) areas
where successful and unsuccessful plants did not dif-
fer are not discussed here, but later in the overall
comparison between empirical findings and theory.
Local perceptions
The way that local managers and workers viewed
the programme, in terms of their associations
and the extent to which they liked it or not, differed
between plan ts. The two less successful plants,
referred to as plant 1 and plant 2, saw the exercise
more as a ‘stick’ and a competition that they could
never win, rather than a carrot. None of the ten
respondents in plants 1 and 2 expressed a positive
view.
The fact that not just methods but also the
results of their application (machine speed, direct
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
118 T. Kalling

productivity and waste levels) were measured
meant that some plants potentially blurred the
focus. ‘It is a performance measurement, a control
device for managers who do not know production
well, to set targets for machine men. I cannot see it
as a carrot, it is a stick’ (supervisor). ‘It is merely a
section of the annual productivity budget’ (produc-
tion manager).
Several respondents claimed they saw it as a
competition that they could never win, and that
they might not even want to win it, or at least not
be awarded for it. ‘The worker of the year approach
doesn’t fit our culture, we are not used to being
given vas es and dinners for doing our job, and
we are a bit too shy to be put on pedestals’ (general
manager). Furthermore, the two plants indicated
that the results-orientated approach did not take
local differences into account. ‘I can’t see that it
contributes a lot to the situation we are in, we don’t
primarily need more production improvements,
we need to focus on winning new customers’ (gen-
eral manager).
In comparison, the four successful plants dis-
played a different view. They focused both on the
results and the methods, and embraced, to a great-
er extent, the benchmarking opportunities. ‘It is
about knowledge and benchmarking’ (operator).
‘It is a knowledge base that has helped us survive
over these years’ (general manager). ‘It is a library
of methods’ (production manager). They did

acknowledge that there had, previously, been fears
that the programme was a corporate control exer-
cise designed to push up productivity. ‘There was
a fear initially that it was just a big stick, but that
view is gone now’ (supervisor). Respondents also
indicated that the programme has become integral
in day-to-day routines. ‘It is institutionalized now.
It is a way of living’ (production manager). ‘It has
helped us develop team spirit, it is in the minds of
the workf orce’ (operator). The majority of respon-
dents expressed positive experiences. However,
some respondents indicated that their level of
activity in terms of searching, absorbing and apply-
ing new methods was slightly declining. ‘I haven’t
been very active lately in checking which new
methods there are’ (production manager).
Aspiration and strategic ambitions
Because each plant investigated was run as a profit
centre and was normally measured (by corporate
headquarters) on operating margin and/or return
on operating capital , there was substantial leeway
and autonomy for local units to decide upon local
strategies. Corporate headquarters normally
allowed plants to work out for themselves how to
generate the margins and returns required, but
supported in specific areas, such as customer con-
tacts, technology development and information
systems. Therefore, local aspirations and strategic
intents had strong impact on whether central initia-
tives (such as the reported knowledge programme)

are being picked up locally.
Consequently, less successful plants did not see
production performance as an item on the strategy
agenda. ‘We have other priorities here at the
moment, like developing our customer base. The
advice is important, but obviously I am not familiar
with it. I don’t think we need that production
knowledge today’ (general man ager). Another gen-
eral manager said ‘We don’t have time. We are not
active enough, definitely not.’ This was true also
where the programme fits the local strategy. ‘It
fits our volume strategy well, but we simply don’t
have the energy’ (general manager). Respondents
also claimed that they have identified more general
inabilities to take on new methods. ‘Whenever we
try to change things here, there are obstacles
prolonging implementation. Things sim ply die,
and so does motivation’ (supervisor). Furthermore,
practical arrangements facilitating participation
were limited. ‘I don’t know of anybody who has
been trained on how to use the intranet. We have
a computer somewhere that accesse s the intranet
but I don’t know where it is’ (supervisor).
In the successful plants the situation was differ-
ent. They prioritized the programme, despite per-
ceived time limitations. ‘I am deeply involved in
working with taking in new methods’ (general
manager). ‘I am not too active but I have appointed
someone to be active for me. We don’t use the
intranet properly, though. It is a time issue’ (gener-

al manager). ‘We now have screens at each of the
machines, where they can access the intranet.
Each team also has formal gatherings where they
exchange knowledge’ (supervisor). ‘I use the intra-
net severa l hours a week to seek for new methods.
But there is a time issue’ (production manager).
The view on internal competition
The competitive nature of the programme was
addressed by many respondents, and it was a par-
ticular area where views differed. The programme
was designed as a competition, with official results
and annual award ceremonies. The program me
management stressed competition in their commu-
nications. Posters with formula-one depot teams,
rowing-boat teams and javelin-throwers stressed
the sports-related component of the programme,
intent to make employees aware of the value of
competition, teamwork and sportsmanship.
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 119
‘Merchandise’ such as printed T-shirts, armbands
and baseball caps were distributed and further
emphasized an athletic profile.
The weaker plants did not see competition as an
incentive, partly because they were too far from
being best in the corporation at the outset. ‘Playing
in Division three you don’t really think about Pre-
mier League. Many of our guys have given up com-
peting’ (production manager). ‘We only have one
machine with a chance to win, they might be com-

petitive, I don’t know really’ (general manager).
Another factor was priority: ‘We’re not driven by
being best’ (general manager). ‘There is always
someone somewhere who has better possibilities
and knowledge than we do’ (supervisor). In an
interesting twist of the competition concept, an
operator stated that ‘competition is good here in
the sense that it makes us wanting not to be the
worst’.
Successful plants embraced internal competition.
‘The people’s perception of competition is impor-
tant’ (general manager). ‘The transfer programme
means we can now compete on a constructive basis
across the company’ (supervisor). ‘The definitions
we use are now agreed upon by everybody in the
company. That was not always the case in the old
days’ (production manager). ‘I don’t think the guys
think about it constantly, but they are very proud
when they get awarded’ (general manager). Plant-
internal competition is still important for the
successful plants: ‘We compete with our selves in
relation to last year and we compete between shifts’
(supervisor). In certain plants, competition is dee-
ply rooted. An operator at a plant in the former
Eastern Europe said: ‘We are used to socialistic
competition, to be benchmarked and compared,
and to setting targets and making plans, and being
rewarded or punished depending on our results.’
The view on the nature of knowledge
Another factor that plants appeared to view differ-

ently is the nature of the knowledge transferred.
The programme clearly was an attempt to explicate
what previously (and to some still is) viewed as
tacit knowledge. While all respondents admitted
that the knowledge required to run any particular
machine efficiently was not completely explicit,
there were some differences in whether there is a
point in trying to articulate and make transferable
such knowledge.
It appeared that less successful plants perceived
production knowledge to be more tacit and diffi-
cult to articulate, than did successful plants—they
did not trust the articulated knowledge as forming
the only basis on which to develop work routines.
As a consequence, they saw little reason in even
trying to make use of it. ‘We have a complex pro-
cess that we cannot write down. There are many
parameters to think of. We once tried to list all
the parameters to consider but it is impossible’
(general manager). ‘There is a large proportion of
tacit knowledge that cannot be taught or trans-
ferred’ (supervisor). ‘There are many variables,
each machine has its own quirky bits’ (operator).
‘A lot of it is very tacit, we see that when certain,
more experienced people are replaced’ (production
manager).
Respondents in successful plants displayed a dif-
ferent view. ‘There is a certain tacit component but
I want to break it down’ (production manager). ‘We
wrongly believe it to be a form of art rather than

bringing it closer to science. Some of it is art but
we overplay that’ (production manager). ‘Quite a
lot can be written down. We can improve by writ-
ing things down’ (supervisor). Successful plants
also addressed motivational factors. ‘Motivation
drives learning here’ (operator). ‘There is a tacit
component, but then you need motivation to be
able to take it in, it is a learning curve to pass’ (pro-
duction manager). ‘The fact that others [less suc-
cessful plants] say knowledge is tacit only means
they are not skilled or motivated enough to grasp
it, doesn’t it?’ (supervisor).
Programme management and control
The way the knowledge transfer programme was
managed also differed between plants. The idea
of the central programme management was that,
at the least, plants should make yearly plans for
each machine, outlining performance targets, and
monitor and feedback progress both to the central
programme administration and to local staff. Their
ambition was that production managers should be
involved in the local assessments, if not the general
manager.
The less suc cessful plants indicate less activity in
this respect than the others. ‘I am involved in the
planning exercise only, once a year. I never discuss
these figures explicitly with my boss but we do dis-
cuss productivity on a quarterly basis. Our actual
results are reported to me by someone at head
office. One of our guys enters the data on the intra-

net’ (general manager). ‘We don’t display perfor-
mance figures on the notice board nowadays’
(production manager). ‘I have meetings with key
operators an hour every three weeks where we
might cover it’ (production manager). ‘I look at
the figures quarterly and focus on highlights. I go
through it with the production manager then too’
(general manager). ‘We don’t really discuss the
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
120 T. Kalling
figures explicitly, we used to. The programme is on
the backburner’ (supervisor).
Successful plants did it differently. The local
management was more involved. ‘I discuss these
things regularly with production management, at
least once a week. I go in ad hoc when needed’ (gen-
eral manager). ‘I get regular updates to be able to
inform my sales guys about current production
performance’ (sales manager). ‘I follow it up daily
and have meetings with key staff three times a
week when we discuss it. Monthly I go through it
with all staff’ (production manager). ‘I communi-
cate daily with operators and they really react
upon it. I have daily meetings about downtime,
overproduction and so on. The planning exercise
is dealt with rigorously with shift leaders and the
teams. We have broken down annual targets into
quarterly to get better control’ (production man-
ager). ‘Within the shifts we talk about it when
new data is displ ayed. All workers know about

the performance’ (operator).
Local communication
A final factor relates to plant-internal communica-
tion of efforts and results. It appeared that the less
successful plants sensed an urge to impr ove com-
munication of what is being done and achieved
within production to other stakeholders. Improve-
ments of activities other than production appear to
be perceived as potentially conflicting with produc-
tivity improvements. Functions such as Sales or
Logistics appear ed not to embody or understand
the principles of the knowledge transfer pro-
gramme, and as a consequence, support and atten-
tion were limited. ‘Sometimes, the production
figures are interpreted by people who do not
have the whole picture’ (production manager).
‘There is too much focus on productivity, you can-
not forget the market side, and we need to invite
the sales people’ (general manager). ‘We must com-
municate better with Sales. We need to communi-
cate it better with customers’ (sales manager).
‘We need to communicate better across plants’
(supervisor). Production too was seen as lacking
in understanding of the programme implications.
‘We must communicate better with the production
people, they don’t understand it very well here.
They must understand that this is something that
makes things easier for them’ (supervisor).
Communication was not seen as an issue in the
more successful units. No respondent indicated

that communication is a problem. ‘I am involved
on a monthly basis or if there is an ad hoc debate
about something between Sales and Production’
(sales manager). ‘We are informed about our
production performance and if it suits our pur-
poses we will communicate it one way or another
to our customers’ (sales manager).
DISCUSSION
The empirical interpretations of accounts of percep-
tions and actions in relation to knowledge transfer
give some indications in relation to existing theory,
discussed below.
The empirical interpretations that there are six
types of differences between plants that succeed
with internal transfer of knowledge indicate that
such corporate initiatives need to consider not
just cognitive factors, but also factors connected to
motivation and local and corporate management
control principles or routines. Indirectly, the orga-
nizational context can be seen as a factor as well.
In knowledge transfer theory, cognitive factors
such as the nature of knowledge and the absorptive
capacity of recipients are key ‘knowledge barriers’
(von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999).
This study implies that cognitive factors, such as
causal ambi guity and tacitness, and absorptive
and retentive capacity, are affected by motivation.
The stronger the motivation to learn, the more
likely it is that individuals will work harder on try-
ing to learn and pick up new knowledge. Trying to

make explicit what might be seen as tacit, at least
partly, may improve learning. Here, motivation is
absolutely central; what else will trigger learning,
if we assume that local knowledge and abilities
are naturally inflexible? Thus we propose that
motivation may be a factor behind cognition in
the first place.
Furthermore, the differences in motivation, in the
reported cases, are also evident in local perceptions
of transfer programmes, by the local aspirations
and strategic ambitions, by the view on internal
competition and partly in the internal communica-
tion. Those who perceive the programme as an
opportunity to learn, rather than as a ‘stick’, suc-
ceed. Those who see a direct fit with the existing
local strategy and those who aspire to improve
their performance, are likely to be more keen on
using the transferred knowledge. Furthermore,
the will to compete, with other shifts and other
plants, also appears to be a motivator. In a sense,
the lack of communication in the unsuccessful
plants also highlights a lack of motivation among
local managers. If those involved in or affected by
knowledge transfer do not understand the purpose
and the contents of it, if they cannot see the reasons
for it, they are likely to be less motivated to support
and contribute.
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 121
For all these factors, motivation is central. Moti-

vation drives cognition, and if cognition is not there
motivation might help. Motivation in turn can be
driven by many things: a weak position perfor-
mance-wise, or by a generic will to learn and
improve. If this ‘natural’ motivation is not in place,
local management control efforts may create the
incentive. General managers and production man-
agers can set targets, monitor and feed back to
those involved to stimulate activity. In the reported
case, we saw that successful plants had very active
local management in all these aspects. Further-
more, should local management not be active
enough in inspiring their work staff, corporate (or
middle if that is the case) management control
could help instead. In the above case, the corporate
involvement in terms of stimulating local manage-
ment was primarily through the award routine.
The regular financial reporting between general
managers and their superiors did not focus very
much on the knowledge transfer programme,
unless the general manager included it himself.
The management control factor can thus be seen
as a way to create an incentive to learn, when there
is no natural desire to do so—hence it is again a
factor connected to motivation.
The role of incentive shines through in the
empirical material. It also relates to corporate man-
agement control principles and indirectly to organi-
zational context. The reported company is
decentralized in the sense that local units are con-

trolled financially, only, and local management has
great leeway and is expected to formulate strate-
gies themselves. Horizontal communication
between plants is desirable but difficult with a
profit centre structure which forces each unit to car-
ry all their costs. In the vertical dimension, a fairly
remote relation between plants and their superiors
at corporate level further isolates the local unit.
Under such ci rcumstances, local motivation is a
make-or-break factor.
In relation to theory, this paper is strongly
focused on the role of motivation and incentives.
Motivation is seldom referred to as an explanatory
factor in knowledge transfer theory. Szulanski
(1996, 2000) found no or limited support for motiva-
tion being a factor, and reasoned that it may be
because motivation is also associated with uncritical
commitment. A few, like Gupta and Govindarajan
(2000) and Stein and Ridderstra
˚
le (2001) claim it is
important. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000), for
instance, do discuss the role of incentives and cor-
porate coercion in stimulating motivation. Huber
(1991) does not discuss motivation but claims that
internal distribution of information is triggered by
the view on the relevance of the information, the
power of the recipient, the level of workload and
resources available. In comparison, this study has
provided some insight on how motivation or lack

of motivation can occur and be managed in transfer
situations. We also suggested that if motivation is
not in place naturally, management control routines
and organizational context may substitute. These
factors are slightly more popular in theory (Epple
et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999; Argote and Ingram,
2000), while others claim they are unimportant
(Szulanski, 1996).
In order to get a more detailed discussion of the
role of motivation, we need to consult more general
knowledge management and organizational learn-
ing theory. However, even within the so-called
organizational learning track (cf. Fiol and Lyles,
1985; March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993) the
focus on learning is fairly cognitively biased. Con-
sequently, Fiol and Lyles refrain from discussing
motivation but suggest that learning is driven by
strategy, structure, culture and the environment.
As an interpretation, at least the first three of these
can be said to be connected with the concept of
motivation. They set the boundaries of learning
by defining business, norms and beliefs, and orga-
nizational infrastructure. Similarly, Nonaka (1994)
discusses organizational learning and suggests
that there are three factors that induce commitment
in an organiza tional setting: intention (sense-mak-
ing, intentionality), autonomy (autonomous organi-
zational members that interact can help stimulate
‘unexpected opportunities’ for learning) and fluc-
tuation (a discontinuous environment can generate

new patterns of interaction and hence stimulate
commitment to learn). Other than these factors,
the so-called not-invented-here concept refers to
situations where potential recipients of knowledge
lack the incentive to learn, primarily because they
do not sense that sources of knowledge have the
proper level of authority, and that their own
knowledge base has a stronger authority (Katz
and Allen, 1982, Hayes and Clark, 1985). Katz
and Allen, in particular, stressed the role of the per-
ception of oneself as an authority as a key obstacle
to learning.
But despite the slightly stronger focus on motiva-
tion within general organizational learning theory,
there is little discussion about motivatio n in knowl-
edge transfer theory. In a sense, existing theory on
knowledge transfer appears to assume that all units
within an organization are interested in a particular
piece of knowledge, and that if they are not, they
will be forced directly by corpo rate command to
recognize its importance. It also appears as if exist-
ing theory assumes that new knowledge is always
‘good’. In the case above, units are highly similar in
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
122 T. Kalling
terms of machinery and so on, but they have differ-
ent strategies, even in such simple dimensions as
the choice of generic strategy (Porter, 1980). Some
go for a low-cost strategy, others are working on
acquiring customers through differentiation. The

knowledge in question appears not to be an appro-
priate fit for both equally well. In organizations
with greater heterogeneity, this will be emphasised
even further. The proposition that theory subcon-
sciously makes these assumptions is also reflected
by the fact that most of them see the objective of
knowledge transfer to be accomplished knowledge
transfer rather than improved performance. A
number of the mentioned texts, like Epple et al.
(1991), Darr et al. (1996), Szulanski (1996), Tsai
(2000) and Stein and Ridderstra
˚
le (2001) use accom-
plished transfer as dependent variable. Exceptions
include Zander and Kogut (1995), Ingram and
Baum (1997) and Tsai (2001), who all study the
effects of transfer on competitive advantage, survi-
val and profitability. It should also be noted that
the knowledge transfer theory we have taken into
account is explanatory in nature. There are, as
yet, few theories aimed at outlining the finer causal
structures that exists between knowledge and suc-
cessful knowledge transfer.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to increase the under-
standing of how knowledge transfers can be per-
ceived and managed, and how choices can affect
success. We have studied a particular knowledge
transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC,
and tried to investigate what differences there

were between units that succeeded and those
who did not. While theory on knowledge transfer
suggests a number of different factors of which
almost all touch upon cognitive matters, the six
overarching factors found to be relevant in this
case all had a connection to motivation. Conse-
quently, we argue that theory should take into
account these factors among others, not least
because it might be that motivation is a factor in
overcoming obstacles provided by cau sal ambigu-
ity, absorptive capacity and the tacitness of the
knowledge to be transferred. Motivation is of
course not a new concept in the world of manage-
ment research, but it is in relation to theory specific
to organization-internal knowledge transfer. The
not-invented-here concept (Katz and Allen, 1982;
Hayes and Clark, 1985) and other concepts co n-
nected to motivation have occasionally been
referred to, but with limited explanatory power
(Szulanski, 1996). In this case, this did not surface
as a particular factor. Motivation aspects were dif-
ferent in character.
This suggestion also provides some input to
managers. It is very important to pay attention
and provide flexibility to make sure there is moti-
vation among both sources and recipients in trans-
fer situations. This could be done through enforced
control mechanisms and a less decentralized struc-
ture, but it appears more efficient to stimulate it by
making sure recipients understand the value of the

knowledge in question, and by fitting the contents
and presentation of knowledge in a way that suits
recipients. Benchmarking exercises, with internally
public methods and output results, awards and
recognition, team-building efforts, is one way of sti-
mulating motivation.
A case study of this kind obviously has some
limitations in terms of generalization to population.
Instead, we discuss findings in relation to existing
theories and propose extensions or refinements in
relation to it (Yin, 1994). A one-case approach also
means the character of the particular case has a
strong influence. The particular pieces of knowl-
edge (hands-on production-related knowledge),
organization (deep decentralization, financial con-
trol), strategies (local), the heterogeneous, local,
character of markets, and so forth, have an impact
on the interpretations. This might explain why this
study focuses motivation so much. In a setting
where knowledge is transferred between, say , two
departments in a functional organization, things
might be different even if this case alone gives a
strong argument why motivation should be part
of a knowledge transfer theory.
The case is re presentative of a typical, fairly
mature, manufacturing industry spread out across
European cultures, and interview respondents
appear to display views that may well be relevant
in other industries as well. In that sense, it is not
unlikely that the suggestions here are applicable

elsewhere. What we have sugges ted is that motiva-
tion is important and should be understood and
managed. Furthermore, we have suggested ways
in which these problems can surface and how
they can be managed. We would argue that on
this level of discussion, the findings are probably
relevant in other transfer settings, especially if
they are industrial and if the organizational context
(decentralization, financial control, size) is similar.
Considering the nature of the knowledge trans-
ferred, it is clear that some of it is specialized
whereas some is fairly simple in nature. But in spite
of that, the findings and suggestions made here are
probably independent of the type of knowledge in
question. It could be that more tacit knowledge will
encounter other factors and lead to different
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 123
situations. Generally speaking, the case operations
are not so specialized that we cannot discuss
knowledge transfer and the role of motivation in
the way that we have. The role of motivation is
probably as important in a chain of hotels or super-
markets, a software vendor or a consulting com-
pany, regardless of the nature of knowledge. The
method of analysis is generalization to theory,
and given the level of abstraction in theory, we
should be able to discuss knowledge, knowledge
transfer, motivation and other co ncepts in the
way we have here, albeit taking into consideration

what settings the findings were taken from.
In terms of future research, there ought to be
plenty of opportunities, considering the increasing
popularity of knowledge transfer and similar meth-
ods of learning. Cases such as SCA Packaging high-
light the need to understand better the role of
motivation, and what corporate managers can do
to stimulate it. Both case studies, cross-case studies
and quantitative studies will be relevant, regardless
of which factors and independent and dependent
variables one is interested in.
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW GUIDE
1. The view on the Knowledge Transfer Pro-
gramme (KTP)? E.g. a knowledge base, a bench-
marking data base, a competition, a mindset, a
social ritual, gatherings etc.
2. What is the plant attitude now and how has it
evolved over the years?
3. The value of KTP?
a. Is KTP valuable to the plant? Examples?
b. How has it changed since 1997?
c. In what way is it valuable? Standardized
behaviour, improved work, control, impro-
ved performance, competitive advantage?
4. What aspect makes KTP valuable? (Grade each,
1–5)
a. The knowledge it contains
b. The competition
c. The social incentives/arrangements
d. The benchmarking/Getting a picture of

where we stand
e. Being best in the group
f. Integrating autonomous plants, a more uni-
fied organization
g. A control device for central and local man-
agement
5. KTP and the Business model:
a. Effects on activities and organization? Any
function that suffers while others prosper?
b. Effects on the offering: Quality (e.g. product
mix, standardisation, poor product quality,
delivery performance etc) or Costs (less
labour per output, less raw material con-
sumption etc).
c. Customer attitude: do they know about KTP?
d. Suppliers? Are they involved in any way?
e. Competition?
6. Strategic context:
a. Describe the plant strategy
b. Does KTP support or constrain the plant
strategy?
c. Is or could KTP be giving you competitive
advantage?
d. Could you have good performance without
the KTP?
7. How would you describe the production knowl-
edge made available in KTP?
a. Does KTP performance reflect desired perfor-
mance?
b. Is KTP knowledge relevant to the plant?

c. Is KTP knowledge well docume nted and pre-
sented?
d. Is the KTP knowledge documentation expli-
cit or does it require further input from local
staff to be comprehensive?
e. If it requires local input, is this input easily
documented?
f. Does KTP knowledge help you improve
operations?
g. Does KTP knowledge help you challenge
your strategies?
h. Do you actively search for knowledge?
i. Do you always understand how to use the
new knowledge?
j. Is it reliable?
k. Does it have to be proved elsewhere before
you take it in?
l. Easy or difficult to unde rstand?
m. Easy or difficult to apply?
n. Does it come from reliable sour ces?
8. How do you act when you apply ‘new’ knowl-
edge?
a. Provide some examples of the plant having
identified a weakness and actively having
solved the issue by using KTP knowledge?
b. Are all machine groups equally good on tak-
ing on and applying new knowledge?
c. What, in your view, distinguishes between
groups’ abilities to assimilate and use KTP
knowledge? Which are the success factors?

9. Submitting knowledge:
a. What contributions has the plant made to the
KTP knowledge base?
b. Is the plant active? Examples?
10. Local KTP work. What is done to improve KTP
performance:
a. Roles and duties? Authorities?
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
124 T. Kalling
b. What procedures are held locally? Plans,
feed back sessions, etc?
c. How informed or educated are senior plant
management about KTP?
d. What sort of training and education is done
internally?
e. Which functions are involved in KTP-related
work?
f. Is there always good motivation to work
with KTP?
g. What is the role of plant management? Facil-
itator, controller etc?
11. The KTP structure, Support
a. Centrally? What do they do to help you?
Regular, ad hoc? Examples?
b. Other stakeholders?
12. Structural context:
a. Is KTP always a ‘vertical’ organizational pro-
ject, or is knowledge exchanged also directly
between plants, ‘horizontally’?
b. Is KTP discussed on Regional general man-

agement meetings?
c. Who, among plant personnel, discusses KTP
with members of other plants?
d. Does KTP affect the general manager and
plant assessments?
e. What would happen if KTP performance
was added to plant and general manager
assessments?
13. How would you improve KTP?
a. Considering your strategy, how would you
change the KTP project to fit better your
strategy?
b. If KTP supports your strategy, how would
you modify it?
APPENDIX B. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
OF THE SIX CASE PLANTS
The six plants studied share many features, like
technology, machinery, skills levels (many opera-
tors and workers go to the same type of schools
and colleges and they are trained regularly by the
same machine suppliers), raw material sources,
basic manufacturing procedures, structures, custo-
mer segments and physical resources.
What separates them are, among other things,
culture, size, history, financial performance, and
current strategies, but it is important to realize
that these differences appear not to be related to
the differences between the plants in terms of trans-
fer success or failure. Plants 1 and 2 failed to take
on the knowledge transfer, whereas the other four

succeeded.
Plant 1 is a small plant, based in northern
Europe, with a history of satisfactory profits. How-
ever, during the last five years their profits had
steadily declined. Its strategy is primarily aimed
at differentiating the offering and to acquiring
new customers. The workforce has been fairly
intact during the last five years, in terms of both
numbers and people.
Plant 2 is a large plant, one of the larger ones in
terms of output, based in northern Europe, with
some problematic years be hind them. They have
been run ning with a loss for some years, and are
curr ently undergoing structural and manage-
ment changes and redundancy programmes.
Their strat egy is a growth-based low-cost strategy.
Personnel turnover is not very high, compara-
tively.
Plant 3 is a small plant, also based in northern
Europe, relatively distant from urban areas. It has
a more dated capital base (machines) but a very
fine yet slightly declining profit margin. The plant
has not done too many changes over the years—
corporate ideas and ventures are taken in slowly.
The workforce as well as the management team
has been very stable over the years. Their current
strategy is to attract new customers.
Plant 4 is mid-sized and based in Central Europe,
in a major city. It has been working hard to keep
its profit levels up but have occasionally delivered

red figures. Here, personnel turnover is very
high, and the average age of the workforce is
very low comparatively. They are keen to try out
new corporate programmes be they conn ected
to production, IT, marketing, product design or
something else. They are currently working on
improving customer relations while improving
efficiency.
Plant 5 is also based in a large city in Central
Europe. It is a small plant, but has one of the lowest
cost bases in the group. Over the last five years, it
has gone from running with a loss to making a tidy
profit. This is despite having lost its major
customer some years ago. Management has chan-
ged, but the workforce has remained fairly intact.
Production management and cost control have
been instrumental in managing this.
Plant 6 is one of the largest in the corporation,
based in a rural part of Western Europe. It has
been improving its performance significantly over
the last two to three years, but from a low level.
Cost management has been important in that trans-
formation. The management team also changed in
conjunction with the transformation, but the work-
force has remained fairly intact. They have a low-
cost strategy, based on scale economies.
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 125
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