Tài liệu Public Attitudes in Contemporary SA docx

Public Attitudes in
Contemporary South Africa
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© 2002 Human Sciences Research Council
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Contents
Contributors ix
Preface xi
Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic
consolidation in South Africa 1999–2001 1
1 Politics, governance and civic knowledge 12
Satisfaction with the government 13
Race 16
Living standard measurements (LSMs) 19
Institutional trust 20
Race and living standard measurements 23
Civic knowledge 25

Conclusion 26
References 27
2 Political party preferences 28
Introduction 28
Intended votes 29
References 33
3 Provincial living preferences in South Africa 34
Provincial place preference: A general picture 36
Geographical preference and demographic characteristics 37
Race 37
Age 40
Language 40
Income 41
Educational qualification 41
Current employment and occupation status 41
Relationships between social well-being and preference for province 41
Migration tendencies 43
Conclusion 45
References 46
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4 Identity and voting trends in South Africa 47
Identity, instrumentality and voting in ‘white’South Africa 49
The racial census approach 53
Self-identity and voting preferences 55
Conclusion 59
References 60
5 Race relations 63
Analysis of the survey 64

Factors influencing racial discrimination and racism in South Africa 70
Conclusion 72
References 72
6 Addressing HIV/AIDS 73
Results 75
Sense of concern 75
Level of knowledge 75
Perceived risk 76
Reported sexual behaviour and condom use 76
‘Helpless, hopeless and meaningless’outlook on life 79
‘Helpless, hopeless and meaningless’stance towards HIV/AIDS protection 80
Discussion 81
Chi-Squared Test Results 81
Concern, knowledge and perceived risk are high 82
Sexual behaviour and condom use 83
Significant protection constraints: Lack of hope 84
The way forward 85
References 86
7 Spirituality in South Africa: Christian beliefs 87
Introduction 87
Attendance at religious meetings 87
Public opinion and church attendance 89
Views about Christian principles 90
1. Prayer 91
2. Extra-marital sex 91
3. Jesus as the solution 91
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4. Life after death 92
5. Spiritual re-births 92
Christian belief 92
Conclusion 96
References 96
8 Perceptions about economic issues 97
Perceptions about economic conditions in South Africa 97
Effects of government policies on the general economic situation
in the country 99
Conclusion 101
9 National priorities 102
Previous surveys on national priorities 102
In regard to job creation, the results by province appear in Figure 9.2 103
Comparison by population group 104
Comparison by income group 105
Comparison by area type 105
Comparison by highest education qualification 107
Comparison by employment status 107
Comparison by age category 107
Comparison of how government could best reduce crime by province 108
Comparison by area type 108
Comparison by population group 110
Comparison by personal monthly income 110
Comparisons by employment status, age and highest
educational qualification 111
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Environmental concerns 113
Major environmental issues at a national level 113
Major environmental issues at a local level 116

Socio-economic profile of people identifying environmental issues
at a local level 118
Access to water 118
Clean air – prevention of air pollution 119
Access to land 120
Protection of indigenous plants/vegetation 120
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vi
Conclusion 122
References 123
11 Civil society participation 124
Membership to civil society organisations in the 2001 survey 125
Distribution of membership of civil society organisations 126
Conclusion 128
12 Information and communications technologies 129
Access to information and communications technologies 130
Access to communications technologies considering other factors 130
Radio station preferences and time spent 133
Conclusion 135
13 Families and social networks 136
Size of social networks 137
Immediate family members 137
Extended family members 138
Workplace friendships 139
Community friendships 140
Other friendships 141
Total number of friends 142

Frequency of contact 142
Frequency of contact with favourite sibling 142
Frequency of contact with child over the age of 18 years 143
Frequency of contact with parents 144
Frequency of contact with closest friend 145
Summary 146
Type of community 146
Gender 147
Race 147
Age 148
Composite social capital score 149
Conclusion 150
References 151
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14 Human rights 152
Knowledge of human rights institutions 153
Gender 155
Race 155
Standard of living 156
Belief in human rights 159
Conclusion 163
References 164
Appendix 165
Introduction 165
The first SAARF Living Standards Measure (LSM) 165
1993 SAARF LSMs 166
Later developments of the LSM concept 167
1995 SAARF LSMs 167

2000 SAARF LSMs 168
The SAARF UNIVERSAL LSM 169
SAARF LSM 170
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ix
Contributors
Abigail Baim-Lance is an intern at the Fogarty HIV/Aids Research Training Programme
at the Nelson Mandela School of Medicine.
John Daniel is head of the Publications Department and a research director in the
Democracy and Governance programme of the Human Sciences Research Council.
Christian De Vos is an intern with the Democracy and Governance programme at the
Human Sciences Research Council in Durban.
Ronnie Donaldson is a senior lecturer in the Department of Geographical Science at
Vista University in Silverton.
Arlene Grossberg is a senior researcher in the Democracy and Governance programme
of the Human Sciences Research Council.
Adam Habib is a part-time research director at the Human Sciences Research Council,
Professor in the School of Development Studies and Director of the Centre for Civil
Society, University of Natal, Durban.
Craig Higson-Smith is a senior research specialist in the Child, Youth and Family
Development research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council.
Mbithi wa Kivilu is a chief research specialist in the Surveys, Analyses, Modelling and
Mapping research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council.
Godswill Zakhele Langais a researcher in the Surveys, Analyses,Modelling and Mapping

research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council.
Maano Ramutsindela is a lecturer in the Department of Environmental and
Geographical Science at the University of Cape Town.
Stephen Rule is director of research with the South African Ministry of Social
Development.
Craig Schwabe is head of the Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Centre in the
Human Sciences Research Council.
Jarè Struwig is a chief researcher in the Social Analyses, Modelling and Mapping research
programme of the Human Sciences Research Council.
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xi
Preface
HSRC Public Opinion Survey
Prospects for consolidating democracy in South Africa, and attempts to address
the country’s ailing economic fortunes, depend largely on three critical factors:
the ability of government to make informed decisions and strategic interventions
based on the principles of good governance and sound policy; the willingness
and determination of the stakeholder community, including civil society
organisations and the private sector, to provide the necessary checks and
balances required to maintain and nurture a constitutionally-enshrined
democratic dispensation; and the ability of the research community to produce
research, either self-generated or commissioned, that provides penetrative and
textured accounts of the multi-faceted nature of our society.
The compilation that follows is an illustration of the latter and, firmly rooted
in the HSRC’s determination to conduct ‘social science research that makes a

difference’, as well as in the organisation’s desire to comprehensively align applied
social research to user needs, is an attempt to generate debate on matters crucial
to the public domain, inform and synergise often competing although
complementary discourses on development, and make inroads in a policy arena
that is sometimes characterised by too much fluidity and a lack of strategic
direction. As such, the account that follows – both as a public snap-shot and a
more in-depth analysis of trends and opinions – makes a significant contribution
to the critical debate around the challenges to, and prospects for, consolidating
democracy in South Africa. It also informs the debate on how to enhance the
impetus towards sustained economic growth, and the fundamentals that
underpin this.
The compilation also has important tangential implications and policy
overtones for the southern African region, and the rest of the African sub-
continent at large. Indeed, comparative insight and perspective will begin to
grow in importance as efforts to implement the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) get off the ground, and it is recognised that a pivotal
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xii
basis for doing this will be through comprehensive and rigorous national public
audits on attitudes and trends on key issues.
Public opinion and attitudes often remain the yardstick against which
interventions are made. The collection which follows, in synthesising and
analysing the results and findings of some key policy areas that have been
investigated, will provide all stakeholders in South Africa with a set of factual
information and derivative analytic insights. Such a representation allows for
informed choices and decisions to be made, policy dimensions to be investigated
further, and research to be commissioned in areas where voids are conspicuous.
UDESH PILLAY

Executive Director
Surveys, Analyses, Modelling
and Mapping (SAMM)
HSRC
April 2002
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Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for
democratic consolidation in South Africa 1999–2001
Adam Habib
Democracy cannot be taken for granted. Its consolidation is neither inevitable,
nor need the process take the form of a linear progression. Democracies are
susceptible to reversions to authoritarianism. As Robert Dahl demonstrates in
his recent work, On democracy, authoritarian regimes have replaced democratic
ones some 52 times between 1900 and 1985 (Dahl, 1998). But southern Africans
do not need to be quoted statistics to be made aware of this fact. Indeed, the
point has been graphically brought home by developments in both Zambia and
Zimbabwe. In the case of the former, a trade union leader who led resistance
against what had been the only president of post-independent Zambia, then
subverted that same democracy by first attempting to re-write the constitution
to enable him to seek a third term, and when that failed, manipulating elections
to ensure that his nominee was elected president. In Zimbabwe,a first generation
independence leader succeeded in holding onto power through graft, patronage,
electoral fraud, constitutional manipulation, and intimidation of opponents and
dissidents. In both cases, democracy and the promise of development dissipated
as a result of both structural conditions and leadership behaviour.
South Africans can thus not be complacent about their democracy. They need
to be constantly on guard against any threat of reversion. In fact, this seems to
have been the intention of the architects of our constitutional system who

established a series of checks and balances in order to contain arbitrary and
authoritarian behaviour, and empower the citizenry. To contribute to this effort,
the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has for several years been
conducting regular national surveys on public opinion. Issues that have been
investigated include, among others, citizens’ satisfaction with service delivery,
their perceived national priorities, their political preferences, and their attitudes
on the state of the economy. Such knowledge about citizens’ perceptions is
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crucial not only to inform government officials about what the citizenry thinks
of their performance and policies, but also because it enables researchers and
scholars to make continuous assessments of citizens’attitudes which constitute
one of the structural conditions for democratic sustainability.
The national survey on which the analysis in this volume is premised was
undertaken in July 2001. The survey instrument comprised a questionnaire
containing questions on a variety of themes. It was divided into different topics
and the duration of interviews of respondents was between 60 and 90 minutes.
A sample of 2 704 respondents was selected throughout South Africa in clusters
of eight households situated in 338 primary sampling units (PSUs)/enumerator
areas (EAs) as determined from the 1996 census. In order to ensure adequate
representation in the sample from each province and from each of the four
dominant population groups, the sample was explicitly stratified by province
and urban/rural locations. This added up to 18 strata (see Table 1). Dispropor-
tional samples were drawn from less populated provinces such as the Northern
Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga and North West.
Table 1 Number of primary sampling units/EAs per province and strata
The realised sample was only slightly less than the intended 2 704. In terms of
province and population group, the spread was sufficiently wide to facilitate

statistical generalisations about opinions prevailing within each province and
among persons of each of the four main population groups. Each case was then
weighted so that the resultant weighted dataset would approximate the
distribution of the population of South Africa in terms of population group,
province, gender and educational qualification.
This chapter summarises the results and findings of the chapters that follow
with a view to understanding how they impact on, and what they reveal about
the challenges to, and the prospects for, the consolidation of democracy.
Obviously, an exhaustive analysis of the results cannot be undertaken here.
Readers interested in such an analysis within a particular issue area should refer
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PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA
EC FS GT KZN MP NC NP NW WC
Urban 14 21 56 24 12 21 14 11 29
Rural 25 19 12 32 18 19 28 19 14
Total 39 30 58 56 30 30 32 30 33
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to the relevant chapters in this volume. This chapter merely summarises and
analyses the overall findings across the various issue areas, as they pertain to the
challenge of democratic sustainability and consolidation in South Africa.
Identity in the post-1994 era
In 1970, in a path-breaking review of the post-World War II democratisation
literature,Rustow (1970:350–351) identified the emergence of a national identity
as the only precondition necessary for habituation, or what we now term the
consolidation of democracy (Rustow, 1970:350–351). This of course should be
an obvious condition to identify, especially in South Africa. After all, apartheid’s
overt attempt to categorise and then govern people along racial lines meant that
the conflict in South Africa came to be principally defined as one of race; a

conflict primarily among racial groups whose choices and political behaviour
were determined by their group identities. For democratic consolidation to be
effected in South Africa then, such group identities have to be transcended, or at
the least, eclipsed in prominence by a new national identity.
What then is the state of identity among South Africa’s citizenry seven years
after the dawn of the post-apartheid era? Mainstream political science still
maintains that the citizenry primarily conceptualise and identify themselves in
racial terms. The most recent exposition of this thesis is detailed in Hermann
Giliomee’s and Charles Simkins’comparative study on one-party states entitled
The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy. This study
maintains that the establishment of a viable parliamentary opposition is
impossible because of the South African electorate’s propensity to vote along
racial lines. The citizenry, they maintain, identify themselves in racial terms, and
their electoral behaviour is so governed. Electoral outcomes for Giliomee and
Simkins (1999:346), then, are ‘likely to continue to resemble a racial census’.
The EPOP survey contained a number of questions designed to get to citizens’
attitudes in this regard,and as a result a number of chapters in this volume speak
on the issue. Almost all would question Giliomee’s and Simkins’‘racial census’
thesis, or at the very least, would tend to qualify it. The most direct challenge to
this thesis comes from Maano Ramutsindela in his fascinating chapter on
identity and voting trends, based on the November 1999 survey. This chapter
categorically demonstrates that the majority of people view themselves primarily
as South Africans. This form of national identity prevailed among 61% of the
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respondents. Only 11% of respondents conceived of themselves in racial terms,
and a further 15% through a linguistic lens. This data then leads Ramutsindela

to conclude,‘the racial census approach neither provides insights into questions
of voting behaviour in a new political environment nor illuminates continuities
and changes in the choices of members of a particular group.’
Obviously, Ramutsindela is not arguing that race is not important. All that he
is maintaining is that one cannot read political and electoral behaviour from the
colour of one’s skin.This is not only because identities constantly evolve,but also
the fact that the coincidence in South Africa of racial and other categories, in
particular class, makes it almost impossible to reach conclusions on the basis of
correlations between race categories and one or other form of political
behaviour. There are a number of examples of this in this volume.
Ramutsindela’s chapter, for instance, demonstrates a relationship between living
standard measure and identity. Although the majority of people across the class
divide conceive of themselves in national terms, the percentage margin in the
lower income brackets was in almost all cases smaller. More significantly, the fact
that 27% of respondents in the lowest income brackets saw themselves in ethnic
terms does suggest that class plays a significant role in influencing how people
conceive of themselves.
This is also borne out in Arlene Grossberg’s rich chapter on race relations.
Grossberg not only demonstrates that a majority of respondents (42,1%) are of
the opinion that race relations in South Africa have improved since 1994,but also
indicates that this view is most prevalent among the Indian (58,9%) and black
(42,9%) respondents. When the data on the Indian population is weighted for
living standard measure, it becomes apparent that this view is as much a
reflection of class as it is of race variables. Similarly, Zakes Langa’s chapter on
access to information and communications technologies demonstrates that
access is greater not only for the white and Indian populations (Table 12.3), but
also for those in the higher income brackets (Figure 12.1). Once again, this
coincidence between race and class should make analysts wary of simply drawing
conclusions on the basis of correlations to racial categories.
These chapters, then, represent a significant challenge to the ‘racial census’

thesis that is so commonly held in, and propagated by, mainstream political
science circles. They suggest that identity formation and conception in South
Africa is far more complex than is normally assumed, and that identity and
broader political behaviour is as much influenced by class as it is by racial
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variables. Moreover, Ramutsindela’s chapter in particular suggests that the
prevailing identity among the majority of South Africans is a national, and not a
racial and ethnic one. This result is heartening particularly for analysts and
political activists committed to the consolidation of democracy. Indeed these
results suggest that the citizenry is way ahead of the political leadership and the
academy in this regard. The leadership of both the opposition and the ruling
party too often play the race card. In fact, simplistic racial assumptions tend to
govern much of their political campaigns, and the national surveys on public
opinion suggest that their campaigns are at odds with the prevailing identities
among the populace. In a real sense, the citizenry is facilitative of, while the
political elites are becoming an obstacle to, the consolidation of democracy in
South Africa.
Party structure and prospects for a parliamentary opposition
It has become an almost uncontested fact in the post-World War II
democratisation literature that a viable institutionalised opposition is an
essential feature of consolidated democracies. Robert Dahl’s comprehensive
study on this subject, published in 1966, made the case for oppositions, and has
not in any way been refuted. In fact, its essential thesis has been supported and
corroborated by other studies in the course of the three decades that followed its
publication. (See, for instance, Barker, 1971; Epstein, 1967; Moore, 1989;
Huntington, 1991; Shapiro, 1994; Blondel, 1997; Jung & Shapiro, 1995.) Even in

South Africa today, the fact that a viable institutionalised opposition is crucial to
democracy is almost undisputed. All that seems to be the subject of debate is the
form of that opposition, and whether its effect would be the same if it were to be
located within an alliance with the ruling party. (For a review of these debates,
see the various chapters in Southall, 2001.)
So what are the prospects for a viable parliamentary opposition? Again, there
seems to be an almost unanimous view among political analysts across the
political divide. Almost all would argue that there is no viable parliamentary
opposition in South Africa, although they would differ as to what the
implications of that are for the consolidation of democracy. This assessment is
borne out by the national survey. Stephen Rule’s chapter on political party
preferences categorically indicates that the ANC is way ahead of the pack. The
party’s support in July 2001 was approximately half of the electorate. Its nearest
rival was the Democratic Alliance (DA) with only 8,9% of support among voters.
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Indeed, these figures are substantively lower than the parties’respective election
votes, although this should not be surprising since electoral uncertainty is a
feature of periods midway between elections. In any case, even if the DA, the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the United Democratic Movement (UDM)
came together, they would not constitute an electoral challenge to the ANC. The
ANC’s dominance is still absolute.
But this is not the whole story. Rule’s further investigation into how close or
distant people feel towards various parties reveals that the ANC is not in an
unchallengeable position. There are three striking features evident in the data in
this chapter, only the first two of which are recognised by Rule himself. First, this
data suggests that substantial proportions of the population have multiple party

preferences. This effectively means that a large part of the ANC’s support base
may simultaneously feel close to other parties. Second, as Rule demonstrates, the
potential bases of support for parties are far larger than actual party votes tend
to suggest. This means that a large proportion of opposition parties’ support
bases do not turn out to vote, and how to get them to the voting booth is the
subject of intense debate within these organisations. Should, however,
opposition parties succeed in this, then, the establishment of a viable
parliamentary opposition would not constitute such an impossible task.
Third, a feature not identified by Rule is that the data indicates that the
fulcrum of opposition sentiment lies to the left of the ANC. The South African
Communist Party (SACP) on its own has as large a potential base of support
(17%) as does the DA (17%). If you add the SACP’s potential support with that
of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO),
and the UDM, you would have a potential base of support (53%) that rivals that
of the ANC.Yet the entire initiative to construct a viable opposition is occurring
to the right of the ANC, initially with the Democratic Party (DP)/New National
Party (NNP) experiment, and now with the DA/IFP initiative in KwaZulu-Natal.
On the left, parties are either too divided or constrained from exploring
innovative solutions by existing strategic alliances and relationships.
But the possibility of the opposition’s potential base of support translating
into an actual one depends on whether the electorate is satisfied with the state of
governance under the ruling party. How, then,does the electorate view life under
the Mbeki presidency? A series of questions in the national survey, and a number
of chapters in this volume, address precisely this issue.
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Citizens’satisfaction with governance

The fundamental goal of a democratic system is citizen satisfaction. A central
element of the system is the empowerment of ordinary citizens so that they can
replace their leaders in the event of dissatisfaction with leaders’ performance. It
is choice, this central tenet of democracy, which enables the system ‘to promote
freedom as no feasible alternative can’ (Dahl, 1989:88–89). This does not mean
that citizens always exercise their choice. Democracies across the world have large
proportions of unhappy citizens who instead of replacing their leaders simply
withdraw from participation in the political system. But the principle of choice
is inviolate. Such citizens always have the right of choice enshrined in their
political system, so that, should they have a majority, they are able to vote out the
leadership they are unhappy with and replace it with one that satisfies their
interests.
This principle of citizen choice is of course also enshrined in South Africa’s
post-1994 constitutional arrangements. The citizenry is empowered to replace
their political leadership should they feel dissatisfied with their performance.But
they have not as yet done so.Instead, the ruling party has been returned to power
in 1999 and 2000 with margins of electoral majorities that exceeded even its
earlier victories in 1994 and 1996. This, then, would lead one to assume that the
citizenry is largely satisfied with the performance of the ruling party.
The results of the opinion survey undertaken in 2001, however, suggest that
this assumption would be incorrect. John Daniel’s and Christian De Vos’chapter
on politics, governance and democracy clearly indicates that there is a large
degree of unhappiness with the state of governance in South Africa. The highest
levels of unhappiness were reserved for local government with about half of the
respondents registering their disapproval with the state of governance in their
local areas. Some 40,5% of respondents also registered their dissatisfaction with
provincial government. But most shocking of all was the proportion of
respondents unhappy with the state of governance at a national level. A majority
of respondents, 42,5% to be precise, indicated that they were unhappy with the
ANC’s performance in governing the country nationally. Only 37,8% were

satisfied with the way the country is being run. What should also be of concern
to government is that civil society components, and in particular the church and
media, are more trusted by the citizenry than is the government. Daniel and De
Vos, however, do make a distinction between satisfaction and trust, and conclude
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‘that people, despite their dissatisfaction, still maintain a sense of faith in the
institutions that represent them.’
This conclusion, while boding well for democratic consolidation, is not
necessarily good news for the ANC. It is useful to note that unhappiness with the
ruling party’s performance is particularly centered on the economy. Jarè
Struwig’s chapter on the electorate’s perception of the state of the economy
demonstrates that a majority of South Africans (58%) see the economic situation
in South Africa as having worsened over the previous 12-month period. These
perceptions are consistent across the class divide. Indeed, a significant majority
of both the rich (LSM 8 category – 76,2 %) and poor (LSM 1 category – 64,4%)
felt economic conditions had worsened. The ANC would thus do well not to
become complacent. After all, Adam Habib’s and Christian de Vos’ chapter on
human rights clearly indicates that most South Africans have a substantive
conception of democracy, one that includes economic justice as a component of
the definition. Couple this with Mbithi wa Kivilu’s chapter which demonstrates
that the black population, what the ANC sees as the mainstay of its support base,
is the most active in political and civic activities, and you have an explosive
combination that suggests that the ruling party could pay the penalty for
complacency at some future date at the polls.
If this scenario is to be averted, government would have to review its macro-
economic strategy. Some commentators believe this is already happening.

Vishnu Padayachee and Imraan Valodia, for instance, suggest that the 2001
budget reflected a shift in government priorities to a more Keynsian economic
orientation. This view, however, tends to be overly optimistic. The government’s
economic programme in its fundamental tenets remains neo-liberal, and playing
on the margins as the 2001 budget did, is not going to fundamentally change the
effects of this macro-economic strategy. And so long as that does not happen,
popular unhappiness with economic outcomes, and ultimately the state of
governance, is likely to continue.
The performance of constitutional and societal institutions
The consolidation of democracy is not only dependent on the performance of
governmental institutions. It is also dependent on the efficient functioning of
constitutional and societal institutions that contribute to the development of
what Putnam (1993) celebrated as social capital in his pioneering work entitled
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Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Social capital, the set of
organisations, networks, norms and values that build trust and facilitate
interactions within communities, is crucial since it constitutes the core element
of the social foundation that enables the sustenance and consolidation of
democracy. An analysis of the performance of the constitutional and societal
institutions that facilitate the development of this social capital is thus necessary
in any assessment of the progress to democratic consolidation in South Africa.
Unfortunately, however, the prognosis is not very good. Adam Habib’s and
Christian De Vos’ chapter on human rights demonstrates that constitutional
institutions, those established at the dawn of South Africa’s democracy for the
defence of the citizenry, have not succeeded in rooting themselves among the
country’s populace seven years after their birth. Indeed, the chapter clearly

concludes that the vast majority of the country’s residents are unaware of and do
not know how to utilise the constitutional instruments that have been
established for the realisation of their rights. Similarly, Stephen Rule’s chapter on
Christian beliefs demonstrates that there is no correlation between church
attendance and norms and values about brotherhood and empathy that can
make a constructive contribution to the development of society. Indeed, his
chapter suggests that the churches, the largest and most widely supported social
institutions in the country, are not having the effect that they should be, namely
to foster the kinds of values that could contribute to the development of social
capital in South Africa.
These conclusions are also borne out by Craig Higson-Smith’s analysis on
families and social networks. Higson-Smith’s chapter concludes by warning
social activists not to take the value of communalism for granted in poor African
communities. His analysis clearly demonstrates that class variables crucially
inform the level of social capital available within communities and societies. He
thus concludes, ‘it is precisely the targets of many developmental initiatives –
people who are poor, people living in rural communities and women – that have
the least social capital. If … social capital is fundamental to sustainable
development work, then it is essential that social activists put energy into
building this important resource.’The overall conclusion that can be drawn from
the data of the national survey, and articulated in the various chapters in this
volume, is that the constitutional and societal institutions are not performing
optimally, and are therefore not facilitating the development of a social
foundation that would enable the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
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Conclusion

To sum up then: the analyses in this volume suggest that there are positive and
negative developments to report from the perspective of consolidating
democracy in South Africa. On the positive side, citizens’ behaviour and
decisions are much less determined by racial identities than analysts have led us
to believe. In fact, citizens are way ahead of political elites from both the ruling
party and opposition circles, who are far more preoccupied with and influenced
by a racial mindset. Moreover, democratic consolidation can only be enhanced
with the existence of a vibrant institutionalised opposition. Although the data
shows that we are far away from such a state of affairs, it does indicate quite
clearly that potential bases of support are quite dispersed across the party
spectrum. Why then hasn’t a viable parliamentary opposition emerged? Once
again, the problem can be traced to the door of political elites. The leadership of
the official opposition is too influenced by racial variables and as such is
incapable of developing a set of policy proposals that could serve to attract the
support of the majority of the citizenry. Left-leaning political elites, where the
potential for opposition is greatest, are reluctant to consider an oppositional
option to the ANC. Nevertheless, the potential for opposition exists and that
does bode well for the consolidation of democracy.
On the negative side, two developments must be highlighted. First, the data
does indicate that the citizenry is really unhappy about the state of governance at
all levels of government, and the state of the economy. Second, the institutions of
society, either those established by the constitution or civil society agencies like
the churches, are not very effective at creating a set of norms and values
conducive to democratic consolidation. Indeed, the analyses suggest that the
state of social affairs in poor communities is not conducive to development and
democracy. Activists need seriously to consider establishing the conditions to
facilitate these goals. If this is not done, we could become vulnerable to
regressions from democracy. South Africans must not become complacent about
their political system and constitutional democracy. It is after all a priceless
treasure that, if taken for granted, can so easily disappear. We need only learn

from the experiences of our brothers and sisters elsewhere on the continent.
10
PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA
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References
Barker, R. (ed.). 1971. Studies in opposition. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Blondel, J. 1997. Political opposition in the contemporary world. Government and Opposition,
32(4).
Epstein, L. 1967. Political parties in Western democracies.New York:Praeger.
Dah l, R.A.1966. Political oppositions in Western democracies. New Haven:Yale University Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1998. On democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Giliomee, H. & Simkins,C. 1999. The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy.
Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Huntington, S. 1991. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century.Norman
Oaklahoma and London: University of Oaklahoma Press.
Jung, C. & Shapiro, I. 1995. South Africa’s negotiated transition: Democracy, opposition and
the new constitutional order. Politics and Society, 23(3).
Moore, B. Jr.1989. Liberal prospects under Soviet Socialism: A comparative historical perspective.
New York: Averell Harriman Institute.
Putnam. 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Place: Publishers.
Rustow, D.A. 1970. Transitions to democracy:Towards a dynamic model. Comparative Politics,
2(3):350–351.
Shapiro, I. 1994. Three ways to be a democrat. Political Theory, 22, February.
Southall, R. (ed.). 2001. Opposition and democracy in South Africa. London and Portland:
Frank Cass.
11
Introduction: Public opinion and the prospects for democratic consolidation in SA
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Politics, governance and civic knowledge
John Daniel and Christian M. de Vos
This chapter focuses on the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of South
Africans with their post-apartheid governance, as well as on their degree of trust
in both the three tiers of government under which they now live and in some of
the institutions spawned by the new democratic dispensation. Finally, it also
looks at the levels of civic knowledge of South Africans.
These are interesting questions for a number of reasons. Most adult South
Africans will have grown up in a period when the government of the day was
seen as ‘the enemy’, a brutally oppressive, unrepresentative and illegitimate entity
which regarded the majority of its citizenry as less than equal, to put it charitably.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether they even regarded them as fellow citizens.
Testifying before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the apartheid
government’s war on both the southern African region and its own people in the
1970s and 1980s,the former Security Branch officer,Craig Williamson,described
the impact of the socialisation of white South Africans, particularly those
charged with defending apartheid, as follows:
My security force colleagues and I did not see the liberation movements
and their members as fellow citizens of our society. We regarded them as
an alien enemy, which threatened our society. Our job was to eliminate
that threat. (Transcript of Armed Forces hearing, 15.10.97:107.)
As a consequence of the regime’s illegitimacy in the eyes of the majority of South
Africans, a widespread culture of resistance to, and non-collaboration with, the
government and its institutions took root in the 1890s. This was reflected, inter
alia, in a widespread refusal by blacks to pay for state services, a legacy of which
lingers to this day.

The issues being probed in these questions were designed to assess the extent
to which South Africans have in the seven years (at the time of the survey) since
12
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their liberation, embraced the new dispensation as theirs and whether they have
developed a degree of trust and pride in those democratic institutions created
essentially as the product of their years of struggle and sacrifice. These are more
than just interesting questions; they are important to the issue of democratic
consolidation. Though hard won, democracy cannot and should not be taken for
granted in South Africa today. The authoritarian habits of the past (capital
punishment, summary justice, ‘kangaroo courts’, muzzling of the media) retain
their adherents and sometimes even appear as viable options in the face of crises.
For democracy to thrive and grow, the citizenry needs to develop a genuine sense
of support for and faith in the new democratic regime and its institutions.
Satisfaction with the government
Each respondent was asked how s/he felt about the political situation in South
Africa in July 2001, as well as with the way in which their local area, home
province, and the country as a whole was being governed. A six-point scale was
used to measure satisfaction levels. Table 1.1 summarises some of this data by
combining the ‘very satisfied/satisfied’ and ‘very dissatisfied/dissatisfied
respondents’into two principal categories.
Table 1.1 Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by province
Most significant in these results is the fact that a larger percentage of South
Africans indicated that they were dissatisfied, rather than satisfied, with
governance at every level.Given South Africa’s past history with unrepresentative
governments and the euphoria that greeted the installation of ‘a government of
the people’ in 1994, this would seem to be a high level of dissatisfaction,
13

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Politics, governance and civic knowledge
Governance
Satisfaction
level
EC FS GT KZN MP NC NP NW WC RSA
Local area
governance
Dissatisfied 45,6 52,5 44,1 45,8 59,8 26,0 49,6 45,9 33,9 45,6
Satisfied 38,5 27,6 36,1 30,9 26,7 48,6 38,9 38,9 32,8 34,7
Provincial
governance
Dissatisfied 43,3 45,5 40,4 38,4 45,3 18,8 43,8 42,3 33,4 40,5
Satisfied 38,7 41,4 36,5 30,0 32,4 56,1 41,9 34,1 31,9 35,9
National
governance
Dissatisfied 37,0 38,4 47,1 47,3 40,8 19,6 36,2 34,6 52,9 42,6
Satisfied 40,7 48,0 37,8 29,3 40,6 57,8 45,7 42,1 24,8 37,8
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