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Taxation without Representation
in Contemporary Rural China
The financial burdens imposed on peasants have become a major source of discontent
in the Chinese countryside and a worrisome source of political and social instability
for the Chinese government. Throughout the 1990s and into the new century, much
of rural China
has been in a state of crisis
as tension has grown between
the peasant
masses and the state. Farmers who bitterly resented the tax burden began increasingly to
protest (sometimes violently) against unpredictable and open-ended financial exactions
by predatory local governments. Local rural officials, in turn, are driven by intense
pressure to develop and modernize in order to catch up with the more highly developed
coastal areas.
Bernstein and L¨u show how and why China’s developmental programs led to con-
tentious, complicated relationships between peasants and the central and local govern-
ments.
They discuss the reasons why
peasants in grain-growing “ag
ricultural China”
have benefited far less during the reform era than those in the industrializing coastal
areas. They examine the forms and sources of heavy, informal taxation and shed light on
how peasants defend their interests by adopting strategies of collective resistance (both
peaceful and violent). The authors also explain why the central government, although
often siding with the peasants, has not been able to solve the burden problem by institut-
ing a sound, reliable financial system in the countryside. The regime has, to some extent,
sought to empower peasants to defend their interests – informing them about tax rules,
e
xpanding the legal system, and

instituting village elections –
but these attempts have
not yet generated enough power from “below” to counter powerful local governments.
The case studies featured here offer rare insight into Chinese political life in the
countryside. This is the first in-depth English study of the problem of aggressive taxation
by local governments in contemporary China and its social and political implications.
Bernstein and L¨u help explain how this has played a large role in defining the relationship
between the state and peasants in the reform period. Their analysis adds to the larger
debate over whether China’s growing strength could pose a threat to other countries, or
whether China’s leaders will be preoccupied with domestic problems such as this one.
Thomas P. Bernstein is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. A former
department Chair and Guggenheim Fellow, he is the author of Up to the Mountains and
Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China (1977) and
numerous articles and book chapters.
Xiaobo L¨u is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia
University, and Director of the East Asian Institute at Columbia. He is the author of
Cadres and Corruption (2000) and coeditor of Danwei: The Changing Chinese Work-
place in Historical and Comparative Perspectives (1997).
A Study of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Through its publication program, inaugurated in 1962, the East Asian Institute
has been bringing to public attention the results of significant new research on
modern and contemporary East Asia.
Cambridge Modern China Series
Edited by William Kirby, Harvard University
Other books in the series:
Warren I. Cohen and Li Zhao, eds., Hong Kong under Chinese Rule: The
Economic and Political Implications of Reversion
Tamara Jacka, Women’s Work in Rural China: Change and
Continuity in an
Era of Reform

Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma
Michael Dutton, Streetlife China
Edward Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China:The Fate of State-Owned Industry
Wenfang Tang and William Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: The
Changing Social Contract
David Shambaugh, ed., The Modern Chinese State
Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics
Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China: The State and Local
Elites in Henan, 1900–1937
Edmund S. K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in
Nationalist China, 1929–1949
Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy
of Institutional Change
Xiaoqun Xu, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of
Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937
Yung-chen Chiang, Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China,
1919–1949
Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition
Mark W. Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State,
Revolution, and Labor Management
Thomas G. Moore, China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and
International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era
Stephen C. Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural
Inquiry
Rachel A. Murphy, How Migrant Labor Is Changing Rural China
Linsun Cheng, Banking in Modern China: Entrepreneurs, Professional
Managers, and the Development of Chinese Banks, 1897–1937
Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform
Era

Taxation without
Representation in
Contemporary Rural China
THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN
Columbia University
XIAOBO L
¨
U
Barnard College, Columbia University
  
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , United Kingdom
First published in print format
isbn-13 978-0-521-81318-1 hardback
isbn-13 978-0-511-07318-2 eBook (EBL)
© Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü 2003
2003
Information on this title: www.cambrid
g
e.or
g
/9780521813181
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
isbn-10 0-511-07318-6 eBook (EBL)
isbn-10 0-521-81318-2 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not

guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
-
-
-
-




Contents
List of Journals, Newspapers, Translation Services,
and Abbreviations page ix
List of Tables and Figures xiii
Preface xv
1 Introduction 1
Locating the Chinese State 1
The Central and Local States 7
Rural Society and Peasant Collective Action 13
Overview of the Chapters 17
2 Peasants and Taxation in Historical Perspective 20
Rural Taxation in Imperial China 20
Rural Taxation in the Late Qing and Republican Periods 25
Taxes and the Communist Revolution 31
The Maoist Era: The Primacy of Grain Procurements 36
Conclusion 46
3 Extracting Funds from the Peasants 48
Burdens: An Overview 50
The TVE Factor 68

Grievances: Lack of Accountability and Brutality of
Enforcement 73
4 Institutional Sources of Informal Tax Burdens 84
Deconcentration of State Power 84
The Local State: Developmental Pressures and Incentives 88
State Sprawl: China’s Expanding Bureaucracy 96
Muddled Finances and the Rural Funding Crisis 105
vii
Contents
Embedded Corruption 109
Conclusion 114
5 Burdens and Resistance: Peasant Collective Action 116
Individual and Collective Protest and Violence 120
Peasant Collective Resistance: Incipient Social Movements? 137
Leaders, Organization, and Coordination 146
Potential Allies 157
Conclusion 165
6 Containing Burdens: Change and Persistence 166
Exhortations, Regulations, and Campaigns 167
“Letters and Visits” and the Role of the Media 177
Enabling Villagers to Seek Legal Redress 190
Toward Effective Institutional Change 197
Conclusion 204
7 Burden
Reduction: Village Democratization and Farmer
National Interest Representation 206
The Impact of Village Democratization on Burdens 207
Strengthening Farmer Interest
Representation at the Center 224
A National Farmers’ Association? 231

Conclusion 239
8 Conclusions 241
Bibliography 253
Index 271
viii
List of Journals, Newspapers,
Translation Services,
and Abbreviations
Banyuetan (Fortnightly Chats), Beijing
Beijing Qingnianbao (Beijing Youth Daily)
Beijing Review
Caizheng Yanjiu (Financial Research), Beijing
CAPD, China Association for the Promotion of Democracy
CASS, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CC, Central Committee
CCP, Chinese
Communist Party
CCTV, Central China Television
CD, China Daily, Beijing
Changjiang Ribao (Yangtze Daily), Wuhan
Cheng Ming (Contention), Hong Kong
China Journal, Canberra (formerly the Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs)
Ching Pao (Mirror), Hong Kong
Chiushi Nientai (The Nineties), Hong Kong
Chuncheng Wanbao (Spring City Evening Paper), Kunming, Yunnan
CPPCC, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Dangdai (The Present Age), Nanjing
EBF, Extrabudgetary funds
FA, Farmers’ Association
Faxue Pinglun (Legal Review), Beijing

Faxue Yanjiu (Legal Research), Beijing
Fengci yu Youmo (Satire and Humor), Beijing
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report: China,
Springfield, VA
FEER, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong
FZRB, Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), Beijing
Gaige (Reform), Beijing
ix
Journals, Newspapers, Translations, Abbreviations
Gaige yu Lilun (Reform and Theory), Beijing
GLF, Great Leap Forward
GMRB, Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), Beijing
Guanli Shijie (World of Management), Beijing
HBRB, Hebei Ribao, (Hebei Daily), Shijiazhuang
Hebei Nongcun Gongzuo (Hebei Rural Work), Shijiazhuang
Hebei Xinfang (Hebei Letters and Visits),
Shijiazhuang
Hsin Pao, Hong Kong
Hunan Ribao (Hunan Daily), Changsha
ICHRD, Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Hong Kong
Jiage Lilun yu Shijian (Theory and Practice of Prices), Beijing
Jiangsu Jijian (Jiangsu Party Discipline Inspection), Nanjing
Jingji Cankaobao (Economic Information Daily), Beijing
Jingji Gaige yu Fazhan (Economic Reform and Development), Beijing
Jingji Pinglun (Economic Review), Wuhan
Jingji Tizhi Gaige (Economic Structural Reform), Beijing
Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), Beijing
Jingji Yanjiu Cankao (Reference Material for Economic Research), Beijing
JJRB, Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily), Beijing
JPRS, Joint Publications Research Service, Springfield, VA

Kaifang (Opening Up), Hong Kong
Laixin Zhaibian (Extracts from Letters), Beijing
Liaowang (Observer), Beijing
Lien Ho Pao (United Daily), Taipei
Lingdao Canyue (Reference Reading for Leadership), Beijing
MCA, Ministry of Civil Affairs
Minzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and Law), Shanghai
Ming Pao, Hong Kong
MOA, Ministry of Agriculture
MOF, Ministry of Finance
Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily), Guangzhou
Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), Guangzhou
Neibu Canyue (Internal Reference Readings), Beijing
Neican Xuanbian (Selected Internal Reference), Beijing
NJW, Nongye Jingji Wenti (Problems of the Agricultural Economy), Beijing
NMRB, Nongmin Ribao (Farmers’ Daily), Beijing
Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun (Rural Work Bulletin), Beijing
NPC, National People’s Congress
Nongcun Jingji (Rural Economy), Beijing
Nongye Jingji (Agricultural Economy), Shenyang
x
Journals, Newspapers, Translations, Abbreviations
NYT, New York Times
PAP, People’s Armed Police
Ping Kuo Jih Pao (Apple Daily), Hong Kong
PLA, People’s Liberation Army
POS, Political Opportunity Structure
Qingnian Yanjiu (Research on Youth), Beijing
RDRI, Rural Development Research
Institute

Renmin Gonganbao (People’s Public Security Newspaper), Beijing
Renmin Xinfang (Letters and Visits from the People), Beijing
RMRB, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing
RMRB-O, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) Overseas Edition, Beijing
SCJP or SJRB, Shih-chieh Jih-pao or Shijie Ribao (World Journal), New York
Shanxi Nongjing (Shanxi Rural Economy), Taiyuan
Shehui (Society), Shanghai
Shehui Gongzuo Yanjiu (Research on Social Work), Beijing
Shehui Kexue (Social Sciences), Shanghai
Sheke Xinxi Wenhui (Collection of Social Science Information), Beijing
SCMP, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong
Shuiwu Yanjiu (Research on Taxation), Beijing
Sichuan Ribao (Sichuan Daily), Chengdu
Social Sciences in China, Beijing
SWB-FE, British Broadcasting Company – Survey of World Broadcasts, Third
Series, Far East, Caversham Park, Reading, UK
Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong
Tangtai (Current Age), Hong Kong
Tansuo (Probe), New York
Tong Hsiang (Trends), Hong Kong
TVE, township and village enterprises
VC, Village Committee
We n We i Po , Hong Kong
VRA, Village Representative Assembly
XHRB, Xinhua Ribao (New China Daily), Nanjing
Xinhua, New China News Agency, Beijing
Xinhua Neican Xuanbian (New China News Selections for Internal
Reference), Beijing
Xinhua Wenzhai (New China News Abstracts), Beijing
Xin Shiji (New Century), Haikou

Xinwengao (News Briefs), Beijing
Xingzheng yu Fa (Administration and Law), Changchun
Xuexi yu Tansuo (Study and Probe), Harbin
xi
Journals, Newspapers, Translations, Abbreviations
Yangcheng Wanbao (Guangzhou Evening News), Guangzhou
Zhengzhi yu Fal¨u (Politics and Law), Beijing
Zhongguo Caijingbao (Chinese Financial and Economic News), Beijing
Zhongguo Caizheng (China State Finance), Beijing
Zhongguo Gaigebao (China Reform), Beijing
Zhongguo Guoqing Guoli (China’s National Condition and Strength), Beijing
Zhongguo Jiancha (Supervision Work in China), Beijing
Zhongguo Minzheng (Civil Affairs in China), Beijing
Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha (China Rural Survey), Beijing
Zhongguo Qingnian (China Youth), Beijing
Zhongguo Qingnianbao (China Youth Daily), Beijing
Zhongguo Shuiwu (China’s Taxation), Beijing
Zhongguo Tongji Xinxi Bao (China Statistical News), Beijing
Zhongguo Wujia (China Prices), Beijing
Zhongguo Xinxibao (China Information), Beijing
ZLTN, Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian (China Annual Labor Statistics),
Beijing
ZNJ, Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), Beijing
ZNTN, Zhongguo Nongcun Tongji Nianjian (China Rural Annual Statistics),
Beijing
ZRGYGB, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (State
Council Bulletin), Beijing
ZTN, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Annual Statistics), Beijing
ZTN-Zhaiyao, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian-Zhaiyao (China Statistical Abstracts
Annual), Beijing

ZTS, Zhongguo Tongxunshe (China News Service), Beijing, Hong Kong
ZXB, Zhongguo Xiaofeizhebao (China Consumer News), Beijing
ZXS, Zhongguo Xinwenshe (China News Agency), Beijing, Hong Kong
xii
List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
2.1. Financial Balance Sheet of the Thirty-First Year of the
Qianlong Reign (1766) page 21
2.2. Land and Other Taxes in the Late Qing 26
2.3. Index of Formal Land Tax vs. Informal Surtaxes 27
2.4. Burdens on Different Social Classes in the Shaan-Gan-Ning
Base Area, 1942–1943 32
2.5. The Grain Tax in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Base Area, 1938–l945 35
2.6. Peasant Burden over Time in Ningxia Province 43
3.1. National Rural Incomes Compared with Those in
Agricultural Provinces 49
3.2. Peasant Burdens 50
3.3. Peasant Cash Payments, 1994–1997 53
3.4. Rates of Increasing Incomes and Burdens 67
3.5.
Annual Gross Value of Industrial Output per Rural Laborer,
1998 71
4.1. Administrative and Service Personnel in the Towns and
Townships 102
4.2. Township Finance, 1986–1993 106
4.3. Township and Village Indebtedness in Anhui 110
5.1. Major Peasant Protests in 1997 126
FIGURES
3.1. Cartoon Satirizing the Use of Fees for Cadre Feasts 54
3.2. Cartoon on the Disproportion between Regular and Informal

Taxes 55
xiii
List of Tables and Figures
3.3. Cartoon on the Numerous Deductions from Teachers’ Salaries 57
3.4. Cartoon on the Numerous Fees Charged to Students 58
3.5. Burdens as Proportions of Incomes 60
3.6. Peasant Burdens in Three Regions 62
3.7. Percentage Shares of Township and Village Levies Paid by
Different Producers in Shaoxing County, Zhejiang Province 69
3.8. Cartoon of Peasant Suf
fering from Levies 75
3.9. Cartoon on the Death of “Serve the People” 82
4.1. Cartoon on “Small Treasuries” 86
4.2. Government Staff Increase Rate, 1980–1999 97
4.3. Cartoon on Bloated Bureaucracy 100
4.4. Cartoon Showing Deception by Counties 113
6.1. Cartoon Lampooning a Burden Reduction Drive 173
6.2. Cartoon Satirizing Efforts to Downsize the Bureaucracy 198
xiv
Preface
In the late 1990s large parts of rural China were in a state of crisis. Households
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood were enduring stagnant incomes
and there was an increasingly tense relationship between peasants and local
officials. Financial exactions to which village households were subject were
a major cause. These included formal taxes, a bewildering variety of infor-
mally levied fees, and unregulated fund-raising among the households by lo-
cal officials. Collecting these unpredictable and arbitrary levies often required
severe coercion and was a major source of r
ural discontent. It elicited consid-
erable peasant resistance, increasingly threatening rural stability. Beginning in

the mid-l980s, when the problem first emerged into prominence, the leaders
of the Chinese Communist Party and government made major efforts to ease
“peasant burdens.” These efforts failed and the situation became more and more
fraught with tension and conflict.
This study sheds light on the nature and extent of the burdens. They were an
issue primarily in agricultural areas, rather than in those areas where rural indus-
trialization had made significant progress. It sheds light on the repercussions
of
the burdens by examining peasant protest and peasant collective action. And it
sheds light on the attempts made by the authorities to find effective remedies. In
analyzing these issues, the study probes the institutional and behavioral sources
of this concrete and practical problem, linking solutions to more deep-going
reforms. The burdens were the product not simply of predatory or corrupt local
officials. They were the product of a well-entrenched approach to development
that set performance targets irrespective of local capacities to meet them (in our
case, the local tax base) and that rewarded officials for achievement, not ques-
tioning the methods
used. The Chinese local state emerges in our study as both
predatory and developmental, requiring that it be the former in order to become
the latter. The burdens were the product of fiscal practices that had deep roots
in imperial and Republican China but they were also grounded in more recent
xv
Preface
innovations such as fiscal decentralization and administrative deconcentration.
Effective solutions required major changes in China’s administrative system,
thus testing the adaptive capacities of the regime.
Our study reveals a complicated and contentious relationship among peas-
ants, the central government, and local governments. Although the central gov-
ernment sided with the peasants, it lacked the capacity to solve the problem by
establishing a sound fiscal system in the countryside,

an inadequacy reminis-
cent of imperial and Republican times. To counter the abusive behavior of local
officials, the regime endeavored to empower peasants to defend their interests,
introducing freer village elections and broadening access to legal redress. These
innovations, although important in their own right, did not generate adequate
power from “below” to solve the problem. The burden issue was part and parcel
of the underlying challenge of how to make the transition from
an authoritar-
ian to a democratic, responsive regime. This book thus brings together major
themes in the study of Chinese politics that are often treated separately.
Our research strategy was to constr
uct a generally applicable picture of con-
ditions in “agricultural rural China” rather than to do intensive local research
in one or more locales. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. It
avoids the inevitable question of just how generalizable case studies are; it also,
inevitably, cannot attain an in-depth understanding of how particular factors
interacted to produce a specific outcome. In studying protest, for instance, the
cases we use are based on press reports, which were sometimes very detailed
but did not allow us to say much about possible correlates of collective behavior
such as membership in a particular lineage or why a riot took place in village A
but not in village B. However, using data from a variety of locales and sources
frees the analyst from being tied to case data only.
Our collaboration began in 1997, when we discovered the extent to which
our research interests complemented one another or ev
en overlapped. L
¨u had
long been working on the institutional roots of corruption and the changing
role of the state, which led him to examine the financial burdens in the context
of the administrative system. Bernstein had been working for some years on
several issues of rural state-society relations during the reform era, including

the transition to household contracting, peasant interest representation, social
instability, and the burden problem. We both brought to bear data that we had
already collected as well as papers and drafts of chapters.
Both Bernstein and L¨u have made numerous research visits to China. In l985
Bernstein spent three weeks in Zouping county, Shandong, and three weeks in
Fengyang county, Anhui, at a time when the burden problem was in its infancy.
He later interviewed officials and researchers, in Beijing (l992, l994, l998)
and in Guangzhou, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Wuhan (l998). L¨u interviewed local
xvi
Preface
officials and farmers during his trips to China in Hebei and Henan in 1996, 1998,
and 1999. In l999, Bernstein participated in a collaborative research project
involving Zhongshan University, Guangzhou, which entailed short field trips
to villages in Guangdong and Hunan. We are very grateful to all those whom
we interviewed and to the Chinese scholars who devoted time to extended
conversations on our topic. We are particularly indebted to the people who
helped us to arrange the inter
views and who hosted us in various locales.
Some material in the book has previously appeared in print: Bernstein’s
“Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses,” in The Paradox of China’s Post-
Mao Reforms, edited by Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, and
“Instability in Rural China,” in Is China Unstable: Assessing the Factors, edited
by David Shambaugh. He is grateful to the publishers for permission to use the
material here. L¨u published “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China”
in Journal of Peasant Studies. We are also grateful for permission to use mate-
rial that appeared in the co-authored article, “Taxation without Representation:
Peasants, the Central and Local States
in Reform China,
” which appeared in
The China Quarterly.

We both owe debts of gratitude to numerous individuals and institutions. To
begin with, we want to thank the readers of the manuscript for their comments:
Charles Tilly, Edward Friedman, Li Lianjiang, Carl Riskin, Dorothy Solinger,
and Vivienne Shue. We also wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for
Cambridge University Press for their comments. Singly or jointly, we have read
papers or made presentations on related subjects to various academic audiences,
and we would like to express thanks for comments received on these occasions.
Bernstein presented papers at the Columbia University Seminar on Modern
China in 1994 and l998; at the conference on “China after Deng,” UCLA, l995;
at the conference “China and World Affairs in 2010,” Stanford, l996 (jointly with
Dorothy Solinger); at the conference, “Is China Unstable,” George Washington
University, l998, and to the China Colloquium of the University of Washington,
Seattle, in 2001. L¨u presented papers at the Stanford-Berkeley Workshop on
Contemporary China, Stanford, 1998, and at the Walter Shorenstein Symposium
on “State Legitimation in Contemporary China,” Berkeley, 1999. Both authors
presented their work at the conference on “Rural China: Emerging Issues in
Development,” Columbia University, l995, and to the New England China
Seminar, Harvard University, 2001. We are also grateful for permission to quote
from unpublished papers by Linda Jakobson, Li Lianjiang, and Murray Scot
Tanner.
Thanks must also go to Li Lianjiang, Laura Luehrman, Kevin O’Brien,
Stanley Rosen, and Christine P. Wong for providing valuable research mate-
rial. The Universities Service Centre, Hong Kong, the Hoover Institution, the
xvii
Preface
Fairbank Center Library at Harvard, the Library of the Center for Chinese
Studies at Berkeley, and the C.V. Starr Library at Columbia provided invaluable
materials. We would like to thank in particular Nancy Hearst and Annie Chang
of Harvard and Berkeley, respectively.
We thank the staff of the East Asian Institute for their support and our col-

leagues for fostering a congenial intellectual climate.
Over the years, graduate
students have provided research assistance and we
would like to extend our thanks to them. The most recent were Tao Yifeng
and Zhong Hong. Editorial assistance was provided by Ashley Esarey, Bernard
Schneider, Edward Wei, and Elizabeth Lacouture.
Research was supported at various times by the Joint Committee on Contem-
porary China of the ACLS and SSRC, the China Research Committee of the
East Asian Institute, and the Luce Foundation in the form of a
grant adminis-
tered by Pacific Lutheran and Zhongshan University. L¨u wants to acknowledge
the support he received when he was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institu-
tion in 1998–9. We are grateful to our editors at Cambridge University Press,
Mary Child and Sue Avery. Their guidance and copyediting were crucial to the
publication of this book.
And finally, we owe an enormous debt to our spouses, without whose patience,
encouragement, support, and advice this book could not have appeared. It is
dedicated to them.
T.P .B.
X.L.
New York City
xviii
1
Introduction
F
OR more than fifteen years China’s top leaders called for the “lightening of
the peasants’ burden,” a term that referred to the imposition on villagers of
“unreasonable” ad hoc fees, fines, local taxes, assessments on peasant house-
holds, or apportionment of governmental expenses among them. Some of these
were authorized; many were not; most had at best a dubious basis in law and

official regulations. Most were bitterly resented by the peasants for their un-
predictability and open-endedness and the coercive manner in which they were
collected. Year after year, central leaders
and agencies sent edicts, directives,
injunctions, exhortations, and pleas down the administrative hierarchy demand-
ing that action be taken to lighten peasant burdens, but to no avail. In l985 the
Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
government’s State Council warned that excessive burdens were damaging the
authority of the regime and were causing rural unrest and instability. Similar
warnings, often in somber tones, have been issued in the years that followed.
In the most recent period, rural disturbances arising from burdens and other
abuses have become even more worrying
to the central leadership. So impres-
sive a record of ineffectuality calls for investigation, analysis, and explanation.
We believe that examination of peasant burdens illuminates two fundamental
problems of contemporary Chinese political development. The state faces major
challenges in building administrative capacities appropriate to governance in
the post-Mao reform era. Just as great a challenge for the state is to develop
the means of accommodating the increased assertiveness of society, including
demands for accountability, the rule of law, and a voice in policy making.
LOCATING THE CHINESE STATE
A State in Transition. The burden problem has to be seen in the context of
China’s continuing efforts to reconstruct its state. The Communist Chinese
1
Taxation without Representation in Rural China
state was established in 1949 for the purpose of building an industrialized so-
cialist society run according to plan and premised on the absolute primacy of
the collectivist over the individual interest. In the reform period, which began
in 1978, although the goal of industrialization remained, the regime gradu-
ally adopted fundamentally new approaches aimed at the establishment of a

“socialist market economy,” in which emphasis would be placed much more on
the stimulation of individual
incentives. This new orientation required exten-
sive redefinitions of the role of the state away from its primarily transformative,
redistributive, command, and managerial roles during the Maoist era. Redefini-
tions were required to enable the state to lead, guide, and regulate the transition
to a market economy.
With regard to the economy, the state’s dominant role in production and distri-
bution was to be gradually curtailed, and reliance on administrative commands
gradually replaced by fiscal, monetary, and regulatory instruments. A legal sys-
tem was to be established that would provide security of contracts in horizontal
business transactions, as well as an infrastr
ucture that could sustain ever more
complex market relations. The pursuit of development measured more or less
exclusively in terms of high aggregate growth rates gave way to more complex
goals that would not only promote growth but also pay greater attention to
welfare, education, health, and other aspects of human development.
1
Numerous decisions had to be made about how far to go in jettisoning Maoist
patterns of governance and administration and about how far the state socialist
system would have to retreat: how much of the planning system should be
retained; how much of a private capitalist sector should be allowed to compete
with state industry; and how much inequality a “socialist” market economy
could tolerate. These fundamental directional questions, which impinged not
just on the economy but on the very nature of the political system and its
relations with society preoccupied the policy makers and, as might be expected,
caused quite a lot of conflict among them.
2
The reforms signified a conscious retreat from the pursuit of all-embracing
transformative goals imposed by the political system on society and hence a

reduction
in the state
’s autonom
y from society. Implementing the goal of radical
transformation of society by means of ideologically based mass mobilization
had entailed the development of extraordinary organizational capacities on
the part of both the Communist Party and the government. These assets
were badly disrupted and damaged during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).
Reform leaders wanted to continue to make full use of their organizational
1
See the extended and informative analysis of these issues in Riskin et al. (1999).
2
Fewsmith (1994).
2
1 Introduction
strength to meet the new challenges ahead, but to do so in modified form. Mass
mobilization, campaigns, and class struggle were to be replaced by a less dis-
ruptive, law-based administrative style, above all one that would allow societal
forces greater scope to take initiatives of their own.
As was the case with the economy, the negative goal of repudiating radical
Maoism opened up the question of how far political reform should go. The most
important answer to this
question was given early on, namely that the Chinese
Communist Party would retain its monopoly of political power. Within that
fundamental constraint, there was considerable flexibility for political reforms
that fell short of political liberalization. The latter would have entailed, for
instance, the legalization of autonomous interest groups under the one-party
umbrella. Chinese society changed very rapidly under the impetus of rapid
economic growth and of “reform and opening up to the outside world.” New
social interests arose, as did demands, grievances, and claims on the state. Yet,

political reform lagged consistently behind the societal changes and observers
looking at China around the turn of the
century widely agreed that there was a
deepening disjunction between societal and political development. The state in
reform China continued to be shaped to significant degrees by the institutional
legacies of the Mao era, a point that will emerge again and again in the chapters
that follow.
The process of redefinition and state building was in progress throughout
the period that our book covers. Formidable and complex, the tasks were by
no means completed during the two decades of reform. This meant that some
of the institutions of the old command economy continued to exist, exerting
continued powerful influence. For instance, in agriculture the state continued
to impose compulsory purchase quotas even after the restoration of family
farming. Sowing targets were retained for critical crops. The way the one-
child policy program was enforced during the refor
m era closely resembled the
mobilizational approach of the Mao period.
3
Most important for our discussion,
rural administrative behavior continued to be strongly conditioned by deeply
entrenched old ways. Local officials were free to impose ad hoc charges on
peasant households without the authority of law, a legacy from the time of
the Maoist campaigns,
in which peasant resources were freely appropriated
( yi ping er diao) in pursuit of developmental or ideological objectives. The
structural incompleteness of the transformation of the Chinese countryside was
a major factor responsible for the burden problem
Chinese leaders wanted a strong and powerful state, one able to guide, lead,
and shape the country’s course so that by the middle of the twenty-first century
3

White (1990: 53–77).
3
Taxation without Representation in Rural China
China could take its place among the advanced countries of the world. This
goal, to which the Chinese were passionately committed, must be understood
in historical context. From the mid-nineteenth century on, when China was
weak internally and unable to defend itself effectively against imperialist ag-
gression, the Chinese dreamed of their country once again becoming “wealthy
and powerful” ( fuqiang). There was strong consensus that attainment of this
goal required a strong state, for without a powerful integrative force, China, in
the words of Sun Yat-sen, resembled “a dish of loose sand.” Regimes, beginning
with the imperial one in its waning days, various local governments, and the
Nationalist government in the 1930s sought to restructure the state to enable it
to lead the country out of its backwardness and weakness. Communist China
also adopted this approach, and for a time, especially the first ten years of the
PRC’s existence, it seemed as if an effective state had been created
that could
systematically attain development goals such as industrialization. Much was
achieved, but Mao Zedong’s successors were deeply chagrined by the disap-
pointing and enormously costly outcome
of Mao
’s utopian efforts to break
through to an egalitarian, yet more advanced developmental level. It was this
disappointment that prompted them dramatically to change course by gradu-
ally turning to the market as a more effective and faster route to wealth and
power.
This dramatic turn in strategy did not mean, however, that the state would not
play a central role. Markets were important but they could not by any means
be left to their own devices. State guidance would go significantly beyond that
of interventionist states such as Japan or in Western Europe. The entire state

apparatus continued to be oriented to the achievement of rapid development
within the new framework of “reform and opening up to the outside world.” It
continued to exhibit a sense of urgency, impatience, and anxiety about its capac-
ity to catch up with the advanced countries that has
always been characteristic
of Leninist regimes.
4
In this sense, the reform era represented a path-dependent
continuity with the Maoist “Great Leap Forward” mentality. Shorn of its utopian
component, the Great Leap slogan of “bigger, better, faster, with more economic
results” continued to describe the motivational basis of the Chinese state.
When they changed direction
in 1978 China
’s leaders had in front
of them
the successes of the East Asian miracle states, the “five tigers” – Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore – whose rapid development in the
1960s and 1970s had left China far behind, mired in revolutionary Maoism.
Implicitly at least, they sought to emulate their neighbors in establishing an
“East Asian developmental state,” in a fully authoritarian variant. The concept
4
See Jowitt (1992: esp. 76 ff) and Jowitt (1970: 233–63).
4
1 Introduction
of the developmental state is useful in appraising the nature of the Chinese state.
Abstracted from reality, the model of such a state had the following properties:
(1) a powerful, highly autonomous state, which defined the goal of achieving
rapid development as the major national interest; (2) guidance by a merito-
cratically recruited bureaucratic elite imbued with an ethic of public service;
(3) authoritative administrative guidance of the economy and close cooperation

between public and private sectors, using financial levers and market incentives
to implement the state’s industrial policies; (4) relative insulation from soci-
ety so that the state did not have to accede to demands that would undermine
growth, but was able to decide by itself how far living standards could be raised
in light of the overriding goal of development. At the same time, to reduce the
chances for social unrest, the state sought to avoid the creation of huge dis-
parities in incomes; (5) heavy and continued investment in education; and
(6) capacity to effectively implement policies.
5
At the center of the developmental state was the bureaucratic elite, which
forged close, usually informal, ties with business but nonetheless retained its
autonomy and capacity to play a directing role. These state linkages with outside
networks, as Peter Evans
suggests in his
Embedded Autonomy, were “the key
to the developmental state’s effectiveness combining Weberian bureaucratic
insulation with intense connection to the surrounding social structure.”
6
Evans proposes a continuum on which states may be placed with the “preda-
tory” state at one end and the developmental state at the other. Zaire under
Mobutu approximated the predatory state, one that “preys on its citizenry, ter-
rorizing them, despoiling their common patrimony, and providing little in the
way of services in return.” In one sense, the Zairian state was strong in not being
constrained by social forces. It was able to penetrate society for the purpose
of appropriating resources. In another sense, it was weak in that it could not
achieve any developmental goals. And it was wholly incoherent in that “any
slice of public power consists of a veritable exchange instrument, convertible
into illicit acquisition of money or other goods.”
7
Needless to say, Zaire’s GNP

steadily declined as Mobutu ran the country into the ground.
In
between the predatory and developmental states were intermediate
cases
such as Brazil and India which contained elements of both. These countries
grew, sometimes substantially, but less rapidly and with lower effectiveness
than the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). Their state capaci-
ties were sapped by dependence on landed classes and, in India,
by a general
5
For a succinct statement, see Johnson (1987:136–64) and Amsden (1989).
6
Evans (1995: 50). This model is applied by Solinger (1991) to the Chinese case.
7
Evans (1995: 45–6).
5