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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the important role of individual
difference factors in the experience of emotion. We begin by describing several
commonalties across two major approaches to the study of emotion, namely, the
neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives. Both approaches provide some degree
of support for the role of individual differences and cognitive factors in the experience
of emotion. This paper builds on these commonalities by reviewing personality and
psychopathology findings that indicate the contribution of both positive and negative
personality characteristics (e.g., extraversion, optimism vs. neuroticism, trait anxiety) to
the types of cognitive appraisals and emotional responses exhibited by different
individuals. A self-schema model of emotion is presented as a means of integrating
more fully this individual differences perspective with a theory of emotion. In this
model, self-schema content provides the basis for individual differences in underlying
core themes and self-evaluative beliefs. The model describes how self-schema content
distinctions across individuals may have a differential impact on the initial processing of
an event, evaluation of this event with respect to the self, and emotional and behavioral
output. Several examples are then presented to illustrate the increased predictability
afforded by this individual differences-based self-schema model of emotion. The
application of this model to treatment and prevention issues in clinical and health
psychology is also briefly considered. Finally, the model is integrated with other
theoretical perspectives on emotion by describing a number of additional research and
theoretical implications. Emphasis is placed on the need for further clarification of both
cognitive and emotional components of an individual differences perspective on the
study of emotions. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd THE PAST decade has witnessed a
resurgence of interest in the study of emotions. A wide variety of theoretical
perspectives have been advanced, ranging from neuropsychological approaches to
cognitive-based theories of emotion (Izard, 1993; Parkinson, 1997). At the
neuropsychological level, researchers have typically attempted to identify various brain
systems that may mediate the experience of emotions. As one illustration, it has been
proposed by several investigators that the two hemispheres of the Authorship is equal.
Correspondence should be addressed to Kathy A. Winter, Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2. 791 792 K. A. Winter

and ;\: A. Kuiper brain are differentially related to emotion. Activation of the left frontal


region is thought to be associated with positive affect or approach-related emotions,
whereas activation of the right frontal region of the brain is associated with negative
affect or withdrawal related emotions (Davidson, 1993; Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992).
Congruent with this proposal, it has been found that right-hemisphere arousal and
vigilance mechanisms are particularly sensitive to increased levels of negative affect
(such as depression), resulting in impaired functioning (Liotti & Tucker, 1992). In a
somewhat different vein, other neuropsychological investigators have focused on
mapping out the biologically based motivational systems that may underlie different
behaviors and emotions. A prime illustration is provided by Gray's (1990)
neuropsychological model for the control of emotional behavior. In his model, Gray has
identified three fundamental neurologically based emotion systems, namely, the
behavioral approach system (BAS), the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), and the
fight/flight system (F/FL S). The behavioral approach system regulates the individual's
behavior in the presence of signals of reward, producing positive emotions and filrther
approach behaviors. The behavioral inhibition system regulates behaviors in the
presence of signals of punishment, leading to increases in anxiety, negative arousal, and
the further inhibition of behavioral responses. Finally, engagement of the fight/flight
system may lead to escape behaviors and/or defensive aggression, coupled with the
emotions of terror and rage. Along with a neux'opsychological perspective, another
approach to the study of emotions that has become increasingly prominent over the
past decade involves a cognitive orientation. This approach is based on the premise that
emotional experience is contingent upon a person's evaluation and interpretation of the
situation for his or her well-being (Frijda, 1993; Izard, 1993; Lazarus, 1993; Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988; Parkinson, 1997; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1993). This personal
evaluation, known as cognitive appraisal, is conceptualized slightly differently by various
cognitive emotion theorists. Some of these theorists describe the emotional experience
without attempting to detail the particular appraisals involved (Arnold, 1960; Epstein,

1983; Leventhal, 1984). Other theorists contend, however, that each emotion is
characterized by a specific and unique set of cognitive appraisals (Frijda, 1987; Lazarus,
1991a, 1993; Ortony et al., 1988; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Commonalties
Across Different Theoretical Perspectives on Emotion Despite the apparent diversity
across various theoretical perspectives on emotion, several commonalties exist. To


begin, both the neuropsychological and cognitive approaches generally distinguish
between emotional and cognitive components when describing their theoretical models
(Izard, 1993; Parkinson, 1997). Considering the emotional components first, one
relatively common theme across both perspectives is that a basic set of emotions can be
identified and classified. For example, the four basic emotions proposed by Gray (1990)
are hypothesized to correspond to each of his three neurologically based motivational
systems. That is, the behavioral approach system is hypothesized to correspond to
reward, the behavioral inhibition system is hypothesized to correspond to anxiety, and
the fight/flight system is hypothesized to correspond to rage and terror (Ortony &
Turner, 1990). Other emotion researchers have advanced somewhat different sets,
depending upon their theoretical perspectives. Plutchik (1980) has proposed that eight
primary emotions exist. These are fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation,
.joy, and acceptance. Oatley and Individual Differences and Emotion 793 Johnson-Laird
(1987), in comparison, have proposed that the number of basic emotions totals five, and
includes sadness, disgust, anger, anxiety, and happiness. Although the exact number
and identity of basic emotions may vary from one theoretical perspective to the next, a
high degree of convergence is still evident in terms of positing a fundamental distinction
between positive and negative emotions. Past models in both domains have typically
focused on negative emotions in greater detail. This imbalance has been recognized in
more recent theoretical approaches, which have also provided a more fine-grained
analysis of positive emotions. As one illustration, a recent cognitive theory of emotion
by Lazarus (1993) describes six positively valenced emotions (happiness, pride, relief,
love, hope, and compassion), in addition to nine negatively valenced emotions (anger,

anxiety, fright, guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, and disgust). Both the
neuropsychologicai and cognitive perspectives on the study of emotion have also
acknowledged, to varying degrees, the important role that cognitions may play in the
experience of emotion (Izard, 1993). In Gray's (1990) neuropsychological system, for
example, information processing or computational functions of the brain are suggested
to underlie all psychological processes, including emotion. Within current cognitive
theories of emotion, cognitions are posited to play a central role (Lazarus, 1993;
Parkinson, 1997). As suggested earlier, these theories are governed by the proposition
that the onset of emotional responses or affective states is dictated by the manner in


which an individual ascribes meaning to the environment. That is, emotions are elicited
and differentiated via the perception of the situation or event as appraised by the
individual (Scherer, 1993). There is considerable debate among current cognitive
theorists, however, regarding the number and type of cognitive appraisals that are
thought to differentiate the emotions (Parkinson, 1997). Lazarus (1993) has advanced a
cognitive-motivationalrelational theory of emotion in which both positive and negative
emotions are thought to be shaped by two cognitive mediators -- primary and
secondary appraisals. According to Lazarus, primary appraisal is defined as an evaluation
of the personal relevance of an encounter for one's well-being, and consists of three
well-defined cognitive dimensions: goal relevance, goal congruence, and type of ego
involvement (Lazarus, 1991b, 1991c, 1993). Secondary appraisal, on the other hand, is
defined as the evaluation of the person's options and resources for coping with the
situation and future prospects, and includes three specific and detailed components:
blame/credit, coping potential, and future expectancy. In comparison to the set of
appraisals specified by Lazarus, Roseman (1979) suggested that emotion is dependent
upon a different set of cognitive attributes, including motivational state, situational
state (presence/absence of reward/punishment), probability (certainty of outcome),
legitimacy, and agency (responsibility). Adding to this list, Smith and Ellsworth (1987)
have found evidence for three further appraisal dimensions, namely, attentional

activity, anticipated effort, and perceived obstacles. Finally, Frijda and his colleagues
(Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) conducted a meta-analysis of several
proposed cognitive appraisals and concluded that support existed for the presence of
five dimensions: valence, certainty, agency, interestingness, and globality. While much
of current cognitive emotion theory focuses on appraisals as the primary means of
eliciting emotions, attributions and construals have also been identified as antecedents
to emotions (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Even more recently, however, cognitive theories of
emotion have begun to incorporate discussions of 794 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper
relational meaning, dynamic systems, and cognitive schemata (e.g., Frijda, 1993;
Lazarus, 1993; Lewis, 1996). Thus, in addition to specifying the type of cognitive content
that may be important in emotions (e.g., cognitive appraisals and attributions), more
recent cognitive models of emotion have increasingly focused on the cognitive
processes that may pertain to the dynamic, unfolding nature of emotions. As one


example, Lazarus (1993) has proposed that each emotion can be defined by a particular
pattern of thought, known as a core relational theme. These core themes are higher
order cognitive constructs that are derived from particular combinations of primary and
secondary appraisal components. Fifteen core relational themes have been advanced by
Lazarus (1993), with each representing a specific relationship between the person and
environment. With respect to anger, for example, the underlying core theme relates to
a demeaning offense against the individual and her possessions. In contrast, the
emotion of happiness relates to a core theme of making reasonable progress toward a
goal. Sadness relates to the experience of an irrevocable loss, whereas pride is
associated with a core theme of enhancing one's ego-identity by taking credit for an
achievement or valued object. A second example of a recent cognitive process
orientation toward the study of emotion is provided by Lewis (1996). Building upon a
dynamic systems approach, his model of emotion recognizes the importance of the
ongoing interplay between cognitions and emotions. In accord with current cognitive
theories of emotion, Lewis (1996) incorporates the notion of a reciprocal relation

between cognitive appraisals and emotions. His model further proposes, however, that
the feedback between cognition and emotion is the basis for self-organizing appraisals
that are recurrent for an individual. These appraisals assemble over time, and constitute
global interpretations of situations that correspond with particular emotions. Thus, for
each individual, self-organizing appraisals help guide the direction and magnitude of an
emotional response by shifting that person's attention to certain features of an event or
situation, and also highlighting particular memories, associations, and scripts. These
cognitive processes elicit emotions. In turn, these emotional changes provide further
feedback that helps guide that individual's subsequent cognitive processing of other
salient features of the situation and/or directs attention to other relevant memories,
associations, and scripts. Overall, Lewis' (1996) model clearly acknowledges the complex
and ongoing interplay between appraisals, emotions, and cognitive processes, such as
selective attention and memory. A final common theme evident across both the
neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives on emotion relates to the role of
individual differences. At a neuropsychological level, investigators have described
various individual differences in neurological systems underlying the experience of
emotion. Davidson (1992), for example, has reported that individual differences in


measures of brain activation asymmetry are associated with substantial variations in
dispositional mood, affective reactivity, and temperament. In a similar fashion, Gray
(1990) has acknowledged the existence of prominent individual difference factors
relating to the degree of sensitivity associated with each of his neurologically based
emotion systems. As corroborated by a number of other investigators (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1985; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Watson &
Tellegen, 1985), individuals high on the general personality dimension of extraversion
exhibit heightened sensitivity to signals of reward (BAS), producing increased levels of
positive affect. In contrast, individuals high on the general personality dimension of
neuroticism display heightened sensitivity to punishment (BIS), with subsequently
enhanced levels of negative affect. When Individual Differences and Emotion 7~5 taken

together, this pattern suggests that individual difference factors mapping onto
underlying biologically based systems may play a prominent role in the differential
experience of situations and emotions. Current cognitive theories of emotion have also
begun to consider the potential role of individual differences in the experience of
emotion. Roseman (1991) has hinted at the need for future research to investigate
individual differences in cognitive appraisals, and their potential relation to emotional
predispositions. In turn, Lazarus' (1991c, 1993) model has introduced several personmediated variables that readily lend themselves to further consideration from an
individual difference perspective. In discussing cognitive appraisals, for example, Lazarus
has proposed that, beyond sharing certain common beliefs and goals, each person also
has their own specific set of well-established and stable goal hierarchies, beliefs, and
cognitive styles that influence how situations are appraised. Thus, due to unique
learning and developmental experiences, individuals may vary significantly in the types
of cognitive appraisals that are made for similar situations. Paralleling his views relating
to cognitive appraisals, Lazarus (1991c) has suggested that great variations in emotions
are noted among individuals as well. Although he proposes that general laws can be
formulated about the emotion process, and that people share emotional experiences,
he believes that "an emotion happens to an individual with a distinctive history who
wants, thinks, and confronts specific environments, evaluates their significance, and acts
as adaptively as possible" (Lazarus, 1991c, p. 7). Moreover, according to Lazarus, when
faced with a recurrent person-environment relationship, stable emotional patterns will


result in the individual. Summary. In addition to distinguishing between cognitive and
emotional components, both the neuropsychological and cognitive perspectives have
commented on the number of basic emotions, with a fundamental distinction being
drawn between positive and negative emotions. Furthermore, although current
cognitive theories of emotion are primarily dedicated to uncovering the role of
cognitions within the experience of emotion, neuropsychological perspectives have also
acknowledged the contribution of cognitive elements as well. For cognitive-based
theories of emotion, this emphasis has recently resulted in more refined theoretical

models that incorporate both cognitive content and processes. In addition to
articulating various types of cognitive content (e.g., appraisals, core themes, and
attributions), cognitive-based emotion researchers have also begun to specify more fully
the cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention and information processing effects)
that may relate to emotion. A final commonality, and one that forms the principal
concern of the present article, pertains to the role of individual differences in emotion.
Across both perspectives there is now reasonable support for the proposal that various
individual difference factors may bear importantly on the experience of emotion. THE
ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION In this article, we propose that a
detailed consideration of individual difference factors is integral to a more complete
theory of emotion. This proposal is quite congruent with a substantial body of literature
that supports an integrative hierarchical model of personality and emotionality
advanced by Watson and Clark (1984, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). This hierarchical model
consists of both a general and specific level. The general level refers to broad
distinctions across personality attributes, namely extra- 796 K. A. Winter and N. A.
Kuiper version versus neuroticism, that also map onto broad distinctions across
emotions, namely, positive versus negative affect. Within each general level of this
model there is also a lower order specific level. As one example, the general level of
neuroticism and negative affect can be further subdivided into different content
domains at the specific level, such as depression or anxiety (Watson et al., 1994). The
hierarchical model was briefly alluded to in our previous discussion of individual
difference factors relating to Gray's (1990) emotion systems. In particular, the general
dimension of extraversion is characterized by a temperamental sensitivity to pleasurable
stimuli (BAS); and is associated with the more frequent and intense expression of


positive affect, including the specific content emotions of joyfulness, enthusiasm,
boldness, pride, and self-confidence. Neuroticism, on the other hand, is thought to be
characterized by a temperamental sensitivity to painful or negative stimuli (BIS).
Individuals scoring high on this general negative dimension of personality more

frequently and intensely experience negative affect, including such specific content
emotions as fear. anxiety, sadness, guilt, hostility, and self-dissatisfaction. Considerable
research findings now converge on the proposal that individuals scoring high on
neuroticism generally perceive their world in a negative manner, viewing their life
experiences as threatening, problematic, and distressing. In contrast, individuals with
high levels of extraversion generally approach their environment in a positive and
energetic manner, displaying a strong willingness and enthusiasm to seek out and
actively engage in various life events (Watson & Clark, 1984, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). The
Watson and Clark hierarchical model is relevant to our individual differences approach
to emotions in several ways. First, the numerous findings associated with this model
provide strong empirical support for the proposal that individual differences in
personality are of fundamental importance to the differential experience of emotions.
Second, the most general level of this hierarchical model (i.e., positive vs. negative
valence) provides a useful framework for organizing our presentation of additional
findings that pertain directly to the cognitive and emotional components of theories of
emotion. Third, and as discussed in subsequent sections of the paper, the specific
content level of the hierarchical model (e.g., depression vs. anxiety; pride vs.
enthusiasm) is of particular importance to the development and presentation of our
individual differences-based self-schema model of emotion. Finally, the last section of
the paper indicates how both the specific and general levels of this hierarchical model
might be integrated with other theoretical and research perspectives to further advance
our understanding of individual difference factors pertaining to emotions. Individual
Differences in Personality and Psychopathology Congruent with the general level of the
Watson and Clark hierarchical framework described above, this section of the paper
reviews research findings from both the personality and psychopathology domains that
are of direct relevance to an individual difference perspective on theories of emotion. In
particular, the impact of both positive and negative personality characteristics on
cognition and emotion, the two central aspects of theories of emotion, is described.

When considering cognition, this review focuses on a construct of primary interest to
emotion theorists, namely, cognitive appraisals of events. Following this, the review of
emotion describes additional personality and psychopathology findings that highlight
the important role of individual difference factors in emotional responses to events.
Individual Differences and Emotion 797 Cognition. A review of the literature indicates
that individual differences in personality mediate cognitive appraisals of both positive
and negative life event.s. To begin with negative personality characteristics, Gallagher
(1990) found that individuals high in neuroticism were more likely to appraise academic
events as more threatening and less challenging than those low in neuroticism. In a
similar fashion,Jerusalem (1990) discovered that individuals high in trait anxiety
appraised a series of difficult performance tasks as threatening and involving loss,
whereas low trait anxiety individuals buffered the experience of stress by appraising
these situations as less threatening. In addition to the specific cognitive appraisals of
loss, threat, and challenge described above, negative personality characteristics have
also been found to be related to higher general stress appraisals for life events. Olinger,
Kuiper, and Shaw (1987), for example, found that individuals who endorsed a large
number of rigid and dysfunctional self-evaluative standards were found to think about
stressful events more often, and rate them as more displeasing, than individuals who
displayed few dysfunctional self-evaluative standards. This pattern of findings was
evident even when these individuals were currently nondepressed, suggesting a
persistent depressive personality style related to negative cognitive attitudes or beliefs
about self-evaluation. Similarly, Westra and Kuiper (1992) found that Type A
dispositions were significantly related to increased perceived stress, with higher Type A
individuals appraising an arithmetic task as more stressful than those lower in Type A
attributes. These heightened stress appraisals, however, were only found to be
correlated with increased Type A characteristics when the arithmetic task was
presented in a manner that maximized self-worth evaluations. While negative
personality characteristics tend to be associated with increased appraisals of threat and
loss, positive personality attributes have been shown to be related to more positive
appraisals of challenge. In terms of extraversion, for example, Gallagher (1990) found

that extraverted individuals were more likely to appraise academic stressors as
challenging than were individuals low in extraversion. A similar appraisal pattern has


been demonstrated for sense of humor, with Kuiper, Martin, and Olinger (1993)
reporting that individuals with a higher sense of humor viewed stressful events as more
challenging than individuals with a lower sense of humor. Other research has shown
that positive personality characteristics are also associated with reduced negative
appraisals of threat and loss regarding stressful life events. In a sample of German
migrants, for example,Jerusalem (1993) found that those individuals high in optimism
and self-efficacy were less likely to appraise their current adaptational demands as
threatening, and were less likely to consider that they had suffered a loss, when
compared with those who were low in optimism. Furthermore, the relationship
between an individual's level of optimism and both challenge and threat appraisals has
been examined in a sample of 73 dental patients presenting for wisdom-tooth
extraction under general anesthesia (Siim, 1994). In this study, higher levels of optimism
were positively related to appraisals of challenge and negatively related to appraisals of
threat. That is, those people who had a positive outlook on life felt more confident and
less afraid when it came to surgery than those people who have a negative outlook on
life. As well, optimists were more likely to appraise pain following surgery as more
challenging, less threatening, and more controllable than pessimists. A similar appraisal
pattern has been demonstrated for individual differences in sense of humor. In
particular, when faced with performing a novel task in a laboratory setting, Kuiper,
McKenzie, and Belanger (1995) found that individuals with 798 K. A. Winter and N. A.
K'uiper an increased level of humor provided higher challenge and lower threat
appraisals, compared with individuals displaying a lower sense of humor. Emotion. A
review of the literature also indicates that individual differences in personality mediate
affective responses to life events. There is some agreement in the literature that a
depressive personality style is associated with a variety of negative emotional features,
including increased levels of dysphoric affect, sadness, anxiety, and guilt (Beck, Rush,

Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Kuiper, Olinger, & Martin, 1990; Segal & Swallow, 1993). As one
example, Krantz and Hammen (1979) found that when faced with ambiguous
information, depressed individuals favored emotionally negative interpretations. As a
second illustration, Olinger et al. (1987) found that individuals with a large number of
dysfunctional self-evaluative standards rated negative life events as having a greater
emotional impact, ruminated more often about these events, and displayed higher


perceived stress levels than individuals who were less cognitively vulnerable to
depression. Consistent with a depressive personality style, these effects were also
evident even when these individuals were nondepressed. Congruent with the above
findings, individuals high in Type A characteristics also perceive their lives as involving
more stress, and consequently experience greater emotional distress than those
individuals displaying few Type A characteristics (Kuiper & Martin, 1989). In two
separate studies, Westra and Kuiper (1992) found a positive relation between Type A
characteristics and negative emotion. That is, high Type A individuals were found to
have increased depressive affect, and reported more anger and negative affect, than
individuals who did not display Type A features. While negative personality
characteristics tend to be related to emotional distress, positive personality
characteristics have been shown to be consistently related to positive emotion. For
example, Carver and Gaines (1987) explored the effects of trait optimism in a group of
women during their transition from pregnancy to motherhood. In this study, an
individual's level of optimism (measured in the third trimester of pregnancy) was found
to be inversely related to depressed mood, 3 weeks postpartum. Similarly, Scheier and
Carver (1991) found that higher levels of trait optimism were negatively related to the
expression of depressive affect in adaptation to college life. The association between
trait optimism and affect is further illustrated in a study of individuals recovering from
coronary artery bypass surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). Specifically, optimistic individuals
were found to report lower levels of hostility and depressive affect prior to surgery,
hnmediately postsurgery, more optimistic individuals were also found to report greater

happiness, relief, and satisfaction than individuals low in optimism. Individual
differences in sense of humor have also been found to moderate emotion in a positive
fashion. In addition to work that has shown that a greater sense of humor is inversely
related to negative affect in response to negative life events (Lefcourt & Martin, 1986),
other research has also found higher levels of humor to be related to more positive
emotions surrounding positive life events (Martin, Kuiper, Olinger, & Dance, 1993). An
increased sense of humor is also significantly related to greater positive emotion in
novel situations. In particular, following the completion of a novel drawing task, Kuiper
et al. (1995) found that individuals with a greater sense of humor also displayed
significantly higher levels of positive affect. Individual Differences and Emotion 799


Summary. Our review of the personality and psychopathology literature points to the
important role that individual differences play in cognition and emotion; the two
fundamental components of theories of emotion. With regard to the cognitive
component, individuals who display negative or psychopathological personality
attributes, such as neuroticism or trait anxiety, often provide cognitive appraisals that
construe their environments as more stressful and threatening. In contrast, individuals
displaying such positive personality characteristics as extraversion or optimism typically
appraise their environments in a more favorable and challenging manner. In terms of
the emotional component, individuals who have more negative personality
characteristics, such as depressive or Type A dispositions, report heightened levels of
emotional distress and negative emotions when faced with either stressful or
nonstressful life events, when compared with individuals displaying more positive
personality characteristics, such as optimism or sense of humor. COGNITION AND
EMOTION IN THE SELF-SCHEMA Attention will now focus on a higher order construct,
the self-schema, as a means of integrating cognition and emotion within the individual.
The self-schema construct was selected as it has a considerable theoretical and research
base that encompasses both cognitive content and process from an individual difference
perspective (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Kuiper et al., 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Segal

& Swallow, 1993). In this approach, the self-schema consists of the organized cognitive
representations of one's own unique traits, attributes, abilities, opinions, and attitudes.
This constellation of self-referent information in the self-schema serves to guide the
processing of personally relevant information. Each individual has a self-schema that is
unique or person-specific, and is responsible for influencing perception, attention,
appraisal, and memory processes. By filtering aspects of the external world, and thereby
influencing what is attended to, self-schemata shape knowledge and behavior (Pace,
1988). This blending of content and process allows for a conceptual model that readily
captures features of the ongoing interactions an individual has with the environment. As
such, a self-schema model is particularly sensitive to the dynamic unfolding nature of
emotions, as it includes the application of motives and cognitive content to ongoing
information processing and feedback. Overall, our general aim in presenting this
integrative self-schema model is to illustrate how an individual difference perspective
can be fully incorporated within a theory of emotion. Prior to presenting this model we


first review findings from both the personality and psychopathology domains that
demonstrate that individual differences in self: schemata exist, and that these
differences have important implications for both the cognitive and emotional
components of theories of emotion. Congruent with the Watson and Clark (1992, 1994)
hierarchical framework described earlier, this review begins by incorporating the
general level distinction between positive and negative personality characteristics. As
the review progresses, however, it becomes increasingly clear that the more specific
content level of the hierarchical framework is of particular importance to our proposed
self-schema model. Within the general negative personality domain, for example, selfschema findings will be reviewed that indicate that specific content differences between
depression and anxiety provide fundamental distinctions in patterns of selfrepresentation, and the experience of emotions. Finally, this review further
demonstrates the important role of cognitive processes in the experience of emotion.
This processing element begins to emerge in the consider- 800 K. A. Winter and ~\ A.
Kuiper ation of cognition and self-schemata, and then assumes more central importance
when commenting on the relationship between emotions and individual differences in

self-schemata. Self-schemata and cognition. Considering first negative personality
characteristics, a number of studies suggest that a unique self-schema with a specific
cognitive profile exists for a depressive personality style. Overall, the relevant cognitions
are organized around broad themes of personal worthlessness and inadequacy (Clark &
Beck, 1989; Kuiper et al., 1990; Segal & Swallow, 1993; Westra & Kuiper, 1996), and
translate into a negative content schema with negatively biased information processing.
Clinically depressed individuals, for example, show greater self-referent endorsement
and recall for negative content personal adjectives, such as inadequate, unlucky, weak,
helpless, and inferior (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Mineka & Sutton, 1992). In contrast,
selfschemata for normal and nondepressed psychiatric controls shows a positive
content orientation, with much greater endorsement and recall of positive personality
characteristics, such as achieving, capable, inquiring, helpful, and sociable. Finally,
additional research has shown that individual differences in self-schemata exist for
individuals who are mildly depressed, Kuiper and Derry (1982), for example, found that
mild depressives endorsed and subsequently recalled equal amounts of self-referent
positive and negative personality, characteristics, whereas nondepressed individuals


primarily endorsed and recalled positive content material only. Further research has
demonstrated that a specific set of dysfunctional self-evaluative beliefs may also play an
important role in a depressive personality self-schema (Kuiper et al., 1990; Olinger et al.,
1987). Using the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), a self-report inventory designed to
measure the dysfimctional sell-worth beliefs thought to predispose individuals to
depression, Cane, Olinge~, Gotlib, and Kuiper (1986) found evidence for two distinct
cognitive dimensions. These were, respectively, performance evaluation (e.g., "If I do
not do as well as other people, it means I am an inferior human being"), and approval of
others (e.g., "What other people think of me is very important."). Empirically, the
increased endorsement of these rigid self-evaluative standards has robust effects. In
addition to the Olinger et al. (1987) findings reported earlier in this paper, Kuiper and
Dance (1994) tound that dysfunctional self-evaluative standards were significant

predictors of increased depression levels and diminished self-esteem across time. This
effect remained significant even "after taking into account initial levels of depression
and self-esteem at time 1. As such, this research highlights the utility of dysfunctional
selfevaluative standards in terms of predicting subsequent levels of aftect and selfesteem. Individual differences in cognitive self-representation can also be described for
anxious individuals. Although a variety' of cognitive structures account tor anxiety
disorders, self-schema content is tL~cused on feelings of vulnerability and fragility (Segal
& Swallow, 1993), as well as themes of personal danger, threat, and uncertainty (Clark,
Beck, & Stewart, 1990; Westra & Kuiper, 1996). In a sample of 470 patients, Clark et al.
(1990), for example, found evidence to support Beck's cognitive theory of
psychopathology. That is, factor analytic findings revealed a two-factor solution, in
which anxiety and depression formed separate dimensions. While those who were
clinically depressed were characterized by hopelessness, low self-worth and negative
thoughts involving loss and past failure, clinically anxious individuals reported
significantly more thoughts of anticipated harm and danger. Despite the fact that fewer
empirical studies have examined the sell-schema of anxious individuals, the existing
research has generally been supportive. In particular, anxious individuals have been
Individual Differences and Emotion 801 found to rate more negative traits as selfdescriptive and display superior attention to and recall for fear relevant stimuli, as
compared to those individuals who are nonanxious (Breck & Smith, 1983; Mineka &


Sutton, 1992). Individual differences in self-schemata have also been investigated for
Type A persons. Price (1982) postulated that three specific fears or irrational beliefs are
characteristic of Type A individuals, namely, that self-worth is largely a function of
personal achievements, that no universal moral principles exist, and that resources are
in scarce supply. This Type A schema, which centers around achievement, competition,
and negativity toward others, has generally received empirical support. Westra and
Kuiper (1992), for instance, reported that individuals high in Type A have dysfunctional
cognitions concerning performance evaluation. These individuals are also characterized
by numerous aberrant cognitions, including a need to seek revenge, a belief that
resources are in scarce supply and that one will not acquire one's share of desirable

commodities, and the conviction that self-worth is contingent upon personal
accomplishments. In a study that simultaneously examined dysfunctional self-schema
content across four different maladjustment domains, Westra and Kuiper (1996) found
further support for the proposed individual difference profiles for content-specificity.
These researchers demonstrated that for depression, Type A characteristics, anxiety,
and bulimia, the expected self-schema content emerged, and was specific for each
domain of maladjustment. Anxiety, for example, was marked by a specific focus on
interpersonal evaluative fears, whereas higher levels of depression were specifically
associated with dysfunctional self-evaluative cognitions pertaining to failure and loss. In
addition, it was found that these individual differences in dysfunctional self-schema
content were highly predictive of future levels of maladjustment in each domain, even
after controlling for both initial maladjustment level and the endorsement of more
general types of dysfunctional cognitions. Given the relatively recent focus on
investigating self-schemata for positive personality dimensions, there is still somewhat
limited empirical evidence in this area. Hillson (1997), however, has found promising
initial results pertaining to two distinct dimensions within positive personality. In her
work, she factor analyzed the Ryff (1989) scale, a broad-based measure of several
positive personality characteristics. Across several samples these analyses consistently
revealed two underlying dimensions of positive personality, namely, Positive
Individualism (PI) and Positive Relations with Others (PR). Positive Individualism consists
of items relating to feelings of acceptance of oneself, feelings of independent or
autonomous functioning, having purpose or sense of meaning in one's life, and a sense


of success or mastery over one's environment. Positive Relations with Others refers to
the giving and receiving inherent in healthy adult relationships, including one's
interpretation of the appropriate use and availability of social support. In addition to
ascertaining that PI and PR are distinct from each other, Hillson (1997) also found that PI
and PR are distinct from other positive personality dimensions, such as extraversion,
optimism, and sense of humor. Of particular relevance in the present context, Hillson

(1997) has demonstrated that these two dimensions of positive personality show
expected self-schema content effects, both in terms of self-descriptive adjectives and
belief statements. Her research demonstrated that unique sets of self-descriptive
adjectives and belief statements (modeled after the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, but
positive in nature) were each able to discriminate between the two positive personality
dimensions of PI and PR. Examples of self-descriptive adjectives for PI include aspiring
and individualistic; 802 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper whereas self-descriptive adjectives
for PR include warm, companionable, and unselfish. Similarly, an example of a belief
statement for PI includes: "You should be confident in your own opinions and evaluate
yourself by your own standards." In contrast, a belief statement reflecting the PR
dimension includes: "It is important to have a sense of belonging with those around
you." Self-schemata and emotion. Over the past few years, the view that cognitive
schematic processes are closely related to the experience of emotion has been steadily
gaining ground (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Researchers are in general agreement
with the notion that individual differences in attitudes, beliefs, and general cognitive
selfrepresentations are associated with individual differences in emotions. According to
Segal and Swallow (1993), for instance, certain schemata are hypothesized to have
concomitant emotional features. Using depression as an example, these researchers
suggested that the core schema of inadequacy and worthlessness that is characteristic
of depressives activates cognitive appraisals of uncontrollability, which subsequently
triggers feelings of sadness. Other studies have also highlighted the influence of
individual differences in cognitive schemata on emotional experiences. In a sample of
university students, Larsen, Diener, and Cropanzano (1987) found that cognitive
processes consistent with a schematic approach are positively related to more intense
affective responses when certain individuals are exposed to either positive or negative
emotional stimuli. These researchers found that individuals scoring high on the


individual difference variable of affective reactivity engaged in more negative selfreferencing and focusing on the specific emotion-provoking aspects of events than
individuals scoring low on affective reactivity. High scorers on this personality dimension

also tended to overgeneralize the emotional implications of a single negative event,
when compared to low scorers. In addition to research that has demonstrated a link
between cognitive schematic processes and the magnitude of emotional experience,
there is some empirical support for a significant relation between individual differences
in cognitive style and the expression of different types of negative emotions. As one
illustration, Berenbaum, Fujita, and Pfennig (1995) found that general cognitive styles
relating to attributional preferences are differentially associated with negative
emotions. Those individuals displaying an increased general tendency to make internal
and unstable causal attributions, for example, also displayed higher levels of fear. In
contrast, individuals with an increased general tendency to make global and stable
attributions for various events displayed higher levels of sadness and anger. Turning to
the psychopathology literature, Mathews and MacLeod (1994) have carefully detailed
empirical research affirming the link between schematic processes and emotion for
depressed and anxious individuals. Specifically, these investigators reviewed literature
attesting to cognitive biases in information processing, selective interpretation, and
selective memory. With respect to cognitive processing, research shows that anxiety
and depression are associated with an encoding bias favoring emotionally negative
information. For example, both anxious and depressed individuals were found to display
disproportionately long color-naming latencies for threatrelated stimulus words
(indicating greater distraction by the semantic meaning of these words); as well as
exhibiting speeded detection of a probe occurring in the spatial location of negative
words. Anxious and depressives also exhibited a selective bias favoring emotionally
negative interpretations. As one illustration, in a homophone spelling test, high anxious
individuals provided more negative word spellings Individual Differences and Emotion
803 for ambiguous homophones than did low anxious individuals (e.g., pain for pane).
Moreover, anxious individuals displayed a greater priming effect for target words that
had a single spelling, but two meanings differing in emotional valence (e.g., stroke).
Finally, depressed individuals were found to have short recall latency for negative
memories and exhibited superior recall for emotionally negative stimulus words.

Summary. Research was presented suggesting that a coherent set of self-descriptive
adjectives and belief statements exists for both positive and negative personality; and
that further specific distinctions can then be made within each of these general
categories. Examination of the cognitive profiles for several patterns of maladjustment
(e.g., depression, anxiety, and Type A) revealed that pathological personality is
differentially related to negative content schemata, and that excessively rigid and
inappropriate evaluative standards are used to guide the lives of those who have
negative personalities. In contrast, preliminary research by Hillson (1997) suggests that
there are at least two useful dimensions within positive personality; and that these two
dimensions are differentially related to self-descriptive adjectives and positive belief
statements that guide self-evaluations and behavior. The preceding review also revealed
that certain cognitive schemata are related to affect intensity, and that cognitive styles
are differentially associated with negative emotions. Finally, it was demonstrated that
cognitive schemata of anxious and depressed individuals are differentially related to the
encoding of emotionally negative information, the favoring of emotionally negative
interpretations, and superior recall of emotionally negative memories. A SELF-SCHEMA
MODEL OF EMOTION This section of the paper presents a self-schema model of emotion
that places individual differences in the forefront. As shown in Figure 1, this will be done
by suggesting that the two major aspects of the self-schema consist of content and
function. The content aspect of the self-schema provides a means for detailing the
precise role of specific individual differences in self-relevant content in theories of
emotion. The three functional aspects of the self-schema, namely, initial processing,
evaluation, and output, provide a means for blending the content and process
components of the self, as the individual deals with environmental events. Components
of a Self-Schema Model of Emotion Self-schema content. As reviewed earlier, the
content aspect of the self-schema includes traits, attributes, abilities, opinions, and
attitudes that are unique to each individual. In addition, self-schema content reflects an
individual's self-descriptive adjectives, self-evaluative belief statements, and
attributions. Although not addressed in the self-schema literature, it is our contention

that Lazarus' notion of core relational themes, as outlined earlier in the paper, is also an
important element of self-schema content. In order for this element to be incorporated
within self-schema content, however, some modification is required. Specifically,


Lazarus (1993) has proposed that a universe of 15 core relational themes is available for
each and every person to draw from. In contrast, our model proposes that the general
availability and applicability of core relational themes across all individuals may not be
the case. Instead, our examination of the self-schema literature suggests that only
certain subsets of core relational themes are inherent in each individual. Within our
model, these themes then 804 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper Self-Schema Content SelfSchema Functioning i Self-Schema trmts, attributes, abilities. opinions, attitudes selfdescriptive adjectives self-evaluative beliefs attributions core relational themes 4
................. perception 'niti -- positive self-relevant Ev u ti°n evaluative H - emotions
Outpu' selective attention judgements behaviors (coping) encoding negative selfrelevant evaluative cognitive appraisal judgements core relational themes Life Events
(stressful and non-stressful) FIGURE 1. A self-schema model of emotion depicting how
individual differences in schema content influence initial processing, evaluation, and
output of stressful and nonstressful llfe events. uniquely guide that person's appraisal of
and emotional reactions to his or her own life events. As one illustration of guiding
themes, a person with Type A characteristics may generally experience core themes
centering around feeling cheated or being given a raw deal, when faced with life
situations. In contrast, a person with depressive personality characteristics may
generally experience themes centering around feeling inadequate regarding progress
toward desired goals. Furthermore, our review of the self-schema literature suggests
that for certain individuals, other sets of core themes above and beyond those
described by Lazarus in his model of emotion, may be particularly relevant and salient.
Recall that Hillson (1997) has identified a set of self-referent belief statements reflecting
the content of at least two distinct dimensions of positive personality (i.e., positive
individualism, positive relatedness) that are not redundant with those proposed by
Lazarus. Self-schema content components can impact on self-schema functioning in a
variety of ways, including initial processing, evaluation, and the generation of output,
when individuals are faced with either stressful or nonstressful life events. During the

initial processing stage, self-schema content guides what information is attended to by
actively filtering out environmental stimuli deemed to be extraneous or irrelevant to the
self. A number of cognitive strategies employing self-schema content guide initial
processing, and serve to maintain positive affect or favorable self-evaluations within the


individual. Examples of these cognitive strategies include social reasoning, social
comparison, and self-presentation (Banaji & Prentice, 1994). Via these strategies,
generally favorable information is accommodated within the self, and slight adjustments
to the sell-schema are subsequently made. However, when one's self-concept is
negative, personal constructs are rigid, and new positively-valenced information is
generally not accommodated within the self-schema. Accordingly, cognitive distortions
result. Selective abstraction, for example, is a form of cognitive distortion in Individual
D![ferences and Emotion 805 which attention is directed toward personal information
that has bearing upon issues of inadequacy and worthlessness, thereby ignoring positive
information that is incompatible with this depressive self-schema (Beck et al., 1979).
Negative views of the self can also be maintained by social comparison strategies. As
one illustration, Swallow and Kuiper (1993) found that depressed individuals failed to
exhibit self-protective downward comparison strategies following poor performance on
a task, when compared with nondepressed individuals. Also as shown in Figure 1, selfschema content is further implicated in how events are evaluated and subsequently
experienced. An example of self-schema content that is integral to the evaluation phase
of schema-functioning pertains to self-evaluative belief statements. As described earlier
in this paper, these unique sets of cognitive representations influence how individuals
personally evaluate situations that are encountered in their daily lives. Depending upon
the exact nature of the self-referent belief statements endorsed by the individual, these
self-relevant evaluative judgments may be either positive or negative in tone. The final
stage that self-schema content is implicated in is output (see Figure 1). This stage
consists of the expression of emotion and a wide range of behaxfors, including coping
techniques. 1 Of particular relevance in the present context is that cognitive strategies
within the self (which themselves are intertwined with content factors), have been

found to influence the types of emotions that are experienced. Recall, for example, that
biases in cognitive processing, selective interpretation, and selective memory for
depressives were found to be associated with negative emotion (Mathews & MacLeod,
1994). Initial processing. As can be seen in Figure 1, initial processing consists of
perception, selective attention, and encoding. Given that this phase is cognitive in
nature and occurs early on in the experience of emotion, we propose that cognitive
appraisals can also be considered to exemplify operations occurring within the initial


processing phase of self-schema functioning. According to most cognitive theories of
emotion, the first step in the experience of emotion is cognitive appraisal. At this stage,
judgments are made regarding the personal meaning or future significance of a
particular situation. That is, attributes of the person or self-schema content (e.g.,
commitments, beliefs, etc.) combine with situation factors (e.g., familiarity,
predictability, imminence, etc.) to produce cognitive appraisals (Lazarus, 1993).
Although this approach recognizes the importance of both person and situation factors,
we suggest that theories of emotion would benefit: from an even more explicit focus on
personal attributes relating to individual differences. In particular, our model would
suggest that in order to accurately represent the appraisal process, various individual
differences in self-schema content must be accounted for. Since distinct learning and
developmental experiences, as well as unique ~Although our self-schema model of
emotion does not directly address the isstie of coping at this point in time, it is proposed
that knowledge of self-schema content and fimctioning will provide valuable
information regarding individual differences in both the choice and effectiveness of
coping strategies. These distinctions are elaborated oil in a stress and coping model of
child maltreatment developed by Hillson and Kuiper (1994). Their model indicates how
individual differences in both the cognitive appraisals and core themes exhibited by
different caregivers can result in different coping strategies that range from highly
effective to highly maladaptive. 806 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper person factors,
contribute to cognitive appraisal, our model would propose that individual difference

factors play a central role. Our proposal is reinforced by the findings presented earlier.
In particular, there is ample evidence to suggest that within the domains of both
personality and psychopathology, individuals have characteristic and unique ways of
construing events in their lives. Our review of the literature regarding cognitive
appraisals and neuroticism, trait anxiety, depressive personality style, and Type A
dispositions suggests that these particular personality characteristics are associated with
more negative appraisals of life events (i.e., threat, loss). In contrast, this review also
indicated that positive personality attributes, such as extraversion, optimism, and sense
of humor, relate to much more favorable appraisals of life events (i.e., challenge).
Evaluation. The evaluation phase of self-schema functioning consists of both positive
and negative self-relevant evaluative beliefs. The self-schema research examined earlier


in the paper indicates that unique cognitive concepts and beliefs are associated with
both psychopathology and positive personality, respectively. Our review of the
literature regarding negative personality (e.g., depressive personality, Type A
characteristics) suggests that each form of pathological personality is differentially
related to negative-content schemata, with each type of schema also incorporating rigid
and unique dysfunctional beliefs that guide self-evaluations and behaviors. A depressive
personality style, for example, is associated with a negative content schema that also
includes dysfimctional self-evaluative standards centering around performance
evaluation and approval by others. Anxiety', on the other hand, is associated with a fearrelated content schema and self:relevant beliefs centering on feelings of vulnerability,
fragility, personal danger, threat, and uncertainty. Finally, our review also revealed
some evidence to suggest at least two useful dimensions within positive personality,
with each of these dimensions then being differentially related to a unique set of
positive self-descriptive adjectives and self-evaluative belief statements. The evaluation
phase is hypothesized to influence the generation of output, namely, the emotional
reactions and/or behavioral manifestations that result when an individual encounters an
event. Since Lazarus' (1993) core relational themes are thought to underlie the
evaluation and experience of emotion, we have incorporated this construct within the

evaluative component of our model. In general, we would propose that the unique
cognitive concepts and beliefs associated with individual differences in both personality
and psychopathology have differential implications for core relational themes. That is,
our self-schema model would suggest that the relevance of core relational themes
varies markedly as a function of identifiable individual difference factors. For example, it
is predicted that individuals with a depressive personality, style would most likely
experience core themes centering around loss, and feeling that they have not lived up
to personal expectations. In contrast, our model would predict that trait anxious
individuals would most likely experience an entirely different set of core themes,
namely, those centering around feeling uncertain, threatened, and overwhelmed by
some immediate danger. In terms of positive personality factors, our approach would
predict that people high on positive relatedness would tend to more often experience
and employ core relational themes centering around empathizing with the needs of
others and wanting to help, whereas people high on positive individualism would more


often tend to experience and use core relational themes centering around feeling selfsatisfied and content. Overall, then, the critical distinction here is that specific and
unique sets of core relational themes Individual Differences and Emotion 807 can be
identified, a pr/0r/, for a wide variety of different personality characteristics. This focus
on the important role of individual differences is in marked contrast to existing cognitive
theories of emotion, which generally assume the universality of these themes across all
individuals, regardless of personality characteristics. Output. As shown in Figure 1, the
final phase of self-schema functioning consists of emotional reactions and behaviors.
Although emotion has previously been identified as an important derivative of the
output phase that is closely tied to self-schema content, current theories of emotion
have tended to underemphasize this point. In Lazarus' approach, for example, a set of
15 discrete emotions, grouped into positive, negative, and borderline categories, has
been identified. Each emotion is derived from a different pattern of appraisal
components, and is thought to represent the various ways that a person can be harmed
or benefited in an encounter. While Lazarus recognizes that variations in emotions

between individuals occur, he does not explicitly address this notion in his model. As
argued here, however, adequate explanation of the experience of emotion requires
consideration of an individual differences perspective. Based on individual difference
factors, people are predisposed toward particular mood states and thus have certain
characteristic domains of emotional expression. When faced with the same situation,
different people will either experience similar emotions in varying degrees, or perhaps
even report a different constellation of emotions entirely. Drawing attention once again
to the literature that was reviewed earlier, it was found that different individuals display
different characteristic forms of emotional expression. Our review of neuroticism,
depressive personality style, and Type A personality characteristics indicates that people
with these negative dispositions tend to report increased negative affect. In contrast,
findings for extraversion, trait optimism, and sense of humor suggest that individuals
with these more favorable dispositions tend to report generally positive affect relating
to life events. Thus, using Lazarus' list of 15 basic emotions as an illustration, we would
propose that while the whole spectrum of emotions may be experienced, certain
subsets of these emotions are more often experienced by a given individual, and that
the composition of each subset varies as a function of individual difference factors.


Individuals with a depressive personality, for example, are predicted to more often
experience guilt, shame, and sadness, whereas individuals high in Type A characteristics
are predicted to more often experience anger and anxiety. In contrast, individuals who
are optimistic are predicted to more often experience hope and happiness. These
proposed emotional distinctions map directly onto the self-schema content differences
in our model. Summary. The model presented here proposes that the two main aspects
of the self-schema involve content and function. In this approach, each of the three sell:
schema functions (initial processing, evaluation, output), represents a blending of
unique self-schema content for a given individual with their processing of environmental
events. The model underscores the primary importance of individual differences in selfschemata impacting on cognitive appraisals, core relational themes, and the expression
of emotions. In addition to the specified relations among self-schema content and

functioning, it is proposed that earlier schema functions can also impact on later
functions, and vice-versa. That is, initial processing, evaluation, and output can operate
interdepen- 808 K. A. Winter and N. A. Kuiper dently or even covary. To clarify, initial
processing may influence evaluation, which may subsequently influence emotional
reactions and/or behavioral manifestations. Furthermore, self-schema output may
influence both initial processing and evaluation functions, or further evaluations may
revise both the processing and output functions. It is also possible that self-schema
functioning, via a feedback loop, may lead to subsequent changes to self-schema
content. Although this model emphasizes the person, it should be noted that situation
factors are not ignored. Implicit in self-schema theory is a consideration of situation
factors, with aspects of the self-schema being activated each time a situation is
encountered. Thus, similar to the notion of relational meaning incorporated within
Lazarus' (1993) theory of emotion, the present model is based on the premise that
separate person and environmental variables are merged into a higher order construct,
the self-schema. Employing the Self-schema Model to Increase Predictive Accuracy for
Emotions Having described our self-schema model, the next stage is to indicate how this
model might serve to increase predictive accuracy regarding the experience of
emotions. This will be done by using a brief scenario to illustrate how the self-schema
model makes differential predictions for two specific individual difference factors (i.e.,
depressive personality style vs. trait optimism), at each of the three major stages of


dealing with life experiences (i.e., initial processing, evaluation, and output). The selfschema model of emotion proposes that individuals with a depressive personality
display specific and unique negative self-schema content, which, in turn, impacts on
their self-schema functioning across a wide range of life experiences. As indicated
earlier, these individuals show negative self-referent content profiles (e.g., hopeless,
loss, failure), inappropriate beliefs and attitudes (e.g., unrealistic selfevaluative
standards), and dysfunctional cognitive biases (e.g., selective attention and
inappropriate social comparisons) that guide their life experiences. The specific
ramifications of this depressive personality self-schema can be highlighted by

considering the following scenario, adapted from Smith and Lazarus (1993), in which
person A, a close friend of person B, betrays the trust of B by revealing to a third party
that B has cheated on his lover. In terms of initial processing of this situation, our model
would predict that, if person B has a depressive personality self-schema, he would be
more likely to report negative cognitive appraisals that center around construals of
threat, loss, and increased personal responsibility. At the evaluation stage, the selfschema model would propose that person B would be more likely to employ core
relational themes that are again negatively valenced. Given their depressive personality
self-schema, these themes may include the perception that they are hopeless with
regard to their ability to handle or improve this situation, and that they are personally to
blame tor everything that has happened. Finally, in terms of emotion, our model would
predict that, consistent with a depressive personality self-schema, person B would be
more likely to exhibit negative feelings, such as sadness and/or guilt, at the output
stage. For this same scenario, the self-schema model of emotion would make quite
different predictions for individuals displaying positive personality characteristics, such
as trait optimism. Our earlier review indicated that individuals with higher levels of
optimism have generally positive self-schema content, consisting of favorable attitudes
and beliefs (e.g., a generalized expectancy for good rather than bad outcomes),
Individual Differences and Emotion 809 as well as adaptive cognitive strategies (e.g.,
social reasoning that emphasizes positive personal attributes). Compared to a
depressive personality, then, the unique selfschema content associated with an
optimistic individual would have quite different effects on each phase of self-schema
functioning. That is, when the self-schema content of an optimist is mapped onto