State of the Nation - South Africa 2007 ppt

South Africa 2007
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South Africa 2007
Edited by Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel,
Roger Southall & Jessica Lutchman
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Published by HSRC Press
Private Bag X9182, Cape Town, 8000, South Africa
www.hsrcpress.ac.za
First published 2007
ISBN 978-0-7969-2166-6
© 2007 Human Sciences Research Council

The views expressed in this publication are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the Human Sciences Research Council (‘the Council’) or
indicate that the Council endorses the views of the authors.
In quoting from this publication, readers are advised to
attribute the source of the information to the individual
author concerned and not to the Council.
Copyedited by Vaun Cornell and Lee Smith
Typeset by Christabel Hardacre
Cover photograph by Mandla Mnyakama of Iliso Yabantu
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Contents
List of tables viii
List of figures x
Foreword xiii
Acronyms xv
Introduction
The ANC state, more dysfunctional than developmental? 1

Roger Southall
Part 1: Politics
Introduction 27
1The state of the African National Congress 35
Anthony Butler
2Taking to the streets: has developmental local government
failed in South Africa? 53
Doreen Atkinson
3 ‘Things fall apart, can the centre hold?’ The state of coalition
politics in the Cape Metropolitan Council 78
Zwelethu Jolobe
4Municipal elections 2006: protests, independent candidates
and cross-border municipalities 95
Mcebisi Ndletyana
5A silent revolution: South African voters, 1994–2006 114
Collette Schulz-Herzenberg
6Local government budgets and development: a tale of two towns 146
Neva Seidman Makgetla
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Part II: Economy
Introduction 171
7Disability and welfare in South Africa’s era of
unemployment and AIDS 179
Nicoli Nattrass
8The ANC, black economic empowerment and state-owned
enterprises: a recycling of history? 201
Roger Southall
9Technological choices in South Africa: ecology, democracy
and development 226
David Fig

10 Old victories, new struggles: the state of the National Union
of Mineworkers 245
Andries Bezuidenhout and Sakhela Buhlungu
11 Rainbow, renaissance, tribes and townships: tourism and
heritage in South Africa since 1994 266
Heather Hughes
12 The promise and the practice of transformation in
South Africa’s health system 289
Helen Schneider, Peter Barron and Sharon Fonn
13 Public hospitals in South Africa: stressed institutions,
disempowered management 312
Karl von Holdt and Mike Murphy
Part III: Society
Introduction 345
14 ‘Some of us know nothing except military skills’:
South Africa’s former guerrilla combatants 351
Lephophotho Mashike
15 The state of South Africa’s prisons 379
Julia Sloth-Nielsen
16 ‘Truck and trailer’: rugby and transformation in South Africa 402
Ashwin Desai and Zayn Nabbi
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17 Violence against women in South Africa 425
Lisa Vetten
18 Kingdom deferred? The churches in South Africa, 1994–2006 448
Anthony Egan
19 Improving learner achievement in schools: applications
of national assessments in South Africa 470
Anil Kanjee
Part IV: South Africa in Africa

Introduction 503
20 South Africa in Africa: trends and forecasts in a changing
African political economy 508
John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman and Alex Comninos
21 South Africa in the DRC: renaissance or neo-imperialism? 533
Claude Kabemba
22 The Zimbabwean community in South Africa 552
Elinor Sisulu, Bhekinkosi Moyo and Nkosinathi Tshuma
Contributors 575
Index 576
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List of tables
Ta ble 1 Racial composition of the civil service, 1993 and 2003 7
Ta ble 5.1 Aggregate electoral results, 1994–2004 116
Ta ble 5.2 Registration, turnout and percentage of voting age population
(VAP) voting for governing party and opposition 117
Ta ble 5.3 ANC identifiers in each social group, by percentage 128
Ta ble 5.4 Opposition identifiers in each social group, by percentage 128
Ta ble 5.5 Independents in each social group, by percentage 129
Ta ble 5.6 Government performance evaluations: identifiers vs.
non-identifiers among black Africans by percentage, 2000 131
Ta ble 5.7 Comparison of turnout as percentage of registered voters 136
Ta ble 5.8 Provincial turnout at local elections as percentage of
registered voters 137
Ta ble 6.1 Average expenditure per person per year by quintile of
municipalities, 2004 150
Ta ble 6.2 Racial composition of population by municipality income
quintile, 2001 151
Ta ble 6.3 Municipal employment by groups of province, 2003 153
Ta ble 6.4 The cost of senior municipal management, 2004 155

Ta ble 6.5 Access to water and sanitation by percentage within quintiles of
municipalities, 2001 156
Ta ble 6.6 Percentage of households with access to selected services by
district-council quintile, 1996 and 2004 158
Ta ble 6.7 Incomes, employment and household expenditure by
district-council quintile, 2004 159
Ta ble 6.8 Access to free basic services by district-council quintile, 2003 159
Ta ble 7.1 The negative impact on household income of the cancellation
of a disability grant in rand, different scenarios 193
Ta ble 10.1 NUM membership data by region and sector, 2004 250
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Ta ble 12.1 Public sector personnel in Mpumalanga and Western Cape
per 100 000 population, 1994 293
Ta ble 12.2 Supply of health professionals working in provincial
health services and percentage decline, 1996–2003 298
Ta ble 12.3 Training of professional nurses in nursing colleges and universities
for a four-year comprehensive course, 1996–2004 299
Ta ble 12.4 Examples of programmatic interventions since 1994 303
Ta ble 13.1 Resource allocations at public hospitals in Gauteng,
KwaZulu-Natal and North West provinces 316
Ta ble 15.1 Number of prisons in South Africa, 2005 382
Ta ble 15.2 Offence profile of sentenced prisoners by number and
percentage 387
Ta ble 18.1 Christian denominations in South Africa by size,
Census results 451
Ta ble 19.1 Participation of South Africa in international/regional
studies 474
Ta ble 19.2 Analysis of the literacy task at national level by different
domains 477

Ta ble 19.3 Total number of days lost across sample schools during
the school year, by percentage 478
Ta ble 19.4 Learner percentage scores by socio-economic status 486
Ta ble 20.1 Rand value of South African exports by region and
percentage change, 2002–05 515
Ta ble 20.2 Rand value of South African imports by region and
percentage change, 2003–05 516
Ta ble 20.3 South Africa’s top ten African trading partners 517
Ta ble 22.1 Experiences by Zimbabweans under various authorities 564
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List of figures
Figure 2.1 National transfers to local government 59
Figure 5.1 Partisans vs. non-partisans among South African voters,
1994–2004 119
Figure 5.2 Direction of partisanship among South African voters,
1994–2004 120
Figure 5.3 Partisans by racial group 122
Figure 5.4 Partisanship by urban vs. rural voters 122
Figure 5.5 Partisanship among South African voters by age group 123
Figure 5.6 Partisanship among South African voters by class group 125
Figure 5.7 ANC partisans among South African voters across
class groups 127
Figure 6.1 Access to basic water and sanitation by race, 1996 and 2004 148
Figure 6.2 Access to basic electricity for cooking and lighting by race, 1996
and 2004 148
Figure 6.3 Households with access to basic services in predominantly
homeland and other areas, 1996 and 2004 149
Figure 6.4 Shares in total municipal revenue by quintile, 2004 151
Figure 6.5 Sources of municipal revenue by quintile, 2004 153

Figure 6.6 Municipal revenue from services by quintile, 2004 154
Figure 6.7 Municipal expenditure by quintile, 2004 154
Figure 6.8 Share of district-council quintiles in new infrastructure
and expansion in social grants, 1996 to 2004 157
Figure 7.1 A comparative perspective on AIDS and unemployment 180
Figure 7.2 National strict unemployment rates 182
Figure 7.3 Labour market participation and the disabled adult 189
Figure 11.1 Foreign tourist arrivals to South Africa, 1965–2004 270
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Figure 12.1 Framework for the performance of health systems 290
Figure 12.2 Top 20 causes of death in South Africa by percentage, 2000 301
Figure 15.1 Total prison population in South Africa, 1995–2005 385
Figure 19.1 Literacy results by province for the South African MLA study 476
Figure 19.2 Literacy results by location of schools 477
Figure 19.3 Learner–classroom ratio by province 478
Figure 19.4 Grade 3 systemic evaluation results by learning area
and province 480
Figure 19.5 Access to resources at home by province 481
Figure 19.6 Language achievement by home language and province 483
Figure 19.7 National achievement levels for LOLT, mathematics
and natural sciences 484
Figure 19.8 ‘AQEE to improve learning’ model 485
Figure 19.9 School resources by province and learning area 485
Figure 19.10 Learner performance by participation in class 487
Figure 20.1 South African investments in the rest of Africa, 1997–2004 511
Figure 20.2 Selected investing countries in Africa, 1994–2004 512
Figure 20.3 South African investment in Africa by country 513
Figure 20.4 South African foreign direct investment by country
(without the Grand Inga) 513

Figure 20.5 Sectoral breakdown of South African foreign direct
investment in Africa 514
Figure 20.6 Sectoral view of South African foreign direct investment
into Africa 514
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Foreword
In February 2006, a number of researchers from the Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC) and I had the opportunity to participate in the First International
Forum on the Social Science–Policy Nexus held under the aegis of Unesco’s
Management of Social Transformations Programme. The Forum was billed as, and
proved to be, an innovative space for dialogue between researchers, policy-makers
and policy activists from various parts of the world. In the South African context,
the fourth edition of State of the Nation continues the tradition of being a regular
contribution to such a dialogue, and a stimulus to informed and wide-ranging
debate.
The original essays in this edition on South African politics, economy, society and
international relations are a testament to the intensity of discussion that swirls
around the major challenges that face the government and people of South Africa.
The interpretations of our situation that are offered here are hugely diverse,
including some which are strongly critical of government policies and state insti-
tutions. However, all the authors have sought to interpret their topics based upon
both historical understanding and empirical research; and the essays reflect a
nuanced take on aspects of the state of the nation. In keeping with its commitment
to ‘social science that makes a difference’ the HSRC is proud to present the selec-
tion of views contained in this edition of State of the Nation.Neither the introduc-
tory editorials nor the perspectives presented in the individual chapters represent
the views of the organisation and, as is the case with all publications from the

HSRC, the editorial independence of these publications – including the State of the
Nation – is respected and upheld as a matter of principle.
I would like to record our gratitude to the four donor organisations that continue
to provide solid support to our flagship project in the nexus of social science and
policy. Atlantic Philanthropies, the Charles Mott Foundation and the Ford
Foundation provided the generous financial assistance which enabled the compi-
lation and production of this publication. Equally important has been the contri-
bution of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation which organised and financed the
‘launch-workshops’ which allow us to engender debate well beyond the academy.
In this regard, an important initiative this year is our launch of the Isolezwe (Eyes
of the Nation) Project, whereby our cover photograph is the winner of a competi-
tion, conducted this year by Iliso Labantu (Eyes of the People). The latter are a
Cape Town-based, informal, self-help group of township street photographers and
enthusiasts who for the last four years have been working together to promote their
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members’ technical and business skills, and hence to improve their employment
opportunities. The Isolezwe Project presented participants with the challenge of
providing a photograph which, in the view of an expert panel of judges, best
depicts ‘the state of the nation’ at the present time and which could hence be used
on the cover of the volume. The photographs submitted by the competition’s
entrants were of a very high quality, and we will be proud to present the best ten
to the general public when we conduct the volume’s ‘launch-workshops’ around
the country. However, a special word of congratulation is due to Mandla
Mnyakama, the winner of our first competition, whose remarkable photograph
adorns the cover of the present collection. I would also like to thank the expert
judges who provided freely of their time and enthusiasm. On the basis of our
encouraging experience this year, we are hoping to widen the competition to other
parts of the country in the future.
The success of State of the Nation is in large measure due to the commitment and

effort of the current editorial team consisting of Sakhela Buhlungu (University of
the Witwatersrand) and John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman of the
HSRC. To all of them, I express my sincere gratitude. The fact that John Daniel and
Roger Southall are also the founding editors of State of the Nation – together with
Adam Habib – speaks for itself. Thank you all for a highly successful project. Garry
Rosenberg, Mary Ralphs, Karen Bruns, and all of the staff of the HSRC Press have
also played their part in ensuring the success of the project and I convey the appre-
ciation of their colleagues.
With an eye focused on both past and future editions of State of the Nation,I would
like to quote from the Buenos Aires Declaration of the International Forum on the
Social Science–Policy Nexus:
We thus state our conviction that better use of rigorous social science
can lead to more effective policies and outcomes. Such use requires
strengthening linkages between the social sciences and policies for
social and economic development. For the knowledge that the social
sciences seek is precisely the knowledge that policy needs. The world
needs new forms of interaction between social scientists and policy
actors – and innovative spaces to make them possible.
The State of the Nation is a mechanism for dialogue and public debate in this space.
Dr Olive Shisana
President and Chief Executive Officer,
HSRC
STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2007
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Acronyms
ACDP African Christian Democratic Party
Acsa Airports Company of South Africa
AFDL Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo
AIC African Initiated Church

AMP African Muslim Party
AMWU African Mineworkers’ Union
ANC African National Congress
AP assessment panel
APF Anti-Privatisation Forum
Apla Azanian People’s Liberation Army
APLAMVA Apla Military Veterans’ Association
AQEE access, quality, efficiency & equity
ART antiretroviral therapy
ARV antiretroviral
ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
BAeBritish Aerospace
BEE black economic empowerment
BIG basic income grant
CASE Community Agency for Social Enquiry
CBM cross-boundary municipality
CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEO chief executive officer
CGE Commission on Gender Equality
CHB Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital
CMC Case Management Committee
Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPLO Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office
CPN chief professional nurse
DA Democratic Alliance
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
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DCSDepartment of Correctional Services
DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism

DHS district health system
DoD Department of Defence
DoH Department of Health
DoHA Department of Home Affairs
DoJCD Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
DP Democratic Party
DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
DVADomestic Violence Act
EDL essential drugs list
EGS employment guarantee scheme
FDI foreign direct investment
FF Freedom Front
GDP gross domestic product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Reconstruction strategy
GM genetic modification
GNU Government of National Unity
GSSC Gauteng Shared Services Centre
HDI Human Development Index
HMIS Health and Management Information System
HR human resources
ICD Independent Complaints Directorate
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IRB International Rugby Board
ISP Industrial Strategy Project
JPOI Johannesburg Plan of Implementation
KANU Kenyan African National Union
KZNRU KwaZulu-Natal Rugby Union

MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MEC Minerals-Energy Complex
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe
STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2007
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MKMVA Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association
MLA Monitoring Learning Achievement
MO medical officer
Naledi National Labour and Economic Development Institute
NARC National Rainbow Coalition
NCA National Co-operation Agreement
NCOP National Council of Provinces
NDR national democratic revolution
NEC National Executive Committee (of the African National Congress)
NMC National Management Committee (of the Democratic Alliance)
NP National Party
NNP New National Party
NRB Natal Rugby Board
NSDP National Spatial Development Perspective
NSSD National Strategy for Sustainable Development
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
OKM Operation Khanyisa Movement
PAC Pan Africanist Congress
PBMR pebble bed modular reactor
PHCprimary health care
PID party identification
PMTCT Prevention of mother-to-child transmission
PTUZ Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe
RDP Reconstruction and Development programme

SAA South African Airways
SACBC Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference
SACC South African Council of Churches
SACMEQ Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality
Sacos South African Council on Sport
SACP South African Communist Party
SADF South African Defence Force
SAHRA South African Heritage Resources Agency
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SAPS South African Police Services
SARB South African Rugby Board
ACRONYMS
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Sarfu South African Rugby Football Union
Saru South African Rugby Union
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal
Scopa Standing Committee on Public Accounts
SDU self-defence unit
SES socio-economic status
SHI social health insurance
SOE state-owned enterprise
SPU self-protection unit
Stats SA Statistics South Africa
TACTreatment Action Campaign
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDM United Democratic Movement
UIF United Independent Front
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UP Universal Party

VCTvoluntary counselling and testing
WHO World Health Organization
Zanu–PF Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front
ZCCZion Christian Church
STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2007
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Introduction: The ANC state, more
dysfunctional than developmental?
Roger Southall
The two preceding volumes of State of the Nation have highlighted the aspiration
of President Thabo Mbeki’s government for South Africa to become a ‘develop-
mental state’, that is, one which works successfully to combine extensive social
redistribution with high economic growth, thereby effectively tackling poverty,
overcoming historic racial divides, and generally rendering the economy more
dynamic, innovative, just and equitable. Mbeki himself is convinced that remark-
able progress is being made towards this objective. His ‘State of the Nation’
address for 2006 trumpeted a raft of achievements. On a basis of sustained
positive economic growth, the government claims to have, inter alia,provided
access to potable water to some ten million South Africans since 1994; allocated
two million housing subsidies to the poor since that year; spent particularly
heavily on education (with primary school enrolment having remained steady at
95.5 per cent of the relevant population since 1995 and secondary school enrol-
ments at 85 per cent); and raised the gross annual value of the ‘social wage’ (trans-
fer payments made by government to eligible recipients) to R88 billion by 2003,
with the poor being the principal beneficiaries. Overall, significant numbers of
people have been leveraged out of poverty, for whereas in 2001, 4.1 million out of
11.2 million households in South Africa lived on an income of R9 600 or less per
year, this decreased to 3.6 million households in 2004, even after taking the nega-
tive effect of price increases into account. In short, the government’s management

of the economy – premised on the broad objectives of increasing investment, low-
ering the cost of doing business, widening economic inclusion and providing the
skills that are required – now ensures that it is able to deliver increased services to
the population in a sustainable way (Mbeki 2006).
Although the annual ‘State of the Nation’ speeches highlight triumphs more than
tears, there is widespread agreement that major economic and social progress has
been made since 1994. According to a recent review of South Africa’s first ten years
as a democracy:
Between 1995 and 2003, real GDP grew at an average of nearly 3 per
cent, which was about double the growth rate recorded between 1980
and 1994…the economy [has] experienced a sharp turnaround in
productivity performance…[reflecting] the impact of greater
integration with the rest of the world following the removal of trade
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sanctions in the early 1990s and the implementation of extensive trade
reforms. At the same time the incidence of poverty has fallen, and
significantly more South Africans have access to improved housing and
basic health, sanitation and utility services. (Nowak 2005: 2)
Writing in the Business Day (12.04.06), local newspaper columnist John Kane-
Berman concurs, noting that South Africa’s gross domestic product per head
will probably reach its highest level yet in 2006, exceeding the figure of
R23 414 (at 2000 prices) achieved in 2005, although also noting that it will have
taken a quarter of a century to surpass the previous highest figure of R23 972 (at
2000 prices) attained in 1981, an achievement which has come alongside advances
in the spheres of health, sanitation and education.
Ye t such commentators also point to the unevenness of delivery, a shared com-
plaint being that gains made have in some instances been overhauled by failures,
the most widely cited example being that of the government’s flawed approach to
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which has done little to counter increasing mortality

rates, and which overall has seen a decline of life expectancy in South Africa.
However, perhaps most damning of all is that South Africa’s Human Development
Index (HDI) rating (as calculated by the United Nations Development
Programme) increased from around 0.735 in 1990 to 0.742 in 1995, but thereafter
slumped to 0.658 in 2003, and the country’s global ranking in this regard is down-
wards rather than up (from 85th out of 174 countries in 1990 to 120th out of 177
countries in 2003) (UNDP 1995, 2004). Triumphs there are and have been, but if
South Africa’s overall HDI is plummeting so sharply, something is clearly drasti-
cally wrong – raising the question of whether, despite the government’s best inten-
tions, the African National Congress’s state is more dysfunctional than
developmental. It is to grappling with this fundamental issue that this editorial is
directed.
We have argued previously that ‘state capacity’ is a critical aspect of South Africa
becoming a developmental state (Southall 2006). The state in post-1994 South
Africa was noted as having acquired the political legitimacy which it lacked
under apartheid, and as mobilising its new inclusiveness to tackle social inequal-
ities, drive growth, meet social needs and resolve conflicts in a consensual rather
than a coercive manner. However, it was also observed that considerable debate
attends the capacity of the state to intervene in a constructive manner in the
economy, the extent to which such capacity is undermined by policy-driven
attempts to achieve ‘demographic representivity’ within both the public and pri-
vate sectors given skills deficiencies amongst previously disadvantaged groups,
and whether the state is ultimately capable of pursuing its developmental goals
democratically.
Following Cummings and Norgaard (2004), the editorial in last year’s State of
the Nation conceptualised ‘state capacity’ as having four dimensions: ideational,
STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2007
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political, implementational and technical (Southall 2006). The controversies con-

cerning how and whether today’s South Africa is proving able to meet the formi-
dable challenges that fall under these headings continue, and opinions vary sharply
about how they should be met. Even so, it is probably true to say that there is more
consensus around implementational and technical dimensions than around
ideational and political capacities. This is because there is broad sympathy (albeit
disagreement around specific policies) with the major thrusts of what may be
termed Mbeki’s modernising project.
Mbeki’s modernising state
Whereas the presidency of Nelson Mandela was characterised by the drive for
national unity and racial reconciliation, that of Thabo Mbeki has sought to give
substance to the ANC’s perception of its historical role as being to structure a mod-
ern democracy out of the backward legacy of apartheid (Daniel et al. 2005).
Presently conceptualised in terms of the aspiration towards the ‘developmental
state’ and the modernisation of the continent as a whole, this vision has been
founded in significant part around Mbeki’s bid to enhance capacity for delivery via
the restructuring and centralisation of the governmental machinery under a pow-
erful presidency. This has had both state and party aspects.
The centralising presidency
Mbeki began constructing the machinery that would deliver modernisation as
early as 1995. Initially, the different government ministries operated relatively
autonomously, yet in practice line functions overlapped and impacted upon each
other. Accordingly, when Mbeki became president in 1999, he sought to increase
co-ordination by merging the hitherto separate offices of the presidency, deputy
president and the Office of the President, under whose effective authority the dif-
ferent ministries were brought together in five overlapping ‘clusters’ – international
relations and trade, social affairs, governance and administration, economic
affairs, and investment and employment – in order to deal with ‘transversal’ issues
and to work closely together according to the government’s agreed strategies.
Within this context, some ministries were definitely more equal than others, with
the Treasury undoubtedly reigning supreme in terms of both authority and pres-

tige. By 2004–05, this combined presidency was comprised of an establishment of
469 people with a budget of R170 million (up from R89 million in 2001) (Sunday
Times 19.09.04).
Central to the presidency’s functioning is the policy unit (headed by Joel
Netshitenzhe) – the engine room where proposals are most thoroughly scrutinised
and key reports on economic and social issues are produced, which are then trans-
lated into five-year strategic frameworks. Agreed policy is refined through a com-
plex web of specialised offices and directorates, ranging from the Cabinet
INTRODUCTION
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Secretariat and Forums of Directors General (the most senior public servants
within ministries) and special advisors through to working groups on issues such
as higher education, youth, business, agriculture, black business and trade unions,
and Offices with responsibilities for the Status of Women, the Rights of the Child,
and Disabled People. Alongside these structures, the deputy president functions
as the leader of government business (responsible for securing passage of the
government’s programme through Parliament), and undertakes other tasks as
allocated by the president. For instance, after Jacob Zuma replaced Mbeki as
deputy president in 1999, he was appointed to head the Moral Regeneration
Movement and the National AIDS Council.
The creation of a powerful presidency was accompanied by the restructuring of the
public service. The authority of ministers to manage their own departments, to
create and abolish posts and to promote, transfer and discharge employees, was
increased; targets were set for national and provincial administrators; and per-
formance management contracts were introduced at senior levels (Picard 2005).
Meanwhile, there were concerted attempts to bring greater discipline and coher-
ence to the structure of government established in 1994. The ANC’s original hope
during the negotiations process had been for a strongly centralised state to replace
the previously racially-divided bodies of apartheid governance, but what emerged

in the 1994 Interim Constitution (agreed by political elites) was a compromise
with federalist positions which saw the establishment of a three-tiered machinery
of national, provincial and local authorities. Subsequently, in terms of the Final
Constitution of 1996 (adopted by the first democratically-elected Parliament sit-
ting as a National Assembly and which reflected ANC preferences to a considerably
greater degree), these different tiers were required to operate within a framework
of ‘co-operative governance’. In practice, this was underpinned by party discipline
(the ANC always being in political control of a minimum of seven out of the nine
provinces) and, more fundamentally, by the fact that provincial budgets were
almost wholly derived from national government.
The government’s attempts to contain the autonomy of provinces, get them
singing to the same tune, and centralise state power, were matched by Mbeki’s bid
to impose stricter discipline on the ANC. After 1994, the ANC’s character in the
provinces was disparate because of its having incorporated a diversity of political
cultures, the provincial party structures drawing in as they did a mix of exiles,
internal anti-apartheid United Democratic Front (UDF) activists, homeland
politicians and technocrats. This had led to severe tensions between a number of
provincial premiers and their local ministers, these often inflamed by resentment
at the way the national leadership of the party was felt to have imposed premiers
upon provinces in opposition to the preferences of the party’s provincial executives
and pre-election party primaries (although the actions of the ANC’s National
Executive Committee [NEC] in this regard were in practice pragmatic and
uneven).
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These tensions came to a head in Gauteng when, in 1997, delegates from local ANC
branches defied the wishes of the national leadership and provincial cabinet by
electing Mathole Motshekga to replace Tokyo Sexwale as premier, following the lat-
ter’s resignation to go into business. Motshekga, whose candidacy built upon the

perception of party activists from outside Johannesburg that Soweto had received
the major portion of development resources, was deeply distrusted by the party
hierarchy for both his independence and his reputation as a ‘populist’.
Consequently, when allegations of corruption against him were leaked to the press,
he became the object of investigation by an internal ANC commission of inquiry.
This cleared him of corruption, but so criticised his managerial capacities that it
advised that the party should dispatch appropriate persons to assist him to run the
province more competently. More pertinently, it also suggested that henceforth
provincial premiers should be appointed by the ANC president, this recommenda-
tion being endorsed by the NEC in August 1998. This decision in no way resolved
intra-provincial tensions, for it de-linked the premiership from the chairperson-
ship of the party’s provincial executive (distinct posts which henceforth were no
longer necessarily filled by the same person). However, in practice it represented a
significant shift in authority away from the provinces, allowing the president to
exert control more firmly over both the provincial governments and the party
organisations. Motshekga, for instance, was displaced by Mbhazima Shilowa as the
party’s choice for premier for the 1999 elections, even though he managed to retain
the provincial chairmanship until May 2000. When this led to confrontations with
Shilowa’s government, the ANC National Working Committee dissolved the
provincial executive, replacing it with an interim body until the next provincial
conference, when it structured a formal reconciliation between the conflicting
groups (Lodge 1999; 2002). Subsequently, increasing efforts have been made to
contain and control regionalism within the party, and to secure ‘co-operative gov-
ernance’ by appointment of the president’s men – and women
1
– to the key posi-
tions in the provinces. The same approach has been adopted with regard to local
government, with the ANC at national level reserving the right to nominate may-
ors and council chairpersons. Meanwhile, the government seems bent on reducing
the provinces to merely administrative entities and to exerting greater centralised

control over municipalities.
The construction of a modernising state is widely hailed as having provided the
framework for remarkable achievements: the consolidation of political legitimacy,
consistent economic growth, fiscal discipline, delivery of increased social benefits
to poorer citizens, and so on. At the same time, however, alongside controversy
around major aspects of the government’s economic policy (notably its
inequalitarian consequences) and widespread criticism concerning alleged policy
failures (for instance regarding HIV/AIDS and the kid-gloved treatment of crude-
ly anti-democratic regimes in neighbouring Zimbabwe and Swaziland), there is
recognition even within government circles that realisation of the modernisation
project has been uneven. In particular, the implementational and technical
INTRODUCTION
5
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capacities of the state appear to be inhibited by flawed efforts to combine ‘represen-
tivity’ with ‘efficiency’, and the apparent systematisation of corruption.
Representivity and efficiency: costly or complementary?
Access to education and skills was overwhelmingly skewed in favour of white
people during the decades of apartheid. Eventually, of course, the consequences of
legislation such as the Bantu Education Act of 1953 (which sought to limit mod-
ern education for black people on the grounds that few opportunities would
become available to them in a white-dominated economy) were to catch up with
the apartheid regime, as employers compensated for a developing shortage of
white skilled workers by hiring cheaper black workers and training them on the
job. In turn, the growth of the black trade union movement from the early 1970s
onward – premised upon the inexorable urbanisation and de facto acquisition of
skills by an increasingly militant black working class – was one of the key develop-
ments which paved the way to democratisation, even if it was the youthful revolt
against the government’s attempt to impose Afrikaans as a language of education
which provided the spark which lit the conflagration of open black revolt. Yet even

though by the early 1990s the economy had become highly reliant upon semi-
skilled black labour, the skills deficit amongst the black population was formida-
ble, and a primary cause of extensive poverty. It was therefore inevitable that
political liberation was envisaged by black people as providing not only for free
and improved access to education and jobs previously denied to them, but also to
the redress of racial imbalances in both the state and private sectors.
From 1994, the ANC worked strenuously towards the attainment of ‘representivi-
ty’within the public sector. Black workers had long formed the majority of work-
ers in the public service and associated institutions. By 1989, for instance, the
public sector (comprising central government and provincial administrations, the
‘self-governing’ states, parastatals, other public entities, universities and technikons
but excluding local government and the four ‘independent’ homelands of Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) was comprised of 337 382 white people
(34%), 125 284 coloured people (13%), 36 605 Asians (4%) and 481 051 black
people (49%). However, fully 38 per cent of black public servants were located in
the ‘self-governing states’, and there and elsewhere black people were overwhelm-
ingly located in professional categories such as teaching and nursing, where they
were poorly remunerated, or in low paid, low status and menial positions.
Furthermore, white people occupied 98 per cent of the top four income categories
within the public service, and 81 per cent of the top eight (Hugo 1992: 54–6).
Initially, the ANC’s efforts to ‘transform’ the public sector were constrained by the
so-called ‘sunset’ clause in the Interim Constitution, whereby white public servants
were guaranteed their jobs, or appropriate financial compensation, for a period of
five years. However, the new government set out its stall as early as 1995, when its
STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2007
6
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White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service established that within four
years, 50 per cent of management positions should be staffed by black people
(Naidoo 2006), the ANC having indicated as early as 1991 that it intended making

the 1 500 most senior posts in the public service ‘representative’ as soon as possi-
ble (Hugo 1992: 58). Subsequently, although the government’s fiscal caution meant
that there was no substantial growth in the size of the public sector during the first
decade of democracy, white departure and proportionately increased black recruit-
ment did lead to it becoming more representative, as indicated by Table 1.
Equally importantly, representivity increased markedly at senior levels. In 2000, the
Department of Public Services indicated that some 60 per cent of 1 766 senior
managers in national departments and 1 175 in the provinces were black (Southall
2004: 533), while according to an independent evaluation, 32 per cent of public
service managers were black, 42 per cent coloured, 3.5 per cent Asian and a mere
23 per cent white (Thompson & Woolard 2002: 5). Meanwhile, measures such as
the Employment Equity Act of 1998, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000, the Broad Based Black Empowerment Act of
2003 and the current pressures upon the private sector to adopt ambitious black
employment targets are providing for a considerable levelling of the employment
field across society as a whole.
For the ANC, the striving towards ‘representivity’ (including measures to redress
gender and disability imbalances) has been simultaneously a bid to extend its con-
trol of the state, a strategy to meet the expectations of its constituency, a thrust to
redress the social injustices of apartheid and a hope that the commitments to
delivery and growing work experience of black employees will compensate for any
lack of formal education and training for the jobs they do. Meanwhile, of course,
these aspirations have been complemented by major initiatives that the govern-
ment has undertaken to transform the educational system to achieve both equity
and, most particularly, an improved quality of education for black learners. Suffice
INTRODUCTION
7
Ta b le 1 Racial composition of the civil service, 1993 and 2003
National Non-independent National Provinces
1993 homelands 1993 2003 2003

African 316 929 241 335 195 238 563 300
41.3% 62.8% 78.6%
Asian 30 453 16 641 21 493
4.0% 5.4% 30.0%
Coloured 124 711 91 994 65 152
16.3% 29.6% 9.1%
White 295 429 73 319 66 797
38.5% 23.6% 9.3%
Total 767 521 310 907 716 742
Source: Southall 2004: 533
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