handbook of water and wastewater systems protection

Protecting Critical Infrastructure
Series Editors
Simon Hakim
Erwin A. Blackstone
For further volumes:
/>
Robert M. Clark · Simon Hakim · Avi Ostfeld
Editors
Handbook of Water
and Wastewater Systems
Protection
123
Editors
Robert M. Clark
9627 Lansford Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45242, USA

Simon Hakim
Department of Economics
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA

Avi Ostfeld
Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
32000 Haifa, Israel

ISBN 978-1-4614-0188-9 e-ISBN 978-1-4614-0189-6
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0189-6

Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2011935004
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written
permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York,
NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in
connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software,
or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden.
The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are
not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject
to proprietary rights.
Printed on acid-free paper
Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
We would like to dedicate this book to our
wives Susan Clark, Galia Hakim, and Yael
Ostfeld and to our children and
grandchildren.

Acknowledgement
We would like to acknowledge, in memoriam, Dr. Paul Seidenstat who was a
pioneer in the field of urban economics, an advocate of protecting societies’ critical
infrastructure, and who materially contributed to this effort. We would also like
to acknowledge the individuals and institutions who contributed to this book and
the men and women who are diligently working to protect critical infrastructure
throughout the world.
vii

Contents
1 Securing Water and Wastewater Systems: An Overview 1
Robert M. Clark, Simon Hakim, and Avi Ostfeld

2 Water/Wastewater Infrastructure Security: Threats
and Vulnerabilities 27
Laurie J. Van Leuven
3 EPA Drinking Water Security Research Program 47
Hiba S. Ernst, K. Scott Minamyer, and Kim R. Fox
4 Drinking Water Critical Infrastructure and Its Protection 65
Rakesh Bahadur and William B. Samuels
5 Wastewater Critical Infrastructure Security and Protection 87
Rakesh Bahadur and William B. Samuels
6 Protecting Water and Wastewater Systems 103
Randy G. Fischer
7 Spatial Distributed Risk Assessment for Urban Water
Infrastructure 119
Michael Möderl and W. Rauch
8 US Water and Wastewater Critical Infrastructure 135
Robert M. Clark
9 Microbial Issues in Drinking Water Security 151
Eugene W. Rice
10 Rapid Detection of Bacteria in Drinking Water
and Wastewater Treatment Plants 163
Rolf A. Deininger, Jiyoung Lee, and Robert M. Clark
11 Chlorine Residual Management for Water Distribution
System Security 185
Jeanne M. VanBriesen, Shannon L. Isovitsch Parks,
Damian E. Helbling, and Stacia T. McCoy
ix
x Contents
12 Biosensors for the Detection of E. coli O157:H7 in Source
and Finished Drinking Water 205
Mark D. Burr, Andreas Nocker, and Anne K. Camper

13 Guidelines, Caveats, and Techniques for the Evaluation
of Water Quality Early Warning Systems 229
Dan Kroll
14 Protecting Water and Wastewater Systems: Water
Distribution Systems Security Modeling 247
Avi Ostfeld
15 Protecting Consumers from Contaminated Drinking Water
During Natural Disasters 265
Craig L. Patterson and Jeffrey Q. Adams
16 Cyber Security: Protecting Water and Wastewater
Infrastructure 285
Srinivas Panguluri, William Phillips, and Patrick Ellis
17 Real-World Case Studies for Sensor Network Design
of Drinking Water Contamination Warning Systems 319
Regan Murray, Terra Haxton, William E. Hart,
and Cynthia A. Phillips
18 Enhanced Monitoring to Protect Distribution System
Water Quality 349
Zia Bukhari and Mark LeChevallier
19 Testing and Evaluation of Water Quality Event Detection
Algorithms 369
Sean A. McKenna, David B. Hart, Regan Murray, and Terra Haxton
20 Water Infrastructure Protection Against Intentional
Attacks: The Experience of Two European Research Projects 397
Cristiana Di Cristo, Angelo Leopardi, and Giovanni de Marinis
21 Utility of Supercomputers in Trace-Back Algorithms
for City-Sized Distribution Systems 419
Hailiang Shen and Edward McBean
22 Water/Wastewater Infrastructure Security: A Multilayered
Security Approach 435

Laurie J. Van Leuven
23 Vulnerability of Water and Wastewater Infrastructure and
Its Protection from Acts of Terrorism: A Business Perspective 457
Dave Birkett, Jim Truscott, Helena Mala-Jetmarova,
and Andrew Barton
Contents xi
About the Editors 485
About the Principle Contributors 487
Name Index 497
Subject Index 501
This is Blank Page Integra xii
Contributors
Jeffrey Q. Adams National Risk Management Research Laboratory, Water
Supply and Water Resources Division, USEPA, Cincinnati, OH, USA,

Rakesh Bahadur Science Applications International Corporation Center for
Water Science and Engineering, McLean, VA, USA,
Andrew Barton GWMWater, Horsham, VIC, Australia; University of Ballarat,
Ballarat, VIC, Australia,
Dave Birkett Truscott Crisis Leaders, Wembley Downs, WA, Australia,

Zia Bukhari American Water, Voorhees, NJ, USA,
Mark D. Burr Center for Biofilm Engineering, Montana State University,
Bozeman, MT, USA,
Anne K. Camper Center for Biofilm Engineering, Montana State University,
Bozeman, MT, USA,
Robert M. Clark 9627 Lansford Drive, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Rolf A. Deininger School of Public Health, The University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, MI, USA,
Giovanni de Marinis Water Engineering Lab (L.I.A.), Department of Mechanics,

Structures and Environmental Engineering (Di.M.S.A.T.), University of Cassino,
Cassino, Italy,
Cristiana Di Cristo Water Engineering Lab (L.I.A.), Department of Mechanics,
Structures and Environmental Engineering (Di.M.S.A.T.), University of Cassino,
Cassino, Italy,
Patrick Ellis Broward County Water and Wastewater Services, 2555 West Copans
Road, Pompano Beach, FL, USA,
xiii
xiv Contributors
Hiba S. Ernst US Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland
Security Research Center, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Randy G. Fischer Division of Public Health, Nebraska Department of Health and
Human Services (NE DHHS), Lincoln, NE, USA, randy.fi
Kim R. Fox US Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security
Research Center, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Simon Hakim Center for Competitive Government, Fox School of Business &
Management, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA; Department of
Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA,
David B. Hart National Security Applications Department, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA,
William E. Hart Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA,

Terra Haxton National Homeland Security Research Center, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Cincinnati, OH, USA, ;

Damian E. Helbling Department of Environmental Chemistry, Swiss Federal
Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag), Duebendorf, Switzerland,

Dan Kroll Hach Homeland Security Technologies, Loveland, CO, USA,

Mark LeChevallier American Water, Voorhees, NJ, USA,

Jiyoung Lee Division of Environmental Health Sciences, College of Public
Health, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA,
Angelo Leopardi Water Engineering Lab (L.I.A.), Department of Mechanics,
Structures and Environmental Engineering (Di.M.S.A.T.), University of Cassino,
Cassino, Italy,
Helena Mala-Jetmarova GWMWater, Horsham, VIC, Australia; University of
Ballarat, Ballarat, VIC, Australia,
Edward McBean School of Engineering, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON,
Canada,
Stacia T. McCoy Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA,
Sean A. McKenna National Security Applications Department, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA,
Contributors xv
K. Scott Minamyer US Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland
Security Research Center, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Michael Möderl Institute of Infrastructure, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck,
Austria,
Regan Murray National Homeland Security Research Center, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Cincinnati, OH, USA, ;

Andreas Nocker Centre for Water Science, Cranfield University, Cranfield,
Bedfordshire, UK,
Avi Ostfeld Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Technion –
Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel,
Srinivas Panguluri Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc., 5050 Section
Avenue, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Shannon L. Isovitsch Parks Environmental Science and Sustainable Technology

Division, Alcoa, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA,
Craig L. Patterson National Risk Management Research Laboratory, Water
Supply and Water Resources Division, USEPA, Cincinnati, OH, USA,

Cynthia A. Phillips Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA,

William Phillips CH2MHILL, 3011 SW Williston Road, Gainesville, FL, USA,

W. Rauch Institute of Infrastructure, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria,

Eugene W. Rice National Homeland Security Research Center, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
William B. Samuels Science Applications International Corporation Center for
Water Science and Engineering, McLean, VA, USA,
Hailiang Shen School of Engineering, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON,
Canada,
Jim Truscott Truscott Crisis Leaders, Wembley Downs, WA, Australia,

Jeanne M. VanBriesen Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA,
Laurie J. Van Leuven Seattle Public Utilities/U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), FEMA, Washington, DC, USA, ;


Chapter 1
Securing Water and Wastewater Systems:
An Overview
Robert M. Clark, Simon Hakim, and Avi Ostfeld
1.1 Introduction
There is a general, and growing, awareness that urban water s ystems are vulnerable

to both manmade and natural, but unpredictable, threats and disasters such as
droughts, earthquakes, and terrorist attacks. Other natural disasters that can effect
water supply security and integrity include major storms such as hurricanes and
flooding. Earthquakes and terrorist attacks have many characteristics in common.
They are almost impossible to predict and can cause major devastation and con-
fusion. Several recent earthquakes centered in urban areas such as the earthquake
that struck Kobe City, Japan, in 1995 have demonstrated the disastrous effect
that earthquakes can have on urban water systems. Terrorism is also a major
threat to water security, and recent attention has turned to the potential that these
attacks have for disrupting urban water supplies. In the United States, govern-
ment planners have been forced to consider the possibility that the nation’s critical
infrastructure, including water systems, may in fact be vulnerable to terrorism. The
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection concluded that the
nation’s water supply system might be vulnerable to certain biological agents (Clark
and Deininger, 2001). The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002 (US Congress, 2002) has intensified the focus on water
security research in the United States. After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a Homeland Security
Strategy (USEPA, 2004). Its intent was to enhance national security and pro-
tect human health and the environment. Much of the r esearch conducted as a
result of these directives is presented in this book (Ernst et al., Chapter 3,this
volume).
In addition to urban water supply natural and manmade threats are important
issues for urban wastewater systems. There are approximately 16,255 publicly
R.M. Clark (B)
9627 Lansford Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45242, USA
e-mail:
1
R.M. Clark et al. (eds.), Handbook of Water and Wastewater Systems Protection,
Protecting Critical Infrastructure, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0189-6_1,

C

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
2 R.M. Clark et al.
owned treatment works (POTWs), and 100,000 major pumping stations in the
United States. According to Bahadur and Samuels (Chapters 4 and 5, this volume)
damage to the nation’s wastewater facilities or collection systems could result
in loss of life; catastrophic environmental damage to rivers, lakes, and wet-
lands; and contamination of drinking water supplies. In addition damage to the
nation’s wastewater systems could result in long-term public health impacts,
destruction of fish and shellfish production, and disruption to commerce and the
economy.
This book contains insights and recommendations from a group of internationally
recognized experts who review the state of the art in protecting water and wastewater
systems from natural and manmade threats. These experts address the following
issues:
• Problems in protecting water and wastewater systems.
• The consequences of not protecting these systems.
• The state of the art in protecting water and wastewater systems.
• Alternative solutions that might be employed to address water and wastewater
security problems.
Contributed chapters from US and international experts will cover the following
areas:
• Overview of the current state of water supply and wastewater system security and
the ability to respond to threats and disasters.
• Characteristics of the water supply and wastewater systems in the United States.
• Chemical and microbiological threats for water system contamination.
• Monitoring for natural and manmade threats in drinking water systems.
• Modeling contaminant propagation and contaminant threats in drinking water
distribution systems.

• Case study applications.
• Distribution system modeling, SCADA systems, security hardware, and surveil-
lance systems.
• Institutional and management issues in responding to natural and manmade
threats.
• Progress in developing techniques and approaches for natural and manmade
threat response in water and wastewater systems since September 11.
1.2 History of Water Supply Vulnerability
According to Gleick (2006) the recorded history of attacks on water systems dates
from 4,500 years ago. Urlama, King of Lagash, and his son Illater cut off the water
supply to Girsu, a city in Umma, during the period 2450–2400 BC. In New York in
1 Securing Water and Wastewater Systems: An Overview 3
1748 an angry mob burned down a ferry house on the Brooklyn shore of the East
River. It is reported that this act was revenge for unfair allocation of East River water
rights. Small groups attacked small dams and reservoirs in the 1840s and 1850s in
the eastern and central United States due to concerns about threats to health and
to local water supplies. In the Owens Valley of California between 1907 and 1913
farmers repeatedly dynamited the aqueduct system being built to divert their water
to the growing city of Los Angeles.
In New York City (New York Times, 1986), low levels of plutonium were found
in the drinking water (on the order of 20 fCi). The usual background is below 1 fCi.
However, a person would have to drink several million liters of water to acquire
a lethal dose estimated at about 100 μCi. A femtocurie is nine orders of magni-
tude smaller than a microcurie (Clark and Deininger, 2000). Another case was the
contamination of salad bars in Dalles, Oregon, by the Rajneeshee religious cult,
using vials of Salmonella typhimurium. S. typhimurium is a highly toxic bacteria
frequently carried by birds. The cult also contaminated a city water supply tank
using Salmonella. A community outbreak of salmonellosis resulted in which at least
751 cases were documented in a county that typically reports fewer than 5 cases per
year. The cult apparently cultured the organisms in their own laboratories (Clark

and Deininger, 2000; Gleick, 2006).
In terms of natural threats, water shortages and droughts have led to crises
and disasters throughout history and in many parts of the world. Drought may
affect both developing and developed countries and according to the UN’s Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance no other natural disaster has caused as many dis-
placed persons in the 20th century. For example, a drought in the Great Plains
in the United States in the 1930s caused serve economic hardship in Missouri,
Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Arkansas. The Great Plains also
experienced droughts in the 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s. Drought affects more people
than any other natural hazard; earthquakes and terrorism can affect water security
in modern urban communities. According to Bruins (2000), Israel included Arab
villages to receive water from the National Carrier System in order to limit the
potential posed by terrorists. Water played an important role in the Peace Treaty
that Israel and Jordan signed on October 26, 1994, and to this point the worst case
scenarios have not materialized over water disputes in the Middle East. With the
advent of global climate change and the anticipated increase in droughts i n some
locations, there is concern that water scarcity might become the basis for future
wars.
Unlike droughts which are described as a creeping phenomenon the damage asso-
ciated with earthquakes is concentrated in time and space. In 1906 an earthquake in
San Francisco caused numerous pipes to rupture and caused drowning of dozens of
residents when broken water pipes flooded the Valencia hotel. It was impossible to
control the firestorms that spread through the area, and entire buildings exploded
in a huge firestorm during which the temperature was reported to reach 2000
◦
F
(1093.2
◦
C). In 1995, a major earthquake directly hit the city of Kobe, Japan. The
quake lasted 20 s and 4,069 people died, 14,679 were injured, and 222,127 people

were moved into evacuation shelters. There were 67,421 fully collapsed structures
4 R.M. Clark et al.
of which 6,985 were burned to the ground and there was a city-wide power failure
and a nearly city-wide water supply failure (Clark and Deininger, 2001). Floods
and major storms can pose a threat to water system security. Patterson and Adams
(Chapter 15, this volume) describe the problems associated with recovery from
Hurricane Katrina.
Until September 11, 2001, terrorism in the United States was not generally
regarded as a serious threat because of the nation’s military strength, relative geo-
graphic isolation, and secure borders. However, recent attacks against targets within
the United States by domestic and foreign terrorists forced many government plan-
ners to consider the possibility that the nation’s critical infrastructure may, in
fact, be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In response to this concern, the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure was formed to evaluate the vulnerability of
the water and wastewater infrastructure to internal and external terrorism. The rapid
proliferation of telecommunication and computer systems, which connect infras-
tructures to one another in a complex network, compounds this vulnerability (Clark
and Deininger, 2000).
Vital Human Services include community water supply systems on local and
state levels. In terms of public administration, water supply systems are generally
governmental in nature. However, each supply system tends to be highly localized.
Failures in one community may have little direct impact on other communities,
although the problems and vulnerabilities may be similar. Water supply systems are
vulnerable to the full range of terrorist threats including physical attack and cyber
and biological terrorism.
The potential of bioterrorism as a threat to public safety is becoming increasingly
apparent. For example, two epidemics of smallpox occurred in Europe in the 1970s.
Each outbreak resulted from one infected individual. An aerosolized anthrax dis-
charge from a Russian bioweapons facility in 1979 resulted in 77 cases of anthrax
and 66 deaths. It is estimated that the release probably lasted no more than a few

minutes and the weight of the aerosols released may have been as little as a few
milligrams (Clark and Deininger, 2000; Gleick, 2006).
1.3 Threats from Earthquakes
It is the authors’ opinion that many of the approaches adopted for earthquake
response would be useful in responding to a terrorist attack. Specific examples
are discussed below. During the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, which had a
magnitude of 8.3 on the Richter scale, approximately 3,000 people lost their lives.
A devastating fire swept through the city which caused more destruction than the
immediate effects of the earthquake itself. As a consequence of that experience
engineers today strive to build water systems characterized by strength, flexibility,
and redundancy. Water systems survived much better during the Loma Prieta and
Northridge earthquakes, averting the kinds of catastrophic losses experienced in the
San Francisco earthquake (Clark and Deininger, 2001).
1 Securing Water and Wastewater Systems: An Overview 5
1.3.1 The Loma Prieta Earthquake
The Loma Prieta earthquake t hat struck on October 17, 1989, had a reading of 7.1
on the Richter scale. It caused 62 deaths and damaged over 18,000 homes. The
earthquake caused water pipes to break in some areas, particularly in places with
older cast iron pipes and in areas known as liquefaction zones, where loose saturated
sandy soil is prone to intensified ground shaking. A reservoir with an earthen dam
and a treatment plant were damaged primarily by earthquake-generated wave action.
However, water distribution facilities were largely left intact.
1.3.2 The Northridge Earthquake
The Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, had a reading of 6.7 on the Richter
scale and although smaller in strength than the Loma Prieta earthquake struck a
heavily populated sector in urban Los Angeles causing 57 deaths as well as the loss
of 14,600 homes. Overall, the Northridge earthquake impacted more households
and businesses than any other disaster in recent US history. Two major wastewater
treatment facilities suffered significant damage due to liquefaction. Aboveground
water storage tanks suffered damage due to failures at their bases (buckling and

tearing), and roof structures and pipe joints failed. The earthquake jolts uncoupled
the fittings causing hundreds of breaks in the water distribution system. Some areas
were without water or power and advisories to boil water went out to areas impacted
by pipe failures. Water agencies made full use of mutual aid agreements and brought
in repair crews from around the state. Within 10 days, all water main breaks were
repaired and the treatment plants were back in service.
1.3.3 Kobe City Earthquake
At 5:46 am on January, 17, 1995, the Southern Hyogo Prefectural Earthquake
(the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake), the first major quake to directly hit a
Japanese urban area, inflicted heavy damage on cities and their surrounding areas
in the Hanshin-Awaji region. The jolt, which lasted barely 20 s, took 4,569 lives in
Kobe City alone and virtually reduced the harbor to a pile of rubble.
Some of the existing facilities that proved to be effective during the earthquake
included emergency shut-off valves, a remote telemetry/telecontrol system, and
earthquake-resistant pipes. Some of the unexpected incidents that resulted from the
earthquake were severe traffic jams, dire shortage of water, a lack of water wag-
ons, frequent pipe breaks, and very slow progress in restoring water from the city’s
various sources.
Based on this experience the city made drastic revisions to its community disas-
ter prevention plan that prescribes how each organization should act when disaster
strikes. The new plan stipulates the role to be played by volunteers, those vulnerable
to disasters, community residents, and businesses.
6 R.M. Clark et al.
1.3.4 Technological and Institutional Adaptation
Water management in California is unique because of the complexity of its water
delivery system and provides an enlightening as to how states might deal with
security threats. Three main aqueducts supply water to the more than 16 million
inhabitants in the southern part of the state where most of the population lives.
However, most of the rain and snow falls in the northern half of the state. For
example, the average annual precipitation in the north is over 760 mm (30 in.),

while the south receives only 50–360 mm (2–14 in.). Recurring disasters, including
earthquakes, and their effect on water systems have spurred emergency planning in
California. These experiences are leading to new approaches to emergency response
that include inter-organizational coordination among various agencies that will help
the water industry cope even more effectively with future emergencies. The success
of these developments is illustrated by comparing the events that took place during
the San Francisco earthquake to the events during the Loma Preita and Northridge
earthquakes (Clark and Deininger, 2001).
1.3.4.1 Technological Adaptations
As a consequence of these experiences the water utilities in earthquake zones in
California have developed innovative technologies to mitigate the impact of future
earthquakes. For example, engineers at the East Bay Municipal Utilities District
(EBMUD) in Oakland, California, devised a unique alternative for transporting large
amounts of water across a known earthquake fault. They developed a specially con-
structed flexible polyurethane hose with a large diameter (up to 12 in.) which can
be stored for long periods of time. In an emergency, a small crew using light trans-
port vehicles can deploy the hose in a matter of minutes. The hose can be used to
bridge breaks in water mains or to bring large volumes of water from one part of
the water system into another part. Different types of fittings allow fire trucks to
connect to the hose and to add branch pipelines with a smaller diameter. EBMUD
has identified key water distribution pipes that cross faults and are expected to fail
during certain earthquake scenarios. Following an earthquake, prepositioned valves
will allow crews to close off and isolate a broken section of pipe. Crews can then
attach the polyurethane hose to prepositioned connections in undamaged sections of
the original pipe, thereby restoring flow in the water distribution system.
1.3.4.2 Institutional Adaptations
The California state government has adopted a system of standardization that
encourages cooperating agencies to use common terminology, a common functional
management template, a standard for liaison relationships between cooperating
agencies, a mutual aid system, and clearly defined governmental roles. California

water utility agencies have learned to partner with government and private agencies
1 Securing Water and Wastewater Systems: An Overview 7
to devise mutual aid and mutual assistance plans, to produce collaborative emer-
gency planning guidance documents, and to arrange for reliable communications
during emergency r esponse.
Other collaborative efforts for emergency response include the work of the
California Utilities Emergency Response Association, in which water utilities may
coordinate with electricity, gas, telecommunications, and pipeline utilities. The pur-
pose of the Water Agency Response Network is to identify the need to help each
other in an emergency. The Water Agency Response Network links the Emergency
Operations Centers of the member agencies with one another. Many public agencies
incorporate amateur radio backup communication. In Los Angeles the distribution
of potable water has been delegated to the fire departments in an emergency. These
partnerships have developed through time and experience and have demonstrated an
attempt to work together in an emergency or disaster and could provide a template
for emergency response to a terrorist attack.
1.4 Vulnerable Characteristics of US Water Supply Systems
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection identified several
features of US drinking water systems that are particularly vulnerable to terrorist
attack. For example, community water supplies in the United States are designed to
deliver water under pressure and generally supply most of the water for fire-fighting
purposes. Loss of water or a s ubstantial loss of pressure could disable fire-fighting
capability, interrupt service, and disrupt public confidence (Clark and Deininger,
2000).
This loss might result from a number of different causes. Many of the major
pumps and power sources in water systems have custom-designed equipment and in
case of a physical attack it could take months or longer to replace them. Sabotaging
pumps that maintain flow and pressure or disabling electric power sources could
cause long-term disruption (Clark and Deininger, 2001).
Many urban water systems rely on an aging infrastructure. Temperature varia-

tions, large swings in water pressure, vibration from traffic or industrial processes,
and accidents often result in broken water mains. Planning for main breaks is usually
based on historical experience. However, breaks could be induced by a system-wide
hammer effect, which could be caused by opening or closing major control valves
too r apidly. This could r esult in simultaneous main breaks that might exceed the
community’s capability to respond in a timely manner, causing widespread outages.
Recognizing this vulnerability, water systems have been incorporating valves that
cannot be opened or closed rapidly. However, many urban systems still have valves
that could cause severe water hammer effects.
Interrupting the water flow to agricultural and industrial users could have large
economic consequences. For example, the California aqueduct, which carries water
from northern parts of the state to the Los Angeles/San Diego area, also serves to
irrigate the agricultural areas in mid-state. Pumping stations are used to maintain the
8 R.M. Clark et al.
flow of water. Loss of irrigation water for a growing season, even in years of normal
rainfall, would likely result in billions of dollars of loss to California and significant
losses to US agricultural exports.
Another problem associated with many community water systems is the potential
for release of chlorine to the air. Most water systems use gaseous chlorine as a
disinfectant, which is normally delivered and stored in railway tank cars. Generally,
there is only minimal protection against access to these cars. Accidental release of
chlorine gas could cause injury to nearby populations.
1.5 The Threat of Terrorism to Urban Water Systems
Unlike the earthquake experience there has never been a successful terrorist attack
on an urban water system, and until recently terrorism in the United States was not
generally considered to be a serious threat. The President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure was formed to evaluate the vulnerability of the nation’s infrastructure
to internal and external terrorism. The Commission identified water supply systems
as vulnerable to the full range of terrorist threats including physical attack and cyber
and biological terrorism.

1.5.1 Bioterrorism and Chemical Contamination
A major concern with regard to water supplies is the potential of bioterrorism as a
threat to public safety. The US Army Combined Arms Support Command evaluated
27 agents for the potential for “weaponization.” Seven of the 27 agents are listed
as having the potential for being “weaponized” and 14 others are listed as either
possible or probable weapons. A number of these organisms are listed as definite or
probable threats in water (Clark and Deininger, 2000).
The President’s Commission concluded that there is a credible threat to the
nation’s water supply system from certain known biological agents. In addition,
newly discovered or emerging pathogens may pose a threat to water supply systems.
One such pathogen was isolated during a US Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) study in Peru.
Several chemical agents have also been identified that might constitute a credible
threat against water supply systems. Although much is known about chemical and
biological agents dispersed in air, almost nothing is known about these agents in
potable water.
The amount of material needed to deliberately contaminate a water source (such
as a reservoir or aquifer) is large and generally exceeds what an individual or small
group of terrorists could easily acquire, produce, or transport. However, contam-
inants introduced into a distribution system would be less susceptible to dilution
and would reside in the system for shorter times, thus diminishing the effects of
disinfectants and chemical decomposition and oxidation.