univ of minnesota pr the jobless future sci-tech and the dogma of work jul 1994

THE
JOBLESS FUTURE
This page intentionally left blank
The
Jobless
Future
Sci-Tech
and the
Dogma
of
Work
Stanley
Aronowitz
and
William
DiFazio
University
of
Minnesota
Press
Minneapolis
London
Copyright
1994
by the
Regents
of the
University
of
Minnesota

All
rights reserved.
No
part
of
this publication
may be
reproduced, stored
in
a
retrieval system,
or
transmitted,
in any
form
or by any
means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or
otherwise, without
the
prior writ-
ten
permission
of the
publisher.
Published
by the
University
of

Minnesota Press
111
Third Avenue South, Suite 290, Minneapolis,
MN
55401-2520
Printed
in the
United States
of
America
on
acid-free paper
Third
printing 1996
Library
of
Congress
Cataloging-in-Publication
Data
Aronowitz, Stanley.
The
jobless
future
/
Stanley Aronowitz
and
William DiFazio.
p. cm.
Includes
bibliographical references

and
index.
ISBN
0-8166-2193-4
(he
:
acid-free paper)
ISBN
0-8166-2194-2
(pb :
acid-free
paper)
1.
Unemployment,
Technological—United
States.
2.
Labor
supply—
Effect
of
technological innovations
on—United
States.
I.
DiFazio,
William.
II.
Title.
HD6331.2.U5A76

1994
331.13'7042'0973—dc20
94-14102
The
University
of
Minnesota
is an
equal-opportunity
educator
and
employer.
For
Stanley's
son
Michael
For
Bill's
daughter Liegia Stella
This page intentionally left blank
Look
at the
noble savage
whom
the
missionaries
of
trade
and the
traders

of
religion have
not yet
corrupted
with
Christianity,
syphilis
and the
dogma
of
work,
and
then look
at our
miserable
slaves
of
machines.
Paul
Lafargue,
The
Right
to Be
Lazy
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface
xi
Introduction
1

Part
I.
Technoscience
and
Joblessness
1.
The New
Knowledge Work
13
2.
Technoculture
and the
Future
of
Work
57
3.
The
End
of
Skill?
81
4.
The
Computerized Engineer
and
Architect
104
5. The
Professionalized Scientist

139
Part
n.
Contours
of a New
World
6.
Contradictions
of the
Knowledge Class: Power,
Proletarianization,
and
Intellectuals
173
7.
Unions
and the
Future
of
Professional Work
202
8.
A
Taxonomy
of
Teacher
Work
226
Part
III. Beyond

the
Catastrophe
9. The
Cultural Construction
of
Class: Knowledge
and
the
Labor Process
267
10.
Quantum Measures: Capital Investment
and Job
Reduction
298
11.
The
Jobless
Future?
328
Notes
359
Index
377
ix
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Preface
We
live
in

hard times.
The
economic stagnation
and
decline
that
changed
many
lives
after
the
stock market crash
of
1987
and
blossomed into
a
full-
scale
recession
in
1990 lingers despite frequent
self-satisfied
statements
by
politicians
and
economists
that
the

recovery
has
finally
arrived
(1992,1993,
1994). Nevertheless, there
are
frequent puzzled statements
by the
same
savants
to the
effect
that
although
we are
once again
on the
road
to
eco-
nomic growth,
it is a
jobless recovery.
Then,
in the
months
in
which
the De-

partment
of
Labor records
job
growth,
we are
dismayed
to
discover that
most
of the
jobs
are
part-time, near
the
minimum wage.
Bemoaning
the
high costs
of
doing business
in the
1990s,
Business
Week
attributes some
of the
problem
to
increases

in
benefits
such
as
health
care.
It is
particularly concerned
that
"small business,
the
engine
of job
cre-
ation
in the
1980s,"
is
unable
to
overcome
the
steep
job
cuts
that
big
busi-
ness
has

imposed
on
hundreds
of
thousands
of
blue-collar, pink-collar,
and
white-collar employees.
For
there
is no
doubt that
we
have
yet to
feel
the
long-term
effects
on
American living standards that will result from
the
elimination
of
well-paid professional, technical,
and
production jobs.
At the
same time, nearly everyone admits

that
many
of
these jobs
are
gone forever.
Still,
we are
amazed that
as
experts, politicians,
and the
public become
acutely aware
of new
problems associated with
the
critical changes
in the
economy—crime,
poverty,
homelessness,
hunger, education downsizing,
loss
of tax
revenues
to pay for
public services,
and
many other social

issues—the
solution
is
always
the
same: jobs, jobs, jobs.
The
central contention
of
this book
is
that
if
jobs
are the
solution,
we
xi
Preface
are in big
trouble.
We
argue that
the
tendency
of
contemporary global eco-
nomic
life
is

toward
the
underpaid
and
unpaid worker.
The
characteristics
of
the
industrializing
era of
world capitalist
development—a
highly
differ-
entiated workforce, strong unions, powerful states that guaranteed econom-
ic
security
and
promoted economic
growth—no
longer describe
our new
era.
Scientifically
based technological change
in the
midst
of
sharpened

in-
ternationalization
of
production means that there
are too
many workers
for
too few
jobs,
and
even fewer
of
them
are
well paid.
As we
completed
the
final
words
of
this book, there
was
considerable evidence that this
point
has
reached deeply into
the
public imagination,
but not

into
the
political
or
cul-
tural
discourse.
The aim of
this work
is to
suggest political
and
social solu-
tions that take
us in a
direction
in
which
it is
clear that jobs
are no
longer
the
solution, that
we
must
find
another
way to
ensure

a
just
standard
of
living
for
all.
This
book
is the
result
of a
collaboration that began
in
1983
when
the
authors were asked
by Lou
Albano
and
Brad Smith
of the New
York Tech-
nical Guild (District Council
37,
AFSCME)
to
perform
a

study
of the
possi-
ble
effects
of the
introduction
of
computer-aided design
and
drafting
on
sections
of the
union's membership.
As
engineers
and
drafters, they were
naturally
concerned
about
the
impact
of the new
technology
on
their
job
security

and
working conditions.
The first
results
of our
interviews
and
ethnography were published
as a
report
to the
union,
Time
for
Decision,
that appeared
in
August 1984.
We
were fortunate
to
have
the
enthusiastic
and
able assistance
of
several colleagues without whose participation this
study
and, hence, this book might never have been published.

We
want
to
thank Patricia D'Andrade, Dana Fenton, Eric Lichten,
Bill
Watson, Martha
Ecker,
and Ted
Yanow.
A
second study,
for the
Communications Workers
of
America Local 1082, employees
of the New
Jersey Department
of
Trans-
portation, became
an
indispensable
verification
of our
intial conclusion that
computer-aided design could
be an
extraordinary boon
to
engineers

and
technicians
only
if it
were used
in a
context
of
equality
and
opportunity.
Used
as a
management
tool,
it
could become
a
powerful weapon against
professional
and
technical knowledge. Eric Lichten
and
David Wagner were
particularly
important
in
bringing this study
to
fruition.

The
next step
in the
process
was the
study group
on
science
and
tech-
nology that
the
authors participated
in,
together with David Chorlian, Mar-
garet Yard, Louis Amdur, Patricia D'Andrade, Janet
Biehl,
and
Jeff
Schmidt.
The
result
of
this group study became
the
basis
for
Stanley Aronowitz's
Science
as

Power, published
by the
University
of
Minnesota Press
in
1988.
The
Jobless
Future
is, in
many respects,
a
second volume
of
this
earlier
col-
lective
effort.
Of
course,
it may be
read
as a
self-contained
work.
xii
Preface
In the

development
of our
general perspective
on
science, technology,
and
work,
we
have been informed
and
supported
by a
number
of
friends
and
colleagues, including Kimberly
Flynn,
Lynn Chancer, Paolo Carpignano,
Carl
Johnson,
Maria Milagros Lopez, Bruce Vanacour,
and
Ellen Willis.
Judy Gregory, then
of the
Professional Department
of the
AFL-CIO,
gave

us an
early opportunity
to
share
our
ideas
and
findings, published
as
"Unions, Technology
and
Computer-Aided
Design," with
a
group
of en-
gineers. Professor
Sam
Bloom enthusiastically helped
us in our
work
on
biomedical
scientists. William Kornblum,
one of
America's leading ethnog-
raphers,
has
been
a

source
of
unfailing support.
Sol
Yurick's editing
and
intellectual toughness have been indispens-
able.
He
helped shape
an
often
amorphous manuscript
and put our
noses
to
the
grindstone,
forcing
us to
make nascent ideas intelligible. Biodun Iginla
and the
copyeditors
at
University
of
Minnesota Press have provided
unfail-
ing
support.

For
DiFazio,
Dan
Barnestein
was an
inspiration.
I
would like
to
thank
supportive colleagues
at St.
John's
University: Richard
Harris,
Father Brian
O'Connell,
Rosalyn Bologh, Henry
Lesieur,
Susan Meswick, Dawn
Es-
posito,
Joseph Trumino, Judy Desena,
and
Michael Welch. Conversations
with Susanne MacGregor, Danny Graham, Arthur Lipow, Frances Man-
nino,
Slawomir
Magala,
and

Arthur
B.
Shostak were very
helpful.
When
I
was
overwhelmed, long telephone conversations with Donna Gaines always
helped
get me
back
on
track.
And, especially, thanks
to
Susanna Heller,
who
taught
me to see in new
ways.
I
would also like
to
thank
my
friends
at St.
John's
Bread
and

Life
Soup Kitchen.
We
also want
to
thank
all of the
architects, biomedical scientists,
drafters,
engineers,
and
university professors
who
allowed
us
into their
worlds.
xiii
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction
The
nation's economy
is
staggering
out of the
recession,
say
most
of the
gauges

that
measure
it, but
people
who are
getting jobs tell
a
sobering story:
Many good factory jobs
and
white-collar
office
jobs with good wages
and
benefits
are
giving
way to
unstable
and
mediocre jobs.
That
makes
the
recov-
ery
different
from
any
other.

Trends
that
started
in the
1980s
have produced
a new
look
to
working
America.
Part-time jobs, temporary jobs, jobs paying
no
more than
the
Federal
minimum wage, jobs with
no
more
benefits
than
a few
vacation days
are
displacing permanent regular jobs
that
people would lose
in
past reces-
sions

and
reclaim when business picked
up.
1
Less
than three months
after
this
report
appeared
in the New
York
Times
(in
December 1992), there
was a
variation
on
this theme: "Em-
ployment
agencies call them contingent workers,
flexible
workers
or
assign-
ment workers. Some labor economists,
by
contrast, call them disposable
and
throwaway

workers."
According
to
Audrey Freedman,
an
economist
for
Manpower,
the big
temporary-help company, "The labor market
today,
if
you
look
at it
closely, provides almost
no
long-term secure
jobs."
2
After
nearly three years
of
recession,
the
painfully
slow "recovery"
that economists said occurred
in
late 1992

failed
to
reduce
official
jobless-
ness
below
7
percent,
or 9
million people, throughout 1992
and
early
1993.
By
March
1993
the
January
figures
on
industrial production, consumer buy-
ing,
and
other indicators showed
a
slight dip, leaving
in
their wake both
1

Introduction
consternation
and
doubt that
the
U.S. economy
was finally
breaking
out of
the
doldrums. When February payrolls grew
by
365,000,
Secretary
of
Labor
Robert Reich noted that unemployment
was
still
two
percentage points
higher
than
before
the
recession.
3
Moreover,
most
employment gains

had
been
part-time jobs,
he
said.
In
fact,
if
part-time employment
was
calculated
as
partial unemployment,
if the
military
was
excluded
from
the
employed
(as
it had
been until
the
Reagan Bureau
of
Labor Statistics revised
the
basis
for

computing
the
number
of
jobholders),
and if
discouraged
workers—
those
who had
stopped
looking
for
work—were
factored into
the
jobless
figure, the
numbers would
be
much higher, closer
to 12
percent, which cor-
responds
to the
rate
in
most
of
Western Europe. Since

the
late
1980s
un-
employment rates around
the
globe seem intractable,
and not
directly
influenced
by the
overall performance
of a
national economy.
The
traditional "smokestack industries" have been
in
decline.
The
general
decline
has not
been only
in the
manufacturing sectors
but in the
nonmanufacturing
sectors
as
well. This process

has
been going
on for
twen-
ty
years
as
U.S. economic dominance
has
been transformed into
the
United
States
as one
major
player among others
in the
global economy. Barry
Bluestone
and
Bennett
Harrison
have traced
the
transformation:
During
the
decade
of the
1970's

we
estimate that between
450,000
and
650,000
jobs
in the
private sector
in
both manufacturing
and
non-manufac-
turing were wiped
out
somewhere
in the
United States
of
both small
and
large
runaway shops.
But it
turns
out
that
such physical relocations
are a tip of a
huge
iceberg. When

the
employment lost
as a
direct result
of
plant, store
and
office
shutdowns during
the
1970's
is
added
to the job
loss associated with
runaway shops,
it
appears that more than
32
million jobs were destroyed.
Together, runaways, shutdowns
and
permanent physical cutbacks short
of
complete closure
may
have
cost
the
country

as
many
as 38
million
jobs.
4
In
1982,1,287,000
jobs were lost
as the
result
of
plant
closings
and
layoffs.
Between
1977
and
1982,150,000
jobs were lost
in the
steel industry. There
are
millions
of
unemployed, underemployed,
and
discouraged workers
in

the
United States. Unemployment
in the
major
industrial sectors seems
to be
out of
control,
and
employed workers wonder
if
they
are
next. Union mem-
bership declines,
and
workers
who
strike
legally
are
threatened with "re-
placement
workers,"
a
sanitized term
for
scabs
in an
antiunion decade.

Workers
are
replaced,
and no one
knows
who is
next.
Will they
go the way
of
longshoremen replaced
by
containerization,
or
auto
workers replaced
by
robots,
or
steelworkers replaced
by
disinvestment
and a
restructured global
steel
industry?
No one
knows,
but the
predictions

are
ominous.
As
Leontief
and
Duchin report,
a
1982
study
from
Japan "suggests that among
the
most
2
Introduction
advanced
robots
currently
in
use, displacement rates
of
2-4
workers
per
shift
are
possible."
5
All
of the

contradictory tendencies involved
in the
restructuring
of
global capital
and
computer-mediated work seem
to
lead
to the
same con-
clusion
for
workers
of all
collars—that
is,
unemployment, underemploy-
ment, decreasingly skilled
work,
and
relatively lower wages. These sci-tech
transformations
of the
labor process have disrupted
the
workplace
and
workers' community
and

culture. High technology will destroy more
jobs
than
it
creates.
The new
technology
has
fewer
parts
and
fewer
workers
and
produces more product. This
is
true
not
only
in
traditional production
industries
but for all
workers, including managers
and
technical workers:
Forecasts made
by the BLS
[Bureau
of

Labor Statistics]
and for
Business
Week
by
Data Resources Incorporated
(DRI)
in
fact
show that
the
number
of
high-tech jobs created will
be
less
than
half
the two
million
jobs
lost
in
manu-
facturing
in the
past three years. While high-tech industries
as
defined
by the

BLS
will generate
10
times
the
number
of
jobs expected
from
the
rest
of
industry,
it
will still amount
to
only
730,000
to one
million jobs.
And
most
of
those
will
be
traditional occupations,
not
technical ones. Fewer than one-
third

will
be for
engineers
and
technicians, according
to
DRI,
and the
remain-
der
will
be
managers,
clerical
workers, operators
and
other
factory
workers.
6
Technological progress
and
capital accumulation seem
to
disrupt
the
social
fabric
in the
United States.

A
weakened
position
in the
international
economy demands
that
American industry increase
its
productivity
and cut
its
unit labor
cost.
As
Carl
G.
Thor,
president
of the
American Productivity
Center
in
Houston,
says, "The trick
is to get
more output without
a
surge
in

employment."
7
Technological change
and
competition
in the
world mar-
ket
guarantee that increasing numbers
of
workers will
be
displaced
and
that these workers will tend
to be
rehired
in
jobs
that
do not pay
compara-
ble
wages
and
salaries.
8
Women
and
minorities will

suffer
the
most
as the
result
of
these changes;
the
increased participation
in an
occupational sec-
tor by
women
and
minorities
is
often
an
indicator
of
falling
wages
in
that
occupation.
The
problems
of
plant shutdowns
and

technological change
in
pro-
duction industries
is
fairly
well known,
but we
lack reliable information
concerning
the
fate
of
displaced workers,
and our
social knowledge
of the
effects
of
technological change
and
corporate restructuring
in the
private
service
sectors
is
virtually nonexistent. Until recently, most economists,
business
analysts,

and
sociologists assumed that
the
long-term
decline
of
manufacturing
employment
was not a
serious social
issue
because
of the
concomitant expansion
of
such industries
as financial
services, insurance,
3
Introduction
and
retail
and
wholesale trades.
The
guiding assumption here
was
that
the
expansion

of
jobs
in
these industries would absorb those
who
lost their pro-
duction jobs.
For
forty
years
after
World
War II,
this assumption proved
more
or
less valid
for
large numbers
of
younger workers. Now, however,
contemporary trends
in
major
financial
corporations point
to
mass
layoffs
among middle managers

as
well
as
clerical employees: consolidation
of
computer
services
may
cause skilled operators
and
programmers
to
seek
jobs
in
other sectors;
a
glut
of
college graduates
has
saturated
the job
mar-
ket, changing
the
criteria
for
employment
in

sectors that traditionally
did
not
hire
the
educated; recent
M.B.A.'s
are
being hired
to
replace senior man-
agers
and
reduce payroll
costs;
and
there
has
been
a
dramatic increase
in
part-time
and
contract employees replacing permanent
staff.
These changes
have become apparent since
the
"crash

of
'87."
Wall Street
layoffs
have
become
a
daily occurrence, spreading
to
banks
and
other
financial
institu-
tions. These
layoffs
are a
result
of
three factors: corporate mergers
that
result
in
reorganization
and
allow
for
downsizing,
that
is, the

elimination
of
workers
who
duplicate services;
the
rapid spread
of
technological innova-
tions such
as
telecommunication systems;
and
more advanced computer net-
works that eliminate workers even
as
productivity rises.
In
banking,
the
combination
of
these changes
has
already
led to
layoffs
among some
of the
country's leading

banks,
including Chase
Manhattan,
Bank
of
America,
and
Chemical Bank-Manufacturers Hanover Trust.
Prevailing
economic wisdom explained
the
puzzlement
of
what
be-
came
known
as the
"jobless
recovery"
in two
ways:
by
ascribing
the
job
cuts
to the
industrial restructuring necessary
to

make
the
economy more
"efficient"
in a
highly
competitive global market;
and the
more pessimistic
view
that
real growth, including
jobs,
could
not
occur
in a
debt-ridden
economy.
The
optimists argued
that
global restructuring
has
forced U.S. indus-
tries
to
become meaner
and
leaner. America's weakened competitive posi-

tion
had to be
improved through
efficiencies
such
as
technological change
that
reduced
the
size
of the
factory labor
force;
mergers
and
acquisitions
that
eliminated redundancy, which resulted
in
plant closings
and
conse-
quent elimination
of
"excess" workforces;
and
applying
a
hatchet

to
"over-
head"
costs such
as
clerical workers
and
middle management.
The
large tent
under which these changes were made
is the
term
productivity.
Everything,
including
jobs,
had to be
sacrificed
to
make
the
worker more productive.
Included
in
these measures were company demands
for
wage concessions,
substantial cuts
in

health
and
pension
benefits,
and
conversion
of
many per-
manent
jobs
to
temporary
and
part-time
work.
Many experts argue that
"leaner
and
meaner" production
is the
right medicine
for the
U.S. economy.
For
example, many
of the
largest
industrial corporations were converting
to
4

Introduction
"flexible
specialization," better known
as
"just-in-time" production meth-
ods. Instead
of
building huge inventories,
a
growing number
of
industrial
companies were producing only enough
to
meet
orders.
This method yields
savings
in
warehousing, truck
fleets, and the
labor needed
to
operate them.
While
advocates acknowledged that this innovation might result
in
smaller
workforces,
they contend

that
joblessness today might
be the
necessary pre-
lude
to
full
employment
tomorrow.
9
The
second explanation, more sobering, emphasized
the
role
of
huge
federal
and
consumer debt accumulated beween
the
late
1970s
and the
early
1990s
that
has
drained public
and
private investment, inhibiting recovery

and
growth.
According
to
this view, economic
growth,
including more jobs,
may
not be
possible unless investors
are
encouraged
to
pour money into
productive activity instead
of
into
high-interest-bearing paper such
as
Treasury bills, municipal bonds,
and
instruments used
by
government
to
pay
the
huge debt service
to
banks

and
other large institutional investors.
Following this
analysis,
President
Bill
Clinton proposed
an
economic plan
to
reduce
government spending
and
raise taxes rather than create
new
jobs,
except
for
some work repairing bridges
and
roads. According
to
many
fiscal
and
economic analysts,
any
sustained economic growth requires reinstitut-
ing
austerity, initiated

first by the
Carter administration
in the
late
1970s
but
disrupted
by
Ronald Reagan's subsequent massive military buildup,
which expanded
the
credit system
to the
breaking point
even
as his
adminis-
tration
tried,
in the
name
of
austerity,
to cut
entitlements
to the
bone.
In
this
view,

the
party
is
over
and
Americans will have
to
learn
to
tighten their belts
further.
They
can
expect little
from
the
federal
government
and may be re-
quired
to
give
back some
of the
already
enfeebled
welfare-state
benefits.
Where Reagan
and

George Bush
failed,
Clinton
can
succeed because only
a
Democrat
can
persuade
the
working class
to
sacrifice
its
historical memory.
In
the
broad picture there
is no
shortage
of
capital, only shortages
of
capital investment
in
economic sectors associated with production, which,
compared
to
other options, cannot deliver
the

maximum possible return.
When,
by
electronic means,
an
investor
can
purchase,
on
margin,
a
large
quantity
of
U.S. Treasury bills
or
bank money market
funds
in the
morning
and
sell them
at a
substantial
profit
in the
afternoon, choosing
to
sink
money

in a
steel, chemical,
or
auto stock
may not be a
rational choice.
The
paper market promises
to
deliver rapid investment turnover, while industri-
al
capital turnover rarely takes
fewer
than
five
years. Given
the
prevailing
rationality
according
to
which investment
efficiency
is
measured
in
terms
of
the
time

it
takes
to
yield maximum
profits,
industrial corporations have
had
an
uphill battle attracting investors away
from
the
bustling
traffic
in
what
might
be
called "spurious" capital formation.
In the
1980s,
real
estate—
both commercial development
such
as
shopping malls and,
especially,
co-op
5
Introduction

and
condo building
and
conversions—was
a
preferred
investment.
As the
economy slowed down
in the
late
1980s,
leaving many
of the
malls empty
(especially
in the
overexpanded South
and
Southwest)
and
condos
repos-
sessed
by
banks because
of
default,
the
transfer

of
paper—which
produces
few,
if
any, jobs,
and no
white
elephants—was
the
investment
of
choice
for
many institutional
as
well
as
private investors.
The
paradox
is
that even when business investors pour substantial
portions
of
their capital into machinery
and
buildings, these investments
do
not

significantly
increase
the
number
of new
permanent,
full-time
jobs.
Computerized machines employ very little direct labor; most
of it is
devoted
to
setup, repair,
and
monitoring.
The
actual production process
is
almost
laborless because control over
it is now
built
into
the
machines
by
comput-
er
processes such
as

numerical controls, lasers,
and
robotics.
In
short, com-
puter-based technology inherently eliminates labor.
The
more investment
in
contemporary technologies,
the
more labor
is
destroyed.
Computer-mediated work processes
are now
worldwide.
In the
early
1990s,
Japan
and
Germany, whose national economies were second only
to
that
of the
United States, began
to
experience substantial reductions
in

pro-
duction
and
workforces.
In
stark contrast
to the
1980s
hype
of the
invinci-
bility
of the
Japanese, especially
its
effective
corporatism,
the
early
1990s
witnessed severe changes
in the
Japanese economic outlook.
For the first
time since
the
early postwar years, many
of the
largest corporations such
as

Mitsubishi laid
off
thousands
of
workers,
cut
production,
and
began
to
transfer
work
to
less-developed countries. Suddenly, Japanese industrial
and
labor relations policies resembled those
of
Western Europe
and the
United
States. Germany, whose economic
"miracle"
cluttered press reports
for two
decades,
found
itself
in the
doldrums; plant closings
and

layoffs
dotted
the
industrial landscape and,
not
unexpectedly,
the
government
faced
deep bud-
get
deficits
and
debt.
Some
of the
decline
can be
attributed
to the
steep descent
of
consump-
tion
of
basic industrial
and
consumer goods such
as
steel

and
autos
in the
United States, which, despite
the
relative deterioration
of its
world position,
remains
the
largest market
for
both
industrial
and
consumer
goods.
But we
must
consider
the
possibility
that
capital-intensive production processes
that
aggravated unemployment,
the
extensive
use of
overtime work

as an
alternative
to new
hiring,
and
relative wage
and
benefit
reductions have
deepened
the
recession
and
made
it
much harder
to
produce
a
vigorous
re-
covery. Since
the end of
World
War II,
working people have been encour-
aged
to
mortgage everything, including their souls,
on the

assumption
that,
economic
ups and
downs notwithstanding, there
was no
real barrier
to
ever
higher
living
standards.
The
historic demand
for
shorter hours that accom-
panied
the
introduction
of
labor-replacing technology
has
been
ditched
in
6
Introduction
favor
of
work without end. But,

as
Bill
Clinton
has
reiterated
as
both candi-
date
and
president, there
is a
shortage
of
"quality" jobs
in the
restructured
economy;
we
wish
to add
that there
is
shortage
of
quality pay,
as
well.
Of
course,
not all

investment
has
been
in
manufacturing
or
money
instruments. Some
of it has
fueled
the
enormous growth
of
informatics:
the
production
of
computer hardware
and
software; electronic communication
equipment
and
processes;
and the
vast array
of
services attached
to
infor-
mation, much

of it
channeled
to finance.
Informatics facilitates even more
rapid money
and
other market exchanges.
The
various
forms
of
labor-
reducing
informatics span
a
wide range
of
industries
from
goods production
to
retail
and
wholesale trades
and
nearly
all
services, large
and
small.

Supermarkets
use
electronic devices
for
inventory control
and to
register
prices
on
nearly
all
items. Small businesses
use
informatics
as
well.
A
liquor
store,
for
example,
is
likely
to use a
computer
to
track inventory, eliminat-
ing
the
need

to
hire
a
full-time
stock clerk. Computers
are now
part
of the
pharmacist's
tools,
and
even
some independent grocers
use
them.
Although
the
information
and
computer "revolution"
at first
created millions
of new
jobs,
it
destroyed many others. Tens
of
thousands
of
workers once

em-
ployed
as
retail clerks
in
"mom
and
pop"
stores,
albeit
at low
wages,
are no
longer needed.
In the
wake
of the
growth
of the
giant supermarket chains
and
multilocation department store chains that
dot the
retail landscape,
one
of
the
major
weapons
of

survival
for
owners
of
small clothing, hardware,
and
grocery stores
is
cutting labor costs
by
working longer hours themselves
and
using machinery.
Even
before
the
worldwide recession began with
the
stock market
crash
of
November 1987, hundreds
of
companies entered into transnation-
al
mergers
and
acquisitions.
In
some cases, such

as the
automobile industry,
these
relationships predated
the
1980s,
but
that
decade
was
marked
by
sev-
eral
joint ventures between U.S.
and
Japanese corporations that reduced fur-
ther
the
need
for
many
of
their respective parts plants.
The
practice
of
"outsourcing" meant
that
many corporations closed their parts plants

and
used
the
same contractors
to
produce everything
from
windshield wipers
to
engine parts
to
sheet metal components.
It was the
decade
not
only
of the
global car,
but
also
of the
global sweatshop. Americans were regularly plied
with reports
of
products they used
in
everyday
life
being produced
by

work-
ers
in
Mexico,
Malaysia,
and
China
who
earned
a
small fraction
of a
U.S.
or
Western European wage.
In
many other industries such
as
machine tools,
computer chips,
and
other hardware components,
the
idea
of a
national
identity
to a
commercial product became
an

advertising
fiction
used
for the
purposes
of
neutralizing protectionism.
In the
communications industry
itself,
several
major
U.S. newspapers were purchased
by
Australian commu-
nications
mogul Rupert Murdoch,
who
also acquired
the
Times
of
London.
7
Introduction
Sony,
Japan's
leading electronics
corporation,
bought substantial portions

of
the
U.S. record industry. Japanese
and
European capital formed con-
glomerates through takeovers
of
U.S. corporations;
in
turn, U.S. investment
grew
in
countries like China,
Mexico,
and
Taiwan,
leaving substantial sec-
tors
of the
U.S. economy
in the
hands
of
foreign
companies and, equally
important, laying waste
to
vast stretches
of the
industrial heartland.

Pittsburgh
and the
Monongahela
valley,
the
Youngstown area,
and
Buffalo,
once
booming steel towns,
are
industrial wastelands; only Pittsburgh man-
aged
to
remain economically viable
by
becoming
a
regional
financial
center.
The
effects
of
global restructuring
are
fairly
well known
by
now.

Awakened
by the
near demise
of the
Chrysler Corporation
in
1979, Amer-
icans were sternly warned
that
unless they learned
to
tighten their belts,
the
consequences
for the
American dream would
be
dire. Indeed,
by
1990
the
once-proud U.S. lead
in
wage
levels
had
been wiped out.
The
Bureau
of

Labor Statistics reported that U.S. wages eroded
from
first in
1970
to
sixth,
behind Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy,
and
France.
For
example,
the
wages
of
German workers were nearly
50
percent higher
and
those
of
Swedish
workers more
than
40
percent higher than those
of
U.S. workers.
In
that twenty-year period, real wages actually deteriorated, while
the

wages
for
all
other
major
industrial countries except
the
Soviet Union
and
Great
Britain
grew
in
real terms.
The
concerted assault
by
government
and
major
corporations
on
workers' income, begun
in
1981 when,
in a
dramatic ges-
ture,
President Reagan
fired

11,000
striking
air
traffic
controllers, managed
to
impose
a
virtual wage
freeze
on the
overwhelming
majority
of
manufac-
turing
workers.
Plant closings, tepid trade union response bordering
on the
supine,
and an
intense antiunion ideological environment conspired
to
weaken workers' resistance
so
that,
by the
mid-1980s,
the
nonunion sector

drove labor relations.
This,
in
brief,
is the
context
within which
a
severely reduced
job
"mar-
ket" began
to
take shape,
not
only
for
U.S. workers,
but
potentially
for all
workers.
In
this book
we
argue that
the
progressive destruction
of
high-

quality,
well-paid, permanent jobs
is
produced
by
three closely related
developments.
First,
in
response
to
pervasive, long-term economic stagnation
and to
new
scientifically
based technologies,
we are
experiencing massive restruc-
turing
of
patterns
of
ownership
and
investment
in the
global economy.
Fewer
companies dominate larger portions
of the

world
market
in
many
sectors,
and
national boundaries
are
becoming progressively less relevant
to
how
business
is
done, investment deployed,
and
labor employed.
As the
North American Free
Trade
Agreement illustrates, there
is no
reason other
than political considerations
to
value
the
concept
of the
nation with
respect

to the
production
and
distribution
of
goods
and
services.
As
much
as
8
Introduction
machinery, organization
at the
level
of the
corporate
boardrooms
and the
workplace
is a
crucial technology
of
labor destruction.
Second,
the
relentless application
of
technology

has
destroyed jobs
and,
at the
same time, reduced
workers'
living
standards
by
enabling trans-
national corporations
to
deterritorialize production.
Today,
plant
and
office
locations
are
less
dependent
on
geographic proximity
to
markets, except
in
the
case
of
some services. Informatics,

of
which computer-mediated process-
es
are the
most common
in
financial, retail,
and
wholesale services, permit
production
and
services
to be
dispersed throughout
the
globe
with
impuni-
ty.
Increasingly, electronically transmitted information
is the
medium
of
business,
and for the
most
part
it
does
not

depend
on
place.
Third,
National Public Radio recently reported
that
a
number
of
U.S.
corporations
were locating their design
and
development activities
in
India,
where, they claimed, systems analysts, programmers,
and
engineers were
highly
competent
and
much lower paid than their Western
(American)
counterparts. Similarly,
Du
Pont
is
preparing
to

build
a
major
synthetics
fiber and
petrochemical
facility
in
Shanghai.
In the
past,
U.S. scientific
and
technical experts were largely responsible
for
designing
and
supervising for-
eign
plant construction,
but Du
Pont
is
employing Chinese engineers, chem-
ists,
and
technicians, many
of
whom were trained
in the

United States
and
other
advanced industrial countries
and
others
who
were not. These cases
illustrate
a
second theme
of
this
book:
informatics
not
only displaces
and
recomposes manual labor
but
also
displaces technical
and
scientific
labor—
a
new and
expanding frontier
of
global restructuring.

As we
shall see,
be-
cause these
are
most
of the new
"quality" jobs
about
which economists
and
political leaders speak,
we
argue
that
there
is
absolutely
no
prospect, except
for
a
fairly
small minority
of
professional
and
technical people,
to
obtain

good jobs
in the
future.
Consequently, whatever
validity
it had in the
past,
the
neoclassical
economic philosophy
and the
policies
it
engenders, according
to
which
economic
growth
leads
to
relatively
full
employment
and
higher living stan-
dards,
are
rendered obsolete
by
recent developments.

If the
economy
re-
spects
no
national boundaries,
the
impact
of
nationally based
fiscal,
monetary,
and
industrial policies
are
severely limited,
just
as
labor
and
wel-
fare
policies that
are not
truly international
in
scope
and
application
are

fated
to be
eroded. Forget
the old
social-democratic slogan
of
full
employ-
ment
in a
humane welfare state. Abolish
the
welfare bureaucracy
and de-
commodify
work
by
separating work
from
income.
Even
with
considerable
political will, national governments
by
themselves
can do
next
to
nothing

to
overcome
the new
conditions
of
life
and
labor.
The old
slogan "internation-
al
labor solidarity"
is now a
practical
political
proposal
to
achieve redistrib-
utive
justice.
9
Introduction
The era of
"jobs, jobs, jobs"
and all
that
this slogan implies
is
over.
We

suggest that
if
justice depends
on
employment
and the
good
life
depends
on the
rewards
of
hard work, there
can be no
justice,
and the
good
life
may
be
relegated
to a dim
memory. However,
we
renounce neither
justice
nor
pleasure.
In the final
section

of
this book
we
propose alternatives
to the
long
wave
of the
job
culture
as the
substitution
for the
good
life.
10