The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Part 14 potx

Thus, for instance, the word can-opener or the phrase Here’s Johnnie! are
conventionally entrenched for millions of American English speakers. The sanc-
tion they receive from well-entrenched [Object-Process-er]or[Here’s Name!]
schemas reinforces their legitimacy as parts of the English language. Those same
schemas will also sanction such nonestablished (perhaps more accurately, not-yet-
established) structures as beetle-smasher or Here’s Hortense! These structures do
not sanction themselves, but the sanction they receive from the schemas qualifies
them as acceptable English. For the (presumably novel) word beetle-collector, there
is also direct sanction from the elaboratively closer schemas Small.Item-collector
and (perhaps) Insect-collector,
23
and partial (indirect) sanction from butterfly-
collector and (perhaps) bug-collector and others, making it more strongly sanc-
tioned than beetle-smasher would be. Similarly, Here’s Jennie! will receive sig-
nificantly more sanction from the established Here’s Johnnie! than will Here’s
Hortense!, because the sanction is more nearly (though not fully) direct.
This is the mechanism by which Cognitive Grammar accounts for the occur-
rence of novel formations. Schematic patterns sanction both established and novel
structures, and a novel structure is automatically acceptable to the degree that it
directly elaborates a well-established, elaboratively close schema or set of schemas.
The sanction it receives ‘‘is [the] measure of [its] well-formedness, i.e. how closely
it conforms to linguistic convention’’ (Langacker 1987a: 66). Although a schema in
such a case is a kind of rule, it is not the schema but the speaker who, taking ad-
vantage of the sanction afforded by that rule, creates the new structure.
‘‘Creative’’ as opposed to ‘‘rule-governed’’ production of new forms will be
evidenced by novel structures which depend more on partial than on full sanction,
or whose sanction comes only from elaboratively distant sources. In extreme cases,
there may even be no clear sanction, and a structure will simply be invented out of
the blue and through constant repetition become established. Much more com-
monly there is some degree of sanction. If someone were to say Over there’s Her-
man! it would be rather odd, because there is not clear sanction for usage of over

there as opposed to there or (better) here in a presentational structure. But it would
still have some sort of indirect sanction from such structures with here and there.If
it were Over there’s Johnnie!, especially if said with the proper intonation and tim-
ing, the sanction would be significantly stronger and the usage, though creative and
norm-bending, more nearly in line with the norms for English. Of course, if such a
structure is used enough, it will become established in its own right and can become
a source of sanction for other, even more divergent, structures.
4.6. Analogy under a Schema-Based Model
Under many other models, rule-based and analogy-based accounts of linguistic
creativity are seen as strict alternatives, theoretically distinct, and relegated to dif-
ferent modules of the grammar. Under Cognitive Grammar, the difference between
them is one of degree, and the two types may often be simultaneously active.
100 david tuggy
For example, the word ink-jet was originally coined to designate a device that
squirted droplets of ink onto paper.
24
This was the central and distinctive mech-
anism for a particular type of printing device, which was then called an ink-jet
printer, often shortened to ink-jet and dehyphenated to inkjet. It contrasted with
such other types as dot-matrix, daisy-wheel, and thermal-paper printers and was
superior to most of them in its ability to quickly and quietly print graphics-
intensive copy on standard paper. Later, the terms deskjet and laserjet were coined
on the analogy of inkjet as names for particular brands of printers;
25
a deskjet is
actually a kind of inkjet, but a laserjet is not. Assuming that deskjet was the first
of the two new formations,
26
we can represent what happened as an extension from
the established inkjet to the nonestablished deskjet, with the relationship of partial

schematicity mediating sufficient sanction to warrant the new formation. This is
represented below in figure 4.10a. It was a ‘‘creative,’’ norm-bending formation,
but it caught on and became established. In accordance with what was said in
section 3 and diagrammed in figure 4.1, this partial sanction entailed the activation
of the specifications common to the two structures, thus facilitating the estab-
lishment of the schematic structure (figure 4.10a.i) consisting of those specifi-
cations. Also in Figure 4.10a is represented the subsequent extension from this
group of structures to the novel laserjet, with the concomitant activation of a new
schema for the whole category. This schema (4.10a.ii), which designates a high-
tech, graphics-friendly printer with a name Noun-jet, can, to the extent that it
becomes established, be used to directly sanction such new formations as Design-
Jet, PaintJet, and OfficeJet. Further extensions and schematizations allow Verb-jet
formations like ThinkJet and (taking design and paint as verbs) DesignJet and
PaintJet, Adjective-jet formations like QuietJet, and names for not-only-printer
and nonprinter computer peripherals like CopyJet and ScanJet. These extensions
are represented in figure 4.10b.
‘‘Analogy’’ is most clearly to be invoked where there is no preestablished schema
to directly sanction the newly coined structure. But the very notion of analogy
implies that the ways in which the new structure is analogous, or similar, to the old
Figure 4.9. Sanction of established and novel structures
schematicity 101
are crucial to the new formation. That is, there must be some basis for the analo-
gy; and that basis will constitute an incipiently established schema. Such are the
schemas represented in figures 4.10b.iii–vi. To the extent that such schemas become
entrenched and begin to participate directly in sanctioning the formation of new
structures, the mechanism of rule-based creativity is active. Such is the case of
4.10b.ii (a more entrenched 4.10a.ii) vis-a
`
-vis OfficeJet, PaintJet, and DesignJet. But
as long as such partially schematic relationships as those from deskjet or laserjet

to PaintJet and OfficeJet are also important for establishing the latter, the mech-
anism of analogy is also at work, reinforcing the entrenchment of 4.10b.ii in the
process.
The distinction between a schema-based and an analogy-based account of
novel formations ‘‘comes down to whether the schema [rule] has previously been
extracted, and whether this has occurred sufficiently often to make it a[n estab-
lished] unit.’’ ‘‘If the notion of analogy is made explicit, and if rules are conceived
as schemas, there is no substantial difference between analogical and rule-based
descriptions. The model therefore achieves a significant conceptual unification’’
(Langacker 1987a: 447).
4.7. Figurative Language
Under Cognitive Grammar, figurative usages of language involve the same sorts of
structures we have been seeing repeatedly. Thus, metaphors (this volume, chapter
8) and metonymies (this volume, chapter 10) involve extension from a standard
(the ‘‘literal’’ sense) to a target (the ‘‘figurative’’ sense). Their whole configuration,
including both senses, will constitute the semantic pole of the expression in its
figurative usage. Thus, in the cat (is) out of the bag the literal meaning cat out.of
bag is extended to mean information out.of concealment, as represented in
figure 4.11a (see Langacker 1987a: 93).
Figure 4.10. Examples of analogy
102 david tuggy
The categories of metaphor and metonymy overlap and grade into each other
and often coincide, but the major difference between them in the clear cases is that
for metaphors the designated cognitive configuration (the profile in Langacker’s
terms) can be seen as holding steady while the cognitive background (base) shifts
dramatically, and in metonymy the base holds steady while the profile shifts. This
has the result that for metaphors the extraction of a coherent schema with both
literal and figurative senses (standard and target) as subcases, as in figure 4.1,is
generally possible, whereas for metonymies it is more problematic (see the dis-
cussion in the next section). For instance, for most speakers of modern American

English, the primary sense of dish is closely synonymous with the primary sense of
plate, designating the physical, usually round and slightly concave, object on which
food is typically placed for eating, and the sense food prepared in a certain
manner is an extension from it. The profiling shifts from the object on which food
is placed to the food (bounded in domains of quality and manner of preparation
instead of, or typically besides, in space). Figure 4.11b diagrams this: it also provides
a couple of additional examples of metaphor, where an activity one excels at or a
good-looking girl or woman is called a dish.
4.8. Domains
Some concepts expressed in alternative terms are easily reducible to a schema: thus
girl/woman in figure 4.11b is intended as a shorthand for (physically mature)
female human. It is not similarly easy to conceive of a schema containing the
Figure 4.11. Examples of metaphor and metonymy
schematicity 103
common essence of plate and food. A common base for the two concepts can
be characterized, however, and the dashed-line schema in 4.11b may be taken as
identifying such a concept. (Perhaps we might paraphrase it as ‘Thing prominent
in the typical scenario of well-prepared food being offered to humans for con-
sumption’.) This is problematic, however: at least prototypically, the profiling of
subcase and schema must match for there to be full schematicity, and we do not
have that in this case. Rather, either the base is devoid of profiling, or it has some
sort of alternative profiling.
27
It may, in the end, be a matter of definition, but it seems reasonable to posit
that people can, as one of the ‘‘focal adjustments’’ they make to a conceived scene
(Langacker 1987a: 116–37), disengage the profiling from any particular entity within
the scene. Such a construct in the case of plate and food certainly abstracts from
the differences and retains the commonality of the two concepts, which makes it
rather difficult to deny that it is a schema with respect to them. Accepting it as such
would make it natural for us to view metaphor and metonymy as similar cognitive

phenomena, yet the difference in the kind of focal adjustment (despecification of
significant parts of the base for metaphor; despecification of the identity of the
profile for metonymy) will allow us to appropriately distinguish the two phenom-
ena as well. Such conceptual unification of closely related phenomena is surely a
desirable result.
This sort of schema (if that is the proper name for it) is probably rightly to be
equated with the idea of a cognitive domain, which in turn is very close if not
identical to what people mean by such terms as ‘‘script,’’ ‘‘scene,’’ ‘‘frame,’’ ‘‘ICM,’’
‘‘scenario,’’ ‘‘semantic field of potential,’’ or ‘‘mental space’’; for some, this is a, if
not the primary, meaning for the term ‘‘schema’’ (see Schank and Abelson 1977;
Adams and Collins 1979: 3; Chafe 1987: 29; Cienki, this volume, chapter 7; Fau-
connier, this volume, chapter 14). For Langacker at least, domains are ubiquitous:
‘‘Semantic units are characterized relative to cognitive domains, and any concept
or knowledge system can function as a domain for this purpose’’ (1987a: 63, 147–
82). This echoes Fillmore’s (1975: 124) statement that a scene can be ‘‘any kind of
coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings.’’ For other
authors, only a subset of concepts, generally highly schematic and ubiquitous in
cognition, or otherwise especially prominent, cognitively independent, and so on,
may be deemed worthy of being called a domain (or frame, etc.) (see Croft 1993:
337–45).
28
By whatever name, what we are talking about is a coherent set of in-
terrelated concepts within which or in relation to which entities may be singled out
for profiling. It is a specialized kind of schema with no profiling prespecified.
29
It does not follow that schemas of this type are of high salience. It is difficult in
most cases to think of them as meanings of the structures involved. Although I can
entertain the schematic concept of the food-served-on-a-plate scenario, devoid
of any profiling, it is significantly more difficult to think of it as a meaning of dish.
It would seem that such profile-less concepts are difficult to maintain as objects of

conception and, as a result, unlikely to be entrenched in specific cases of meton-
104 david tuggy
ymy. The partial schematicity relation involved in the same configuration (i.e., in
the example, plate
"
food) suffers under no such disadvantages and is more
likely to be well entrenched.
The requisite domain or scenario for establishing a metonymy commonly
characterizes not the prototypical meaning of a lexical item, but a more elaborate
but less prominent subcase. It is only a subcase of bag, and not a very salient one
for most people nowadays, that features the notion of ‘bringing game home from
the field in a bag’. But that base scenario is the one that underlies the metonymic
change to the verb bag meaning ‘to successfully hunt or capture’, or to the noun
bag meaning ‘the game’ in such a case.
When we speak of domains we use nominal structures (e.g., nouns such as
domain, scenario, etc.) which profile the domain as a whole. That is a rather dif-
ferent thing from the kind of profile-less concept we have been discussing. It is
much like profiling a place: a (profiled) location is not schematic for the things in
it. There is a similar difficulty in conceiving of a domain or situation which one has
just named and thereby profiled as schematic for the elements which can be located
in it. Whether or not profile-less domains are to be considered schemas for the
elements in them, profiled domains are not.
This is particularly relevant to cases of part-to-whole or whole-to-part me-
tonymy (synecdoche or meronymical metonymy), where one of the two concepts
involved is largely coextensive with the common base for the two concepts. Thus,
in the case of wheels
"
vehicle, the common base would be a vehicle with its
wheels, but it would be a vehicle which is neither profiled itself nor has any subpart
profiled. Such a concept could still be claimed to be activated as a schema for the

two metonymically related meanings, but the meaning vehicle, which profiles the
whole, is a different concept precisely because it is profiled.
4.9. ‘‘Elaboration Sites’’ and Syntactic Coherence
Relationships of schematicity are, in the Cognitive Grammar model, important for
syntagmatic valences. Always some (sub)structure in one entity is identified with
the neighboring entity or a substructure of it. Usually when the whole of the one
entity is identified with a substructure of the other, there is a clear relationship of
schematicity between the two. The schematically characterized substructure is in
such cases called an elaboration site or e-site. Most typically, a central participant in
a Relation functions as an e-site for a Thing. Thus, the process ate has as central
participants a schematically characterized eater and some schematically charac-
terized food. In figure 4.12a, those substructures are identified with, and elaborated
by, the Things John Wayne and the toast, respectively.
To the extent that an e-site is salient within the meaning of a structure and its
elaborative distance from its target (its syntagmatic partner) is great, the structure
schematicity 105
containing that e-site is said to depend on its syntagmatic partner. Thus, in figure
4.12a ate depends quite strongly on John Wayne and on the toast.
30
Depen-
dence is a central element for characterizing the range of kinds of valences (Lan-
gacker 1987a: 298–310).
4.10. Profile Determinance and the
Complement-Modifier Distinction
Figures 4. 12b and 4.12c represent two possible results of combining the toast with
John Wayne ate,
31
preserving the same dependence relationship (of John
Wayne ate on the toast). In one case, the composite structure designates the
same entity as John Wayne ate, and in the other the same entity as the toast.In

Cognitive Grammar terms, John Wayne ate is profile determinant in the one case
and the toast is profile determinant in the other.
Profile determinance is the major factor in what has traditionally been called
headship.
32
Thus, John Wayne ate is the head of the construction in figure 4.12b
(the semantic pole of John Wayne ate the toast) and the toast in figure 4.12c
(the semantic pole of the toast John Wayne ate). Profile determinance amounts to a
schematicity relationship in which the composite structure elaborates the profile
determinant component.
Figure 4.12. The elaboration of e-sites, profile determinance
106 david tuggy
When the profile determinant within a construction depends on its syntag-
matic partner(s), as in figure 4.12b, a head-complement construction obtains. Con-
versely, when the nonhead depends on the profile determinant, as in figure 4.12c, it
is a head-modifier construction (Langacker 1987a: 309–10). Schematicity is thus
central to the definitions, within Cognitive Grammar, of these important syntactic
notions.
4.11. Schemas and the Component-Composite
Relationship
The profile determinant, in clear cases, is fully (or very nearly fully) schematic for
the structure of which it is a component. It thus sanctions the formation of the
composite structure. But nonprofile determinant components also sanction par-
ticular substructures or aspects of the composite structure. Thus, in figure 4.13a,
which represents in slightly greater detail the same structure as figure 4.12b, the
nonhead is represented as sanctioning a subpart of the composite structure.
In figure 4.13a, the toast is virtually, if not totally, the same within the com-
posite structure as in its solitary state as a component. It is thus quite easy to con-
strue it as simply embedded within the structure or as added to its syntagmatic
companion to form that structure. This is a very common and a prototypical kind

of component-composite relationship, and its predominance is what makes plau-
sible the commonly assumed building-block metaphor, which construes complex
structures as composed completely and exclusively of the components, much as a
brick wall consists entirely and exclusively of bricks. One of the implications of this
mental model is that the bricks (e.g., lexical items) and their patterns of integration
(syntax) are very difficult to construe as anything but completely different sorts of
entities.
Typically there are small discrepancies, however. In figure 4.13b(¼ 4.12c), there
is such a discrepancy: the structure John Wayne ate comes with a strong ex-
pectation that a phonologically subsequent noun phrase will elaborate the concept
of the eaten substance; that is, the phrase is strongly transitive, but its counterpart
in the composite structure is not. It is for that reason that the relationship between
the component structure and its counterpart in the composite structure is re-
presented by a dashed rather than a solid-line arrow.
This difference, though in a sense minor and quite understandable, even fully
expectable,
33
is a very mild case of something that can be seen more clearly in other
cases where the independent meaning of a structure differs significantly from its
meaning as a component in a composite structure. For instance, the noun toast
alone designates (at least for most American English speakers) sliced (and other-
wise initially untreated) bread the surface of which has been toasted, that is,
browned by being held close to a source of radiant heat. In French toast, the com-
posite structure designates sliced bread which has been browned, but only after it
has been dipped in a milk-and-egg batter, and the manner of the browning is by
schematicity 107
being placed on a hot surface (i.e., the bread is fried rather than toasted). Toast is
still usefully identified as the head (profile determinant) of the composite structure,
but its relation to the composite meaning is one of partial rather than full sche-
maticity. The other component, French, does not correspond clearly to anything at

all salient in the composite structure. Most speakers will suppose that this method
of preparing bread for eating originated in France, but that is a quite peripheral
and even a somewhat doubtful specification. The building-block metaphor does
not work very well in such a case, and of course there are even more egregious
examples: English horn, for instance, which is a kind of large oboe (one of the least
horn-like of wind instruments) and which is not particularly English in origin or
distribution, or eavesdrop (see figure 4.13c), which is an action of listening to what
is not addressed to one and has nothing obvious to do with eaves or with dropping
(though since drop designates a process it is more nearly schematic for the com-
posite and thus identifiable as head).
34
Such discrepancies between the components and the composite are entirely un-
problematic under the Cognitive Grammar model. Instead of the building-block
Figure 4.13. Sanction by components
108 david tuggy
model, it is helpful to adopt a scaffolding metaphor: ‘‘component structures are
seen as scaffolding erected for the construction of a complex expression’’ (Lan-
gacker 1987a: 461). Their structural specifications and modes of integration will
generally parallel and suggest the shape of the composite structure, but (even from
the beginning and vastly more so as it becomes entrenched in its own right) it exists
independently of them and may vary from them in significant ways (Langacker
1987a: 460–64).
By accounting for composition in terms of schematicity relations, the Cog-
nitive Grammar model handles such variations of compositionality with no fur-
ther machinery. The prototype for composite structures has a clear and fully sche-
matic relationship from the head to the composite structure and identical or fully
schematic relationships from nonhead components to clearly identifiable subparts
of the composite structure. The prototypicality of this configuration accounts for
the plausibility and pervasiveness of the building-block model. But the existence of
such structures does not preclude others where the headship is less easy to deter-

mine and where the contributions of the components to the composite structure
are difficult to recognize—to the point where it might be posited that they are not
components at all. The differences between these kinds of constructions are all
matters of degree rather than differences of kind: no new syntactic or lexical ma-
chinery is needed to account for the full range of attested types.
4.12. Blends
A powerful theoretical tool wielded by many practitioners of Cognitive Linguistics
has been the idea of blending mental spaces to achieve a new kind of combined
space with emergent properties (see Fauconnier, this volume, chapter 14; Turner,
this volume, chapter 15). At least in clear cases, blending structures are easily seen as
a particular kind of schematic network.
Coulson and Oakley (2000: 178) describe the conceptual integration network
as central to conceptual blending theory:
These networks consist of two or more input spaces structured by informa-
tion from discrete cognitive domains, a generic space that contains structure
common to all spaces in the network, and a blended space that contains selected
aspects of structure from each input space, and frequently, emergent structure
of its own. Blending involves the establishment of partial mappings between
cognitive models in different spaces in the network, and the projection of con-
ceptual structure from space to space.
This can be expressed in a schematic network as in figure 4.14a. Figures 4.14b–d
represent three kinds of blends. Figure 4.14b represents a high-level blend refer-
enced in several publications by Fauconnier (e.g., 1997), in which the concepts of
schematicity 109