The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Part 22 docx

may stand for an institution or people located at that place. The ICM provides the
framework for allowing one to make metonymic reference, in that it provides a
limited search domain which the addressee can use to identify the metonymic ref-
erent. Social stereotypes are one example of how certain salient members of a cat-
egory can be used to represent the entire category (part stands for whole), with the
inherent danger that inferences can be made about the entire category of people
based on the characteristics associated with the one subgroup.
3.5. Symbolic ICMs
The association of symbolic units, such as linguistic forms, with the conceptual
elements in ICMs is the criterion for identifying an ICM as symbolic (Lakoff 1987:
289–92). In terms of linguistic form, our understanding of what constitutes a lexi-
cal item, a grammatical category, and a grammatical construction is claimed to be
structured by ICMs. So the concept of ‘noun’ is a radial category based on the
central (prototypical) subcategory of names for physical entities. But ICMs are also
relevant in terms of the connection between symbol (linguistic form) and meaning.
Lakoff also draws on the Figure/Ground distinction and recasts the findings of
Fillmore’s work on frame semantics to say that the meaning of each lexical item is
represented as an element in an ICM, or conversely, an ICM provides the back-
ground against which a word is defined.
3.6. ICMs: Closing Points
ICMs have been used as analytic tools in research on lexical and morphological
semantics, polysemy (particularly of prepositions, verb particles, and verbal pre-
fixes), and the syntax and semantics of grammatical constructions. The three case
studies in Lakoff (1987) give a sense of this work. One is a semantic analysis of over
as a preposition and verb particle (developing on Brugman 1981); one provides a
coherent account of English constructions with there, which sometimes refer to
relative location and sometimes to existence (and this analysis invokes the work on
frame semantics); and one explicates the ICM of ‘anger’ (drawing on work with
Ko
¨
vecses). The cross-linguistic studies on cognitive models of emotions that use

ICMs as a basis (such as Lakoff and Ko
¨
vecses 1987;Ko
¨
vecses 1995) take us into
research on cultural models (e.g., Holland and Quinn 1987; Quinn 1991; D’Andrade
and Strauss 1992).
Implied, but not mentioned in the explications above, is a relation between
ICMs and ‘‘mental spaces’’ (Fauconnier 1985). Mental spaces have been described
as ‘‘small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local
understanding and action’’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 40; see also Fauconnier,
this volume, chapter 14). Thus, ‘‘any fixed or ongoing state of affairs as we con-
ceptualize it is represented by a mental space’’ (Lakoff 1987: 281). ICMs provide
180 alan cienki
ready-made ways of structuring mental spaces. If one encounters a situation in
which several salient elements evoke a known ICM, that model can provide a
framework for filling in potentially relevant details. For example, hearing verbal
formulas which introduce a story can invoke the ‘‘storytelling ICM,’’ which can
help one construct relevant mental spaces more easily to understand the story
(Lakoff 1987: 281–82).
One of the critiques of research promoting ICMs as an analytic tool has been
that it does not take account of the central role of culture in cognition (e.g., Quinn
1991). While the research on cognitive models and cultural models does not present
them as two names for the same thing, the relation between the two sides cannot be
ignored (Gibbs 1999). In this regard, Shore (1996) provides a detailed analysis of
the many types of models which go into making up what we call ‘‘a culture.’’ Shore
points out that while some ICMs are really mental models, others are models con-
structed in the world in terms of social institutions and/or practices (334). Also note
that the focus in this chapter, as in the extant literature on the subject, has been on
linguistic instantiations of ICMs. But since such models are meant to be part of our

general cognitive abilities, we can also find nonlinguistic versions of the various
types of ICMs (e.g., various kinds of symbolic models, models employing meto-
nymic reference via iconic images, etc.).
4. Domains

Two main contexts in which the notion of ‘‘domains’’ has been used as a theoretical
construct in cognitive linguistic research include conceptual metaphor theory and
Cognitive Grammar. Though the term appears to have developed independently in
these two lines of inquiry, an exploration into use of the term reveals that it can
most profitably be understood by consideration of both contexts.
Lakoff (1993) makes it clear that the mappings in conceptual metaphors are
between two ‘‘domains of experience,’’ such that a target domain (of experience) is
understood in terms of a source domain (of experience). What exactly constitutes a
domain remained implicitly understood for some time by many who used the the-
oretical framework beginning with Lakoff and Johnson (1980), since the term was
not yet used in that work. But even initially it was apparent that domains, as em-
ployed in conceptual metaphor theory, are something broader than mental spaces,
as mentioned earlier. Whereas mental spaces involve conceptualizations enlisted by
the individual in a specific context for a specific purpose, domains encompass many
aspects of an experience that are conceptualized as associated.
A more explicit treatment of domains appears with the application of the
notion in Cognitive Grammar. Langacker (1987: 488) defines ‘‘domain’’ within this
framework as ‘‘a coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic
frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 181
units may be characterized.’’ This use of ‘‘domain’’ covers a range of types of cog-
nitive entities, from mental experiences, to representational spaces, concepts, or
conceptual complexes (147). The notion is at the heart of the encyclopedic view of
linguistic semantics in Cognitive Grammar; if knowledge is encyclopedic, rather
than dictionary-like, domains provide a way of carving out the scope of concepts
relevant for characterizing the meanings of linguistic units. The following is a brief

summary of properties of different kinds of domains (based on Langacker 1987:
chapter 4).
Domains, as understood in Cognitive Grammar, may be basic or abstract.
‘‘Basic domains’’ cannot be fully reduced to any other domains, and in this way they
can be thought of as primitive dimensions of cognitive representation. Our sensory
capacities are examples of several different basic domains. A domain which is not
basic, ‘‘any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for the def-
inition of a higher-order concept’’ (Langacker 1987: 150), is called an abstract do-
main. For example, an understanding of what an elbow is requires knowledge about
the domain of ‘arm’, but ‘arm’ is itself clearly not a basic domain, and so in this
framework it qualifies as an abstract domain. In a footnote, Langacker (1987: 150)
says that an abstract domain is essentially equivalent to an ICM, a frame, scene,
schema, or possibly a script. However, given the various ways in which the terms
listed have been understood, as described in the previous sections of this chapter, it
might be best to understand ‘‘abstract domain’’ based on Langacker’s own descrip-
tion of it.
In Cognitive Grammar, basic domains are recognized as having one or more
dimensions. Thus, while time, pitch, and temperature are understood as one-
dimensional, since each entails a single, consistent ordering, domains like kinship
relations and color involve multiple dimensions (for kinship relations: intra- versus
intergenerational relations; and for color: brightness, saturation, and hue). In ad-
dition, a domain can be described as locational or configurational. Examples of
locational domains include temperature and color, since each is defined by a loca-
tion on one or more scales. A configurational domain is one which can ‘‘accom-
modate a number of distinct values as part of a single gestalt’’ (Langacker 1987: 153).
For example, we can have a two-dimensional or a three-dimensional conceptual-
ization of the domain of space, and so it is a configurational domain.
Domain should also be distinguished from what is called a dominion in Cog-
nitive Grammar. This is something specific to discussions about ‘‘reference points,’’
which can be any entities that are used to establish mental contact with another (see

Langacker 1993). In this context, the dominion is the conceptual region or set of
entities to which a particular reference point affords direct access (Langacker 1991:
170). A dominion is therefore a concept localized to a specific type of context, and
rather different from the broader notion of domains.
Croft (1993) reflects on the understanding of domains in the analysis of con-
ceptual metaphors and metonymies in light of Langacker’s work. He begins with
Langacker’s distinction between a profile and a base. If a profile is the entity des-
ignated by a semantic structure, then a base is the ground with respect to which that
182 alan cienki
entity is profiled. He recalls Langacker’s (1987: 183–84) example of an arc of a circle:
not every curved line is an arc, as an arc presupposes the concept of a circle for its
definition. Thus, a circle serves as the base, the background, against which we
understand what an arc is (and in this case an arc is the relevant profile). Given this,
‘‘we can now define a domain as a semantic structure that functions as the base for
at least one concept profile’’ (Croft 1993: 339 ).
Croft (1993) moves on to relate domain, as defined in this way, to the study of
metaphor and metonymy. First, many concepts presuppose several different do-
mains. So a human being is defined relative to domains such as physical objects,
living things, volitional agents, and others. ‘‘The combination of domains simu-
lateously presupposed by a concept such as [human being] is called a domain
matrix’’ (340). Metaphor, then, is a mapping between two domains that are not part
of the same matrix (348). Croft notes, ‘‘If you say She’s feeling down, there is no
spatial orientation domain in the matrix of the metaphorical concept of emotion
being expressed; happy is up involves two different concepts with their own do-
main structures underlying them’’ (348). However, metonymy normally involves
mapping within a domain matrix (see also Panther and Thornburg, this volume,
chapter 10). This construal of metonymy helps make sense of previous analyses
which claim that metonymy involves a relation of ‘contiguity’, and explains how
metonymy is often used for purposes of reference to something which is related in a
contextually salient way. Thus, the notion of domain, though applied in different

ways in different avenues of Cognitive Linguistics, is important in several respects
to linguistic analysis because it is such a basic cognitive construct.
5. Concluding Issues

One criticism that might be leveled against these notions is that in any specific
analysis, it is not necessarily clear how to demarcate what is or is not part of a given
frame, ICM, or domain. Because they are cognitive constructs, their scope is going
to be determined in any instance by contextual factors as well as the subjective
nature of construal. So, while they provide useful ways of thinking about the cog-
nitive bases of linguistic structures and the relations of form to meaning, their
inherent nature can make them tricky to use as analytic tools in a reliable, replicable
fashion. Whether, and if so, how, these notions can be better operationalized for
applied research remains to be seen.
In addition, because each of the terms ‘‘frame,’’ ‘‘ICM,’’ or ‘‘domain’’ can refer
to a kind of knowledge structure which can serve as a background for interpreting
the meaning of linguistic forms, there is sometimes overlap in how they are used
by different researchers. However, each term seems to find its best functional home
within one or two specific theoretical frameworks. In this regard, we saw above that
frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 183
frame theory paved the way for particular theories of grammar (such as Con-
struction Grammar). ICMs have been a useful way of capturing the role of back-
ground knowledge for certain kinds of semantic analyses, particularly as they relate
to questions of categorization (as espoused by Lakoff 1987). Domains play an es-
pecially prominent role in conceptual metaphor theory and in Cognitive Grammar.
The different theoretical contexts in which frames, ICMs, and domains are used
accentuate the nuances of the differences between them.
The development of all of the basic notions outlined in this chapter helped lay
the groundwork for what has come to be known as Cognitive Linguistics. They
reflect a common view of the study of language which Lakoff (1990: 40) charac-
terizes in terms of ‘‘a commitment to make one’s account of human language

accord with what is generally known about the mind and the brain, from other
disciplines as well as our own.’’ The research on frames, ICMs, and domains reflects
this commitment in how it has both drawn on and influenced work in various
branches of cognitive science, such as psychology, anthropology, and philosophy.
Because of the fundamental roles these basic concepts have in cognitive linguistic
theory, the original research on them will continue to remain influential in future
work in the field.
NOTES

1. It is interesting to note this early connection made between the cognitive and the
sociocultural—a concern which was alien to work in American linguistics at the time
within the generative paradigm and was ahead of its time in relation to Cognitive Lin-
guistics, which initially did not give much attention to the social aspects of language use.
2. Lakoff (1987: 68) claims to be discussing image-schematic structure as described in
Langacker’s (1987) Cognitive Grammar, but Langacker does not present a theory of image
schemas, and Langacker’s notion of ‘‘schemas’’ is not the same as that of Johnson’s ‘‘image
schemas.’’ Lakoff is really referring to the image schemas explicated in Johnson (1987).
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frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 187
chapter 8

METAPHOR

joseph e. grady
1. Introduction

Metaphor has been a central topic within Cognitive Linguistics since the field was
born and the term coined in the 1970s. This is partly a historical consequence of
George Lakoff’s dominant role and major contributions—metaphor was his focus
at the time he and a number of colleagues were defining the field of Cognitive
Linguistics, and continues to be today. But the importance of metaphor studies

within the discipline is also a reflection of the nature of Cognitive Linguistics as it is
understood by its practitioners. If Cognitive Linguistics is the study of ways in
which features of language reflect other aspects of human cognition, then meta-
phors provide one of the clearest illustrations of this relationship. Since the 1950s,
Chomskyan linguists have been devising theories of syntax which largely exclude
references to the meanings of linguistic structures; it is nearly impossible, though,
to conceive of metaphor without taking into account the connections between
lexical semantics, usage, and our understanding and perceptions of the world.
Metaphors provide rich evidence about the ways in which some aspects of our lived
experience are associated with others, for reasons that reflect basic aspects of per-
ception, thought, and possibly neurological organization.
Within Cognitive Linguistics the term metaphor is understood to refer to a pat-
tern of conceptual association, rather than to an individual metaphorical usage or a
linguistic convention. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) describe metaphor as follows:
‘‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing
in terms of another.’’ When Robert Frost refers to the ‘‘road less traveled,’’ he uses
the words road and traveled in metaphorical ways; in conventional usage, this
phrase is ‘‘the metaphor,’’ but for cognitive linguists the more important object of
study (and, according to typical usage within the discipline, ‘‘the metaphor’’) is the
underlying pattern of thought which allows the phrase to have the meaning it does.
Since this pattern involves associations at the conceptual level, it can be expressed
by many different lexical means—metaphorical uses of path, fork in the road, di-
rection, and numerous other terms reflect the same basic set of associations, be-
tween traveling and making life choices.
The emphasis within Cognitive Linguistics on this conceptual dimension sug-
gests a view in which metaphor is not inherently a linguistic phenomenon. In fact,
cognitive linguists do conceive of metaphors as patterns of thought which can be
expressed on nonverbal ways, such as pictures and gestures. Diagrams, for example,
generally follow the convention that ‘‘higher’’ numbers and quantities should be
represented higher on a physical surface (e.g., linguistic usages such as Crime has

risen dramatically). In the artistic realm, M. Johnson (1987: 83) considers the notion
of pictorial ‘‘balance’’ and observes that ‘‘in Kandinsky’s Accompanied Contrast ,
there is an exquisite balance in the work that can be made sense of only by inter-
preting ‘weight,’ ‘force,’ ‘location,’ and ‘value’ metaphorically, based on a schema
whose structure specifies forces or weights distributed relative to some point or ax-
is.’’ Johnson is suggesting that visual images may stand metaphorically for physical
masses and forces.
Cognitive Linguistics is hardly the first area of scholarship to treat metaphor as a
serious object of study. Aristotle (1996) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1947) wrote on the
subject, as did Vico ([1744] 1961) (see M. Johnson 1981, for a summary of philosoph-
ical scholarship on metaphor). More immediate and direct predecessors included
Anderson (1971), who explored ways in which understandings of spatial relationships
are extended to other kinds of relations expressed in grammar, and Reddy (1993),
whose discussion of metaphors for communication Lakoff and Johnson cite as a
catalyst for their own interest in the subject. Reddy’s paper, in fact, appeared in an
important volume of papers treating metaphor from a variety of scholarly perspec-
tives (Ortony 1979). Cognitive Linguistics’ unique contribution has been to treat met-
aphorical language as data to be examined systematically and to be considered in
connection with other basic aspects of mental activity. Even more importantly, schol-
ars in the field have recognized the thorough pervasiveness of metaphor even in
‘‘ordinary’’ language and thought.
The starting point for a discussion of metaphor within the field of Cogni-
tive Linguistics must be the approach initiated in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) sem-
inal Metaphors We Live By and elaborated by cognitive linguists since that time
(Paprotte
´
and Dirven 1985;
1
M. Johnson 1987, 1993; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner
1989; Sweetser 1990; Turner 1991; Lakoff and Johnson 1999;Ko

¨
vecses 2002; etc.).
metaphor 189