DSpace at VNU: The French communist party and the French people during the resistance of the Vietnamese people against the French colonists which led to the victory of Dien Bien Phu

VNU JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, s o c . SCI ■HUMAN , N;;3E. 2004

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY AND TH E FR EN C H PE O PL E
DURING THE RESISTANCE OF THE VIETNAM ESE P E O PL E
AGAINST THE FRENCH COLONISTS W HICH LED TO THE
VICTORY OF DIEN BIEN PH U
D in h X u a n L a m (,)
It is p ossib le to confirm th at from the
outbreak o f World War II to the spring of
1944 w hen the resista n ce a g a in st Fascism
in France w as com ing to an encl. in a
context th at everv connection betw een
France and V ietnam w as nearly disrupted,
the French C om m un ist Party did not know
an yth in g about the developm en t of the
R evolution in V ietnam . From the sum m er
of 1940 to th e victory of th e A ugust
R evolution in
1945, th e Indochinese
C om m unist
P arty
w as
com pletely
separated from th e o u tsid e world and all
con n ection s w ith the French C om m unist
Party w ere cut off. Et tine Fajon. a m em ber
of the th e French C om m unist Party
Politbureau stated: “I d id not think the

which led
the Viet M inh to power in

A u g u st a n d Septem ber in 1945, the French
C om m unist Party h ad not had any
inform ation for evaluating the situation o f
the w ar in Indochina. Only after a few days
when newspapers announced that the Viet
M inh was in power, I was told by
Vietnamese comrades in France that Ho
Chi M inh usas N guyen A i Quoc, who had
been well-know n to the leaders o f the
French C om m unist Party. A s soon as the
news was confirm ed, it was im m ediately
sent to the leadership o f the French
C om m unist P a rty " (1. p. 70).
M ean w h ile, th e d esig n o f th e French
Im p eria lists to reoccupy colonial cou n tries
(in clu d in g Indochina) had revealed quite
early. Even w hen W orld W ar II had not
en ded and France had been in vad ed by the
G erm ans,
th e
p rovision al
republican
g o v ern m en t o f France (the R esistan ce
g overn m en t) in A lger led by C om m ander
D e G au lle called for a m eetin g in
B ra zza v ille (the Congo) to d iscu ss colonial
is s u e s (from J a n u a ry r ' to February 8th in
1944). At th e m eetin g , th e idea of
lib era tin g colon ial n a tio n s w as ignored.
R en e P lev en , rep re se n ta tiv e o f th e French

provisional
g overn m en t,
announced
frankly th a t “u n d er French Im perialism ,
th ere w ere n a tio n a l is s u e s to be liberated
and th ere w ere no racial d iscrim in ation s to
g et rid o f (...); th e o v ersea s n a tio n s knew
n o th in g o f n a tio n a l in d ep en d en ce except
th e n a tio n a l in d ep en d en ce of F ran ce.” (1,

steering
com m ittee
(of the
French
C om m unist Party) knew anything about
Indochina" (1, p. 61). EỈ 1C M ignot, a
stan d in g
m em ber
of the
Colonial
C om m ittee o f th e French C om m unist
Party from A u gu st in 1945 also adm itted:
‘7/1 1945 a n d Ĩ946, we had very little
inform ation o f V ietnam . We knew the

A ugust Revolution through some pieces o f
news in the newspapers. These pieces o f
inform ation
were
not sufficient for

understanding the situation happening in
Indochina” (1, p. 62). R aym ond Barbe, a
stan d in g
m em ber
of the
Colonial
C om m ittee from th e su m m er of 1945
added: “A s fa r as I know, u n til the uprising

° Professor, Department of History, College of Social
Sciences & Humanities, VNU.

19


2 0

P.73-74). By A ugu st 1944 w h en Paris w as
liberated,
the
G overnm ent
of
the
résistan ts, w hich had ju st won a victory for
the nation, issu ed an order to esta b lish an
arm y led by C om m ander Leclerc and th is

army was assigned with the mission to
move tow ards the Far E ast to figh t a g a in st
the last allies o f H itler - the J a p a n ese

Fascists. A fter France had been liberated,
the
De
G aulle
govern m en t
issu ed
Ordinance on the future o f Indochina
(March 24th in 1945). T h is docum ent is, in
essen ce, the restoration o f the colonial
regim e in Indochina. In th a t h istorical
context, m any French com m u n ists could
avoid being ideologically influenced. The
thing
th a t n eed s
to
be confirm ed
im m ed iately is th a t before then the
relationship b etw een F rench com m u n ists
and the R evolution o f V ietn am had been
close and had gone through th e m ill in
m any historical periods. Red A ssistan ce,
the stru ggle com m ission for relea sin g
political prisoners carried out m any fierce
fights a g a in st brutal terrorist actions by
French Im p erialists at the b egin n in g of the
1930s. Then in 1936 and 1937» th e French
P eo p les Front w ith co m m u n ists w orking
as activists stood sid e by sid e w ith
R evolutionary figh ters and th e V ietn a m ese
people to fight for basic dem ocratic

in terests.
B ecause the relation sh ip b etw een the
Indochinese C om m un ist P arty and the
French C om m unist P arty w a s disrupted
for a long tim e and partly b ecau se the
political situ atio n of France and the world
after the liberation of F rance (France had
just won the victory over facism and there
w as an inner sp lit am on g th e political
allian ce of forces o f th e four victorious
superpow ers) d eterm in ed th e policy o f the
French C om m unist P arty on colonial
countries in general and on Indochina in

Dinh Xuan Lam

particu lar,
th a t
is,
com bining
the
p rogressive forces in th e m other country
w ith th o se in the colonies to fig h t for new
d em ocratic rights. T h is policy sh ow s th at
th e ta rg ets o f th e French C om m unists by
th a t tim e w ere like th o se o f the D em ocratic
Front period, th ey w ere un able to realise
the fact th a t th ere had been m any changes
in th e political life o f the peoples in the
colonial and d ep en d en t nations. Ejien

F aron g’s sp eech at th e C ongress of the
F rench C om m u n ist Party held in June,
1947 can be quoted to illu stra te the idea at
th a t tim e: uIn the general situation o f the

world a t the moment, the French Union is
still the best organization for the
im plem entation o f the aspiration o f the
colonial peoples w ith the assistance o f the
French w orking class an d the French
people (...). Please stay with us in the
French U nion!'
In th a t specific historical context, the
F rench C om m u n ist P arty could not have
th e rig h t policy on colonial countries.
H ow ever, th ere w ere quick ch an ges after
S ep tem b er 2nd, 1945. Through electric
waves» th e D eclaration of Independence
w a s tra n sm itted to every corner of the
earth . On b eh a lf o f th e provisional
g o v ern m en t o f th e D em ocratic Republic of
V ietn am an d th e V ietn a m ese people,
P resid en t Ho Chi M inh solem n ly declared

“V ietnam
went
aw ay from
French
Im perialists' relationship a nd abolished
the privileges o f France in Vietnam ’ (5, p.

21). A t th e sa m e tim e, P resid en t Ho Chi
M inh also an n oun ced in cisively in the
w orld uV ietnam has the right to enjoy

independence a nd freedom, arid in fact has
is an independent an d free country. The
entire Vietnam ese people have determined
to devote all their spirit and forces, their
lives a n d wealth to holding fa st to that
freedom a n d independence ” (5, p. 22).

V N U , Jo u rn al o f Science. S o t, Sci.t Human.. N J E , 2(H)4


The French communist party and the French people during..

R ight after th at, th ere w ere ch a n g es in
th e words o f the French C om m u n ists’
papers. T he politbureau o f th e French
C om m unist
Party
ad van ced
an
an n ou n cem en t on S eptem ber 20th and th en
organized a m eetin g on J a n u a ry 12th.
O bviously, a t th e end of th e la st three
m onths in 1945, th e French C om m un ist
Party w as aw are of th eir b a ck w a rd n ess in
u p dating inform ation. B ut it w a s not u n til
spring 1946 th a t the lin k s b etw een th e two

parties w ere established. On N ovem ber 15th,
1945, th e C entral C om m ittee o f th e
Indochinese C om m unist P arty issu ed th e
D irective on nation-w ide resista n ce, in
w hich it predicted th at after th e gen eral
election in October» 1945, th e French
C om m un ist P arty would be th e stro n g est
force in th e French P arliam en t. On M arch
9,ht 1946 as soon as the P relim in ary
A greem en t had been sign ed by V ietnam
and France, the C entral C om m ittee of
In dochinese C om m un ist Party decided to
estab lish
co n ta cts
w ith
th e
French
C om m un ist Party in order to carry out
concerted action s. T hen, on A pril 4 th, 1946,
the N ation al A ssem b ly d elegation o f th e
D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietn am led by Mr.

Pham Van Dong arrived in France and
th ere w as
a
m eetin g b etw een
th e
V ietn a m ese d elegation and Mr. M uarice
Thorez. Mr. J a cq u es D uclos and Mr. A ndre
M arty on M ay 7‘h, at th e h ead office of th e

French C om m u n ist Party. At th a t tim e,
th e steerin g com m ittee o f th e French
C om m un ist P arty w a s accu ra tely and
su fficien tly inform ed o f th e situ a tio n in
V ietnam . B eca u se o f lack o f in form ation
before th a t tim e, m isu n d ersta n d in g w a s
cau sed by som e th in g s su ch a s th e
an n o u n cem en t
of
th e
In dochinese
C om m un ist P arty th a t “it dissolved itse lf ’
in N ovem ber, 1945 th e n ew s w a s clarified.
T he “con fid en ce” and “m u tu al a g ree m en t”

Y N U . Journal o f Science, Sot.,

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of two p arties w ere set up. Later, when
answering
interview ers
about
the
restoration of the relationship betw een the
two p arties of lea d in g the N ational

A ssem bly d elegation to France in April,
1946, the delegation leader, Mr. Pham Van
Dong, confirm ed: “Yes, it was” There were

no other possibilities. We had close
contact...We made great efforts to inform
the French C om m unist Party o f the
situation, the French C om m unist Party
became a big party but it could not
understand everything1' (1, p. 71).
R ight after th at, the L /H u m an ite\ a
new spaper of French C om m unist Party,
considered the Prelim inary A greem ent as
the m an ifestation o f “a realistic p o licy ’ of
the French governm ent. A fter th a t there
w as a num ber of a rticles carried in the
n ew spaper
d em an d in g
th e
French
governm ent to expel reaction aries and
im p erialist-m in d ed
sold iers
from
the
expeditionary arm y and sen d to V ietnam
dem ocratic-m inded on es to fight again st
the
policies
of

colonial
monopoly
cap italists. T he French C om m unist Party
actively fou gh t a g a in st the sch em e for
sep aratin g South V ietn am from V ietnam
and raised its voice to exp ose Thierrry cT
A rgenlieu “ H igh C om m issioner of France
in the Pacific region and M ax A ndre’* the
delegation lead er a t the conference who
w as rep resen ta tiv e of corporations and
Indochina B ank during th e Fontainebleau
conference.
As for us, w e put no hope in French
C olonialism . A lthough our governm ent
signed th e P relim in ary A greem en t with
rep resen ta tiv e of th e French governm ent
to set up fou n dations for an official
agreem en t, th e sta n d in g com m ittee of the
central party issu ed th e D irective entitled:
“T he current situ a tio n and our policy”
(March 3rd , 1946). A fter a n alyzin g the


22

cunning sch em es o f French Im perialism
and their lackeys, our Party fin ally
confirmed: %
iI f the French keep the self-

governing
policy
on
Indochina
in
accordance w ith the declaration on March
24th , 1945, we will carry oat our fight
against them and we will carry out a long­
term resistance against them , using
guerilla warfare. We w ill stop fighting i f
they recognise the
independence o f
Indochina," (6, p. 44). T ogether w ith
m aking clear th e prim ary principles of the
negotiation b etw een V ietnam and France,
which are in d ep en d en ce and cooperation
on the b asis of eq u ality, France had to
adm it our people’s righ ts to independence
and self-control, w e recognised the right to
station tem porary o f th e French arm y in
V ietnam . T he D irective em p h asized th a t
‘T h e m ost im portant th in g is th a t w hen
negotiating w ith France, w e not only
continued preparation, but also w ere
determ ined th at w e did not allow the
negotiation w ith them to w ear down the
fighting spirit of our people” (6, p. 46).
Three days after th e a g reem en t had been
signed; the stan d in g com m ittee of th e
central party also issu ed a D irective

entitled: "Reconcile to advance (March 9th,
1946) in order to m ake clear the reason
w hy we needed to be a friend of France,
criticizing the erroneous ten d en cies w hich
m ight occur in officials, party m em bers
and people, w atch in g out in case th e
French C olonists w ould break th eir
prom ise, and tak e a d v a n ta g e of d ộtente
and actively prepared for th e resista n ce
throughout th e country.
A few days after th e Prelim inary
A greem ent
had
b een
signed»
th e
reactionaries in France and Indochina
broke their prom ise, restiv ely trying their
u tm ost to u n derm in e th e negotiation,
in ten tion ally cu ttin g o ff every dộtente.

Dinh Xuan Lam

T h ese a ctio n s forced our people in the
w hole country to sta n d up to figh t against
the en em ies. On D ecem ber 19l\ 1946,
P resid en t Ho Chi M inh issu ed an Appeal
to the whole country to carry out the

war of resistance against the French:

“We w ant peace a n d we make concessions.
But the more concessions we make, the
nearer French Colonialists come to us
because they are determ ined to invade our
country again.
N o!
We
would
rather
sacrifice
everything than lose the country and be
slaves” (6, p. 86).
At th a t tim e, th ere w ere many
noticeab le ev en ts in France. In January,
1947, V in cen t A uriol, a m em ber of the
S o cia list Party won th e election and
becam e P resid en t of France, th e cabinet of
Paul R am adier w as set up and there were
five m in isters w ho w ere m em bers of the
French C om m un ist Party in the new
govern m en t. T he French C om m unist Party
still k ep t on figh tin g for a peaceful solution
to th e Vietnam issue and dem anded the
govern m en t of R am adier to n egotiate with
the g overn m en t o f Ho Chi Minh. In spite of
the fact th at the French C om m unist Party
w as a big party in France a t th a t tim e, it
w as n ot stron g enough to gear th e political
direction for France.
H ow ever, under th e p ressure of the

stru ggle o f th e French people and the
French C om m u n ists and w ith the fierce
cou n ter-attack s o f th e V ietn a m ese army
and people, th e French C olonists had to
ch an ge th eir sch em e. In M arch, 1947,
E m ile B olaert w a s appointed to be
C om m issioner in Indochina. On the
surface, h is “m issio n ” w as for peace but in
essen ce h is p resen ce w as to fin ish the war
by a m ilitary attack to crush our regim e
and th en played th e “Bao Dai card” in
order to esta b lish a puppet governm ent

17V(/. Journal o f Science. S(>( . Sc I . Human

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The French communis! party and the French people during.

w hich w a s th e lackey o f th em . To cope
w ith a new sch em e of th e en em y, on Ju ly
15th 1947, the sta n d in g co m m ittee of the
central party issu ed the Directive: "What

did Bo-la say? " A n d "What do we have to
do? " to show clearly: Ẽ\Every force o f our
nation is encouraged to fight against the

French Colonist ss scheme - "use the
Vietnamese
to
fight
against
the
Vietnam ese' a n d prepare to fight against
the enem y's great attacks in the coming
months: "m ilitary victory helps political
success" (6, P. 144‘145). The Directive
confidently concluded: "We are not lonely.
Only when we unite closely , the whole
people carry out the war o f resistance for a
long tim e , and we have the right policies ,
we will certainly w in . Then, it is not the
enemies such as B 0 ‘La who can pose
conditions upon us, but it is the unity and
fierce struggle o f our nation a n d o f the
French people that, will force French
reactionary colonists to surrender ‘ (6, p.
144-145).
To im p lem en t th e D irective of the
central party dated O ctober 15, 1947 (to

sm ash the w inter attack o f the French
enemy), (6, P .146-161), our arm y and
people in all b a ttlefield s nation-w ide
cooperated closely w ith th e arm y and
people in V iet Bac to fight w ith fortitude
and w in a glorious victory, w hich fostered

th e confidence o f th e arm y and people
th rou gh out th e w hole cou n try to achieve
th e final victory in th e long resista n ce war
o f V ietnam .
At th a t tim e, in France, th e fig h t of the
allian ce forces a g a in st th e p olitical policies
o f the French C om m unist P arty becam e
more acute. Prim e M in ister R am adier
decided th at five m in isters w ho w ere
com m u n ist party m em bers had to resign
from th e govern m en t. In th a t situ ation ,
alth ou gh the French C om m un ist Party

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23

m ade a great effort to fight for a peaceful
solution, obviously th e balance of power
did not allow th e French C om m unist Party
to create essen tia l ch an ges. However, the
French C om m unist Party m ade the right
decision w hich w as dynam ic and flexible:
no lim itation; th at w as, the Vietnam issue
w as not lim ited to th e scope of two cam ps
in the world. From 1947 to 1954, the

French C om m unist Party attem pted to lay
bare to the French people th at the war in
Indochina in creased F rance’s dependence
on Am erica and w as th reaten in g the
in d ep en d en ce o f France; and at th e sam e
tim e the Party m ade th e French people
un derstan d th at th e fight for peace in
V ietnam w as closely related to the
protection for F rance’s in d ep en d en ce from
A m erican Im perialism . T he new spapers of
the French C om m unist Party such as
L 'H um anité' and France Nouvelle carried
m any articles w hich dem anded French
C olon ialists to put an end to th e war in
V ietnam , to n eg o tia te im m ed iately with
th e govern m en t of Ho Chi M inh and to
m ake clear th e in tere sts o f V ietnam and
France. A t the P arliam en t m eeting,
d eleg a tes w ho w ere m em bers of the French
C om m unist Party raised th eir voice to
condem n th e figh tin g factions. At the
m eeting on J an u ary 25th, 1950, the fem ale
com rade J ea n n ette V erm ersch angrily
condem ned th e figh tin g factions: 44You

forget that the Vietnamese people are living
in their own country. They are not
invaders , but you yourselves are... It was
not the Vietnamese people who dropped
bombs in Marseille, it was you yourselves

who dropped bombs in Hai Phong... Do I
feel indignant?Yes , it is me who feel
indignant . I am indignant when. I think o f
m illions o f children being hungry and
living in poverty, when I think o f millions
o f proletarians who are being exploited by


24

you; Yes, I a m in d ig n a n t because most o f
the members o f our P arliam ent are
im perialists...” (1, p. 2 2 0-221). French

Dinh Xuan Lam

social o rg a n iza tio n s (such a s G eneral
C onfederation o f Labour, W om en U nion,

In th a t situ a tio n , for th e sake of
in tern a tio n a lism
and o f th e national
in te r e sts of France, th e F rench C om m unist
P arty sp ed up th e str u g g le to end the
in v a sio n w ar in V ietn a m . T he dem and

and Youth Union) carried out various

they raised at that time was stronger; they

form s of fig h tin g su ch a s co llectin g
sig n a tu res to dem an d for p eace in V ietn am
in order to han d over th em to m em bers o f
city cou n cils, m em b ers o f P arliam en t,
m in isters,
governors...;
m eetin g s
and
d em on stration s w ere h eld in th e w hole
country; o rg a n isin g m eetin g s u n d er the
n am e “We are for V i e t n a m French
m others d em an d ed th e F rench govern m en t
to return to th em th eir ch ild ren w h en th ey
are alive, not w hen th ey are in coffins;
th ey w ore m ou rn in g for th eir children;
organ izin g ballot-box to d em an d peace for
V ietn am , etc.

could not rem a in a t propaganda level,
rath er th ey had to carry o u t m ore active
stru g g les. In resp o n se to th e appeal by the
French C o m m u n ist P arty, th e French
G eneral C onfederation o f L abour launched
d em o n stra tio n s a t th e ports w here there
w ere sh ip s loaded w ith w eap on s and
eq u ip m en t to In dochina. From M arseille,
Toulon, Le H arve to D u n k erq u e, Angler...,
ev ery w h ere th ere w ere d em o n stra tion s of
th e w ork ers a g a in st load in g com m odities
on sh ip s to V ietn a m in sp ite of the

su p p ressio n , p u n ish m en t, and ev en arrest
and
im p riso n m en t
of
reactionary
govern m en t. T he str u g g le s o f th e port
w orkers as w ell a s o th er stru ggles
th rou gh ou t F ran ce w ere a lw a y s connected
w ith th e dem an d for peace, for the
w ith d ra w a l o f th e F rench expeditionary
arm y from V ietn a m , an d for negotiation
w ith th e g o v ern m en t o f Ho Chi Minh.
R ep resen ta tiv e of th e fierce struggle
m ovem en ts o f th e F rench people and
w ork ers a t th a t tim e w ere Mr. Raymond
D ien w ho lay on th e railw ay to prevent
tra in s from carryin g w ea p o n s to V ietnam
(F ebruary 2 4 th, 1949) and th e cam paign to
dem and r e lea sin g H enri M artin, a m ember
of th e F rench C o m m u n ist P arty w ho used
to be p resen t at th e b a ttle field of
Indochina. W hen co m in g back to France,
h e d en ou nced th e crim es o f th e French
in v a d ers in V ietn am . D u rin g th ree years
(1950*1953), th e co m m u n ists, th e working
cla ss, th e w om en u n ion and th e youth
u n ion o f France carried o u t various
stru g g le a ctiv ities. T h ey m ade th e case of
H angrim axtan becom e th e fu se resounding

Also a t th a t tim e, from 1949 to 1953,
th ere w ere m an y ch a n g es w h ich w ere not
favorable for th e im p e r ia lists in th e world
a s w ell a s in V ietn a m . T he C hin ese
liberation arm y m oved to th e so u th to get
close to th e n orth ern border o f V ietn am . In
1950, th e w ar in K orea broke o u t and three
years la ter th e A m erican Im p e ria lists and
th eir h en ch m en had to w ith d rew in to the
Sou th. In V ietn a m , th e re sista n c e w ar
ag a in st th e F rench d ev elo p ed in to a new
sta g e, th e border p rovin ces in th e north
from Cao B an g to L an g S on w ere all
liberated. T he A m erican Im p e ria lists took
ad van tage o f F ra n ce’s m isera b le situ a tio n
in V ietn am to in terfere in Indochina. The
shadow of A m erica w a s coverin g the
in d ep en d en ce o f France. H enri N avarre
adm itted: "The m ost dangerous th in g o f
Am erican aids was its political purpose ...

Am erican aids have interfered more deeply
in our work, a n d the consequence is that we
will lose Indochina even though their aid
m ay help us w in the w ar in th is region ” (4).

V N U . Jo u rn a l o f Science, Soi’., S ci .. Human., N 'J E . 2004


The French communist party and the French people during.

the Vietnam issue am on g the people of
France and co n stitu ted th e stro n g est force
in every place in th e co u n try sid e and cities
of F rance to stru g g le for peace in
Indochina. T h e good feelin g and con scien ce
of the French people, in clu d in g m any
in tellectu a ls w ho w ere an ti-co m m u n ists,
w ere aw oken in th e figh t a g a in st th e dirtyw ar w hich th e F rench C o lo n ia lists w ere
carrying out in Indochina. F in ally, facing
the fierce stru g g le m o v em en ts of th e
people, th e French P re sid en t had to give
order to relea se H enri M artin. T he
ƯH umanité" joyfu lly confirm ed th a t it w as
a noble victory o f u n ity and of th e
activ ities to protect freedom and peace for
V ietnam .
At th is tim e, in th e b a ttlefield o f
Indochina, th e French ex p ed ition ary arm y
fell into m ore and
m ore m iserable
situ ation . T he V ietn a m ese people and
arm y cooperated clo sely w ith th e a rm ies of
Laos and C am bodia to sp eed up encounterattack s in all b a ttlefie ld s, lib erated m any
areas, cau sed m ore d a m a g e to th e French
arm y, and d isin teg ra ted th e p u p p et arm y.
France w a s on th e brink of a d isaster.
France could n ot carry o u t th e w ar alone.
It w as ob viou s th a t a n y o n e w ho w as th e
leader o f France a t th a t tim e w ould h ave

to adm it th e fact (1, p. 2 9 1-292). On April
27th, 1953 w h en P au l R eyn au d had ju st
com e back from In dochina, he reported
b itterly to P resid en t V in cen t Auriol: “7

th in k i f we continue bleeding in the w ar in
Indochina , we com m it a crim e against
France” (2).
On M ay 7th, 1954, th e en tire w intersp rin g w ar (1 9 5 3 -1 9 6 4 ), w ith th e peak
w hich w as D ien B ien P h u cam p aign , en d ed
su ccessfu lly. O nly on e day after D ien B ien
Phu cam paign had en d ed , th e Indochina
issue w as m en tio n ed at th e G en eve
conference. A t th a t tim e, th e w arlik e

V N U , Journ al o f Science. Soc..

Sc/..

Human.. N ụ ỉE , 2004

25

govern m en t
of
Joep h
L aniel
w as
overth row n by th e p a rlia m en t of France
and the new g o v ern m en t of M ende France

held
pow er
w ith
th e
approval
of
com m u n ist p a rlia m en ta ria n s. Soon after
th at, French co m m u n ists tried th eir b est
to exp an d th e front a g a in st th e w ar in
Indochina. T h eir a c tiv itie s w ere not only
p o sitiv ely resp on d ed by French people and
religiou s o rg a n iza tio n s b u t also created
stren g th to ch a n g e th e a ttitu d e s of the
people w ho w ere by n a tu re a n ti-co m m u n ist
such as A lb ert S arrau t, Edouard D aladier,
Edouard H erriot, and even th e French
Prim e M in ister M endes. M any m eetin gs
w ith ten th o u sa n d s o f people to dem and for
peace in V ietn am w ere h eld du rin g the
conference. T h e French C om m u n ist Party
criticised tim ely th e d esign to occupy more
land in th e so u th of V ietnam : “to cease fire

is the prerequisite for a long-term peace
and there cannot be long-term peace
w ithout political solutions. I f the French
governm ent thought th a t they could cease
fire a n d carry out negotiation together with
encouraging the policies o f building the
bases for Am erica's invasion around

Democratic Republic o f Vietnam , it Ivas a
great m istake ” (1, p .3 03). The French
C om m u n ist P arty w a s d eterm in ed to
object to th e d esig n o f th e French
C o lo n ia lists in th e S ou th o f V ietn am . The
d esign w a s th a t V ietn a m w as sep arated
and la titu d e N o. 17 w as con sid ered as a
stra teg y frontier.
T he resu lt w a s th a t on J u ly 20th, 1954
th e G en eva A g reem en t on Indochina w as
sign ed and it w a s ob viou s th a t th e French
co m m u n ists m ade a g rea t con trib u tion to
th a t su ccess. For th e F rench com m u n ists,
th e victory in D ien B ien P h u and th e P aris
conference w ere con sid ered a s th e shared
su ccess o f both th e F rench and th e
V ietn a m ese people. A t th e m eetin g on Ju ly


Dinh Xuan Lam

‘2 6

22nđ, 1954 in P a rist Jacq u es D uslos
explained: “This victory is not the result of
the good w ant o f some people , but it is the

result o f peoples activities which isolated
the reactionary governm ent o f America in
France , and it m ade capitalists expose

differences in their interests in contrast
with the interests o f the capitalists directly
related to America" (1, p. 310).
For the French com m u n ists, peace
restored in V ietnam and Indochina in 1954
w as the great victory of peace in the world.
To understand the sta tu re and significance
of this resistan ce w ar o f th e French people
under th e leadersh ip of the French
C om m unist Party, it is possible to quote
the general ju d gm ent o f a French historian
as follows:

"In Vietnam , although the fighting
against the colonists had existed before
World War II. there have never been any
wars which lasted so long a time from 1944

to 1954... It can be concluded that the
struggle against the war in Indochina was
first initiated by the French com m unists ,
then it became the peoples first long lasting
resitance
against
French
Colonialsm ’ (1, p. 394).
W ith its ow n
active and great
activities, the French C om m unist Party
radically im p lem en ted a th esis on the

coalition b etw een th e n ation al liberation
m ovem ents in colonial cou n tries and the
revolutionary party in th e m other country.
In the spirit of th is m eaning, a thorough
in v estig a tio n into th e a ctiv ities o f the
French C om m un ist Party and the French
com m u n ists w ho stood sid e by side w ith
the V ietn a m ese people in the nine-year
resistan ce w ar (1946*1954) w ill contribute
to con solid atin g and stren g th en in g the
m utual u n d ersta n d in g and fostering the
friendly rela tio n s b etw een the two parties
and the people of th e two countries.

R EFER EN C ES
1.

Alain Ruscio dẫn trong: ikNhừng người Cộng sản Pháp và cuộc chiến tranh Đông Dương
1944-1954", NXB L’Harmattan, Paris, 1985.

2.

Alain Ruscio dẫn trong: “L?Historiographie Franciasc et Dien Bien Phu: un demisiecle

de

recherches et de controverses ' (Sử liệu học Pháp và Điện Biên Phủ:một nửa th ế kỷ nghiên
cửu và tranh luận)
3.

Báo N h à n Đạo , các số ra ngày 17 và 18/9. ngày 15/10/1944.

4.

Navarre (H), Đòng Dương hấp hôì, NXB Pion, Paris, 1956, tr. 28.

5.

Tuyên ngôn độc lặp, Văn kiện về kháng chiến chống thực dàn Pháp , tập ỉ (1945*1954), NXB
Sự thật* Hà Nội, 1986.

6.

Văn kiện Đảng về kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp , tập ỉ (1945*1950), NXB Sự thật, Hà
Nội, 1986.

Y N U . Journal o f S iiem e. Sot

. S( !.. Hitman

. N ,JE . 2004