DSpace at VNU: International small dam safety assurance policy benchmarks to avoid dam failure flood disasters in developing countries

Accepted Manuscript
International small dam safety assurance policy benchmarks to avoid dam failure
flood disasters in developing countries
John D. Pisaniello, Tuyet Thi Dam, Joanne L. Tingey-Holyoak
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S0022-1694(15)00829-X
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Journal of Hydrology

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12 July 2015
11 September 2015
12 September 2015

Please cite this article as: Pisaniello, J.D., Dam, T.T., Tingey-Holyoak, J.L., International small dam safety assurance
policy benchmarks to avoid dam failure flood disasters in developing countries, Journal of Hydrology (2015), doi:
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International small dam safety assurance policy benchmarks to avoid dam failure flood
disasters in developing countries

Dr John D. Pisaniello
Sustainable Engineering, Accounting and Law Group
School of Commerce
UniSA Business School
University of South Australia
City West Campus, North Terrace
ADELAIDE SA 5000
Tel: +61 8 8302 0031
Fax: +61 8 8302 0992
Email:

Ms Tuyet Thi Dam
Research group on Natural Resources and Environmental Economics
Faculty of Development Economics
University of Economics and Business
Vietnam National University
144 Xuan Thuy str., Cau Giay dist., Ha Noi
Tel: (84.4) 37547506 + 309
Fax: (84.4) 37546765
Email:

Dr Joanne L. Tingey-Holyoak*
Sustainable Engineering, Accounting and Law Group
School of Commerce
UniSA Business School
University of South Australia

City West Campus, North Terrace
ADELAIDE SA 5000
Tel: +61 8 8302 0462
Fax: +61 8 8302 0992
Email:

September 2015

*Corresponding author

1


International small dam safety assurance policy benchmarks to avoid dam failure flood
disasters in developing countries

Abstract
In developing countries small dam failure disasters are common yet research on their dam safety
management is lacking. This paper reviews available small dam safety assurance policy
benchmarks from international literature, synthesises them for applicability in developing
countries, and provides example application through a case study of Vietnam. Generic models
from ‘minimum’ to ‘best’ practice (Pisaniello, 1997) are synthesised with the World Bank’s
‘essential’ and ‘desirable’ elements (Bradlow et al, 2002) leading to novel policy analysis and
design criteria for developing countries. The case study involved 22 on-site dam surveys finding
micro level physical and management inadequacies that indicates macro dam safety management
policy performs far below the minimum benchmark in Vietnam. Moving assurance policy
towards ‘best practice’ is necessary to improve the safety of Vietnam’s considerable number of
hazardous dams to acceptable community standards, but firstly achieving ‘minimum practice’ per
the developed guidance is essential. The policy analysis/design process provides an exemplar for
other developing countries to follow for avoiding dam failure flood disasters.

Key words – small dam failure disasters, dams management, policy analysis and design,
developing countries, Vietnam case study.

2


1. Introduction
Dam failure disasters are a great concern all over the world especially in developing countries
where dam safety has been given little attention (WB, 1990; Dam, 2011). In developing countries,
small dams account for over 90% of dam failure disasters which often have catastrophic
consequences for the downstream community, infrastructure and the environment (ICOLD,
2011). A large number of notable failures of small dams with disastrous consequences have
occurred throughout the world. For example, a small 10 meter high, 2000 ML earthen dam
outside Jakarta in Indonesia failed by overtopping in 2009 (The Associated Press, 2009). At least
96 people were killed, 130 displaced and significant infrastructure and property was lost and
damaged (The Associated Press, 2009). The Shimantan and Banquia dams failed in 1975 in
Henan province in Central China because of the cumulative failure of 60 small dams in the
upstream catchment area. Around 230,000 people were killed, more than 1 million hectares of
land were inundated and over 100 km of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway line damaged in this
disastrous cumulative dam failure (Fu and Qing, 1998; Fuggle and Smith, 2000). Furthermore,
these structures not only age but over time, the physical areas of catchments have changed and
continue to change significantly due to human activity meaning dam failure disasters that threaten
life are set to increase (Jothityangkoon et al., 2013).
In developing countries, growing water resources infrastructure development combined with older
infrastructure deterioration and mismanagement has meant organisations around the world are
looking for tools and methods for how to improve the situation, including increased data
collection, performance measurement and rankings (Berg and Corton, 2007). Amongst these
methods, benchmarking methodologies have emerged as a valuable information system for
policymakers and managers that pinpoints the areas that should be targeted for future initiatives
whilst allowing them to evaluate the impacts of past interventions (Berg and Corton, 2007).

Benchmarking is the process of comparing and measuring policy and practice against others to
3


gain insights into the optimal measures for rapid improvement toward best-practice performance
(Bowerman et al., 2002; Yasin, 2002). The process of benchmarking has been used extensively to
rank and implement a wide variety of policy management practices and techniques (Yasin, 2002)
and is useful for issues such as farm dam safety management (Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). In
the developed world, benchmarks for dam safety management are receiving increased attention
from both academics and practitioners because many small dams are neither constructed nor
managed

adequately1 (Bradlow et al., 2002; Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). However, in

developing countries there exists a lack of awareness of the dangers of poor dam safety
management practice and impacts (Levitan, 2014; Dam, 2011), policy is often not strong or wellenforced and cumulative dam failure effects are more likely (Levitan, 2014). Therefore,
internationally benchmarked dam safety assurance policy guidance is needed to help developing
countries design policies (Jha et al., 2012) that will ensure dams are constructed and risk managed
to an acceptable standard, and as cost-effectively as possible, in order to save downstream lives,
business, property and the environment that are too often lost as a result of dam failures.
Vietnam has one of the largest dam systems in the world. The dam network comprises over 750
medium and large dams and thousands of small dams in close proximity (Dao et al., 2000; Silver,
1999; WB, 2004). But at present, the country has no national record of either small dams or their
problems, for example location, dam type and size, hazard rating, condition etc. There has been
no systematic collection of data on dam failures and there have been no specific approaches to
determine associated impacts or economic losses of failure (Nguyen, 2007). Ad hoc evidence
suggests that many dam safety problems and notable dam failures have occurred in various
provinces in Vietnam but have often been unreported (Nguyen, 2003). These failures have taken
1

Adequate construction here refers to ensuring adequate planning, design and construction of new dams or upgrade of existing
dams, especially with respect to the three key areas of dam engineering: structural integrity, spillway flood capability and
earthquake resistivity. Adequate management refers to appropriate surveillance, maintenance and review of existing dams – items
that should be reviewed periodically include hazard rating (as this can change throughout the life of a dam due to new community
developments downstream) and spillway flood capability (due to changes in engineering standards and design rainfalls brought
about, for example, by climate change). See also ANCOLD (2003) and Pisaniello et al. (2012).

4


hundreds of lives and have caused devastating impacts on property and the environment (Nguyen,
2007; Silver, 1999). Even from just this limited recorded information, it is apparent that the costs
of dam failures, including the associated threats to the security of agricultural produce (Gohar et
al., 2015) are significant (Nguyen, 2003; 2007, Silver, 1999; Dam, 2011). Policy tools to drive
better practice and establish levels of standards for operating are required (Yasin, 2002).
Therefore, the research aims to investigate the available dam safety policy benchmarks2 and
synthesise them to enable application to developing countries, and then apply these specifically to
the case of Vietnam in an exemplary way. The core research question addressed is “What
international dam safety policy benchmarks can assist Vietnam to assure small dams are
constructed and managed to an acceptable safety standard?”
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: Section 2 reviews available
literature and synthesizes international dam safety policy benchmarks to identify models,
guidelines and selection criteria for determining necessary assurance models for developing
countries. Section 3 provides results of the micro level on-site dam safety surveys in Tan Moc
commune, Bac Giang province. In Section 4, a descriptive analysis of relevant macro level policy,
laws and regulations on small dam safety management in Vietnam is presented and then analysed
comparatively against the international benchmarks established. Section 5 provides a summary
and discussion of the results and the associated implications, Section 6 concludes the paper with
the answer to the core research question and with final discussion of the implications for Vietnam
in particular and developing countries in general.

2

That is, internationally benchmarked policy elements ranging from minimum to best practice that governments can use to assure
the community that dam owners/managers construct and manage dams to an acceptable risk standard.

5


2.

Review and synthesis of international benchmarks and guidelines for necessary policy
in any jurisdiction including developing countries

Considerable work on international dam safety policy benchmarks has been done based on
comprehensive review and comparative assessment of dam safety management responsibility,
accountability and assurance practices in a large number of countries (Bradlow et al., 2002;
Pisaniello et al., 2012; Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). Underpinning these studies are the three
benchmark models initiated by Pisaniello (1997) that are “best practice”, “average practice” and
“minimum practice”. These three models are in line with the socio-ecological objective to balance
the need for public and environmental protection (Sanchez et al., 2014) with the imposition of
restrictive and expensive requirements on builders and owners. The models, the criteria necessary
to apply them and their application to Australian jurisdictions have been reported most recently in
Pisaniello et al. (2012). However, these models were developed primarily based on and for
application to developed countries. In contrast, the World Bank’s “regulatory frameworks for dam
safety” (Bradlow et al., 2002) were derived to include application to developing countries. The
problem is that the World Bank frameworks are descriptive only (see section 2.1 below) and do
not provide for any criteria on how to apply them for varying circumstances as do the Pisaniello
(1997) models (see Pisaniello et al., 2012; Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). Hence, there is a need to
synthesise the Pisaniello (1997) models with the Bradlow et al. (2002) frameworks in order to

establish updated models and criteria representing minimum to best practice that is applicable to
varying circumstances (ie the number of hazardous dams within a jurisdiction and the number that
are deficient) for both developed and developing countries. In this Section the World Bank
models will firstly be described (Section 2.1) and their synthesis with the Pisaniello (1997)
models will then follow (Section 2.2).

6


2.1 A summary of World Bank’s Regulatory Frameworks for Dam Safety (Bradlow et al., 2002)
The Bradlow et al., (2002) study involved a detailed comparative assessment of dam safety
regulatory frameworks in 22 countries 3 including developing countries such as China and India.
The study provides information to policy makers and technical experts in countries that are
planning to develop new or to modify existing regulatory frameworks for dam safety. It highlights
the main similarities and differences in the approaches adopted by the 22 countries, enabling
general precedents to be set for both “Essential” and “Desirable” elements of a dam safety
regulatory scheme. The essential elements include those that any regulatory scheme needs if it is
to be capable of performing the most essential functions with regard to dam safety, such as
assuring that dams satisfy minimum international safety standards. The desirable elements are
simply additional ones that can be adopted by regulators for providing a higher level of dam
safety assurance. This subsection reviews the principal part of Regulatory Frameworks for Dam
Safety by Bradlow et al. (2002): ‘Part 3: Essential and Desirable Elements for Dam Safety’.
2.1.1 Essential elements of a regulatory scheme
Bradlow et al., (2002, p.72) found from the international comparative analysis of the 22 countries
that the common general principles underlying dam safety are that (i) the owner4 is responsible for
making the dam safe and for its safe operation and maintenance and (ii) the regulator is
responsible for protecting the public by establishing dam safety standards and monitoring
compliance by the owners5. Hence the four essential elements discussed below are intended to

3

The counties were selected based on the availability of information about their dam safety regulatory frameworks and comprised
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4

“Owner” here is intended to be used broadly as it can include private owners as well as other forms of ownership, eg public dams
owned by government on behalf of the public or any other person/s or entity that is/are legally responsible for the dam under any
applicable law of a country.
5

This is also in line with ANCOLD (2003, p.3) which follows international standards set by the International Committee on Large
Dams (ICOLD), stating that “A role of Government is to enact legislation to protect the community. Legislation should establish
regulatory authorities that ensure dam owners, and authorities that ensure dam owners, are taking appropriate actions in regard to
dam safety”. Furthermore, Bradlow et al., (2002, p.2) found from its international comparative study that “A failure to pay
attention to dam safety can cause a country to violate its obligations under existing international treaties and conventions, such as

7


satisfy these principles by (i) clarifying that the dam owner is responsible for dam safety and that
regulators are responsible for monitoring performance in this regard, (ii) specifying that owners
have operational and maintenance responsibilities, and (iii) explaining the ways in which the
regulatory authority can perform its monitoring functions, which can include inspections and
penalisation of non-complying owners (Bradlow et al., 2002, p.73).
1. Clearly articulated laws
The regulatory structure comprises documents that are publicly available and stipulate in clear
terms the aforementioned responsibilities. The forms of these differ widely across the world. It is
the authors’ opinion that a national scheme with national guidelines that a provincial government
administers is the best arrangement—not as in Australia where each state has different laws (see

Pisaniello, 2011) which has led to non-uniform dam safety legislation across Australia: residents
in one state, for instance, may be exposed to a different hazard and standard of care because the
state has not paid attention to the issue.
2. Clear identification of regulatory agencies involved, and clear power and funding to
enforce the regulations
The essential element relates to separation of the regulatory agency from those who make
decisions about whether to build dams and from those who own and/or operate them. This
separation of powers has been a fundamental tenet of Australian water law and administration
since the COAG reforms of 1994. An adequate budget for the exercise of laws is essential or else
they become meaningless.
3. Powers of the regulatory authority
These include the power to: (i) identify and enforce national norms; (ii) comment on the issue of
permits; (iii) monitor inspection by others and approve the inspector selected by the owner; (iv)
conduct its own inspections; (v) maintain a register of regulated dams; (vi) advise dam owners
those relating to transboundary watercourses and the environment. It can also have an adverse impact on the state’s ability to
perform its international financial obligations, thereby undermining its overall development strategy”.

8


and other interested parties, such as affected communities, on dam safety issues; (vii) issue public
reports on dam safety; and (viii) enforce the dam safety framework (Bradlow et al., 2002, p.75).
4. Content of the scheme
The international community points to these as widely followed standards (Bradlow et al., 2002,
p.79): (i) establish clear criteria with which to determine dams requiring regulation (based on size
and the nature of the hazards); (ii) address dam safety in a life-cycle approach; (iii) clarify that the
owner is primarily responsible but that the operator can be deemed the owner; (iv) stipulate
standards, international, such as ICOLD, or locally based; (v) demand that owners supply
regulators with periodic reports, the frequency of which may reflect characteristics such as life
stage and size; (vi) insist that the owner maintain complete records at a convenient location; (vii)

require that all dams have an operations maintenance manual and an adequate budget; (viii)
impose fees that cover the cost of the dam safety activities of the regulatory authority; and (ix)
require an emergency plan for high hazard dams 6.

2.1.2 Desirable attributes of a regulatory scheme
This list covers items in addition to those above; many are aspirational (see Bradlow et al., 2002,
pp. 86−88): (i) the exclusive devotion of the dam safety agency to dam safety; (ii) a dam safety
advisory committee skill base of technical experts and representatives of affected communities;
(iii) overarching coordination roles for the dam safety agency; (iv) the granting of power to the
dam safety agency to inspect periodically all high hazard dams, and technical archives of the dam
to be made available to it; (v) dam licences that require a failure impact assessment with regard to
communities, property and the environment; (vi) the development of broad-based benchmarks,
including structural, environmental, social, health and economic factors, to gauge dam safety at all
dams; (vii) a periodic review by the owners of all dams to test compliance with the stipulations of
6

These 9 elements are also in line with ANCOLD (2003) which is guided by the International Committee on Large Dams
(ICOLD).

9


the regulatory authority, which also has the power to conduct such evaluations; (viii) the
submission of annual reports on dam safety; and (ix) implementation of education activities.

2.2 Models of various practice and selection criteria for application to both developed and
developing countries
By comparing the Pisaniello (1997) models (see Pisaniello et al., 2012; Tingey-Holyoak et al.,
2011) with the above World Bank frameworks, it becomes apparent that the two bodies of work
complement each other. More specifically the Pisaniello (1997) model of “best practice”

incorporates both essential and desirable elements of the World Bank frameworks. At the same
time, the “average practice” and “minimum practice” models incorporate only essential elements
of the World Bank frameworks. Key elements of international benchmarks that incorporate
Pisaniello’s (1997) three benchmark models and synthesize the World Bank frameworks, thereby
advancing current dam safety assurance benchmarks are presented in Table 1.

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The Pisaniello (1997) benchmarked models are linked to selection guidelines and criteria as
described in Pisaniello et al. (2012, see also Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). The criteria were
developed firstly on the basis that in any jurisdiction where a considerable number of hazardous
small dams exist, there is a need for at least minimum practice dam safety assurance policy that
satisfies basic human rights in regard to dam safety risk awareness and preparedness. Then for a
Government to determine the extent of any higher level of assurance policy that is necessary for
its particular jurisdiction (i.e. selecting one or a mix of the three models presented in Table 1) it
requires an indication of the scope of the local dam safety problem. Pisaniello (1997) identified
two main indicators that have been used by international practices for this purpose:


Level 1 Indicator - Density of potentially hazardous reservoirs



Level 2 Indicator - Density of deficient potentially hazardous reservoirs

An extensive range of selected practices from eight developed countries were analysed by
Pisaniello (1997) with regard to: (i) the extent of the private dam safety problem in the area based
on Level 1 indicator and if available, also Level 2 indicator, and (ii) the level of assurance policy
which has been implemented in order to accommodate it. The level of assurance policy was

quantified as a proportion of the model of “best practice”, depending on the number of key
elements of best practice that are common. From this analysis precedents could be established for
limiting indicator criteria, that is limiting values which would necessitate differing levels of
policy. Table 2 presents these criteria/guidelines updated for use with Table 1. As illustrated in
Figure 1 the guidelines have been developed and applied in various settings including the
Australian case (Pisaniello et al., 2012; Tingey-Holyoak et al., 2011). However, there have been
calls for application of such benchmarks to developing countries where issues of water
infrastructure policy are critical (Jha et al., 2012). But it is important to note that developing
countries will have different circumstances (to developed countries) in terms of safety assurance
11


policy affordability, governance structures and risk tolerance culture meaning that any policy
model above minimum practice may not always be looked upon favourably. As such, in this
paper, the synthesised international benchmarks and guidelines established (Tables 1 and 2) are
used as criteria for assessing the adequacy of a Vietnamese dam safety assurance policy case
study at both local micro (on-site practices and policy application) and central macro (overall
assurance policy regulated through laws and regulations) levels to demonstrate how they can be
used by developing countries for initial guidance. The guidelines importantly take basic human
rights into account in the minimum level benchmark – this should therefore apply to any country,
developing

or

developed

–

but

then

it

is

up

to

each

particular

developing

jurisdiction/government/culture to decide how far they are willing/can afford to climb to a higher
benchmark per Tables 1 and 2.
According to the guidelines (Table 2), the extent of dam safety assurance policy necessary for a
particular jurisdiction is determined based on an indication of the scope of a jurisdiction’s dam
safety problems per the two indicators described above. The first level indicator requires the least
effort and resources to apply. The implication of this indicator is that all local dams are evaluated
from aerial photography, and then assigned a hazard rating in line with standard dams engineering
practice (eg ANCOLD, 2003; 2012). The second level indicator requires much more effort and
resources, but provides a more accurate indication of the local dam safety problem. This accurate
indication is the result of expert safety assessment that is conducted for every dam, but as this can
require significant government resources7,

a more cost-effective alternative is to base this

indication on a representative sample of dams in the jurisdiction (per Note C in Table 2).

7

A dam engineer would need to visit the dam and make a detailed safety assessment along the lines of that undertaken in the
Vietnamese case study described in Section 3. This can involve up to 3-4 days of work per dam, so if the dams number in the
thousands the costs can becomes significant.

12


In order to answer the core research question “What international dam safety policy benchmarks
can assist Vietnam to assure small dams are constructed and managed to an acceptable safety
standard?”, according to the guidelines above, there is a need to advance the current research to
define the scope of dam safety problems at the micro level as well as at the macro level in
Vietnam (Figure 1). Hence, Section 3 provides results of on-site dam safety surveys (the scope of
dam safety problems at the micro level). A comparison of Vietnam’s dam safety management
assurance policy against available international benchmarks (the scope of dam safety problems at
the macro level) is presented in Section 4.
3. A case study of on-site dam safety surveys in Tan Moc commune in Vietnam
The scope of dam safety problems at the micro level is determined and demonstrated through a
case study of on-site dam safety surveys in Tan Moc commune, Luc Ngan district, Bac Giang
province in Vietnam. Twenty-two dams in Tan Moc commune were purposively selected for
safety examination and inspection. All dams selected for on-site surveys in the fieldwork had to
satisfy the following two criteria: (1) dams of less than 15m in height and with a storage capacity
of less than 3000 ML (small dams) (GVN, 2007); (2) ‘Significant’ or ‘High’ hazard dams based
on an initial assessment of the dam size, living activities and economic development in the
downstream inundation area (ANCOLD, 1994, 2003). Each on-site dam survey was based on a
dam inspection checklist developed from two key publications, DSE (2007) and MELP (1998)
which consistently describe current international guidelines for small earthen dam review and

inspection (Pisaniello et al., 2012). The dam surveys were undertaken continuously from 28 th
September to 2nd October 2010. The physical characteristics of the dams are summarised in Table
3.
Results from the on-site dam surveys (Table 3) demonstrate that all twenty-two dams surveyed in
Tan Moc commune, Luc Ngan district in Bac Giang province are seriously degraded and poorly
maintained. All of the dams surveyed are highly hazardous and, hence, have the potential to fail
13


with disastrous consequences. The current condition and associated maintenance levels of the
sample dams are extremely poor and unacceptable. All twenty-two dams surveyed are in critical
need of repair and maintenance.
As part of the dam surveys it was also discovered that there is no official statistics and accurate
data about the total number of dams and about safety conditions of existing dams in Tan Moc
commune. Nevertheless, it is evidenced that 100% of the twenty-two dams surveyed are deficient
(Table 3) and on that basis alone, the Level 1 and Level 2 indicators in Table 2 point towards an
Average practice model being necessary in Tan Moc commune. But the Tan Moc commune is but
a small micro representative sample of Vietnam since there is knowledge that the dam network in
Vietnam comprises over 750 medium and large dams and thousands of small dams in close
proximity (Dao et al., 2000; Silver, 1999; WB, 2004). Hence, at the macro level it is reasonable to
assume very conservatively8 that there are at least 70 hazardous small to medium dams in
Vietnam for the purposes of the Level 1 indicator in Table 2. Then just based on the results of the
Level 2 indicator for Tan Moc commune (ie 22 deficient dams, without even having to translate
the sample result of 100% deficiency to the entire dam population of Vietnam) the best practice
model may be necessary at the macro level to provide an adequate level of dam safety assurance
in Vietnam. How far away Vietnam is from providing such policy will be tested in the following
section.

8

Reasonable because the surface area of Tan Moc which is located in Luc Ngan District no more than 10% of that of Luc Ngan
district which covers an area of about 1000 km2 (Dam, 2011). Therefore Tan Moc surface area is no more than 100 km2. As the
surface area of Vietnam is around 331,000 km2, the 22 dams in Tan Moc may be translated to estimate around 72,000 hazardous
dams in Vietnam. This estimate provides a “ball park” measure from which it is also reasonable to assume conservatively that
there are at least 70 hazardous small to medium dams located throughout Vietnam, ie only 0.001% of the translated estimate.

14


4. Comparison of Vietnam’s dam safety management assurance policy against international
benchmarked models
The Vietnamese dam safety management legislation comprises mainly laws and regulations
enacted by legislative agencies such as the National Assembly of Vietnam (NAV), Standing
Committee of NAV and Government, and by-law documents such as Circulars, Instructions,
Directives and Decisions issued by Ministers of relevant Ministries or Provincial People’s
Committees. In general, by-law documents have only one purpose that is to provide detailed
guidance and instructions for organisations at the local level to implement laws and regulations.
They do not enhance enforcement and penalty regimes on non-complying practices. Therefore,
the paper does not cover the analysis of by-law documents. Laws and regulations dealing with
dam safety management analysed include (1) the Law on water resources (hereafter referred to as
the LWR, 20 May 1998); (2) Decree No.72 on dam safety management (hereafter referred to as
Decree No.72, 7 May 2007) and (3) the Ordinance on exploitation and protection of irrigation
works (hereafter referred to as the Ordinance, 4 April 2001).
This section determines the scope of any necessary dam safety assurance policy reform at the
macro level in Vietnam by comparing the current dam safety policy that involves the above three
laws and regulations against the established international benchmarks (Table 1), bearing in mind
that the best practice model has been determined in Section 3 to be appropriate.
4.1 Dam owner/manager education and guidance (element 1)

Article 23 (Clause 9) of Decree No.72 and Article 29 (Clause 6) are the only provisions which

provide requirements for enhancing capacity of dam managers. Both of these Articles simply
stipulate that State management of irrigation works includes information dissemination, education
and training for staff and dam managers who are involved in the operation and management of
irrigations works. Hence education and training for staff and dam managers is simply mentioned
15


as a task of State management, with no guideline publications actually produced or disseminated,
so element 1 of the international benchmarks (Table 1) is unsatisfied.
4.2 Registration and classification of dams (element 2)

Decree No.72 is the only document that specifies the need for dam registration (Article 4) and
dam classification in terms of size (Article 2). Dam managers must register their dams with State
competent agencies under Article 4. Article 2 defines small dams as “all dams of less than 15 m in
height and with a storage capacity of less than 3000 ML”. But in practice such a register does not
exist which means there is a lack of detailed provision for dam registration. Also, there is no
provision for classifying dams according to their hazard potential so that a risk-based approach
can be applied to ensure their design, construction, and management meet acceptable community
standards – such that the higher the hazard rating the higher the standard. In effect, hazard
classification which is a critical element in dam safety management (MELP, 1998; FMAF, 1997;
ANCOLD, 2000, 2003; 2012) is not regulated in any of the three laws and regulations. Thus,
element 2 of the international benchmarks is unsatisfied.
4.3 Community education and preparedness (element 3)

Article 22 of Decree No.72 stipulates community preparedness at a limited level. Clause 1
requires that dam managers must send notices to the local community in advance if they discharge
water from their dams to the downstream area during flood season. Clause 2 requires dam
managers to develop flood control and mitigation plans for the downstream area. These plans
must help downstream communities to cope with emergency situations associated with flood
discharge from dams and/or dam failure. But community education about dam safety is not

stipulated in any provisions. Also in practice no such plans existed for any of the case study dams
(Section 3). Therefore, element 3 of the international benchmarks is not satisfied.

16


4.4 Legislative purposiveness (element 4)
Dam safety in Vietnam is dealt with either through specific regulations such as Decree No.72 or
as part of general regulatory schemes such as the LWR and the Ordinance. All three laws and
regulations reviewed contain general provisions without giving detailed guidelines, standards and
procedures. For example, the LWR provides general provisions that “all organisations and
individuals have the responsibility to protect water conservancy works” (Clause 1 of Article 48)
and “organisations and individuals who manage and exploit water conservancy works must work
out the plan to protect it” (Clause 1 of Article 49). Universal statements on principles of dam
safety management are listed in Article 3 of Decree No.72 and include (1) “responsibility of dam
managers, ministries, agencies and the people’s committees in dam safety management must be
specified”; (2) the involvement of the local community is appreciated in dam safety management;
and (3) “relevant organisations and individuals must be proactive in dam safety management”.
Article 11 of the Ordinance states broad criteria for assigning organisations and individuals to the
operation and management of irrigation works. That is “the Government shall regulate the regime
and policies for, as well as rights and obligations of, organisations and individuals managing the
exploitation and protection of irrigation works based on this Ordinance and relevant legislation”.
Hence element 4 of the international benchmarks is only partly satisfied because Vietnam has
developed an array of legal instruments ranging from laws, decrees, and ordinances to subsidiary
legal documents that have provided a legal foundation to ensure legislative intervention at both
the central and local levels. But element 4 is mostly unsatisfied because the dam safety policy,
laws and regulations reviewed only provide general provisions and broad criteria. That is they are
adequate in form but lacking substance as there are no detailed guidelines, procedures and
standards established for implementation of dam safety management.

17


4.5 Administrative authority and empowerment (element5)
Institutional arrangements for water conservancy works management and/or dam safety
management in Vietnam are regulated by Article 48 of the LWR, Article 24 of Decree No.72 and
Article 30 of the Ordinance. Accordingly, Vietnam has a number of regulatory agencies ranging
from the central to the local levels as illustrated in Figure 2.

At the central level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is the standing
agency which implements the State management function with respect to water conservancy
works management and/or dam safety management. The General Department of Water Resources
(GDWR) is authorised by the MARD to take responsibility for the national dam safety program.
This responsibility includes developing the national strategy framework for irrigation and
drainage management, issuing by-law documents, consulting for the central government, and
supervising and instructing local dam safety management organisations. In addition to the
GDWR, three irrigation management companies established under the MARD are operating and
managing certain dams and reservoirs.
At the local level, the general structure of dam safety management of districts and communes
resembles that of provinces. Provincial People’s Committees have the highest level of statutory
powers in dam safety management at the local level. Departments of Agricultural and Rural
Development are authorised by Provincial People's Committees to implement the strategic and
legal management of dam safety. In addition, a number of irrigation management companies are
established to operate and manage certain dams and reservoirs in a direct way. An exception is
made at the commune level where agricultural cooperatives and water user associations are
established, instead of irrigation management companies, to provide direct operation and
management of dams and reservoirs in the commune area.
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Statutory powers and responsibilities of the three agencies - the MARD, Ministry of Industry and
Provincial People's Committees, are provided in Article 24 of Decree No.72 and Article 30 of the
Ordinance. Both of these Articles stipulate that the Government exercises unified management of
dam safety. Within the Government, the MARD take the highest level of statutory powers and
responsibilities including: (1) developing legal documents, plans, policies and standards in dam
safety management; (2) checking and taking over water conservancy works and/or dams; (3)
ratifying operation and management manuals of reservoirs that are managed by the Ministry and
reservoirs that supply water resources for two provinces or more; (4) cooperating with the
Ministry of Police, Ministry of Defence and Provincial People's Committees to develop operation
and management guidelines for “important dams”; (5) ratifying flood control and mitigation
plans; and (6) inspecting and supervising the operation and management of dams.
In addition, the Government has delegated the Ministry of Industry and Provincial People's
Committees to take coordinating responsibilities in line with the MARD. The Ministry of Industry
takes responsibility for the operation and management of hydropower dams. Provincial People's
Committees take responsibility for dams that are located in the province and/or dams that are
operated and managed by organisations in the province. Responsibility includes (1) developing
by-law documents and supervising the implementation of these documents; (2) conducting
review, inspection and surveillance; (3) inspecting dams with a storage capacity less than 10
million m3 located in the province; (4) ratifying dam safety management plans and flood control
and mitigation plans; (5) determining emergency actions plans and other plans in case dam
failures occur in the province; (6) issuing necessary permits and procedures; and (7) conducting
research on and applying advanced technology to all stages of dam safety management as well as
flood control and mitigation.
Overall element 5 of the international benchmarks is partly satisfied because Vietnam has its own
dam safety legislation with a number of management organisations ranging from the central level
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to the local level with defined administrative responsibilities. However, there are no specific
provisions on statutory powers and responsibilities of regulatory agencies at the local level such

as district agricultural departments, district people’s committees and commune people’s
committees. Also adequate human and financial resources for regulatory agencies at both the
central and local levels are not provided for in any of the three laws and regulations. Financial
resources for the operation and management of irrigation works and/or dams are discussed in
Articles 12 to 15 of the Ordinance. Irrigation management companies are funded by the State
budget capital and operating pursuant to the public utility regime. Organisations and individuals
who use water resources and/or benefit from irrigation works are required to pay irrigation fees
and contribute their own “manpower” to the building, protection and management of these works.
Thus, element 5 is mostly unsatisfied.

4.6 Surveillance, inspection and safety reviews (element 6)

Articles 13, 14, 15 and 17 of Decree No.72 specify requirements for dam review, remedial
actions, safety upgrades and maintenance. Article 13 regulates that (1) dam managers must have
specific maintenance plans for each component of dams and (2) “maintenance must be undertaken
periodically, regularly as regulated in laws and regulations in order to identify warning signals
and conduct preventative activities”. According to Articles 14 and 17, dam review includes the
following tasks: (1) regular examination through analysis and evaluation of monitoring data over
technical parameters of dams; (2) inspecting dams before and after heavy rain and flood seasons;
(3) inspecting dams after natural extremes such as floods and earthquakes; (4) inspecting dams
and developing dam reports in detail and (5) periodic (less than 10 years) and comprehensive
review must be conducted with dams that have a storage capacity of 10,000 ML or more.
Remedial actions and safety upgrades must be undertaken under Article 15 in the following cases:
(1) dams appear unsafe; (2) spillway cannot function at its designed capacity and (3) dams cannot
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meet new design standards. Based on requirements of the international benchmarks, element 6
appears to be satisfied at least in form and substance, but the case study (section 3) indicates that
it is not being applied in practice, most likely due to the unsatisfactory elements associated with

element 5 in Section 4.5 (ie inadequate funding and resourcing of administrative authority and
empowerment).
4.7 Dam owner/manager responsibility with information (element 7)
Dam safety reporting is regulated by Articles 4 (Clause 3) and 16 of Decree No.72. Dam
managers must “develop a report for each dam and submit this report to the Ministry of Industry,
MARD and relevant organisations” (Clause 3 of Article 4 and Clause 1 of Article 16). However, a
systematic synthesis of dam safety profiles and records is not required. Contents of the dam safety
report include: (1) the highest level of water storage; (2) peak flood inflow into the reservoir; (3)
dam survey; (4) damages and problems occurring from dam survey and (5) dam safety assessment
before flooding. In addition, dam managers must also make a report to “competent State
agencies” if any of the following problems occur: (1) seepage and leakage; (2) dam movement;
(3) serious damages; (4) a dam that is at high risk of failure in flood season and (5) vandalism.
Although dam safety reporting is mandated in the Decree No. 72, the content of reporting only
includes very basic information. There are no specific requirements about dam safety profiles,
records and frequency of reporting and there is no provision for maintaining all information in a
special dam safety file that is easily accessible to anyone concerned. Hence, element 9 of the
international benchmarks is mostly unsatisfied.
4.8 Punitive enforcement (element 8)
A number of illegal practices associated with the safety of dams or water conservancy works are
listed (Article 52 of the LWR, Article 26 of Decree No.72, and Articles 34 and 35 of the
Ordinance). Accordingly, “forbidden acts” in the management, exploitation and protection of
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water conservancy works or dams include (1) illegal use of land within the area of protection of
dams; (2) conducting activities that obstruct the management, repair and handling of dams in case
of accident; (3) drilling and digging soil and stone, building illegal constructions within the area
of protection of dams; (4) using explosives causing damage, unauthorized removal or filling of
dams; (5) building supplementary works to the existing dams without prior approval of the
competent State agency; (6) operating dams incorrectly in accordance with existing regulations

and (7) any other acts that affect the safety of dams.
In addition, punishments are applied to individuals in the following cases: (1) persons who are
found to have engaged in acts that affect the safety of water conservancy works or dams; (2)
persons who fail to comply with laws and regulations with regard to dam safety; (3) persons who
fail to fulfill their responsibilities in the operation and management of dams and (4) persons who
abuse their positions and powers to illegally use revenues from irrigation charges, and wastewater
discharge fees or to cover up violators of the legislation on exploitation and protection of dam
safety. Punishments can include fines, jail terms and other forms of disciplines depending on the
nature and seriousness of their violations.
Although general punitive provisions applied to violations in dam safety management are
provided, details of the legal basis for penalty regimes as well as procedures to determine ‘the
characteristics and the extent of violations’ are not specified. In particular, the current legislation
fails to identify which individuals and organisations are liable for consequences of dam failures.
There are also no provisions in any policy, laws and regulations reviewed specifying liability for
dam failures. Therefore, element 8 is only partly satisfied.
4.9 Federal/Central government involvement (element 9)
The involvement of the Vietnamese Government in dam safety management is regulated by
Article 58 of the LWR, Article 24 of Decree No.72 and Article 30 of the Ordinance. There are no
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specific provisions prescribing involvement of the Vietnamese government in national dam safety
management. Only general provisions about the role of the Vietnamese government are provided
in the above Articles. As such, the Government exercises unified management of water
conservancy works and/or dams. A number of ministries such as the MARD and Ministry of
Industry which perform ‘State management’ function are seen as being representative of the
Government in dam safety management. There is no evidence of a national dam safety inventory
or dam safety assurance program that can be undertaken by the Government. It is evident that the
Vietnamese government has a limited involvement in national dam safety management. Thus,
element 9 is only partly satisfied when compared to the international benchmark.

5. Summary and discussion of results and implications
Results of the above comparison between Vietnam’s dam safety policy, laws and regulations
against the available international benchmarks are presented in a rated format in Table 4.

According to the comparative review in Section 4, the dam safety policy, laws and regulations in
Vietnam satisfy only a limited number of elements of the Minimum and/or Best Practice Models
of the international benchmarks (Table 4). Satisfactory aspects include that Vietnam has its own
dam safety legislation with a number of management organisations ranging from the central level
to the local level. In addition, Vietnam has developed an array of legal instruments ranging from
laws, decrees, and ordinances to subsidiary legal documents. Current dam safety legislation in
Vietnam has provided a legal foundation to ensure legislative intervention at both the central and
local levels. As such, basic provisions pursuant to key elements of international benchmarks are
introduced. These provisions include (i) statutory powers and responsibilities of particular
agencies such as the Ministry of Industry and Provincial People's Committees; (ii) responsibilities
of dam managers; (iii) dam classification in terms of size; (iv) dam review, remedial actions and
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maintenance; (v) dam safety reporting and (vi) recognition and definition of unacceptable
practices in dam safety management.
However, more significantly Section 4 shows that the majority of elements of the international
benchmarks are unsatisfactory. The regulatory agencies lack statutory powers and funds and are
not competent to ensure adequate dam safety management. In addition, the laws and regulations
are too general in their language and lack detailed guidelines thereby being ineffective and
inefficient in addressing current problems as evidenced by the case study. Dam hazard
classification is not regulated in any forms of legislation. Community education and preparedness
is not regulated. Dam safety reporting is also stipulated at a limited level that is only simple
information about water volume and conditions of dam safety before flooding seasons. No
specific provisions about dam owner/manager education and guidance are provided in the current
legislation. There is a lack of detailed information about penalty regimes for violation of dam

safety and liability for dam failures. Finally the involvement of the Vietnamese government in
national dam safety management programs is also not evident.
In summary, the above analysis finds that the existing regulatory frameworks have made certain
contributions to dam safety management in Vietnam. That is they provide potentially powerful
regulatory instruments and legal foundations to ensure legislative intervention in Vietnam’s dam
safety management at both the central and local levels. However, the laws and regulations
analysed have a number of limitations. First, the language of laws and regulations is both general
and ambiguous. Most provisions do not give clear standards, criteria, procedures and detailed
guidance on activities. Second, the scope of the laws and regulations is generally expansive as
most provisions are generalised to all dams, small and large. Third, responsibilities of local dam
safety management organisations that are operating and managing a large number of small dams
in provinces are not provided in detail.

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