The Oxford Companion to Philosophy pdf

The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy
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The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy
Second Edition
Edited by Ted Honderich
3
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
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The Oxford companion to philosophy / edited by Ted Honderich.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Philosophy—Encyclopedias. I. Honderich, Ted.
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Preface
The brave, large aim of this book has been to bring philosophy together
between two covers better than ever before. That is not a job for one man, or
one woman, or a few, or a team, although it is tried often enough. So 249 of us

joined forces joined forces ten years ago for the first edition. We have now been
reinforced by forty-two more contributors for this second edition. To the 1,932
entries in the first edition, about 300 more have been added. Also, many of the
entries in the first edition have been considerably lengthened and revised. Many
others have been updated. The list of contemporary philosophers in the first
edition has been adjusted in order to reflect what McTaggart denied, that time
is real.
The philosophy brought together includes, first of all, the work of the great
philosophers. As that term is commonly used, there are perhaps twenty of
them. By anyone’s reckoning, this pantheon of philosophy includes Plato, Aris-
totle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, the
blessed Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. These, together with others who
stand a bit less solidly in the pantheon, are the subjects of long essays in this
book.
Philosophy as this book conceives it, secondly, includes all of its history in the
English language, a history mainly of British and American thinkers. In this his-
tory there are many figures not so monumental as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.
Among them, if they are not admitted to the pantheon, are John Stuart Mill,
Charles Sanders Peirce, Bertrand Russell, and, if an Austrian can be counted in
this particular history, and should be, Ludwig Wittgenstein. They also include
Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Reid, William James, and F. H. Bradley.
Thirdly, if the book cannot include all of the histories of philosophy in lan-
guages other than English, it does attend to them. It attends to more than the
great leaders of the philosophies in these languages. Thus Descartes is joined by
such of his countrymen and countrywomen as Simone de Beauvoir, Henri
Bergson, and Auguste Comte. Kant and Hegel are joined by J. G. Fichte, Jürgen
Habermas, Karl Jaspers, and others. There are also general entries on each of
the national philosophies, from Australian to Croatian to Japanese to Russian.
A fourth part of the book, not an insignificant one, consists in about 150 entries
on contemporary philosophers, the largest groups being American and British. It

would have been an omission to leave out contemporaries, and faint-hearted.
Philosophy thrives. Its past must not be allowed to exclude its present. It is true,
too, that one of these contemporaries may one day stand in the pantheon.
What has now been said of four subject-matters within philosophy as the
book conceives it can be said differently. These subject-matters can be regarded
less in terms of individual thinkers and more in terms of ideas, arguments, the-
ories, doctrines, world-views, schools, movements, and traditions. This con-
tributes to another characterization of the book, more complete and at least as
enlightening, perhaps more enlightening. In particular, it brings out more of
the great extent to which the book is about contemporary philosophy rather
than the subject’s history.
There are perhaps a dozen established parts of philosophy: epistemology,
metaphysics, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical logic, logic,
the philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and so on. In the case of each of these, the
book contains a long essay on its history and another on its problems as they
now are, by contributors not at all new to them.
In the case of each of these established parts of philosophy, more light is shed
by very many additional entries—for a start, by the aforementioned entries on
the great philosophers, on their lesser companions in English-language history
and other-language histories, and on contemporaries now carrying on the
struggle.
In the case of each of the established parts of philosophy, there are also very
many subordinate entries not about individual philosophers. They are quite as
important and perhaps take up more of the book. They range from shorter
essays down to definitions. To glance at subordinate entries just in the philoso-
phy of mind, the two long essays go with such shorter entries as actions, animal-
ism in personal identity, anomalous monism, body, Brentano, bundle theory of the self,
cognitive architecture, cognitive science, and determinism, double-mindedness, dual-
ism, and duck-rabbit. That is but a very small start on the philosophy of mind.
I have now said something of the philosophy which it is the aim of the 2,230

entries of this book to bring into clear view. But whose clear view? The book is
for all those who want authoritative enlightenment, judgement by good
judges. Thus it is directed partly to general readers for whom philosophy has a
fascination greater than, or at least as great as, any other part of our intellectual
and cultural existence, and who want accounts of it that they can trust. The
book is also directed to those who study and practise the subject, and are
scrupulous about their guides. If it did not also have the second aim, it could not
have the first. No accounts of a subject can be authoritative for the general
reader if they do not also attract and aim to survive the scrutiny of its experts.
If that is one description of the two classes of intended readers of this book,
there is another quite as important. There are different ways of reading. The
general readers and the experts can be taken together and then divided into two
other classes of readers. The first class has in it readers who are on the job, the
second those who are not. Not even your most conscientious postgraduate, or
your academic of truly careerist inclination, or your zealous autodidact, is
always attending to duty. Reading is not always work. Fortunately, it is more
often not work. It is not done to get answers to pre-existing questions, to pass
exams or write essays, to get promoted to full Professor. It is not done out of a
stern determination to become informed, to pursue truth. To read is often to
browse, dally, and meander. It is to satisfy curiosity, or a curiosity owed just to
a page that falls open. It is to be intrigued by the sight of affirming the consequent,
viii Preface
agglomeration, American philosophy today, arthritis in the thigh, Baudrillard, beati-
tude’s kiss,closure,feminist philosophy of science,quantum logic,slime, slingshot argu-
ments, tarot, tarwater, Thrasymachus, vague objects, or the new Wittgenstein.
A Companion, then, in what there is excuse to call the correct sense of that
sometimes abused word, is not only a book for diligent readers, to be studied
and perhaps laboured over. It is not only a complete reference book. It is more
amiable than that. It diverts. It suits a Sunday morning. Hence, not all that is in
it was chosen by the high principle of nose to the grindstone. There are entries

in it, as already noticed, that are owed to their intrinsic interest rather than their
proven place in a sterner editor’s list of headwords.
Only three things remain to be said in this Preface, the first of them about the
nature of philosophy and hence of the book. Isaiah Berlin, one of the contribu-
tors, once characterized philosophy not only as lacking answers to many ques-
tions but also as lacking an agreed method for the finding of answers. (He may
have had in mind a contrast with science, perhaps a contrast not dear, albeit for
different reasons, to a fellow contributor or two, say Paul Feyerabend or W. V.
Quine.) Certainly it is true that philosophy, no doubt because of the peculiar dif-
ficulty of its questions, is at least as much given to disagreement and dispute as
any other kind of inquiry. In fact it may be more given to disagreement and dis-
pute than any other inquiry. It has the hardest questions.
As a result, this book cannot be wholly consistent. Even with fewer than 291
contributors, if they were as committed to their views as philosophers usually
are, and no doubt should be, there would be disagreement. There would be dis-
agreement if the book was limited to the thirty-four Oxford philosophers in it,
or, say, the various Californians. As it is, there are entries, occasionally cheek by
jowl, that fight among themselves, or at any rate jostle. As an editor, I have not
tried too hard to subdue or get between my colleagues, but only succumbed to
a thought or two about unlikely philosophical propositions. (Nor have I bullied my
colleagues about what sort of thing to put into the bibliographies at the ends of
their entries, or ruthlessly excluded an entry whose subject is also treated,
somewhat differently, somewhere else.) To do so would have produced more
decorum but less truth about philosophy. It would also have touched what I
hope is another recommendation of the book: it has not only different views
but different voices in it.
That brings to mind a second matter, that of the 150 contemporary philoso-
phers on whom there are entries in the book. The aim was to give to the reader,
mainly the general reader, a sense of the philosophical enterprise as it is now
being carried forward. (Philosophy, as already remarked, is not a dead or dying

subject, but one whose vigour—I am tempted to say its youth—is as great as
ever it has been. It is only the sciences and the superstitions that come and go.)
Another editor, quite as sane, would have looked around at his cohorts, con-
templated a reputation or two, no doubt mused on the fact of philosophical
fashion, and chosen somewhat differently.
For the first edition, a list of contemporaries was initially drawn up mainly by
me. The list was subsequently the subject of a kindly suggestion or two from
possible contributors to the book who laid eye on it, and perhaps a letter or two
of hurt pride or disbelief. Notice was taken of these pleas, in a certain way. The
initial list of contemporaries was submitted to a jury of a dozen distinguished
Preface ix
philosophers from all parts and inclinations of the subject. They agreed about
the large and indisputable core of the list, but not much more. They did not
much agree about their proposed additions to the rest of the list, or their pro-
posed deletions from it. No proposed inclusion or deletion got more than two
votes from the twelve good philosophers and true. Any contemporary who did
get two votes was added in. No deletions were made.
For this second edition, opinions were taken from thirty philosophers, of all
or anyway various persuasions, as to how to make the contemporaries in the
book representative of the new millennium well under way. The results of this
poll contained some biffs to my loyalties and sensibilities. But, being a true as
against merely a hierarchic democrat, I acted on the advice. Should you be cer-
tain, reader, that this little anointing is a very serious matter, remember David
Hume, Saint David, the greatest of British philosophers. He did not get elected
to professorships at Edinburgh and Glasgow, which accolades went instead to
Mr Cleghorn and Mr Clow.
Finally, my gratitude, of which there is a lot. I am grateful to many people,
first the 291 contributors. They did not do too much satisficing. Contributors to
the first edition put up with a change of mind about entry lengths. Many of
them put up with a lot more, including a lot of letters about revising their work

or making new starts. Some were stalwarts who did a goodly number of entries
very well. They rush to mind, and produce glows of gratitude there. Some were
philosophical about the sad fact that their prize entry, say the Frankfurt School
or the indeterminacy of translation, did not get into the book because the editor
had blundered and earlier assigned it to someone else. Some contributors and
others were decent or anyway silent when their proposed entries, say marital act
and Ayn Rand, did not penetrate my fortress of philosophical principle.
My special thanks to Peter Momtchiloff, doyen of the world’s philosophy
editors, the Philosophy Editor of Oxford University Press. This book is almost
as much his doing as mine, despite my sole responsibility for errors, infelicities,
and one or two judgements with which he is not in absolute agreement. I am
also grateful to the following fourteen philosophers who read all or parts of the
first manuscript and issued proposals for its improvement: Christopher Kirwan,
David Hamlyn, and Jonathan Lowe, above all, and also Simon Blackburn,
Alexander Broadie, Jonathan Cohen, Ross Harrison, Ronald Hepburn, Michael
Inwood, Nicola Lacey, David Miller, Richard Norman, Anthony O’Hear, and
Richard Swinburne.
My thanks as well to the jury of distinguished philosophers who cast an eye
over the initial list of their contemporaries, and then to the thirty advisers in this
matter for the second edition.
Thanks too to all of these: Ingrid Coggin Honderich; Jane O’Grady; Alan
Lacey, who did the Chronological Table of Philosophy and the Maps of
Philosophy; John Allen of the library at University College London; Helen
Betteridge, Vivien Crew, and Ann Wooldridge for some secretarial assistance;
Tim Barton, Laurien Berkeley, Angela Blackburn, and Frances Morphy of
Oxford University Press, all of whom were fortitudinous, and almost always
right.
t.h.
x Preface
Contents

list of portraits xii
list of contributors xiii
on using the book xix
The Companion: Alphabetical Entries 1
appendices
Logical Symbols 971
Maps of Philosophy 973
A Chronological Table of Philosophy 991
sources of illustrations 1003
index and list of entries 1005
List of Portraits
ancient philosophy
Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Socrates, Democritus 754
Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Plotinus 35
late ancient and early medieval philosophy
Augustine, Boethius, Abelard, Anselm 344
medieval philosophy
Avicenna, Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon, Aquinas 580
founders of modern philosophy
Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant 784
Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 243
philosophy in britain
Francis Bacon, Reid, Sidgwick, Bradley 249
Bentham, Mill, Wollstonecraft, Burke 937
Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Collingwood 121
Ryle, Ayer, Strawson, Popper 676
french philosophy
Rousseau, Comte, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty 320
Sartre, de Beauvoir, Foucault, Althusser 278
continental european philosophy

Hegel, Marx, Lukacs, Croce 366
Fichte, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche 334
Husserl, Frege, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger 171
philosophy in america
Edwards, Peirce, James, Santayana 749
Dewey, Carnap, Quine, Goodman 25
Davidson, Putnam, Searle, Nagel 609
Rawls, MacIntyre, Kripke, Dennett 628
eastern philosophy
Confucius, Nishida, Tagore, Radhakrishnan 429
philosophy at the end of the twentieth century
Kuhn, Lewis, Rorty, Williams 483
Contributors
Almost all the contributors are or were members of the departments, faculties or
sub-faculties of philosophy at the mentioned universities.
A.C.A. Dr Alison Ainley
University College, Dublin
E.B.A. Prof. Edwin B. Allaire
University of Texas, Austin
H.E.A. Prof. Henry E. Allison
Boston University
M.A. Dr Milosˇ Arsenijevic´
University of Heidelberg
M.M.A. Prof. Marilyn McCord Adams
University of Oxford
S.R.A. Dr Sophie Allen
University of Oxford
W.E.A. Prof. William E. Abraham
University of California, Santa Cruz
A.B. Prof. Akeel Bilgrami

Columbia University
A.Bel. Mr Andrew Belsey
University of Wales, Cardiff
A.Bre. Prof. Andrew Brennan
University of Western Australia
A.Bro. Prof. Alexander Broadie
University of Glasgow
D.B. Mr David Bostock
University of Oxford
D.Bak. Prof. David Bakhurst
Queen’s University, Ontario
D.Ber. Prof. David Berman
Trinity College, Dublin
G.B. Prof. George Bozonis
University of Athens
G.H.B. Prof. Graham Bird
University of Manchester
H.A.B. Prof. Hugo Adam Bedau
Tufts University
H.I.B. Prof. Harold I. Brown
Northern Illinois University
I.B. Sir Isaiah Berlin
University of Oxford
J.B.B. Prof. James Bogen
Pitzer College
J.Ber. Prof. Jose Bermudez
Washington University, St Louis
J.Bish. Dr John Bishop
University of Auckland
J.Bro. Prof. Justin Broackes

Brown University
J.W.B. See Alvin Goldman
K.B. Prof. Kent Bach
San Francisco State University
K.Ber. See Pauza
L.W.B. Prof. Lewis W. Beck
University of Rochester
M.B. Prof. Myles Brand
Indiana University
N.B. Prof. Ned Block
New York University
R.L.B. Prof. Robert Bernasconi
Memphis State University
R.P.B. Prof. Richard Bellamy
University of Reading
S.B. Prof. Sissela Bok
Harvard University
S.W.B. Prof. Simon Blackburn
University of Cambridge
T.L.B. Prof. Tom L. Beauchamp
Georgetown University
T.R.B. Prof. Thomas Baldwin
University of York
W.B. Prof. Dr Wilhelm Baumgartner
University of Würzburg
A.C. Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti
University of Delhi
A.Car. Prof. Alisa Carse
Georgetown University
B.J.C. Prof. Jack Copeland

University of Canterbury,
New Zealand
C.A.J.C. Prof. C. A. J. Coady
University of Melbourne
C.C. Prof. Charles Crittenden
California State University,
Northridge
D.C. Dr David Charles
University of Oxford
D.E.C. Prof. David E. Cooper
University of Durhan
F.C. Prof. Frank Cioffi
University of Essex
F.Chr. Prof. Ferrell Christensen
University of Alberta
J.C. Prof. James Cargile
University of Virginia
J.Cot. Prof. John Cottingham
University of Reading
L.J.C. Mr L. Jonathan Cohen
University of Oxford
M.C. Mr Michael Cohen
University of Wales, Swansea
M.J.C. Prof. Max Cresswell
Victoria University, Wellington
N.C. Prof. Nancy Cartwright
London School of Economics and
Political Science
Associate contributors
T.Chi. Timothy Childers

R.F.H. Robin Findlay Hendry
T.U. Thomas E. Uebel
N.S.C. Prof. Norman S. Care
Oberlin College
Q.C. Prof. Quassim Cassam
University College London
R.Clif. Prof. Robert Clifton
University of Western Ontario
R.Cri. Dr Roger Crisp
University of Oxford
S.C. Prof. Steven Coutinho
Towson University
S.R.L.C. Prof. Stephen Clark
University of Liverpool
T.C. Prof. Tim Crane
University College London
T.Car. Prof. Terrell Carver
University of Bristol
T.Chi. See Cartwright
W.C. Mr William Charlton
University of Edinburgh
D.D. Prof. Donald Davidson
University of California, Berkeley
F.D. Prof. Fred Dretske
Stanford University
J.D. Prof. Jonathan Dancy
University of Reading
M.D. Sir Michael Dummett
University of Oxford
N.C.D. Mr N. C. Denyer

University of Cambridge
N.J.H.D. Prof. Nicholas Dent
University of Birmingham
R.D. Prof. Ronald Dworkin
University College London
R.De G. Prof. Richard T. De George
University of Kansas
R.S.D. Prof. R. S. Downie
University of Glasgow
W.A.D. Prof. Wayne A. Davis
Georgetown University
D.E. Prof. Dorothy Edgington
University of Oxford
J.D.G.E. Prof. J. D. G. Evans
Queen’s University, Belfast
P.E. Prof. Paul Edwards
Brooklyn College
E.J.F. Dr Elizabeth Frazer
University of Oxford
J.M.F. Prof. John Finnis
University of Oxford
N.F. Prof. Nicholas G. Fotion
Emory University
O.F. Prof. Owen Flanagan
Duke University
P.K.F. Prof. Paul K. Feyerabend
University of California,
Berkeley
P.R.F. Prof. Philippa Foot
University of Oxford

A.C.G. Dr Anthony Grayling
Birkbeck College, London
A.Gew. Prof. Alan Gewirth
University of Chicago
xiv Contributors
Contributors xv
A.Gom. Dr Antoni Gomila
University of Salamanca
A.Gup. Prof. Anil Gupta
Indiana University
A.H.G. Prof. Alan Goldman
University of Miami
A.I.G. Prof. Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University
Associate contributor
J.W.B. Prof. John Bender
B.G. Prof. Bernard Gert
Dartmouth College
D.G. Prof. Don Gustafson
University of Cincinnati
G.G. Prof. Gary Gutting
University of Notre Dame
J.C.A.G. Prof. J. C. A. Gaskin
Trinity College, Dublin
J.C.B.G. Mr J. C. B. Gosling
University of Oxford
J.G. Prof. Jorge J. E. Gracia
State University of New York, Buffalo
Associate contributors
M. G. Michael German

E. M. Elizabeth Millan
J.Gar. Dr James Garvey
Royal Institute of Philosophy
J.O.G. Prof. James O. Grunebaum
Buffalo State College
J.P.G. Prof. James P. Griffin
University of Oxford
L.E.G. Prof. Lenn E. Goodman
Vanderbilt University
L.P.G. Prof. Lloyd P. Gerson
St Michael’s College, Toronto
M.D.G. Dr Marcus Giaquinto
University College London
M.G. See Gracia
P.G. Prof. Paul Gilbert
University of Hull
P.Good. Prof. Peter Goodrich
Birkbeck College, London
P.G S. Prof. Peter Godfrey-Smith
Australian National University
P.L.G. Mr Patrick Gardiner
University of Oxford
R.G. Prof. Reinhardt Grossmann
Indiana University
R.M.G. Prof. Richard M. Gale
University of Pittsburgh
R.P.G. Prof. Robert P. George
Princeton University
S.A.G. Prof. S. A. Grave
University of Western Australia

S.G. Dr Stefan Gosepath
Hochschule der Künste, Berlin
S.Gard. Prof. Sebastian Gardner
University College, London
S.Gau. Prof. Stephen Gaukroger
University of Sydney
A.H. Prof. Alastair Hannay
University of Oslo
B.H. Prof. Brad Hooker
University of Reading
C.H. Prof. Colin Howson
London School of Economics and Political
Science
C.J.H. Prof. C. J. Hookway
University of Sheffield
D.W.H. Prof. D. W. Hamlyn
Birkbeck College, London
D.W.Has. Prof. D. W. Haslett
University of Delaware
E.L.H. Mr E. L. Hussey
University of Oxford
G.P.H. Mr Geoffrey Hawthorn
University of Cambridge
I.C.H. Ingrid Coggin Honderich
Royal Institute of Philosophy
J.Hal. Prof. John Haldane
University of St Andrews
J.Heil Prof. John Heil
Washington University, St Louis
J.Horn. Prof. Jennifer Hornsby

Birkbeck College, London
K.H. Prof. Karen Hanson
Indiana University
K.J.J.H. Prof. Jaakko Hintikka
Boston University
P.H. Prof. Paul Humphreys
University of Virginia
P.H.H. Prof. Peter H. Hare
State University of New York, Buffalo
P.M.S.H. Dr Peter Hacker
University of Oxford
R.B.H. Prof. R. Baine Harris
Old Dominion University
R.F.H. See Cartwright
R.H. Dr Ross Harrison
University of Cambridge
R.Har. Prof. Russell Hardin
New York University
R.J.H. Mr R. J. Hawkins
University of Oxford
R.W.H. Prof. R. W. Hepburn
University of Edinburgh
V.H. Mr Vincent Hope
University of Edinburgh
W.A.H. Prof. Wilfrid Hodges
Queen Mary and Westfield College, London
M.J.I. Mr M. J. Inwood
University of Oxford
C.J. Prof. C. Janaway
University of Southampton

E.R.J. Dr Roger Jones
Berea College, Kentucky
M.D.J. Prof. Mark D. Jordan
University of Notre Dame
O.R.J. Mr O. R. Jones
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
P.F.J. Prof. Paul F. Johnson
St Norbert College
S.J. Stuart Jeffries
The Guardian
S.P.J. Dr Simon James
University of Durham
A.J.P.K. Sir Anthony Kenny
University of Oxford
C.A.K. Mr Christopher Kirwan
University of Oxford
C.H.K. Prof. C. H. Koch
University of Copenhagen
H H.K. Prof. Hans-Herbert Kögler
University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign
J.A.K. Dr Jill Kraye
Warburg Institute, London
J.J.K. Prof. Joel J. Kupperman
University of Connecticut
J.K. Prof. Jaegwon Kim
Brown University
J.Kek. Prof. John Kekes
State University of New York, Albany
L.K. Prof. Leszek Kolakowski
University of Oxford

M.K. Dr Martha Klein
University of Oxford
P.K. Prof. Peter King
University of Toronto
R.K. Prof. Robert Kirk
University of Nottingham
S.T.K. Prof. Steven T. Kuhn
Georgetown University
W.K. Prof. Will Kymlicka
Queen’s University, Ontario
A.J.L. Mr Ardon Lyon
City University, London
A.R.L. Dr Alan Lacey
King’s College London
B.L. Prof. Brian Leiter
University of Texas, Austin
E.J.L. Prof. E. J. Lowe
University of Durham
H.L. Dr Hallvard Lillehammer
University of Cambridge
J.L. Dr James Logue
University of Oxford
J.Lac. Prof. John Lachs
Vanderbilt University
J.Lev. Prof. Jerrold Levinson
University of Maryland, College Park
K S.L. Prof. Kwang-Sae Lee
Kent State University
M.L. Prof. Margaret Little
Georgetown University

N.L. Prof. Noa Latham
University of Calgary
N.M.L. Prof. Nicola Lacey
London School of Economics
O.L. Prof. Oliver Leaman
University of Kentucky
R.Le P. Prof. Robin Le Poidevin
University of Leeds
W.G.L. Prof. William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
A.M. Prof. Adam Morton
University of Alberta
A.MacI. Prof. Alasdair MacIntyre
University of Notre Dame
A.R.M. Prof. Alfred R. Mele
Florida State University
B.M. Dr Benjamin Morison
University of Oxford
C.McK. Prof. Catherine McKeen
SUNY Brockport
D.M. Dr Derek Matravers
Open University
D.McL. Prof. David McLellan
University of Kent, Canterbury
D.McN. Dr Mike McNamee
University of Wales, Swansea
xvi Contributors
E.J.M. Dr Elinor Mason
University of Edinburgh
E.M. See Gracia

F.MacB. Dr Fraser MacBride
Birkbeck College,
London
G.B.M. Prof. Gareth B. Matthews
University of Massachusetts,
Amherst
G.F.M. Prof. Gregory Mellema
Calvin College
G.I.M. Prof. George I. Mavrodes
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor
G.W.McC. Prof. Gregory McCulloch
University of Nottingham
J.J.M. Prof. Jack Macintosh
University of Calgary
J.M. Prof. Joseph Margolis
Temple University
J.McM. Prof. Jeff McMahan
Rutgers University
K.M. Dr Kevin Magill
University of Wolverhampton
M.G.F.M. Prof. Michael Martin
University College London
N.M. Prof. Nenad Misˇcˇevicˇ
Central European University
P.J.M. Dr Penelope Mackie
University of Nottingham
P.N.M. Mr Peter Momtchiloff
Oxford University Press
R.B.M. Prof. Ruth Barcan Marcus

Yale University
R.D.M. Prof. Ronald D. Milo
University of Arizona
S.M. Prof. Susan Mendus
University of York
S.McC. Prof. Storrs McCall
McGill University
S.M G. Dr Saladin Meckled-Garcia
University College London
C.N. Prof. Christopher Norris
University of Wales, Cardiff
H.W.N. Prof. Harold Noonan
University of Nottingham
J.N. Prof. Jan Narveson
University of Waterloo
P.J.P.N. Dr Paul Noordhof
University of Nottingham
R.J.N. Prof. Richard Norman
University of Kent, Canterbury
S.N. Dr Svante Nordin
University of Lund
T.N. Prof. Thomas Nagel
New York University
A.D.O. Dr Alexander D. Oliver
University of Cambridge
A.O’H. Prof. Anthony O’Hear
University of Buckingham
J.O’G. Ms Jane O’Grady
Fine Arts College, London
D.P. Prof. David Papineau

King’s College London
D.Pri. Dr D. H. Pritchard
University of Stirling
G.P. Prof. Graham Priest
University of Melbourne
G.R.P. Prof. Graham Parkes
University of Hawaii, Manoa
I.S.P. Prof. Ingmar Persson
University of Lund
L.P. Dr Letizia Panizza
Royal Holloway College,
London
M.J.P. Prof. M. J. Petry
Erasmus University
M.P. Dr Miroslav Pauza
Institute of Philosophy, Prague
Associate contributors
K.Ber. Prof. Karel Berka
V.S. Dr Vera Soudilova
M.Pot. Prof. Matjazˇ Potrcˇ
University of Ljubljana
O.P. Dr Oliver Pooley
University of Oxford
P.P. Prof. Philip Pettit
Princeton University
S.P. Mr Stephen Priest
University of Oxford
T.P. Dr Thomas Pink
King’s College London
A.Q. The Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton

University of Oxford
P.L.Q. Prof. Philip L. Quinn
University of Notre Dame
W.V.Q. Prof. W. V. Quine
Harvard University
B.B.R. Mr Bede Rundle
University of Oxford
Contributors xvii
M.R. Prof. Michael Ruse
Florida State University
N.R. Prof. Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh
P.R. Prof. Peter Railton
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
S.D.R. Dr Sarah Richmond
University College London
S.L.R. Dr Stephen Read
University of St Andrews
B.C.S. Dr Barry C. Smith
Birkbeck College, London
D.H.S. Prof. David H. Sanford
Duke University
E.S. Prof. Ernest Sosa
Brown University
E.T.S. Prof. Edward Sankowski
University of Oklahoma
J.E.R.S. Mr Roger Squires
University of St Andrews
J.M.S. Prof. John Skorupski
University of St Andrews

J.P.S. Prof. James P. Sterba
University of Notre Dame
J.R.S. Prof. John Searle
University of California, Berkeley
J.S. Dr Jeremy Stangroom
The Philosophers’ Magazine
K l. S. Prof. Kwong-loi Shun
University of California, Berkeley
L.F.S. Mr Leslie F. Stevenson
University of St Andrews
L.S. Prof. Lawrence Sklar
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
M.S. Prof. Michael Slote
University of Miami
P.F.S. Professor Paul Snowdon
University College London
P.S. Prof. Peter Singer
Princeton University
R.A.K.S. Dr Rowland Stout
University College, Dublin
R.A.S. Prof. Robert Sharpe
University of Wales, Lampeter
R.C.Sle. Prof. R. C. Sleigh, Jr.
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
R.C.Sol. Prof. Robert C. Solomon
University of Texas, Austin
R.G.S. Prof. R. G. Swinburne
University of Oxford
R.M.S. Prof. Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas, Austin

R.S. Prof. Richard Schacht
University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign
R.W.S. Prof. R. W. Sharples
University College London
S.S. Prof. Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
T.S. Prof. Timothy Schroeder
University of Manitoba
T.L.S.S. Prof. T. L. S. Sprigge
University of Edinburgh
V.S. See Pauza
V.Such. Dr Victor Suchar
Bath Royal Literary and Scientific Institute
B.T. Prof. Bergeth Tregenza
California State University, Northridge
C.C.W.T. Prof. C. C. W. Taylor
University of Oxford
G.M.T. Prof. G. M. Tamas
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
I.T. Prof. Ivo Tretera
Charles University, Prague
L.S.T. Prof. Larry S. Temkin
Rutgers University
R.E.T. Prof. Robert Tully
St Michael’s College, Toronto
R.P.L.T. Dr Roger Teichmann
University of Oxford
T.U. See Cartwright
R.V. Mr. Ruediger Vaas
University of Giessen

A.D.W. Mr Andrew Williams
University of Reading
A.W.W. Prof. Allen Wood
Stanford University
Cath.W. Prof. Catherine Wilson
University of British Columbia
C.J.F.W. Prof. C. J. F. Williams
University of Bristol
C.W. Mr Colwyn Williamson
University of Wales, Swansea
D.N.W. Prof. Douglas Walton
University of Winnipeg
G.J.W. Sir Geoffrey Warnock
University of Oxford
I.P.W. Prof. John White
Institute of Education, London
J.Wol. Prof. Jan Wolen´ski
Jagiellonian University, Cracow
xviii Contributors
J.Woo. Prof. John Woods
University of British Columbia
K.W. Prof. Kwasi Wiredu
University of South Florida
K.Wuch. Prof. Dr Kurt Wuchterl
University of Stuttgart
M.W. Prof. Michael Wreen
Marquette University
M.Walz. Prof. Michael Walzer
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
M.Warn. Baroness Warnock

University of Cambridge
P.W. Ms Patricia Walsh
King’s College London
R.C.W. Prof. Roy C. Weatherford
University of South Florida
R.S.W. Prof. Roger Woolhouse
University of York
S.W. Dr Sybil Wolfram
University of Oxford
T.W. Prof. Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford
H.Z. Prof. Hossein Ziai
University of California, Los Angeles
Contributors xix
On Using the Book
In one way there is little need for an entry in this book to contain cross-
references to other entries. This is so since the reader can safely assume that
almost every philosophical term which is used for an idea or doctrine or what-
ever also has an entry to itself. The same is true of almost every philosopher
who is mentioned. That is not all. Entries can be counted on for very many
subjects which fall under such common terms as ‘beauty’, ‘causation’, ‘democ-
racy’, ‘guilt’, ‘knowledge’, ‘mind’, and ‘time’—all such subjects which get
philosophical attention.
Still, it seems a good idea to provide occasional reminders of the general pos-
sibility of having more lights shed on something by turning elsewhere. And
there is often a good reason for prompting or directing a reader to look else-
where, a reason of which a reader may be unaware.
So occasionally a term in an entry is preceded by an asterisk, indicating that it
is the heading or the first word of the heading of another entry. For the same
reason an asterisked term or terms may appear on a line at the end of an entry.

In some cases the latter references are to related or opposed ideas or the like. In
order not to have the book littered with asterisks, they have very rarely been
put on the names of philosophers. But it is always a good idea to turn to the
entries on the mentioned philosophers.
The cross-references are more intended for the browsing reader than the
reader at work. For the reader at work, there is an Index and List of Entries at
the back of the book. The Index and List of Entries usually gives references to
more related entries than are given by cross-references in and at the end of an
entry. It is also possible to look up all the entries on, say, aesthetics or American
philosophy or applied ethics.
The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from
the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before
a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be
missing.
At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as
well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy.
abandonment. A rhetorical term used by existentialist
philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre to describe the
absence of any sources of ethical authority external to one-
self. It suggests that one might have expected to find such
an authority, either in religion or from an understanding
of the natural world, and that the discovery that there is
none leads one to feel ‘abandoned’. For existentialists such
as Sartre, however, this sense of abandonment is only a
prelude to the recognition that ethical values can be
grounded from within a reflective understanding of the
conditions under which individuals can attain *authenti-
city in their lives. Thus the conception of abandonment is
essentially an existentialist dramatization of Kant’s rejec-
tion of heteronomous conceptions of value in favour of

the *autonomy of the good will. t.r.b.
*existentialism; despair.
J P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. P. Mairet (London,
1948).
abduction. Abductive reasoning accepts a conclusion on
the grounds that it explains the available evidence. The
term was introduced by Charles Peirce to describe an
inference pattern sometimes called ‘hypothesis’ or ‘*infer-
ence to the best explanation’. He used the example of
arriving at a Turkish seaport and observing a man on
horseback surrounded by horsemen holding a canopy
over his head. He inferred that this was the governor of
the province since he could think of no other figure who
would be so greatly honoured. In his later work, Peirce
used the word more widely: the logic of abduction exam-
ines all of the norms which guide us in formulating new
hypotheses and deciding which of them to take seriously.
It addresses a wide range of issues concerning the ‘logic of
discovery’ and the economics of research. c.j.h.
*induction.
C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vii (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 89–164.
Abelard, Peter (1079–1142). Most widely known for his
love affair with Héloïse, about which we learn a good deal
from his letters to her as well as from his Historia Calamita-
tum. He was also one of the great controversialists of his
era. After studying under Roscelin (c.1095) and William of
Champeaux (c.1100), he established himself as a master in
his own right, and one to whom students flocked through-
out his career. In the dispute about the nature of *univer-
sals he was in the nominalist camp, holding that universals

are utterances (voces) or mental terms, not things in the
real world. The universality of a universal derives from
the fact that it is predicable of many things. Nevertheless,
unless a number of things are in the same state, the one
universal term cannot be predicated of them. Hence
although universals are not themselves real things, it is a
common feature of real things that justifies the predica-
tion of a universal of them.
In his Dialectica Abelard takes up, among numerous
other topics, the question, widely discussed in the Middle
Ages, of the relation between human freedom and divine
providence. If God, who is omniscient, knows that we are
going to perform a given act, is it not necessary that we
perform it, and in that case how can the act be free?
Abelard’s answer is that we do indeed act freely and that it
is not merely our acts but our free acts that come under
divine providence. God’s foreknowing them carries no
implication that we are not free to avoid performing
them. a.bro.
*Heloïse complex; properties; qualities.
Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen, 1970).
J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 2002).
ableism. Prejudice against people with disabilities, which
can take many forms. It can take the form of a prejudice
against using sign language with those who are deaf even
when only a small percentage of them can master the
alternatives of lipreading and speaking. It also shows itself
as a prejudice against the use of Braille with the blind or
visually impaired even when this makes them less efficient
readers than they might be. In general, it is a prejudice

against performing activities in ways that are better for
disabled people. j.p.s.
*disability and morality.
Anita Silvers, ‘People with Disabilities’, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford, 2003).
abortion. Human beings develop gradually inside
women’s bodies. The death of a newly fertilized human
egg does not seem the same as the death of a person. Yet
A
there is no obvious line that divides the gradually develop-
ing foetus from the adult. Hence abortion poses a difficult
ethical issue.
Those who defend women’s rights to abortion often
refer to themselves as ‘pro-choice’ rather than as ‘pro-
abortion’. In this way they seek to bypass the issue of the
moral status of the foetus, and instead make the right to
abortion a question of individual liberty. But it cannot sim-
ply be assumed that a woman’s right to have an abortion is
a question of individual liberty, for it must first be estab-
lished that the aborted foetus is not a being worthy of pro-
tection. If the foetus is worthy of protection, then laws
against abortion do not create ‘victimless crimes’ as laws
against homosexual relations between consenting adults
do. So the question of the moral status of the foetus cannot
be avoided.
The central argument against abortion may be put like
this:
It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.
A human foetus is an innocent human being.
Therefore it is wrong to kill a human foetus.

Defenders of abortion usually deny the second premiss of
this argument. The dispute about abortion then becomes
a dispute about whether a foetus is a human being, or, in
other words, when a human life begins. Opponents of
abortion challenge others to point to any stage in the grad-
ual process of human development that marks a morally
significant dividing-line. Unless there is such a line, they
say, we must either upgrade the status of the earliest
embryo to that of the child, or downgrade the status of the
child to that of the foetus; and no one advocates the latter
course.
The most commonly suggested dividing-lines between
the fertilized egg and the child are birth and viability. Both
are open to objection. A prematurely born infant may well
be less developed in these respects than a foetus nearing
the end of its normal term, and it seems peculiar to hold
that we may not kill the premature infant, but may kill the
more developed foetus. The point of viability varies
according to the state of medical technology, and, again,
it is odd to hold that a foetus has a right to life if the
pregnant woman lives in London, but not if she lives in
New Guinea.
Those who wish to deny the foetus a right to life may be
on stronger ground if they challenge the first, rather than
the second, premiss of the argument set out above. To
describe a being as ‘human’ is to use a term that straddles
two distinct notions: membership of the species Homo
sapiens, and being a person, in the sense of a rational or
self-conscious being. If ‘human’ is taken as equivalent to
‘person’, the second premiss of the argument, which

asserts that the foetus is a human being, is clearly false; for
one cannot plausibly argue that a foetus is either rational
or self-conscious. If, on the other hand, ‘human’ is taken to
mean no more than ‘member of the species Homo sapiens’,
then it needs to be shown why mere membership of a
given biological species should be a sufficient basis for a
right to life. Rather, the defender of abortion may wish to
argue, we should look at the foetus for what it is—the
actual characteristics it possesses—and value its life
accordingly. p.s.
*applied ethics; double effect.
D. Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge, 2002).
Rosalind Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (Oxford, 1987).
Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, in Peter Singer
(ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford, 1986).
Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford, 1983).
Absolute, the. That which has an unconditioned exist-
ence, not conditioned by, relative to, or dependent upon
anything else. Usually deemed to be the whole of things,
conceived as unitary, as spiritual, as self-knowing (at least
in part via the human mind), and as rationally intelligible,
as finite things, considered individually, are not. The
expression was introduced into philosophy by Schelling
and Hegel. In the English speaking world it became the
key concept of such absolute idealists as Josiah Royce and
F. H. Bradley. t.l.s.s.
*idealism, philosophical.
J. N. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute (London, 1970).
T. L. S. Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh,
1983).

absolutism, moral. The view that certain kinds of actions
are always wrong or are always obligatory, whatever the
consequences. Typical candidates for such absolute prin-
ciples would be that it is always wrong deliberately to kill
an innocent human being, or that one ought always to tell
the truth or to keep one’s promises. Absolutism is to be
contrasted with *consequentialism, the view that the
rightness or wrongness of actions is determined solely by
the extent to which they lead to good or bad conse-
quences. A consequentialist could maintain, for example,
that *killing is normally wrong because it creates a great
deal of grief and suffering and deprives the person who is
killed of the future happiness which he/she would have
experienced, but that since, in some cases, a refusal to kill
may lead to even more suffering and loss of happiness, it
may sometimes be right even to kill the innocent.
Moral absolutism is linked to, but not synonymous
with, a *deontological position in ethics. The latter is the
view that certain kinds of actions are intrinsically right or
wrong—right or wrong simply because they are that kind
of action—independently of the consequences to which
they may lead. Killing the innocent, for instance, may be
thought to be wrong just because it is the killing of the inno-
cent, quite apart from the suffering and loss of happiness to
which it will normally lead. A deontological position obvi-
ously contrasts with a consequentialist one, and may
appear to be the same as absolutism, but in fact the two are
distinct. One may hold that killing the innocent is intrinsic-
ally wrong, but also accept that in certain extreme cir-
cumstances the intrinsic wrongness of killing the innocent

may itself be overriden by the appalling consequences
2 abortion
which will occur if one refuses to kill. Absolutism builds
on a deontological position but adds a stronger claim—
not only is the action intrinsically wrong, but its wrong-
ness can never be overridden by any consideration of
consequences.
The absolutist position corresponds to common trad-
itional views of morality, particularly of a religious kind—
what might be called the ‘Ten Commandments’ idea of
morality. Nevertheless, when detached from appeals to
religious authority absolutism may appear to be vulner-
able to rational criticism. Is it not perverse to maintain that
a certain kind of action is simply ruled out, even when the
refusal to perform it will lead to even worse conse-
quences? Why insist on never killing the innocent, for
instance, if in certain circumstances a refusal to do so will
mean that more innocent people will die? To be plausible,
absolutism needs to be supplemented with some further
distinction between different ways in which conse-
quences may come about, such as the distinction between
*acts and omissions, or the doctrine of *double effect. The
absolutist who refuses to condone the killing of the inno-
cent, even though more innocent people will die as a
result of not doing so, can then say that though the loss of
innocent lives is a terrible thing; nevertheless, letting inno-
cent people die, or bringing about innocent deaths as an
unintended side-effect, is not ruled out by an absolute pro-
hibition in the same way as is the intentional killing of the
innocent. Whether this is a sufficient defence of abso-

lutism remains a matter for debate. r.j.n.
*ideals, moral; lying.
G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in Collected Philosophical
Papers, iii (Oxford, 1981).
Jonathan Bennett, ‘Whatever the Consequences’, in Analysis
(1966).
Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, in Mortal Questions (Cam-
bridge, 1979).
abstract entities. The dichotomy between the abstract
and the concrete is supposed to effect a mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive ontological classification. The
dichotomy is, however, too naïve to be of theoretical use.
There are many different ways, themselves vague, to
mark the distinction: abstract entities are not perceptible,
cannot be pointed to, have no causes or effects, have no
spatio-temporal location, are necessarily existent. Nor is
there agreement about whether there are any abstract
entities, and, if so, which sorts of entity are abstract.
Abstract entities, conceived as having no causal powers,
are thought problematic for epistemological reasons:
how can we refer to or know anything about entities
with which we have no causal commerce? Hence the
existence of nominalists, who try to do without abstract
entities. a.d.o.
*universals; nominalism; proposition.
B. Hale, Abstract Objects (Oxford, 1987).
abstract ideas: see ideas.
abstraction. A putative psychological process for the
acquisition of a *concept x either by attending to the fea-
tures common to all and only xs or by disregarding just the

spatio-temporal locations of xs. The existence of abstrac-
tion is endorsed by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (esp. ii. xi. 9 and 10 and iii. iii. 6ff.) but
rejected by Berkeley in The Principles of Human Knowledge
(esp. paras. 6ff. and paras. 98, 119, and 125). For Locke the
capacity to abstract distinguishes human beings from ani-
mals. It enables them to think in abstract ideas and hence
use language. Berkeley argues that the concept of an
abstract *idea is incoherent because it entails both the
inclusion and the exclusion of one and the same property.
This in turn is because any such putative idea would have
to be general enough to subsume all xs yet precise enough
to subsume only xs. For example, the abstract idea of tri-
angle ‘is neither oblique nor rectangular, equilateral nor
scalenon, but all and none of these at once’ (The Principles
of Human Knowledge, Introduction, para. 13). s.p.
George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge (1710).
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689).
Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists (London, 1990).
abstract particulars: see properties, individual.
absurd, the. A term used by existentialists to describe that
which one might have thought to be amenable to reason
but which turns out to be beyond the limits of rationality.
For example, in Sartre’s philosophy the ‘original choice’ of
one’s fundamental project is said to be ‘absurd’, since,
although choices are normally made for reasons, this
choice lies beyond reason because all reasons for choice
are supposed to be grounded in one’s fundamental pro-
ject. Arguably, this case in fact shows that Sartre is mis-

taken in supposing that reasons for choice are themselves
grounded in a choice; and one can argue that other cases
which are supposed to involve experience of the ‘absurd’
are in fact a *reductio ad absurdum of the assumptions
which produce this conclusion. The ‘absurd’ does not in
fact play an essential role within existentialist philosophy;
but it is an important aspect of the broader cultural con-
text of existentialism, for example in the ‘theatre of the
absurd’, as exemplified by the plays of Samuel Beckett.
t.r.b.
*abandonment; existentialism.
A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (London, 1955).
J P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. H. Barnes (London, 1958),
479.
academic freedom. An integral aspect of open societies,
academic freedom is the right of teachers in universities
and other sectors of education to teach and research as
their subject and conscience demands. This right, though,
may not be unproblematically applicable, even in free
societies. Should academic freedom be extended to those
perceived by others as using it to interfere with the rights
academic freedom 3
of others, or to pursue morally objectionable research?
Like other *freedoms, in practice academic freedom is
constrained by often tacit conventions regarding its limits.
One should never underestimate the ingenuity of aca-
demics themselves in justifying denials of academic
freedom to their colleagues. a.o’h.
*persecution of philosophers; teaching and indoctrinat-
ing.

C. Russell, Academic Freedom (London, 1993).
Academy, the. The educational institution founded by
Plato, probably around 387 bc, so-called because of its
location at a site sacred to the hero Academus. It is fanciful
to call the Academy a ‘university’ or ‘college’. The best
idea we have of the subjects studied there comes from
Plato’s dialogues themselves and Aristotle’s testimony.
When Plato died, the leadership of the Academy passed to
his nephew Speusippus. About 275 the so-called Middle
Academy came to be dominated by *Sceptics under the
leadership of Arcesilaus. This dominance continued
through the middle of the second century when
Carneades founded the New Academy. In 87/6 Antiochus
of Ascalon broke away from the sceptical tradition of Pla-
tonic interpretation to try to recover what he regarded as
a more authentic form of Platonism. Since the physical
structures of the original Academy had been destroyed
with the fall of Athens in 88, Antiochus’ Academic leader-
ship was more notional than real. Though the Academy
was revived in the later fourth century ad, it was
destroyed finally by Justinian in 529. l.p.g.
*philosophy, history of centres and departments of.
J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy 347–274 BC
(Oxford, 2003).
—— The Middle Platonists 80 BC to AD 220 (Ithaca, NY, 1977).
access, privileged: see privileged access.
accident. The term ‘accident’ in philosophy has two main
uses, both stemming from Aristotle. In the first an acci-
dent is a quality which is not essential to the kind of thing
(or in later philosophers, to the individual) in question.

‘Being musical’ is accidental to Socrates, ‘being rational’
and ‘being an animal’ are not. Which *qualities, if any, are
essential or non-accidental is a controversial matter in
contemporary philosophy. In the second main use, the
term ‘accident’ is a way of allowing chance and causality
to coexist: digging for truffles I turn up some treasure. The
digging was not an accident, and since the treasure was
there all along, my finding it if I dug there was determined;
none the less, my finding of it was accidental, since my dig-
ging was a digging for truffles, not for treasure. Typically,
events which are accidental under one description are
determined under another. In non-philosophical contexts
the term often connotes harmful accidents. j.j.m.
*properties, general.
J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in Philosophical Papers (Oxford,
1961).
Irving Copi, ‘Essence and Accident’, in Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.),
Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds (Ithaca, NY, 1977).
Achilles paradox. A paradox of motion, due to Zeno of
Elea. In a race, Achilles can never catch the tortoise, if the
tortoise is given a head start. For while Achilles closes the
initial gap between them, the tortoise will have created a
new gap, and while Achilles is closing that one, the tor-
toise will have created another. However fast Achilles
runs, all that the tortoise has to do, in order not to be
beaten, is make some progress in the time it takes Achilles
to close the previous gap. Standard responses include
claiming that the argument misconceives the implicit
ideas of infinite series and their limits; alternatively, that
space is not adequately described in purely mathematical

terms. Zeno’s own response is not documented. One
hypothesis is that he took the conclusion at face value, as
part of a general scepticism concerning matter, space, and
motion. r.m.s.
*infinity.
Mark Sainsbury, Paradoxes (New York, 1988), ch. 1.
acquaintance and description. A distinction between
two kinds of knowledge, crucial to Russell’s philosophy,
and analogous to that between connaître and savoir. We
are not acquainted with Sir Walter Scott, so we know him
only by description, for example as the author of Waverley.
By contrast, we can know one of our experiences ‘by
acquaintance’, that is, without the intermediary of any
definite description. More generally, to know a thing by
description is to know that there is something uniquely
thus and so; to know a thing by acquaintance is for it to
come before the mind without the intermediary of any
description. Knowledge by description involves know-
ledge of truths, whereas knowledge by acquaintance does
not: it is knowledge of things.
For Russell, acquaintance is basic on two counts: all
understanding rests upon acquaintance (with what the
word or concept stands for); and all knowledge of truths
depends upon acquaintance with those things which the
truths concern. r.m.s.
*descriptions, theory of.
B. Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by
Description’, in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vi (Lon-
don, 1992); first pub. in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(1911).

—— The Problems of Philosophy (London, 1912), ch. 5.
action. An action is sometimes defined as someone’s
doing something intentionally. The phenomenon of
human action owes its importance both to questions
about *agents’ metaphysical status, and to ethical and
legal questions about human *freedom and *responsibil-
ity. Recently many philosophers have thought that an
account of action (the phenomenon) should proceed via
an account of actions (events). When an action is defined
as someone’s doing something intentionally, actions are
4 academic freedom