COPORATE FINANCIAL IN ENGLISH
GROUP :
-
The Agency problem
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
Hare holders
stnemegana
Possibly of coflict of interest
AGENCY PROBLEM
…the principal owns the majority of the equity
The manager (or the agent) is the person who owns only a small part of the equity of a company…
In large corporation the managers are not the owners
managers maybe tempted to act in ways that are not in the best interests of
shareholders
For example: they might buy luxurious corporate cars
the director clearly ignores the common
or overindulge in expense-account diners
good of the business, which should be his
ultimate goal
the interests of the mandator (the company, the shareholder) and the interests of the mandated (director) are contradictory
Lost
It
They might shy away from attractive but risky projects because they are worried more about the safety of their jobs than the potential for
superior profits
The shareholders, must seek to ensure that the authorized person (the manager) acts in the interests of the mandator
uti
Sol
on
spend
rs must
e
ld
o
h
e
shar
ve this,
To achie
:
rizati
Autho
on
monitor the performance of managers…
…create incentives for managers to pursue maximizing the
of shareholders, not just for personal gain
Several following arrangements are believed to help shareholders and manager are working toward common goals
PLAN
compensation schemes encourage management to
maximize shareholder
wealth
...But some schemes are not well designed and in these cases poorly
performing managers may receive large windfall gains
In the latter, the compensation plans cannot help to eliminate the agency problems
Inc
rea
s
ep
rofi
t fo
r th
ea
gen
t
s
Rewarding managers means improving the benefits for
shareholders
Shareholders
can reward
in the futu
a certain date
allows
stock options,
h
it
w
s
er
g
a
man
rice
re at a fxed p
them to buy
stock at
from the
ngly
s stro
e
s
i
r
tock
I f th
s
e of a
e pric
day the
the stock
buy
manage
and the
r is give
n the rig
date of e
xercising
th
the real manager will earn a fortune by buying the stock at a predetermined
price and selling it to the market
ht to buy
e right to
These managers have a clear benefit from pushing up stock prices and thus to a certain extent have reached
consensus with shareholders, as the company works well,…
… they both will helpful.
rs
o
t
c
e
r
i
D
f
o
The boards
Board of directors are often portrayed as passive supporters of top
management
But when the performance starts to slide
and managers don’t offer a credible
recovery plan, boards do act
To solve the problem of the boss and the agent, the owner or major shareholder of the company may be dismissing
bad management, but it is extremely difficult
The shareholder must have time, energy and money to determine if the
board of directors really works
In addition, the legal mechanism that makes dismissing a bad manager is
complex and time-consuming
On the other hand, they can try to replace the board in the next election
The dissident shareholders will attempt to convince other shareholders to vote their slate of candidates to the board
If they succeed, a new board will be elected and it can replace the current
management team
So taking full control of the company by acquiring equity contracts to set up a
new management team is a good solution for the principals and the agents
The problem is that if the management is not be able to run the company effectively, the stock price will
de
cre
as
e
The company may be at risk of being taken over by another company, and of course senior
management positions will lose their jobs
This threat remind managers to keep their eyes on the company’s performance
Specialists Monitoring
Specialists Monitoring
scruti
Managers are subject to the
ny of specialists
rs to
alysts who advise investo
an
y
rit
cu
se
the
by
d
ore
ns are monit
buy, hold, or sell the
Their actio
company’s shares.
Moreover, if the manager knows he is closely
monitored by other shareholders, he will pay more
attention to the company's profits
They are also revie
wed by banks or le
By this way, ti
ghtly monitor
ing
nders, which keep
information fr
om
an eagle eye on th
the owner can
e progress of firm
minimize the
di
manager
s receiving their lo
sagreement by
ans
imbalance info
rmation betw
een the owne
r and
Legal and Regulatory Requirements
CEOs and financial managers have a legal duty to act responsibly and
in the interests of investors
However, the manager can use fraudulent measures
and detecting fraud is not easy. Most notably, the
scandal led to the bankruptcy of the US energy giant
Enron - the largest bankruptcy reorganization in
American history in 20th century
(SEC) sets accounting and reporting standards for public companies in order to ensure
consistency and transparency
The SEC also prohibits insider trading, that is, the purchase or sale of shares based on
information that is not available to public investors
legal and regulatory standards
compensation plans that tie the
rewarding managers for their
fortunes of the managers to the
dedication
fortunes of the firm
Agency problems are mitigated in
monitoring by lenders, stock
market analysts, and
investors
practice in several ways
taken over by
another
company
ultimately the threat that
poorly performing
managers can be fired