Dai Loan

Reaching out in the darkness: The changing nature of U.S.
policy toward Taiwan
In this article I examine recent adjustments in U.S. policy toward the Republic of China (ROC
or Taiwan). I outline the basic framework of U.S. policy and explain how and why Washington
is adopting a more balanced approach in its relationship with Taipei. I suggest that the United
States should continue the review of U.S.-Taiwan relations initiated by the Clinton
administration. Modifications in policy are a step in the right direction. But other subtle
changes also are in order.
I. Basic Framework of U.S, Policy
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States maintained a firm alliance with the ROC and
poured massive amounts of economic aid and military equipment into Taiwan. In the 1970s,
however, Washington sought to enlist Beijing's strategic cooperation in a global drive to
contain Soviet expansionism. In order to secure this support (and normalize relations with
China), Washington severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. During the post-normalization
period, American policy toward Taiwan was guided by the TaiwanRelations Act (TRA) and
three communiques. Together, these documents constitute "the basic framework"
for U.S. policy towardboth Chinese governments.(1) However, there were numerous points of
disagreement between the TRA on the one hand and the communiques on the other. Some said
this created ambiguity and that there were two U.S. China policies: one coming from the TRA
(supported by Congress) and another from the communiques (supported by the White House
and Department of State).
The Taiwan Relations Act and the Communiques
On 15 December 1978, the United States announced, effective 1 January 1979, the
establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). To
achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing's three long-standing demands: (1)
termination of formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, (2) abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty, and (3) removal of all U.S. troops from Taiwan. At the same time,
Washington "acknowledged" the PRC as the legitimate government of China.(2)
These moves were devastating blows to Taiwan. But Washington did agree to maintain
"unofficial" or "substantive" relations with Taipei. Approximately fifty-five treaties,
agreements, and programs with Taiwan were to remain in effect, and President Jimmy Carter

declared that "the people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade
and other relations with Taiwan through non-governmental means."(3)
This highly unusual, multilevel arrangement required legitimization by Congress. Rejecting the
Carter administration's legislative proposals as too timid, the U.S. Congress passed the TRA by
an overwhelming majority, and the act was subsequently signed into law by the president.


The TRA provides a legal framework for America's continued commercial and cultural
relations with Taiwan. It also outlines the terms of Washington's unofficial governmental
relations with Taipei. For example, the law stipulates that the functions of the U.S embassy
would be taken over by the nongovernmental "American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)." The AIT
would be staffed by U.S. government employees "on approved leave of absence."
Claiming that the TRA violates understandings that were reached to achieve normalization, the
PRC condemns the act. Most contentious is Section 2(b)--the law's provisions for the defense
of Taiwan. In terms of America's security commitment, the TRA states that it is
the U.S. policy "to consider any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful
means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." At the same time, the law clearly states
that it is the U.S. government's policy to provide Taiwan with such weapons as may be
necessary for its security and an adequate defensive capability. The law further states that the
quality and quantity of these weapons will be determined by the president and the Congress
after consultation with U.S. military authorities.
In addition to the TRA, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is guided by three U.S. PRC Joint
Communiques: the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the 1978 Normalization Communique, and
the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique. In the 1972 Shanghai Communique--a
document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization of U.S.-PRC relations-Washington and Beijing sought to sidestep the troublesome Taiwan issue. Both sides "agreed
to disagree" over Taiwan. The PRC's version of the communique calls for the "liberation"
of Taiwan while the United States reaffirms "its interest in a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question."
In the 1978 Normalization Communique, which played a critical role in shaping

America's Taiwan policy, Washington acceded to Beijing's three long-standing demands for
normalization and "acknowledged" the PRC's position that it is the legitimate government of
China. Henceforth, U.S. relations with Taiwan would be conducted on a "private" or
"unofficial" basis.
Perhaps most controversial is the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique. This
document--an agreement that focuses on American arms transfers to Taiwan--seems to
contradict key elements in the TRA. Taken at face value, the Communique appears to pledge
the United States to eschew long-term arms sales to Taiwan and to keep sales from exceeding
either the quality or quantity of arms sold to Taiwan after Washington established relations
with the PRC. The document also apparently commits Washington to reducing its arms sales
to Taiwan gradually.(4)
U.S. policy toward Taiwan is both ambiguous and contradictory. For example, the TRA warns
that Washington would consider any hostile actions directed against Taiwan as "a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the US But Washington
is not committed to Taiwan's defense (the TRA provides the United States only with an option
to defend Taiwan).(5) At the same time, the TRA guarantees that Taipei will maintain an


adequate self-defense capability. But the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique
commits Washington to reducing its arms transfers to Taiwan.
The ambiguities and contradictions associated with U.S. policy have afforded American
decision makers ample leeway in their dealings with Taiwan. For roughly ten years,
Washington opted to emphasize the "unofficial" nature of the relationship. Cabinet-level visits
were banned, the ROC embassy was compelled to adopt a curious and cryptic title ("The
Coordination Council for North American Affairs"), Taipei's repeated requests for an advanced
warplane were denied, and U.S. arms sales to the island decreased. During the 1990s, however,
Washington is taking another look at Taiwan--the other China.
II. Adjustments in U.S, Policy
Since 1949, U.S.-Taiwan relations have passed through several distinct stages.
During the 1990s, it appears that the relationship may be entering into yet another phase. The

following discussion focuses on the nature and scope of recent adjustments
in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
Security Ties
America's security relationship with Taiwan is guided by two contradictory documents--the
TRA and the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique. Despite executive branch
waffling on the precise meaning of the 1982 Communique, and reassurances that the United
States would comply fully with the provisions of the TRA, American arms sales
to Taiwan began to decline in the 1980s. Between 1983 and 1991, military sales dropped by
more than US $130 million.(6) But Washington has reassessed its position on arms sales.
In September 1992, President George Bush approved the sale 150 F-16/A and F-16/B fighter
aircraft to Taiwan. The US $6 billion deal also included 40 spare engines, 900 sidewinder
missiles, 600 Sparrow missiles, 500,000 rounds of 20mm cannon shells, spare parts, technical
documentation, and logistics service and personnel training.(7) Some analysts believe that the
sale amounts to "the abrogation" of the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of 17 August 1982.(8) As
if to underscore this position, the F-16 agreement is being followed by numerous other sales-including deals for Hawkeye E-2T early warning aircraft, MK-46 torpedoes, M60A3 tanks,
Knox-class destroyers, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and a derivative of the Patriot missile air
defense system. These arms represent a significant boost to Taiwan's defensive capabilities.
In addition to the explosive growth in arms transfers, lawmakers in Washington are seeking to
clarify some elements in American security policy. In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into
law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Section 531 of the act declares that the TRA
takes precedence over the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique.(9) Clinton also has
signed into law legislation containing provisions to allow more U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.(10)
Changes in political ties are accompanying adjustments in security policy. Shortly after lifting
the ban on the sale of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan, President Bush permitted Carla


Nills, then the U.S. Trade Representative, to travel to Taipei. This symbolic visit represented
the first time since 1979 that a Cabinet-level official had visited Taiwan.
The most significant adjustments in political relations, however, are being initiated by the
Clinton administration. In September 1994, it completed a comprehensive inter-agency review

of American policy toward Taiwan. After over a year of study, the Department of State
announced several adjustments in policy.(11) These changes include the following:
* Senior U.S. economic and technical officials will be allowed to visit Taiwan.
* Taiwan's leaders may make transit stopovers in the United States. But senior Taiwanese
officials--including Taiwan's president--will still be prohibited from visiting Washington or
conducting official business in the United States.
* Taiwan will be permitted to change the name of its thirteen U.S. representative offices from
the baffling "Coordination Council for North American Affairs" to the "Taipei Economic and
Cultural Representative Office."
* The United States will support Taiwan's membership in international organizations where
statehood is not an issue and will support opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in
organizations where it is denied membership.(12)
In May 1995, the Clinton administration reversed course and announced that Taiwan President
Lee Teng-hui would be permitted to pay a private visit to the United States to attend an alumni
reunion at Cornell University. The announcement came only days after the State Department
had explained that Lee would be denied a visa because "a visit by a person of President's Lee's
title, whether or not the visit were termed private, would unavoidably be seen by the PRC as
removing an essential element of unofficiality in the US-Taiwanrelationship."(13) No
President of the ROC had been allowed to visit since 1979.
Despite these modifications, Washington stresses that it has not abandoned its "oneChina" policy. Following the State Department's 1994 announcement detailing adjustments in
American policy toward Taiwan, Winston Lord, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, explained, "the basic framework of our policies toward Taiwan remains unchanged ...
US policy toward Taiwan is governed, of course, by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Three
Communiques with the PRC--the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Normalization
Communique of 1979, and the Joint Communique of 1982--also constitute part of the
foundation." (14) When announcing the decision to grant President Lee a visa to visit the
United States, officials also emphasized that the move "doesn't signal a change in the
administration's policy toward China or Taiwan."(15)
The U.S. Congress, unsatisfied with executive-branch initiatives, also has sought to strengthen
America's political relations with Taiwan. In fact, many legislators favor measures that go far

beyond administration policy. Both Houses of Congress have circulated petitions and passed
nonbinding resolutions calling on the president to elevate contacts with Taiwan, support
Taipei's entry into the UN, and allow high-level Taiwanese officials to visit the United States.


In some instances, Congress has passed legislation intended to compel the president to adopt
such policies.
In October 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994. This law contains an amendment (Section 221), sponsored by Senator
Hank Brown (Republican-Colorado) and Senator Paul Simon (Democrat-Illinois), requiring
the U.S. government to allow Taiwan's president and other high-ranking Taiwanese officials to
visit the United States. According to Section 221, Taiwan's leaders may visit the United States
for the purpose of discussing any of the following issues:
* Trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the U.S.-Taiwan trade deficit;
* Prevention of nuclear proliferation;
* Threats to the national security of the United States;
* The protection of the global environment;
* The protection of endangered species; and
* Regional humanitarian disasters.(16)
The law further states that Taiwanese officials shall be admitted to the United States unless the
official is otherwise excludable under U.S. immigration laws.
In addition to the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Congress
has passed other legislation focusing on political relations with Taiwan. For example, the State
Department Authorization Technical Corrections Act of 1994 includes a provision
allowing U.S. citizens of Taiwan origin to register their place of birth as Taiwan on U.S.
passports.(17)
In summary, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is changing. In fact, both the executive and legislative
branches are attempting to chart a new course for U.S. policy. Following the passage of the
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Senator Brown boasted that
"Congress has reversed over two decades of unfortunate policy(18) It is noteworthy, however,

that the executive branch takes a dim view of congressional attempts to legislate relations
with Taiwan. Arguing that such actions conflict with the president's powers to conduct
foreign policy, the Clinton administration interprets the provisions of some laws--including the
Section 221 of the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 and Section
531 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act--as nonbinding views of the Congress.(19)
III. Understanding Adjustments in U.S. Policy
Why is Washington upgrading relations with Taipei? What does it hope to gain by the changes
in policy? The discussion below explains how a conjunction of economic, political, and
strategic considerations are influencing U.S. policy.


An Economic Explanation
Taiwan's economic stature as one of the world's largest trading nations contrasts sharply with
its second-class international status. The island boasts a per capita income of roughly US
$10,000, a gross national product of approximately US $200 billion, and foreign exchange and
gold reserves of over US $87 billion--all among the highest in the world. Taiwan also has
launched an ambitious Six-Year National Development Plan that calls for the expenditure of
approximately US $304 billion to upgrade the island's infrastructure. With about US $100
billion of the work open to foreign bidding, American officials have described the plan as "the
best overseas market for major projects, bar none."(20) Finally, the island is one of America's
largest trading partners. Although only a fraction of the size of the PRC, American investment
in Taiwan is higher than investment in mainland China and U.S. exports to Taipei are almost
double those to Beijing (US $15.6 billion versus US $8.6 billion).(21)
As the world moves into an era of intense economic competition, many states are strengthening
ties with Taipei. For example, all of the European Community nations have upgraded
unofficial or substantive relations with Taiwan. Moreover, several third world nations have
been added to its diplomatic list and a wide array of governments--both developed and
underdeveloped--now support Taiwan in its bid to join (or rejoin) the world's major economic
and financial organizations. Some governments also are more willing to risk Beijing's wrath
and sell weapons to Taiwan. Western arms manufacturers, faced with bloated inventories,

weak domestic economies, and reduced orders from abroad are pressuring their governments to
sell weapons to Taiwan.(22)
Do economic considerations best explain Washington's decision to upgrade ties with Taipei?
Some members of the Clinton administration advance this interpretation. As one senior official
explained, "the primary goal
of the recent changes in policy, is to make it easier to conduct business with Taiwan, which is
now the United States' fifth largest trading partner and has more than US $80 billion in foreign
exchange reserves."(23) To underscore this position, the administration insisted that the new
name of Taiwan's representative offices highlight the economic nature of U.S.Taiwan relations. Consequently, Taiwan's "unofficial embassy" is now called the "Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office."(24) Taiwanese officials had hoped originally to
change the name to "Taipei Representative Office."
A Political Explanation
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC was not a democracy. But those days are
over. Taiwan is well on the way to becoming one of Asia's liveliest multiparty democracies.
In 1991, Taiwan held free elections to choose a new National Assembly, the body that elects
the president and amends the Constitution. In 1992, elections were held to select a new
Legislative Yuan, the ROC's legislative body. In 1994, the island held elections to select the
provincial governor and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. These and other moves--


including the lifting of martial law, the legalization of opposition parties, the deregulation of
the print media, and amending the Constitution to provide for the direct election of the
president--stand in stark contrast to the PRC's hardline responses to popular demands for
democratic reform. As one ROC official boasted, "we are not only a prosperous economy, but
also a true democracy--a democracy in every sense of the word."(25)
These changes are not going unnoticed. Senator Simon expressed the views of numerous
American lawmakers when he complained that "many of the terms of our relations
with Taiwan seem like official pettiness.... Taiwan has a multiparty system, free elections and a
free press--the things we profess to champion--while we continue to cuddle up to the mainland
government whose dictatorship permits none of those(26) The Senator and other lawmakers

are calling on Washington to visibly demonstrate its support for Taiwan's democratization.
Is it possible that Washington's decision to strengthen ties with Taiwan may be traced, in part,
to congressional attempts to reward the island's democratization? Some believe this to be the
case. For example, Professor Michael Kau, a leading authority on Chinese politics, suggests
that the Clinton administration's 1994 inter-agency review of Taiwan policy was "very much a
political response to lots of pressure from Congress."(27) Moreover, U.S. officials
acknowledge that congressional pressure played a key role in the Clinton administration's
decision to reverse course and permit Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States.(28) In May 1995,
the Senate voted 97-1, and the House of Representatives 396-0, to grant the Taiwanese
President a visa to attend Cornell University's alumni reunion.
A Strategic Explanation
Taiwanese officials contend that strategic considerations have played a paramount role in the
relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Fredrick Chien, Taiwan's Foreign
Minister, explains:
Strategic factors brought the US and the mainland together. In the late 1960s, the US learned
that the USSR was targeting missiles against mainland Chinese positions. This is what made it
possible for Kissinger to make his secret visit to the mainland. This triangular strategic
configuration also played an important role in the final normalization of relations between the
PRC and the US. And, strategic considerations were important with respect to the August 17,
1982 Communique.(29)
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the raison d'etre for U.S.PRC rapprochement vanished. Some officials in Taipei believe that Washington is now more
willing to upgrade relations with Taiwan: The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant the
disappearance of the so-called "China card." The importance of mainland China in the eyes of
the White House people definitely has decreased to a great extent because of the collapse of the
Soviet Union-it is quite evident. In that regard, I think our ties with Washington can be
strengthened.(30)


A number of U.S. officials share this view. As Lloyd Bentsen, then senator (Democrat-Texas),
explained, "US courtship of mainland China is no longer strategically imperative."(31) In other

words, Washington is now free to strengthen ties with Taipei.
Summary
A conjunction of several considerations led Washington to reassess its policy toward Taiwan.
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the demise of the so-called China card and the strategic
triangle, thereby greatly reducing China's importance to the United States. This has enabled
decision makers in Washington to reassess policy toward Taiwan. At the same time, the island
has evolved from a backward, agrarian society into an economic powerhouse. As one of the
world's principal trading nations, Taiwan is too big to ignore. Finally, Taiwan has experienced
a political metamorphosis. The island's transformation from a staid, authoritarian regime into a
lively multi-party democracy is winning it a lot of friends and supporters within the U.S.
government.
IV. A Need for Further Adjustments
Some complain that recent adjustments in U.S. policy do not go far enough. Senator Simon
characterizes the 1994 changes as "small steps
when
this was an opportunity for truly significant, constructive and realistic adjustments(32) Lynn
Murray Stein, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, says that
"these preliminary measures fall short of affording the people of Taiwan the full respect and
consideration due a democracy."(33) James R. Lilley, former U.S. Ambassador to China, calls
the new policy "basically a nothing ... I just don't see anything new in it(34) Senator Frank
Murkowski (Republican-Alaska) charges that "our policy towards Taiwan probably has still
(sic) more loose ends than a ten dollar hairpiece when you think of all the extremes and
exceptions and so forth(35) Even some administration officials concede privately that the socalled comprehensive examination of U.S. policy towardTaiwan was largely a "phony review"
designed to "answer some questions from an incoming President who, as governor of
Arkansas, had visited Taiwan five times."(36) Are these criticisms justified?
Present U.S. policy calls for the maintenance of a strong, constructive relationship with both
the PRC and Taiwan.(37) It is likely that a solid, productive relationship with both Chinese
governments
will
continue

to
serve
American
interests
in
the
next
century. U.S. policy toward Taiwan should be developed accordingly.
It is possible, perhaps even inevitable, that Washington will make additional modifications in
its relationship with Taiwan. Indeed, some predict that Republican control of the U.S.
Congress will lead to a "continual review" of U.S. policy.(38) The new Congress is being
described as the "most pro-democracy, pro-Taiwan, pro-Tibet, anti-Chinese Communist Party
and anti-People's Liberation Army Congress in recent memory."(39) Radical shifts in
American policy, however, must be avoided.


Washington should not lurch from one extreme in China policy to another. For example, the
United States should not re-establish official ties with Taiwan. Furthermore, visits by highranking Taiwanese officials should remain unofficial. The United States also should avoid
statements supporting "plebiscites" on Taiwan's future, Taiwanese independence or Taiwanese
self-determination. Such actions could provoke a negative and possibly hostile PRC response.
But Washington should continue the review of U.S.-Taiwanrelations initiated by the Clinton
administration. The discussion below examines several additional steps that Washington
should consider in an effort to adopt a more realistic approach in its relationship with Taiwan.
High-Level Taiwanese Visits
Washington should explore methods whereby high-ranking Taiwanese officials may be
permitted to visit the United States--if only as visiting tourists on semiofficial tours. The new
provisions permitting transit stopovers and overnight visits do not go far enough. Permission
for a visit by Taiwan's president or other high-ranking ROC officials should not require months
of intense congressional pressure.
Taiwan--the most democratic society in Chinese history--should be treated with a modicum of

respect. Humiliating Taiwan's president and other Taiwanese government authorities will only
encourage Taiwan's separatist movement, thereby undermining peace and security in the AsiaPacific region.
High-Level U.S. Visits
In December 1994 U.S. Transportation Secretary Frederico Pena traveled to Taipei--a move
heralded by Taiwanese officials as "an important breakthrough" in U.S.-Taiwan relations.(40)
The visit will help U.S. firms win lucrative contracts in a number of Taiwan's infrastructure
projects, including construction of the island's fourth nuclear power plant and the trans-island
high-speed rail system.(41) Visits by other cabinet-level officials should follow and
discussions should not be limited solely to economic or technical matters. High-level
negotiations with Taipei are essential to ensure the island's support and cooperation on such
global issues as the environment, wildlife protection, population, health, arms control and
proliferation.
Membership in International Organizations
The United States should actively support Taiwan's inclusion in most international
governmental organizations (IGOs). Washington should no longer acquiesce meekly to
Beijing's ludicrous position that Taipei must be locked out of all important international bodies.
The PRC has agreed--albeit reluctantly--to Taiwan's admission to some institutions (APEC and
ADB). Beijing will tolerate Taiwan's membership in other organizations. As one of the world's
largest trading nations and the owner of over US $80 billion in foreign reserves, Taiwan could
play a constructive role in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many other
IGOs. At the same time, Washington should study methods whereby Taipei might be able to
return to the UN--if only as an observer.


V. Conclusion
Lord Salisbury, the noted British statesman, once complained that the most frequent mistake in
politics is the tendency for government officials to cling to the carcass of a dead policy.
Salisbury's observation applies with special force to several elements of
American policy toward Taiwan. But U.S. policy is changing.
Taken together, the recent adjustments in U.S. policy represent the most significant overhaul

of U.S.-Taiwan relations since 1979. Although the changes are not as dramatic as some might
prefer, they are significant nevertheless. As Senator Murkowski conceded, "US policy changes
a little bit everyday ... So it's moving, it's not moving as fast as I'd like, but it's moving."(42)
The recent modifications in policy are a step in the right direction. As described, however,
other subtle changes also are in order. It is unlikely that these modest measures will jeopardize
America's ties with the PRC--the U.S. export market is far too important to Beijing. These
moves will, however, underscore America's commitment to Taiwan's fledgling democracy. At
the same time, they could help the U.S. economy make it over some of the rough spots during
the painful transition away from a cold war economy. In sum, it would be wise policy for
Washington to make some additional modifications in its relationship with Taiwan.
NOTES
1. Winston Lord, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, describes these
documents as the "basic framework" for U.S. policy. See "Taiwan Policy Review," Department
of State Dispatch, 5:42, 17 October 1994, 705.
2. The word "acknowledge" was deliberately chosen as it indicates cognizance of, but not
necessarily agreement with, the Chinese position. For more information about the significance
of this term, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "United States Policy and the International
Status of Taiwan," The Journal of East Asian Affairs 7:2 (Summer/Fall 1993): 578.
3. See Taiwan Communique and Separation of Papers, Report on the Taiwan Relations Act and
the Joint Communique signed by the United States and China to the Committee On The
Judiciary, United States Senate, Made by Its Subcommittee On Separation of Powers, Part 1
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 2.
4. For a complete discussion of the document's meaning, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey,
United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994).
5. See Ibid.
6. At the same time, however, technology transfers to Taiwan increased substantially. These
transfers enabled Taiwan to produce its own missiles, tanks, warship, and fighter aircraft. For
more information, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "American Technological Assistance,

Technology Transfers and Taiwan's Drive for Defense Self-Sufficiency," Journal of Northeast
Asian Studies 8:3 (Fall 1989).
7. For more information on the sale, see Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From
Cold War to Beyond Containment, 77-93.
8. Don Oberdorfer, "US Decries China's Sale of Reactor, But Clears the Way for Satellite
Deal," Washington Post, 12 September 12 1992, A13. For more information, see Ibid, 85-86.
9. See "US to Taiwan: Policy Stands," China Post (International Airmail Edition), 18 June
1994, 4.
10. See Robert G. Sutter, CRS Issue Brief, Taiwan: Recent Developments and
US Policy Choices (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 7 November 1994),
11.
11. In order to underscore the continuing unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, the
Department of State refused to release a written account of the changes in U.S. policy.
12. For more information, see "Taiwan Policy Review," Department of State Dispatch, 5:42,
17 October 1994, 11, and Jim Mann. "US Slightly Elevates Ties with Taiwan," Los Angeles
Times. 8 September 1994, 4.
13. Tony Walker and George Graham, "Reaction was Predictable But Fallout is Not:
Washington's About-Face Sets Stage for the Taiwan Issue Overshadowing All Relations,"
Financial Times, 24 May 1995, 4.
14. See "Taiwan Policy Review," 705.
15. "U.S. is Breaking Taiwan Taboo," Chicago Tribune, 22 May 1995, 8.
16. See N.K. Han, "Clinton Cautious Over Law Letting ROC Officials Visit," China Post
(International Airmail Edition), 27 October 1994, 1.
17. Prior to this time, the passports of Taiwan-born U.S. citizens listed "China" as their place
of birth. See N.K. Han, "Passports May Get Stamped 'Taiwan'," China Post (International
Airmail Edition), 4 November 1994, 1.
18. N.K. Han, "U.S. Approves Changes to Taiwan Relations Act," China Post (International
Airmail Edition), 10 October 1994, p.4.
19. Of course, this interpretation infuriates lawmakers in both Washington and Taipei. For

more information, see N.K. Han, "Clinton Cautious Over Law Letting ROC Officials Visit,"
and Benjamin Yeh, "Spokesman Urges High-Level Exchanges with U.S," 26 October 1994,
Central News Agency in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, 27 October 1994, 83.


20. See testimony of Natale Bellocchi in Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The
Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1993, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress,
Second Session, 10 March 1992 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 992),
1108.
21. See United States International Trade Commission, The Year in Trade: Operation of the
Trade Agreements Program, 45th Report, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: USITC Publications,
1994), p.xxix.
22. In addition to the American sales described above, France has signed agreements to sell
warships, Mirage 2000-5 fighters, and over 1.000 short-range and medium-range air-to-air
missiles to Taipei. Paris has also offered to sell its ship-to-ship Exocet missiles, Crotal and
Mistral anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, 100mm rapid-fire cannons, and electronic warfare
systems to Taiwan. Although France seemed to cave in to PRC demands that it limit future
sales, it is now waffling on the issue. Other governments--including Germany and the
Netherlands--are reviewing their respective policies on arms sales to Taiwan.
23. Jim Mann, "Clinton to Ease Restrictions for Taiwan," China Post (International Airmail
Edition), 7 July 1994, 1.
24. See "Taipei Seeks Change of De Facto Embassy Title," China Post (International Airmail
Edition), 24 June 1994, 1.
25. Author's interview with Stephen S.E Chen, Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China. Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 19 May 1994. The Vice Minister made
this statement when asked to explain Taiwan's growing acceptance by the international
community.
26. Carol Giacomo, "US Shifts Policy on Taiwan," Reuter World Service, 7 September 1994 in
Lexis/Nexis.

27. See Jim Mann, "US Slightly Elevates Ties with Taiwan."
28. See "US is Breaking Taiwan Taboo," Chicago Tribune.
29. Author's interview with Dr. Fredrick Chien, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China,
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 14 July 1992.
30. Author's interview with Chang Shallyen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of
China, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 8 January 1992.
31. See "Senator Bentsen Urges Bush to Sell F-16s to ROC," Central News Agency (Taipei),
11 August 1992 in Lexis/Nexis.
32. Jim Mann, "US Slightly Elevates Ties with Taiwan,"


33. Bear Lee, "US Hasn't Gone Far Enough in Improving Ties with Taiwan, AmCham Says,"
Central News Agency (Taipei), 8 September 1994 in Lexis/Nexis.
34. Jim Mann, "US Slightly Elevates Ties with Taiwan."
35. Federal News Service, Senate Foreign Relations Committee/East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee Hearing Regarding US Policy Toward Taiwan (Washington, D.C.: Federal
News Service, 27 September 1994), A-27-02, page 2.
36. See Jim Mann, "International Outlook: Taiwanese Opposition's Independence Drive Shows
Need for New U.S. Policy," Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1995, A5.
37. See Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report the
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 1992), 11-12. A copy of this report
was provided to the author courtesy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
38. For information about the impact of the 1994 Congressional elections upon U.S.Taiwan relations, see Nigel Holloway, "New Deal: Republican Congress will Challenge
Asia Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 November 1994, 20; Nayan Chanda, "Storm
Warning," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 December 1994, 14-15, and Christopher Bodeen,
"US Policy on Taiwan to Relax, Senator Vows, China Post (International Airmail Edition), 9
December 1994, 1.
39. See Nayan Chanda, "Storm Warning," 14.
40. "US Official Arriving on Monday," China Post (International Airmail Edition), 1
December 1994, 1.

41. See Christopher Bodeen, "US Cabinet Official Visits ROC President," China Post
(International Airmail Edition), 7 December 1994, 1.
42. Christopher Bodeen, "Alaskan Senator to Work for Lee Visit to the US," China Post
(International Airmail Edition), 8 December 1994, 4.